SATYĀKĀMĀ

सत्या: कामा:॥

SATYĀKĀMĀ

OR

"TRUE DESIRES"

(being Thoughts on the Meaning of Life)

BY

S. E. STOKES

These same are true desires (Satyakama) with a covering of what is false

For truly, whoever belonging to one departs hence, him one cannot see again here. But those who belong to one, whether living or departed, and whatever else one desires but does not obtain—all this one finds by going in there. For there truly are those true desires which have a covering of what is false.

(Chandogya Upanishad 8. 3: 1, 2.)

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FOREWORD

THERE are probably moments in the life of every thoughtful man when he feels intensely the need to pause and stand apart for a time from the rush and stress of his daily activities in order to take stock of what they all mean to him. In our modern world few are fortunate enough to obtain the opportunity. Mine came to me in the winter and spring of 1921-22 when so many of us were imprisoned in connection with the non-co-operation movement initiated by Mahatma Gandhi, and it was during those six months of enforced retirement that this book was first written. Since then much time and thought have been given to bring it into its present more developed form, but the complete foundation of the outlook it sets forth was laid in the jail at Lahore, and I have not found that any important position taken then has needed modification.

It may be added that the book represents an outlook upon life which has gradually been taking shape since 1912. The period at Lahore afforded opportunity for its clarification and the years which followed have brought with them merely a deeper appreciation of its implications.

As will be obvious to the reader, it was not originally written for publication. The idea at the back of my mind when I first undertook it was to find out in so far as was possible what life had come to mean to me, and to share my experience with my wife. It was only four or five years later that the intention to publish the book really took active shape in my mind as the result of a visit from an old friend--C. F. Andrews—who felt that it might be helpful to others. How far he was correct in this remains to be seen.

Andrews was especially strong that in the event of its being published no changes should be made which would eliminate " the personal element". At first I rather shrank from this; one naturally hesitates to share with a larger circle writings and experiences of so intimate and personal a character. My suggestion that the book should be published anonymously was not approved of, and I incline to think the reasons against such a course were sound,

There has been one outstanding consideration which has inclined me to the view of Mr. Andrews and my friend Mr. Richard Gregg as regards the justifiability of its publication. The outlook which it embodies has been, to me at least, a source of profound strength and comfort. In times of trouble and difficulty—notably at the death of a little son some years ago—I found myself sustained and upheld by it in quite a wonderful manner. The thought that to even a very few others it might be what it has been to me, naturally influenced me in favour of sharing it.

I desire especially to acknowledge my debt to Gregg in the whole affair. During the three years he spent with us in our mountain village his interest in the book and conviction that it should be published played an important part in my final decision to do so.

A few words may here be in place regarding the interpretation of the implications of personal experience which the book attempts. When I began writing it I had no suspicion that it would develop eventually into a full fledged "philosophy". This was, as a matter of fact, what happened and "Satyakama" undoubtedly does contain a complete philosophy—"complete", that is, in the sense that it is concerned with *Reality* as a whole, both in Time and beyond it. As it stands it offers—for those who have the patience to read it carefully—a 'system' of speculative philosophy which, whether worthy of acceptance or no, still claims to interpret life as a whole. That the book is clumsy in form and longer than it should be no one will feel more than I do myself; that it contains far too much repetition I am painfully aware, yet despite the utmost endeavour I have been simply unable to reduce these defects. I claim for it that notwithstanding such shortcomings it embodies an outlook worthy of the deepest consideration. To dip into it here and there would be useless for its approach to the problem of reality will be quite unfamiliar in various respects, but I venture to assert it will prove worth the trouble involved in a careful reading irrespective of the amount of acceptance it secures.

As regards the use I have made of the Upanishads and the Gita I would disarm critics at the outset by stating that I do not make the slightest claim to "orthodoxy" in my interpretation of them. "Satyakama" is not primarily concerned

with the exposition of any of the recognized philosophical systems or with refutation save where questions arise which make one or the other relevant to its purpose. That purpose is the study of some of the deepest aspects of personal experience; its one object is to work out the implications of this area of experience. The Upanishads are much in evidence because they have played so profound a part in bringing me to my present position, yet I have not turned to them as *authority*—as 'Shruti'—for support of my philosophical outlook. That outlook does not permit me to rest upon the authority of any "scripture".

For me at least, the significance of the Upanishads, the Gita, or any other scripture, lies in its power to beget in those who study it deep far thoughts—to arouse responses and call forth powers for spiritual vision that before were latent. Whether the meanings and implications which I find are the ones which were present to those who composed the Upanishads and the Gita must remain a question of opinion. Personally I feel that my interpretation does not involve so many or such vital difficulties as do certain others. Yet my *primary* concern is neither with what these scriptures meant to those who first enunciated them, or to those who subsequently founded systems of philosophy or theology upon them. I am concerned with them principally because of the response they have called forth *in me* in the course of long years of loving study and earnest meditation. What we find in this "scripture" or that is not so important as what it finds *in us*—gives rise to in us emotionally and intellectually. The power to evoke such responses in the deepest areas of our experiencing life constitutes, as I see it, the only "authority" to which any scripture may righfully lay claim.

I shall bring this Foreword to a close with one other observation. The era of isolation in the relations of mankind is drawing to its close. Day by day the contact between the East and the West is becoming more intimate. As a consequence the influence of the East upon Western thought and of Western thought upon that of the East must steadily grow. Where will this ultimately lead us? Surely here is a question of vital interest to us all.

Viewed purely from this angle "Satyakama" should be significant, for it embodies the reaction of a speculative Western mind to the spiritual outlook and atmosphere of the

East. In it will be found what happened in the case of one Westerner who nearly twenty-eight years ago set out to live as an Indian and has lived almost exclusively among Indians ever since.

He might add that he is profoundly grateful for the experience these years have brought him, and feels that his life has been immeasurably enriched by it.

Kotgarh,
October 1931.

(*Note* —The author is a Philadelphian of Quaker extraction whose family joined the American branch of the Anglican communion a generation ago. He came to India in 1904 and seven years later married a daughter of the land of his adoption, settling down to live as a farmer in a Himalayan village fifty miles above Simla. At one period he took an active part in political life, being a member of the All India Congress Committee but of recent years has devoted himself to philosophy and to social uplift in the hills.)

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PART I
SATYĀKĀMĀ

Beloved Wife:

For one who is naturally inclined to thought and meditation jail offers a wonderful opportunity. At least I have found it so. Cut off entirely from the destractions and interests of the outer world, compelled by circumstances to look within for light, one is led, as it were, into a solitude alone with God. Being so far as the 'outer man' is concerned at the beck and call of others, one learns in a peculiar degree to turn to Him and rest in Him. The sordidness and squalor of one's surroundings are in themselves aids, driving one in upon oneself and teaching that if peace and sustaining strength are to be found they must be sought within.

For some of my comrades in other wards or other prisons I presume there has been a stressing of the emotional aspect of their idealism. In my own case this has not been so, except that prayer has possibly had a larger place in my life than it ever had before, and my sense of dependence has been increased. The reason for this probably lies in my temperament, as well as in the fact that early in my imprisonment I set myself the task of trying to express on paper what life has come to mean for me. This book which I have written for you is the result.

In it I have not attempted to systematize what I have tried to express. At first I did try to do so but I found that it interfered with my freedom of thought.

As a consequence I have allowed myself to go wandering on without anxiety as to form or arrangement. You will understand the reason for this ; I am dealing with conceptions most difficult to formulate for the first time, and the only way in which I can hope to succeed at all is by putting them down as they come to me. The first twenty or thirty pages especially were full of difficulty for in them I was like a wrestler maneuvering for an opening grip. It was hard to find exactly how to approach my subject.

This is your book. It is the way by which from the loneliness of the jail I stretch out the arms of my spirit to you. It is the offering of my love to you, with whom I long for the perfect oneness with which it deals.

Accept it, therefore, with your husband's deepest devotion.

After the sentence was passed, beloved, I formed the intention of using this time of enforced inactivity to set down on paper for you my conception—my ever deepening conviction of the meaning of life, and to explain what I conceive to be its significance to you, to me, and to that personally evolving Spirit in whom I feel we have our being.

I desire to do so, not that you may become a student of abstract philosophical theories; such have no attraction for me and I know that they would have even less for you. But to me the interpretation of the meaning of life that I am about to attempt to put in words has been a very living and practical thing, and a constant inspiration. Whether I shall be able to make the vision

that I see real and living to you, I of course cannot say. If it is true to experience, and true to the truth underlying experience, I doubt not that sooner or later you too will see it, and should you come to do so I believe we shall both be immensely strengthened to meet life's storms and difficulties. It will teach us to build our love for each other upon a foundation deeper and broader than the limitations of the world of ordinary human experience. It will provide us with a higher set of values and teach us more and more to view what we now know in *time* from the stand-point of eternity. We shall see the unreality of much that we fancied was Life, and of all that we imagined was Death, and with a renewed confidence in the purpose and meaning of our lives and of our relation to each other we shall press on joyfully and hopefully toward our wondrous destination.

As you proceed with this book—particularly in the opening pages—you will probably find much that you do not fully understand, or that appears irrelevant. Do not be discouraged; read quietly on, for I shall have to write as I am able and gather up the clues as I advance. Before you have proceeded very far my thought will begin to assume form and grow clearer, and by the time you have finished the whole you will have grasped it. I am thinking upon paper, and I wish you to think with me. For, so far as many details are concerned, this attempt will be a voyage of discovery for me also. Though I am quite clear as to the main outlines this is the first time that I have attempted to put it on paper and in the course of doing so many points should become clearer and aspects of the problems with which

I am to deal should emerge which have hitherto not presented themselves to me.

It will become evident to you as you proceed that I am seeking to advance by a study of experience and its implications, though—especially at first—I may often give my conclusions leaving the processes by which I have arrived at them for subsequent treatment. And it will be primarily a study of my own personal experience for naturally I know it more intimately than that of another. It is from our own experience that we must learn, and if we have any message to pass on to others it is there that we must find it.

My life has been a full and varied one, yet as I look back upon it I can see very clearly that the deepest and most illuminating of its experiences have been associated with my home. It has been to my relations with my parents in childhood, and later to those with you and my children that the deepest chords of my nature have responded. And it is in the deeps rather than the shallows of experience that I look to find light shed upon what I am in essence and potentiality, and what you are.

I have spoken of a foundation for love deeper and broader than the limitations of ordinary human expression can adequately implement. As I develop my thought I hope to convince you that the task before us here is the conscious establishment of our relations with each other, and with our loved ones, upon an eternal basis. There can be little doubt that the bond established by marriage is, for vast numbers of people, a purely temporary one, and that death is for such a real parting. This is because they have never raised their relationship above the earthly plane.

Their love is concentrated upon those aspects of each other's lives which are earthly and the feelings which they entertain for each other find their entire satisfaction in purely temporary aspects of their relationship. As a consequence, when death brings with it an end of those fleeting expressions then all relationships which were founded upon them as the only realities, must find an end too. It is only in so far as love, consciously or unconsciously, is centred upon those aspects of its object which are abiding that there is hope of its transcending the change we know as ' death '.

Hence I conceive that those who love each other, and who desire that their love may become as deathless as their being, should seek to so live that their thoughts, purposes and experience in love may be gradually raised to a plane where their experiencing is intimately bound up with those aspects of reality which are unaffected by the dissolution of the body, where their love for each other is inter-woven with their love for God where they apprehend the significance of their relationship to Him, where their common joy is in things of the spirit, where their common purpose and aspiration reach out to those timeless aspects of reality that underlie the fleeting expressions of them which ' this world ' affords. They should consciously seek to cultivate a mutually shared enthusiasm for the Eternal purpose, and in order for this to be possible they should strive to enter ever increasingly into an understanding and participation in that Purpose. Their purview should come to include eternity, and they should learn to look at life in its present terms as but an incident—howbeit a very

beautiful and important one—upon the road to union with God and with each other.

Some would separate the way of knowledge and the way of devotion. Krishna calls those who do so 'Children', and says that he who is rightly devoted to one obtains the fruits of both. For me they are inseparable. The joy of knowledge is the joy of vision and gives birth to very deep emotion. Suddenly there dawns upon the spirit a clearer understanding of the significance of some hitherto unapprehended aspect of experience, another fragment fits into its place, and the meaning of life as a whole becomes clearer. I wish I could describe the feeling of joy and thankfulness that comes to me then. More than once upon such an occasion I have found myself breathing quickly, my eyes full of tears, and you who know how little I am inclined to such exhibitions of feeling, will appreciate what depths of emotion must have been stirred to affect me in such a manner. Surely this too was 'Bhakti'—the exultation begotten of one's intellectual apprehension of the underlying unity of the differentiated, the increased comprehension of what creature life is becoming, the understanding (however dim and incomplete) of the part of the creature in the unfolding of the divine experience, begetting in him who saw and felt these things the desire to sink to his knees and cover his head and be silent. It was Bhakti', leaving in one no place for pride—only an overwhelming sense of weakness and frailty, felt the more deeply by the self that had begun to see its own deeper meaning. Surely such experience urges one onward in pursuit of greater light and as vista after vista unrolls

before the eyes of the spirit, the rapture of the vision must beget ever deeper adoration.

The materialist scoffs at those who teach that this life should be lived as part of a larger whole. And indeed he is not to blame, for he has not yet felt the reality of what may not be perceived by the senses. As yet his experience is limited to the temporarily significant aspects of reality and consequently includes nothing worth remembering beyond his present life. This world includes the whole of his world and his ends and aims do not go beyond it.

But for you and me another path is opening. We have become conscious of aspirations for the realization and expression of which this present life with this limitations is ceasing to be an adequate medium. Among these are some of the deepest and most potent factors of our conscious experience, of the presence of which we are intensely aware and to the influence of which our spirit passionately responds.

I entertain no doubt, beloved, of your desire to share my thought. Well knowing your brave and loyal love—a love which I have seen more than once tried by circumstances of stress and peril—I am confident that you will wish to leave nothing unheard or unapprehended which might help us to enter more deeply into each other's lives.

And indeed the object that I have set before me is no little thing—no goal which the limitations of this world could make possible of attainment. I seek to bind your spirit to my own with more than human ties—with a love transcending its earthly expressions. Nor do I think this would hamper our spiritual growth

but that, on the contrary, our truest life would be greatly enriched and glorified.

Regarding our life together during these past years, and in view of the possibility that I may not live to return to you, there is one thing that I wish to set down here. Should anything happen it would be a happiness to me to know that I had written it. Once or twice, when for some reason or another you have been feeling low spirited, you have talked as if you felt you had not been the help to me that you might have been. Your fears were groundless and I wish to say so here that it may be my assurance to you. I have found you the wife of my ideal and every day I thank God for you and for the blessing of our years together. It is impossible to express what these years have been to me. I am not, as you know, a man of naturally saintly disposition. What little I have won has been through sore struggle. At the time you came into my life I was desperately beset by my weaknesses and suffering from wounds received in a spiritual conflict that had been waged with more courage than wisdom. With your coming came light, and I am deeply conscious of how your steadfast love and patience have helped me to win back gradually to a calm and happy life. How dependent I have been upon you and how much you mean to me you will gather in part from the following pages.

In truth you will find my philosophy one of dependence rather than of ascetic renunciation. For though no true philosophy of spiritual progress can be without its doctrine of renunciation—and that which I shall put before you is no exception—nevertheless it does not teach me that

the path to spiritual self-realization is to be traversed by rising superior to the love of parents, wife and children. On the contrary I learn from it that increasing love for these is an essential part of our experience in our approach to the light. I find in our relationship, and our love for those who are dear to us, helps—not hindrances—to the vision of God.

The Function of Philosophy.

The deepest and most elemental experience of the personal self is not intellectual but emotional. The scriptures and spiritual teachers of all religions are united in asserting that one cannot reason oneself into communion with God, Such communion is "beyond the veil"—beyond the province of the mind. And this is a fact for which we should be profoundly thankful as otherwise the supreme vision would be attainable only by the sages.

"There the eye does not go, nor speech, nor mind", as the Kena Upanishad puts it. For it is an experience in which they have no part. It is beyond the category of intellect. As Sankara says, "It is well known that the unconditioned Brahman may be known by persons of inferior intellect."

But though it is not *to* the intellect we should turn for the experience of oneness with that timeless life which is Brahman, it is *through* the intellect that we may reappropriate what has been directly perceived by the personal self, and from within the 'holy of holies', as it were, bring forth that which will glorify thought and illuminate our experience-world. This seems to me to be the true function of philosophy.

Descending into the regions of thought we

may study that which is present to consciousness, in terms of the mind and the senses, and in the light of what has been experienced beyond them gain a deeper understanding of the significance of our world of 'name and form'.

In other words we may set ourselves to study our experience world, and in the light of our deepest and most significant experience lying beyond thought itself, seek to appreciate its implications.

We must start with what we meet in our daily lives and work in from that. What things are in themselves is another matter, but the *experience* of them is a fact, and an investigation must begin with a fact or it will lead nowhere. Our investigation, therefore is not of things in themselves but of *experience* and the reaction to it of the personal self. Just as the scientist starts with certain phenomena and treating them as though they were facts, builds up by observation and deduction his hypothesis, so must we, starting with the personal self as revealed in its experience build up by observation and deduction our hypothesis of the meaning of our conscious life.

Unless one lays claim to be a prophet and can begin what he has to say with "Thus saith the Lord", I am certain that the scientific approach is the only justifiable one. We *never* have the right to start somewhere off in the blue and build downward from some transcendental, hypothetical being beyond our experience to the world we know. We must never attempt to build up a theory and then explain life by trying to square experience with it. Our deductions must be the outcome of experience, and must attempt to explain the facts of experience.

It is quite permissible for us to make use of what are enunciated as 'truths' in the scriptures of the various religions, but we may not use them *because* they are found in scriptures which are considered authoritative by this or that group of people. In such an investigation as we have undertaken our only criterion as to their authoritativeness must be the manner in which the personal self reacts to them. If we find, for example, that something they announce as truth is of universal appeal—that it strikes chords of response in the most spiritual natures, among men of widely differing race, religion, and era in the world's history, and that it does so in our own hearts as well—we would seem justified in the presumption that it is a more or less correct expression of an essential truth. If we further find that it appeals *increasingly* to the personal self as the inner life of the latter grows and deepens, we shall rightly consider that the evidence receives additional support. Again, if we find that its acceptance is invariably associated with an enrichment and ennobling of character and personality and accompanied by an increase of Ānanda (spiritual joy) in the one to whom it has come as a reality, and by an attraction toward him of that which is noblest in the impulses of those about him, then we may feel that we have almost the strongest available evidence of a deep and essential truth underlying what has so transformed him.

Of course it may be ultimately true in a sense not as yet grasped; his own conception of the significance of the truth may be far less than the reality and its implications far wider than he suspects. Yet its very power to appeal to the

deepest that is in him, and to grow more precious and inspiring to him as he grows, implies that there is that in it which is true to the truth of him.

Thus if an organism were put in our hands and we were told to discover its natural environment, we should begin to test the conditions under which it appeared to keep most healthy and to thrive most manifestly. When we had found such we should be justified in thinking we had found its natural environment. It would not take us long, even if we had never seen them before, to discover that the natural home of fishes is the water and of man the land, and of birds the air and the trees. We should discover it by finding that there they displayed the greatest healthiness and well-being. Our knowledge would result from testing and studying their reactions.

In an attempt to ascertain what constitutes the most suitable environment of the personal self we must make use of similar methods. We must study its reactions to its experience with a view to finding that which makes for its greatest Ānanda (joy). In so far as we are successful in this it seems probable that much light will be thrown upon the nature of its subsistence as a conscious and personal mode of being and upon its relation to that which is not personally identical with it. This, as I understand it, is the real task of speculative philosophy in an attempt such as mine.

And the result of my quest, of years of thought and deep experience in suffering and in joy, has been a vision of unity both wonderful and inspiring, such as fills me with courage and self-respect and a profound sense of personal responsibility. In it the world of our experiencing

life shines with a new and beautiful significance and all things assume new meaning.

The sense of Need.

I have said that the most elemental form of the experience of the self is not intellectual but emotional. I have come to feel that a deep sense of inherent and essential *need*, finding its expression in *desire*, is the primary mode of experience. The degree of the desire and the object upon which it is concentrated depends upon the stage in the evolution of the personal self as conscious experiencer, and ranges all the way from the first blind groping of the self of us at the dawn of its conscious evolution, to that yearning which finds expression in the fullness and richness of the most perfect love. This sense of inherent need or incompleteness expressing itself as *desire* is the dynamic at the back of all effort and growth. The intellect is the interpreter of the experience of the personal self, and undoubtedly as the latter gradually extends its capacity for experiencing, that which it experiences will be increasingly presented to it in terms of the 'buddhi'. We know that this is so in our own experience. Intellect doubtless played a far greater part in the experience of the submen than in that of the anthropoids, and it certainly looms larger in the deepest experience of man at the highest that we know him than it does in lower human types. Yet the *fact* is the experience; the *self* is the experiencer, The intellect is only an increasingly important mode under which experience is presented. Therefore to the philosopher who not having crossed the threshold of deep spiritual experience seeks *by pure intellect* to apprehend the ultimate nature of

the self, or to predicate this or that of the ultimate reality which he has not experienced, there can be only one reply 'Neti, Neti'.*

What is the most precious thought in the New Testament—the thought to which the personal self leaps in the quickest and most joyful response? What is the thought which has the most dynamic power to transform and beautify the heart of man and raise it to otherwise unachievable levels of nobility and joyful experience? What is the thought in which the deepest craving of the self finds a satisfaction which 'the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them' cannot provide? It is not that of any promise of eternal life; whatever objections the intellect may put forward, the spirit that is in man feels itself deathless. It is not the thought of 'Heaven'; as the inner life of the self grows and deepens it becomes increasingly conscious that the heavens of the various religions could be no answer to its sense of need. It is not any assurance of escape from punishment, for there is something sublime about the self which in certain circumstances would make it ready to dare Hell itself.

But when the meaning of the familiar words "God is Love" .... "God so loved the World" suddenly and mysteriously penetrate to the soul and grip it, does it not leap and thrill to the thought? With my own eyes I have seen hardened criminals who would laugh at the idea of heaven and scoff at the threat of punishment, break down utterly at the thought of God's loving them. When I was a lad all religion was an unreality to me until one day there entered

* "Not that! Not that!"

my heart the thought that God loved me, and all life was changed.

Nor is it only to the sense of the love of God that the deeps of the personal self respond. Its capacity to realize divine love is closely associated with its capacity to love its fellows. It would seem to be the outcome of a gradual growth in the power to love others. Not without reason did John make the experience of love for God dependent upon the love of one's brothers. Later on we shall study this evolution of the personal self and its growth in capacity to express its need and yearning in terms of love. It will then become clear to you how relevant all this world of our experience is to the development of that capacity, and what a glorious and wonderful school human experience is for the education and development of the potentialities of the self.

I hope to make it clear as we proceed that, as this centre of personal experiencing which we call the self grows and evolves, it becomes increasingly dependent upon loving and being loved, for its Ānanda (happiness), and that an ever wider circle is included in its love. It will be seen also that along with its growth in depth and richness of experience is a corresponding growth in its consciousness of *need,* and with it in its sense of *dependence.* With that sense of dependence comes, at first certainly greater pain, but through pain higher levels of joy than any that are otherwise open to it.

Need brings with it pain, no doubt, but it is in *need-satisfied*—not in *no-need*—that the highest joy of the personal self is to be found. For the Ānanda of Love is through the '*Tapas*' of true love-not the burning of selfish passion and lust,

but the suffering begotten of the sense of incompleteness by the "I" until it finds the fulfillment of its experiencing life in that which it essentially needs.

For what is the essential characteristic of that emotional experience which man has termed love? It is the stretching out of the personal self for satisfaction in another "I", hungering to give itself, thrilling at the thought of oneness. It is as different from lust as unselfishness is from selfishness, as different from covetous desire as the impelling sense of need to give oneself is different from the thought of personal gain.

How strange a thing is love! How it exults at the thought of suffering for its beloved! How it rejoices at the thought of sharing all that it is! How oblivious of the petty considerations of worldly gain or advantage!

As I review my own experience I can see that all that is highest and best in me finds its most adequate expression in Love. All the purest joy I have experienced has been connected with it—not only with my love for God and the sense of the divine love enfolding me, but with my love for you and the children and those others for whom I have felt it and from whom I have experienced it. I have found it not only the expression of my noblest and most unselfish experience hitherto, but the *increasingly* adequate expression of my inner life as that grows and deepens. More and more I find that the highest levels of my experience are inexpressible except in the terms of need and love. Intellectually even, I find that I have reached the highest I yet know in the perception of the implications of love as this

personal self experiences it. I am convinced that if this aspect of my conscious and experiencing life were eliminated all that is highest and best in me would be eliminated along with it. For I know my experience in loving as by far the highest and noblest expression of my conscious self.

And love, as I have said before, implies *dependence*. Let us consider the nature of love as we have known it—you and I. Does not our own experience demonstrate to us that the more we have grown to love each other, the more dependent we have become? Or possibly it might be putting it more correctly to say that our growing love is the conscious expression of our growing sense of dependence upon each other. We are increasingly conscious that an aspect of the elemental need of our nature finds its fulfillment in each other, and with this increase of consciousness comes increased sense of mutual dependence.

I have had the truth of this borne home to me with especial force of late. Here in jail I perceive that the thing which makes my confinement most difficult to bear is not the foul conversation * and rabald noisiness of the pathetically undeveloped personalities among whom I find myself. Nor is it the prison life nor the discipline. The most difficult feature is undoubtedly my enforced absence from you and the children. Being as yet subject in my experience to human limitations in which the factor of 'place' looms so largely, I feel cut off from you and suffer in consequence. It is in this suffering that my need for you and dependence upon you is most strikingly manifested. Did I need you less I should

* I was separated during the entire period from my Congress associates, being placed in the ward with European convicts.

suffer less. Yet who that has known Love would purchase freedom from suffering by being freed from the need that begets it?

There are in the Hindu marriage ritual some beautiful mantras in which the bridegroom says to the bride.

> "Become thou my partner as thou hast past all the seven steps with me. Partners we have become as we have together passed all the seven steps. Thy partnership have I gained. Apart from thee now I cannot live. Apart from me do thou not live. We shall live together; we shall be a source of joy each unto the other, sharing alike all foods and powers combined. I join thy mind, thy actions, thy senses with mine."

Here is expressed in a wonderful manner the emotions and the experience of love as I know it. For I grow more and more needy, beloved, as the years go by. I need you; I need the children; and as my experience of love grows I—the personal self of me—grows in it and through it, and becomes increasingly incapable of completeness apart from you. Thus Love reveals itself as as an expression of Need. It has meant dependence—a dependence growing ever greater as my feeling for you grows and deepens.

The only independent man would be the man who loved no one—who lived in and for himself alone. Such a one would escape the pain that love must experience until it has achieved its fulfillment but he would also never know the joy of the personal self that has found its fulfillment in love. We have unfortunates in this ward who sufficiently approximate such a state to afford us some slight idea of what it might be. They are maimed and impoverished personalities—men without ties who are content to spend long

periods in jail. As far as I can gather by a study of them they are not particularly conscious of the need for anything higher than the purely material. Provided sufficient food is given them, enough clothing to keep them warm and not too much to do, they seem on the whole content. There is something strangely unnatural about these people. It would almost seem as if their personalities were in the process of disintegrating; at any rate there appears to be a curious numbness—an incapacity to feel greatly about anything. The outlines of the personalities of these men appear blurred and ill-defined ; not only is their intellectual reaction to the world of their experience lacking in definiteness and their impression confused and hazy, but their emotional reactions are so slight as to be almost imperceptible. Not entirely so, for they can be querulous about unimportant matters though I doubt if they are capable of strong anger. The impression that one gets is that they are dying fires. One of them was released a short time ago; the poor fellow was worried at the idea of going out and managed to return to the jail in a few days.

There were of course various contributing factors to his desire to return—diffidence, loss of self-confidence, fear—but the thing which has struck me particularly is that such men seem to be on the whole not dissatisfied with the limitations of their poor little poverty-stricken world of self-centred emptiness. In the case of one of them I gathered that there was no one he very much desired to see, no one for whose welfare he had any special anxiety, no one whose happiness or misfortune would make him more happy or

more sad. And the reason? Because he loved no one.

I am not here concerned with the cause for the condition of this unfortunate. The point I wish to make is that he and those like him are, in a sense, less dependent upon others than I am. They are far less conscious of need than I am. They are cut off by their lack of love from the suffering which I experienee by reason of love. Yet I know well that my deep sense of needis wealth beside the poverty of their independence.

From all this it would appear that *lack of a sense of need is by no means necessarily an indication of greater fullness or perfection than intense sense of need.* Even in the world of our present experience a body never has as few needs as when it is a dead body.

The need to be needed.

Let us consider another aspect of the elemental need of the personal self in its expression as Love. We shall take again the field of our own experience. Love longs for love, longs for a consciousness of need for it in its beloved. That which knows itself as "I" *needs* to feel that it is needed by the object of its love. This is a very vital and basial aspect of love, yet it is in fact the very antithesis of selfishness, for the supreme joy of feeling utterly needed lies in giving oneself utterly.

Love perfected implies a state of absolute mutuality. It is possible that we may not be able to win the love of those who are dear to us, and if our love be real we shall still love them in spite of this. Yet I am conviniced that there is no true love that does not long for the love of its beloved. We may wish well to others and still not be

unhappy if they fail to wish us well. We may do good to others without desiring either reward or gratitude. Our so doing would be the sign of a noble spirit, but not of love. The nobler and deeper love is, the more insistent will be its longing to be needed.

Love does not yearn for what its beloved *has* but for what its beloved *is*. As I have said, it is the antithesis of selfish acquisitiveness. It needs to be needed in order to give itself in the manner that love demands. The sense of not being needed is a barrier to the perfection of its gift of of all that it is. A barrier is a separation and the pain of love is rebellion against that which stands in the way of perfect at-oneness.

Yet love longs for all that its beloved is, and some might say that this is after all a sign of selfishness. I do not think so, for its joy is in that feeling of perfect at-onement with its object which is possible only where there is perfect mutual self-surrender. Love would abolish 'mine' and 'thine' by the realization of 'our', dear because it is shared. Love suffers at the thought of having anything which is not its beloved's also, or of *being* anything which is not part of the life of its beloved as well. It longs to share all that constitutes the life of its beloved—not out of any thought of appropriating something to itself but out of its sense of need for oneness with its beloved. It is that which is its joy and for which it stretches out. Surely this is not selfishness, for love—love in the noblest form known in human experience—is as eager to share the sorrow and pain of its beloved as its joy. How can that be selfishness which glories in the thought of being able to suffer for its beloved, finds its greatest joy

in the joy of its beloved, suffers its most poignant pain in the suffering of its beloved, and utterly forgets itself in its concentration upon its beloved?

But the self, though longing for at-onement, longs for such a oneness as may be experienced. It knows that its Ananda (joy) consists in the *conscious* realization of oneness with its beloved. It is not moved by any attraction to the metaphysical concept of abstract oneness but by the yearning for *oneness with* that in which it seeks its completion. Therefore it values its *personal* self—its "I"ness—not for the sake of the "I"ness, but because that is essential to the *experience* of the oneness in which lies its joy. It knows that its elemental craving—its deepest sense of need—must find its fulfilment in terms of *personally* conscious experience. The thought of attainment to any realization of itself as needing nothing but its own personally undifferentiated self, subsisting complete in itself apart from all aspects of personality, becomes increasingly abhorant to it as it grows in the experience of love. Such a conception might, conceivably, be acceptable to the unfortunate convict I referred to some pages back, though I doubt it. As for me, the acceptance of such a salvation would make me traitor to all of which I am conscious as the best, the highest and the most unselfish part of me. It is not for itself that my "I"ness is dear to me but because it is that through which our oneness in love is experienced. In its relation to God my "I"ness is only dear because through it *my* love for God and the love of God for *me* are experienced. I would indeed realize my oneness with you, dear, but *never* a oneness which eliminated the

personal element—the reality of what at present is represented by the terms "you" and "I". It is not a oneness of such a nature that could ever satisfy my deepest need. Nor has this self the slightest desire to realize a oneness with God of a nature that would eliminate its personal individuation, for it hungers to realize in *experience* its oneness *with* the divine life—not to apprehend itself as an undifferentiated entity of self-subsistent being.

I think that there has been much misconception of the meaning and significance of the term *non-duality*. I too am a believer in non-duality but hold that non-dual does *not* mean undifferentiated. What is Yajnavalkya's conception of the mode under which a seer 'alone, without duality' subsists 'whose world is Brahman'? It is given at length in mantras which I cannot quote here. The substance of it is that though experience continues it is not experience of that which is 'other than himself and separate'. The barriers raised by Ahaṁakāra, the illusions of Māyā have broken down. The personal self's misconception of itself as a separate entity with a separate good of its own, a separate salvation of its own, a separate essence of its own, a separate existence of its own—all this is gone. While the self does not think as it did when under the influence of Avidya (ignorance) it is still thinking. 'It is not, however, a second thing, *other than himself and separate*, of which he may think'. All this I too believe and shall make my feeling on the subject clear to you later. The attainment of 'Brahman' is, I conceive, the attainment of the realization of that timeless reality in which *whatever is* is one, and 'beyond which nothing goes'.

But I am convinced that this one timeless reality does not exclude personal individuation, and indeed subsists timelessly in the mode of multi-personality.

Several points of importance have emerged from our consideration of Love as we know it in human experience. In the first place it is a *personal* experience. It is the expression of a feeling of *personal* insufficiency on the part of the experiencer—a deep sense of incompleteness seeking to find what will complete it in that which it experiences as personal, but personal in terms other than its own.

Then we have seen that in proportion to its growth in loving experience the personal self is ennobled. Its love is the expression of its highest and least selfish experience.

Also, with the growth in love there is a corresponding growth in consciousness of *need*. The greater the love, the greater the need and dependence of the experiencer upon that which, though personal, is not personally identical with it. On the contrary, the lower and more selfish the experiencer, the less is this consciousness of need and dependence.

From this it would seem to follow that a sense of need carries with it no necessary implication of imperfection in the experiencer, and that the *lack* of a sense of need may even indicate imperfection and poverty of personality, as in the case instanced of the convict.

Briefly then the *personal* as we know it in experience is not self-sufficient. It indicates by the character of its yearning that it needs to be completed beyond its "I"ness in order to experience joy. It finds that joy, not in what is

present to it in terms of impersonality, but in what it experiences as personal yet not in terms of its own personality. In the experience of loving and feeling itself loved it finds its sense of personal incompleteness both increased and increasingly satisfied.

In fact it behaves as if it were a *part*—not a *whole*—and a part under the urge to be made whole. The indications also seem to be that if there is a wholeness in which its sense of inadequacy can be relieved, that whole must have implicit in it the potentiality for an inter-personal relationship or relationships.

If it is actually a *part*—a fraction—as its behaviour would seem to indicate, then there must be that which in conjunction with it constitutes the whole. Should that be the case then our search must be for it. The problem for the personal self would then be, " What is that in which I shall find the completeness for which I hunger—that in the realization of which I shall be ' made whole' ? "

To a materialist our consideration of love would mean merely that "human" need expresses itself more or less along the lines I have indicated and that each human being is shown to be a ' fraction ' which is completed only in a certain number of human relationships.

Very frankly this is not my own view. I am at one here with all Indian philosophy which holds that one of the primary expressions of ' Avidya ' (spiritual imperception) is the tendency of the personal self to *identify* itself with its vehicle and ascribe to itself what pertains to its vehicle. As we proceed you will see that I do

not think of myself or yourself as "human." My thought is of the *personal self* at present experiencing in the terms of human experience and I am studying its experience in those terms. But I do not think of it as a 'human self,' or of the experiencer in terms of dog or cat experience as a 'canine self' or a 'feline self.' If I did so that would be an end of the matter, and there would be no need to write this book.

Have I any *proof* that mine is the correct approach to the problem? Certainly not; neither has the materialist. He starts with *the man*; I start with *the self* conscious of itself in terms of "I" ness. To me this seems the greater reality, and as to the *man-ness,* I am conscious of needs of the self—its deepest needs—which the limitations of human experience can never satisfy.

I look to *the self* and there I find that for which human nature is utterly inadequate. In any interpretation of the meaning of life based upon the identification of the Experiencer with its 'human' vehicle I can find no satisfaction of the self's profoundest needs. I do not believe that an adequate explanation is possible upon such a basis. On the other hand, if we start with the personally conscious self, not attempting to identify it with the present terms of its experience-life, I feel we can arrive at an interpretation of its experience-life which will satisfactorily explain what could be explained along no other line, showing how that might find its wholeness which obviously does not do so within the limitations of 'human' experience.

And so I am in agreement with Sri Kṛishna when he says—

> "Never have I not been, nor thou, nor these lords of men; nor verily hereafter shall any of us cease to be. Just as in this body there is for the Embodied One childhood, youth and old age; so is there the gaining of another body. The wise are not bewildered by this."

Is Divine Love a possibility?

If love were a purely 'human' experience—an affair of nervous reflexes and sex impulses—the idea of its being something which God could reciprocate, or indeed of its being in any sense analogous to what the divine nature could feel, would be absurd. What could such a being as God is conceived to be in all theistic religion have *in common* with even the highest product of chemical combinations? For those, therefore, who think of the Experiencer as one with the vehicle no question of a loving relationship between the personal self we know and God arises. They can devote their attention more profitably to the little world that is real to them.

But for those who do not identify the personally experiencing self with its vehicle—who look upon the world of their present experience as no more than a temporary presentation of experienee to something both conscious and personal existing beyond it—the concept of such a loving relationship between God and the personal self is not an absurdity.

If love is a *personal* relationship then the possibility of its subsisting between a personal God and a personal self is not out of the question. Indeed the fact that longing and hunger for such a relationship on the part of the personal self has played such a profound part in the noblest areas of 'human' experience, and that

such numbers of the noblest and richest personalities in different ages and among the most various peoples and religions have experienced it, points to its possibility. When we can add to this that many have claimed to actually find the joy of such a relationship, and that those who have felt they had experienced it were in many cases manifestly transformed and glorified, towering above their fellows in beauty and nobility of character and power to move the hearts of men, we find further grounds for believing that such a relationship may be possible. And if it should be, then the Gospel assurance that "God is Love" may well set forth one of the most profound truths in the universe.

I too, beloved, feel that I have experienced that love--not as deeply as some, I know, yet sufficiently to have no doubt of its reality. My whole outlook upon life and all that I write here is based upon the conviction that God loves and that a relationship of loving experience is possible between the timeless "I" and the personal self.

Yet here a question arises. In the study of our own personal experience we have seen love as an expression of the elemental need of the personal self for completion in that which it experiences as personal, yet in other terms than its own. Love has been seen to be associated with need—with the inadequacy of the personal self for the satisfaction of its deepest and most essential need.

If such is love, then could God love? If love is an expression of longing, of yearning, could the divine nature experience it? Or if the divine nature is capable of longing, yearning to realize

itself in what is personal in other terms than its own, would it still be what we conceive God to be—beyond time, changeless, self-subsistent? Or if God is all this, could any feeling which He may experience have anything in common with the love we know—the love which is the expression of a personal self seeking fulfilment in another?

These are deep questions and demand an answer before we can proceed.

Could a being whom we conceive of as self-subsistent, and changeless because beyond time, experience a sense of need and as a consequence such love as we have been just considering?

Would not the presence of such sense of need imply imperfection in such a nature as theists conceive God to possess?

If God is conceived of as ultimate being and the only self-subsistent reality would not the presence of a need requiring expression as love for something not itself destroy the divine 'Swarajya' which the theologians mean when they speak of the absoluteness and infiniteness of the divine nature?

I do not think so.

The question and its answer really depend upon what we mean when we speak of God as 'infinite' and His nature as 'perfect'. What do we mean when we use such terms? Do we mean that the divine nature is one that has no limitations whatever? Such a conception would be manifestly absurd; no such nature could exist. It is impossible, for example, for the divine nature to be or do anything inconsistent with its essential characteristics. It must be subject to the limitations imposed by the terms of its nature. If it should be all-knowing then illusion

is impossible for it; if it is by nature changeless then change is impossible for it; if it exists then non-existence is impossible for it. All these are limitations but they do not belong to a category that would impinge upon the changeless self-subsistence and perfection of the divine nature.

Should God need anything which existed *independently* of Him—that had any being apart from Him—then indeed would his nature be neither perfect or self-sufficient. Should He ever come to need that which He had not *always* needed—essentially needed apart from all questions of time—then He would be subject to *change* and His nature could not be thought of as a perfect nature.

But let us suppose that His nature were such that the need for the existence of a subsidiary and relative category of being was timelessly implicit in it, and suppose that along with this there was absolutely no limit to His power to satisfy that need, what then? Could He because of the presence of such a need be rightly considered limited or subject to change? Certainly not the latter if the need were as timeless as God Himself. Nor would the presence of such a need detract from the divine self-sufficiency provided the power to satisfy it were as essentially present.

In itself, then, a sense of need is no mark of either imperfection or limitation. It is only so if it is not constant and caused by something extraneous to the nature experiencing it, or if the experiencer is not able to utterly satisfy it.

I conclude therefore that love such as is experienced by the personal self—love which is the product of a deep desire or yearning begotten of

essential need—would not be inconsistent with a divine nature that is personal, timeless, changeless and self-sufficient, provided that the need and yearning of which it is an expression is timelessly inherent in the divine nature itself, and provided the power to satisfy that need and yearning is inherent in that nature also.

The Divine Nature Changeless but Divine Experience Progressive.

As you proceed you will find that the whole thought of this book is based upon the conviction that God does love, that God does need and that you and I and all personal selves together with their experiencing life are His answer to His own timeless and inherent need for loving personal experience:

At the root of all *becoming* I see the divine desire, springing from a need timelessly inherent in God's nature. And from this it would naturally follow that "from beginningless time," as Indian thinkers express it, the personal self has been the object of His love, and that the 'Jagat' (world) and 'Samsara' never had a beginning.

By this I do not mean to imply that you and I, *as* 'you' and 'I,' are without a beginning, or that the world of our present experience did not have one. So far as our *personal* lives are concerned I am convinced that we had a beginning, but so far as our essential being is concerned I believe it to be as timeless as God himself.

What I conceive that being to be and the nature of its subsistence I shall make clear later. Here I would only point out that I believe there are two subsidiary categories of reality the necessity for the existence of which is implicit in the divine nature, which have no existence apart

from it, and timelessly are by reason of it, and that of one of these timeless categories you and I and all other centres of conscious experiencing are evolving personal expressions in time.

This of course does not mean that I think of these categories as 'co-existing' with God—of having any existence apart from Him. But my conception does not permit me to think of God as having ever existed without them. He is their cause, and the cause is *before* the effect it is true, but not here in a *time* sense. He is before them in the sense that they are timelessly by reason of the need implicit in His nature for them. But because the divine nature is here conceived as changeless it is held that these—its implications—are as timeless as itself. All this I shall go into later.

The divine nature is apprehended in this book as from "beginningless time" realizing itself in personal relationships and the experience arising out of them. I shall have to bring this out gradually and to the best of my ability as we proceed. It is sufficient here to say that I believe that God experiences His own infinite potentialities through the personal self—Himself in us. I also feel that as each evolving personality experiences in terms peculiarly its own and thus differently from every other, so there are aspects of experience and self-realization which are open to the divine nature *only* through you—only through me. In other words, that you and I and every other personal self is of *individual significance* to God. This seems a tremendously arrogant assumption but I assure you, beloved, that it does not arise from any failure upon my part to appreciate my own littleness; it follows rather from my

conception of the infinitude of the divine need and the way in which God wills its satisfaction.

One possible objection has to be answered to the position I have taken above. If we think of the divine nature as experiencing in its personal relation with you what it could not possibly experience apart from what you personally are, do we not imply that in a sense God is limited by his need for you, and that He would not be what He is apart from this particular relationship and is consequently subject to change?

To me there seems to be no such implication. It is essential for us to distinguish what is timelessly inherent in the divine nature from what may be considered the outcome of divine experience. As I see it, the potentiality for the divine side of the loving personal relationship that subsists between God and you has been timelessly inherent in the divine nature. All that He is to you, all that in you He realizes Himself to be, was wholly and unlimitedly there in his timeless nature waiting to find expression in experience for you who make that experience possible. His relationship with you adds nothing whatever to the infinite fullness of His changeless nature but it adds to his infinitely progressing self-realization in experience. It is like the spirit of motherhood latent in the heart of a maiden. That is there before she becomes a mother waiting to reveal itself to her in experience.

It seems to me that the difference between the consequences of divine experience and finite experience lies in this—that whereas in all finite experiencing the reaction to what is experienced registers itself in a modification of the texture

of the experiencing personality, that which the divine nature experiences results in *no modification* in its texture. As a result of communion with the divine "I" you become personally different from what you were, but to that "I" the experience would be only one of self-realization—realization of what had been timelessly present in the divine nature waiting for *your* side of the relationship to find its expression in experience.

Thus, in accordance with this view, the divine experience is progressive, but the divine capacity for experience does not increase or the texture of divine personality undergo any change or modification. In so far as there are any limitations they are not limitations of the plenitude of the divine nature but limitations in the field of experience, and if that field of experience is what it is by reason of the divine will then its limitations may be considered as no more than divine self-limitations upon the path by which God in and through beginningless time progessively realizes his infinite and changeless being.

The Significance of Divine Need.

The conception toward which I have been working in the foregoing pages is of a divine nature that is self-subsistent (स्वायम्भु), timeless, and in-finite in its perfection, and yet *infinitely needing*. Its perfection does not consist in independence of anything that is not essentially itself but in unlimited power to satisfy its need. It is conceived as the *only* self-subsistent reality, upon which depends whatever else has any existence, and in which subsidiary categories of being (परतन्त्र सत्ता) have their reality, their meaning and their timeless cause.

Being absolute in its perfection it is conceived as essentially changeless (निर्विकार) but progressively experiencing and realizing itself through "beginningless time" in the world of experience and the finite personal self.

The finite self and the 'Jagat' (world) are conceived as finding their meaning beyond time in the need and consequent yearning implicit in the terms of the divine nature. Thus the divine *desire* stretching forth into "beginningless time" is seen as the cause of all *becoming*.

According to the view which I am setting forth, that product of the divine will (संकल्प) which we call "creation" must—seen in its entirety—be as timeless as God Himself. The personal relations that it implies must have each been essential to the divine self-realization. God must need "the creature".

Surely this is a nobler conception, more consistent with the deepest experience of the personal self, than that of those who say the self-sufficing divine nature can have no need of any experience dependent upon what is not itself.

Every philosophy is based upon the conviction that there is a reason in things. If not why attempt to interpret them? If there is a world of experience and a finite self they must have some reasonable basis for existence. If there is a reason where shall we look for it if not in the ultimate reality? If the ultimate reality is God and if the reason for the world and the finite self is to be found in Him then it must have been there changelessly or His nature is subject to change. If the reason is there timelessly then there must be timelessly a *need* for the finite self

and the world of experience implicit in the divine nature. If God is changeless then either these have always existed or have never existed at all.

Most Christian theologians and Hindu thinkers have been so certain a divine nature in need of anything other than itself could not be perfect that they have been unable to find any ultimate significance for 'the world' and the finite self of our experience. If asked the wherefore of "creation" the theologian could only reply that since God finds His full sufficiency within the terms of His own nature, and in fact subsisted alone before He created the world, it is evident that He does not need it. If pressed further to assigne some meaning to the creature he could only suggest that God had created it "for His glory".

The thinkers of India speak of "creation" as the spreading out of a 'Lila'—a puppet show—which, in so far as it has any sort of existence at all, must be looked upon as a 'playful' expression of the divine will. "For on the ground neither of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the Lord"

And obviously this is the only logical conclusion for those who hold such a conception of divine perfection. Yet it necessarily deprives the 'world' and the finite self of all significance and meaning, and makes life and the profoundest depths of our most noble experiencing but the shadows of a dream, or at most a sort of unessential adjunct to what really matters.

But as I interpret life and its meaning nothing is without significance. Nothing is without reason. There is no waste; there are no useless "by-products". Everything is relevant and

is because the need for it is timelessly implicit in that one ultimate verity in which it has its being, and apart from which it has neither being nor meaning.

There you too have a meaning, beloved—you personally and individually. For I believe that there is that in the infinite yearning of God which can find its answer alone in you.

PART II

The conception I find in it appears to me to be further developed throughout the whole field of the Upanishads. Again and again the sages refer to this *Desire*, as the cause of differentiation in the Bráhman, and to its further far-reaching implications. Here are just a few out of the constantly recurring passages that clearly or implicitly refer to this grand conception and what it involves:

In the beginning, Ātman, verily only was here. (Aitareya Upanishad, 1.1)

He is without beginning or end, unmeasured, unlimited, not to be moved by another, independent, devoid of marks, formless, of endless power, the creator, the enlightener. (Maitri Up. 7 2).

In the beginning this world was Ātman alone in the form of a Person. . . . Verily he had no delight. Therefore one alone has no delight. He *desired* a second. . . (Brihad-Aranyaka Up. 1 4 : 1 & 3).

In the beginning, my dear, this world was just Being (sát), one only without a second. . . . It bethought itself " *Would that I were many* ! " (Chandogya Up. 6 3 : 1 & 3).

He desired " *Would that I were many* ! " Having performed austerity, he created this whole world, whatever there is here. (Taittirya Up. 2 6).

To him then he (Pippalada) said : " The Lord of Creation verily was *desirous* of creatures (praja). He performed austerity. Having performed austerity he produces a pair matter (rayi) and life (prana)—thinking, " These two will make creatures for me in manifold ways ". (Prasna Up. 1 4).

Verily " Om " is this world-all. (Chandogya Up. 2 23 : 3).

The sages, searching in their hearts with wisdom,
Found out the bond of being in non-being.*

There have been many interpretations of the famous Hymn of Creation from the Rig of which this is a portion; let me give you here what it suggests to me. 'In the beginning, when neither night, nor day nor death, nor life existed—when no other thing existed beyond the *One* who subsisted " by its own inherent force "—there entered that One, as the product of thought, *desire*—" the earliest seed " '.

" In the beginning "—what is the significance of this expression ? It obviously does not indicate a *time*, for it refers to when night and day, life and death, had not come into being—when only " the One " existed. Nor does it refer to a beginning of the " One ", for that *was*, and existed " by its own inherent force". I gather, therefore, that " In the beginning " is used to express merely the idea of *ultimateness*, and with special reference to the *order* of causation. If this be so, and if there is no implication of *time*, the meaning can only be that *Desire* in " the One ", begotten of thought, was the seed or cause of creation.

At the Root of Becoming lies Desire.

Expressing this in words devoid of the time-conception, it would be proper to say that at the root of all *becoming* lies the desire arising out of the thought of " the One " timeless self-subsistent. Now if I were looking for a 'Mula-Mantra' from which to build up my philosophy—which I am not—I should choose this.

* I have quoted from Macdonell's metrical translation. ('Heritage of India Series', " Hymns from the Rig Veda ".)

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The sages, searching in their hearts with wisdom,
Found out the bond of being in non-being.*

There have been many interpretations of the famous Hymn of Creation from the Rig of which this is a portion; let me give you here what it suggests to me. 'In the beginning, when neither night, nor day nor death, nor life existed—when no other thing existed beyond the *One* who subsisted "by its own inherent force"—there entered that One, as the product of thought, *desire*—"the earliest seed"'.

"In the beginning"—what is the significance of this expression? It obviously does not indicate a *time*, for it refers to when night and day, life and death, had not come into being—when only "the One" existed. Nor does it refer to a beginning of the "One", for that *was*, and existed "by its own inherent force". I gather, therefore, that "In the beginning" is used to express merely the idea of *ultimateness*, and with special reference to the *order* of causation. If this be so, and if there is no implication of *time*, the meaning can only be that *Desire* in "the One", begotten of thought, was the seed or cause of creation.

At the Root of Becoming lies Desire.

Expressing this in words devoid of the time-conception, it would be proper to say that at the root of all *becoming* lies the desire arising out of the thought of "the One" timeless self-subsistent. Now if I were looking for a 'Mula-Mantra' from which to build up my philosophy—which I am not—I should choose this.

* I have quoted from Macdonell's metrical translation. ('Heritage of India Series', "Hymns from the Rig Veda".)

The conception I find in it appears to me to be further developed throughout the whole field of the Upanishads. Again and again the sages refer to this *Desire*, as the cause of differentiation in the Bráhman, and to its further far-reaching implications. Here are just a few out of the constantly recurring passages that clearly or implicitly refer to this grand conception and what it involves:

In the beginning, Ātman, verily only was here. (Aitareya Upanishad, 1.1)

He is without beginning or end, unmeasured, unlimited, not to be moved by another, independent, devoid of marks, formless, of endless power, the creator, the enlightener. (Maitri Up. 7 2).

In the beginning this world was Ātman alone in the form of a Person. . . . Verily he had no delight. Therefore one alone has no delight. He *desired* a second. . . (Brihad-Aranyaka Up. 1 4: 1 & 3).

In the beginning, my dear, this world was just Being (sát), one only without a second. . . . It be thought itself " *Would that I were many*! " (Chandogya Up. 6 3: 1 & 3).

He desired " *Would that I were many*! " Having performed austerity, he created this whole world, whatever there is here. (Taittirya Up. 2 6).

To him then he (Pippalada) said: " The Lord of Creation verily was *desirous* of creatures (praja). He performed austerity. Having performed austerity he produces a pair matter (rayi) and life (prana)—thinking, " These two will make creatures for me in manifold ways ". (Prasna Up. 1 4).

Verily " Om " is this world-all. (Chandogya Up. 2 23: 3).

There are, assuredly, two forms of Bráhman the formed and the formless. Now that which is formed is unreal; that which is formless is real, is Bráhman, is Light. . . . *He divided himself threefold.* "Om" is three prosodial units (a-u-m). By means of these the whole world is woven, warp and woof, across Him. (Maitri Up. 6.3).

This pair is joined together in this syllable "Om". Verily when a pair come together, *the two procure each other's desire.* (Chandogya Up. 1.1 : 6).

To him then Ajatasatru said. . . "As the *counter-part*—thus, verily, I reverence him. . . . as *the inseparable Double*—thus, verily, I reverence him. (Kaushitaki Up. 4 : 11 & 12).

This has been sung as the supreme Bráhman. *In it there is a triad* It is the firm support, the Imperishable. (Svetasvatara Up. 1.7).

With the one *unborn* female, red, white and black, who produces many creatures like herself, there lies the one *unborn* male taking his delight. Another *unborn* male leaves her with whom he has had his delight. (Svet. Up. 4.6).

When one recognizes the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment, and the universal actuator, all has been said. This is *the three-fold Bráhman.* (Svet. Up. 1.12).

That, verily, is the Bráhman-unity, for therein all *desires* are contained. (Maitri Up. 6.35).

He desired: "Would that a second self of me were produced!" . . . Whatever he brought forth that he began to eat. (Bri. Aran. Up. 1.2 : 4 & 5).

This is that great unborn Ātman who eats the food. (Bri. Aran. Up. 4.4 : 24).

This whole world is his food. (Maitri Up. 7.7).

This whole world verily, is just food and the eater of food. (Bri. Aran. Up. 1.4: 6).

This Ātman is honey for all things, and all things, are honey for this Ātman. Bri. Aran. Up. 2.5: 14).

Oh, wonderful! Oh, wonderful! Oh, wonderful!

I am food! I am food! I am focd!

I am eater of food! I am eater of food! I am eater of food!

..... I who am food, eat the eater of food! (Taittiriya Up. 3.10: 6).

"Bráhman is food" thus some say. This is not so. Verily food becomes putrid without life.

"Bráhman is life" thus some say. This is not so. Verily life dries up without food.

Rather, only by entering into unity do these deities reach the highest state. (Bri. Aran. Up. 5.12).*

I could go on quoting such passages for pages but I have given a sufficient number for you to be able to appreciate some little of the significance that this line of thought, running like a thread through all the most revered of the ancient scriptures of India, has for the position that I am trying to place before you. As I go further you will be able to see this more clearly still.

There is another point about Indian philosophic thought I desire to refer to here. In all

* I am indebted for the translations of Upanishad verses used throughout the book to Prof. Hume ("The Thirteen Principal Upanishads"), also to Prof. Ganganath Jha and others in the series published by Mr. V. C. Seshachari, and to Pt. Harinath Bhagvat of Poona.

Passages quoted from the Gita are either my own translations or chosen from various sources.

its systems true *salvation*, has been understood to depend upon *self realization*, and to denote the attainment of perfect freedom from the desires and aspirations begotten of Illusion or Māyā. This does not at all mean that the path to spiritual perfection is one wherein *desire* is to be progressively eradicated from our conscious experience, though many in India have come mistakenly to believe this is the case. Nothing, as I apprehend it, could be farther from the real teaching of the Upanishads. *Desire* is the great dynamic force at the back of all advance—spiritual as well as worldly—and is, as I hope to be able to show you, the outcome of a deep and ultimate sense of incompleteness seeking to be completed. What the Upanishads teach us is that the path of progress is the path of *right desire*—desire for the *real* rather than for that which transitorily clothes it. *Desire* is an essential factor in the experience of the conscious self; in itself it is *true*—satyakāma. Spiritual progress does not consist in ceasing to desire, but in discovering what that reality is which will really satisfy the need of which desire is begotten. The Upanishads teach that, as a result of our limitations and 'avidya", true desire is overlaid with a "covering of what is false", and that the Soul must learn to disentangle, as it were, the real from the unreal in experience and come to apprehend with ever increasing clearness the *true* nature of that which it desires and now tends to identify with this or that purely temporary phenomenal expression. For it is in the realm of the Spirit itself—not in the ever changing phantasmagoria of name and form—that we shall find what we really desire,

Salvation is Self-realization.

and the true and final significance of that which we desire, and the real nature of our relationship to what we desire. As the Chandogya Upanishad so beautifully says:—

> "These same are real desires (satyākāmā) with a covering of what is false. Although they are real, there is a covering that is false.
>
> For truly, whoever of one's (fellows) departs hence, one does not get him (back) to look at here.
>
> But those of one's (fellows) who are alive there, and those who have departed, and whatever else one desires but does not get—all this one finds by going in there, for there truly are those desires of his which have a covering of what is false." (8, 3; 1 & 2).

Closely associated with this misapprehension —that the scriptures demand the elimination of desire itself—is a further idea that the path of progress in the spiritual life demands we should rise above love of those who are naturally dear to us. And I am bound to confess that this question has often been treated in Hindu works in a manner that would tend to encourage such a belief. Yet, after earnestly turning over in my mind the whole of the attitude of the Upanishads toward life and experience, I cannot feel that this is what the sages really meant.

Yajna-valkya and Maitreyi.

For example, take that passage in the Brihad-Aranyaka where the great sage Yajnavalkya teaches his wife Maitreyi about the Ātman, when she asks him to teach her the secret of immortality. He begins his discourse by acknowledging that she is dear to him. "Dear as you are to us, dear is what you say. Come sit down. I will explain to you.'

Now Yajnavalkya was about to leave his home and retire to the forest to lead the life of a "vānaprastha" in accordance with the rule of life laid down for Brahmans. Yet did he believe that loving was unworthy of him ? By no means. On the contrary he saw depths of reality in it such as are hidden from the purview of those who confuse the unreal with the real. After telling his wife so affectionately to be seated, he continues—

"Lo, verily, not for the love of the husband is a husband dear,
but for the love of the Ātmán a husband is dear,
Lo, verily, not for the love, of the wife is a wife dear,
but for the love of the Ātman is a wife dear.
Lo, verily, not for the love of the sons are sons dear,
but for the love of the Ātmán sons are dear."

Just what does the sage mean by these words? In the first place we should clearly appreciate that he does *not* say that husband, wife or children are not dear to the knower of Bráhman. On the contrary, he says very distinctly that they *are* dear—dear by reason of the dear reality that finds expression through them—the Ātman.

I am not at all concerned, dearest, to give here the usual explanation of Yajnavalkya's words, though I have studied it attentively. Rather I propose to tell you the significance that his words have to *me*—and I find a very deep and wonderful significance in them too.

"Ātmán" is usually translated as "Self" or "Soul". Personally I feel that in general it could be more suitably rendered "underlying reality." The Ātmán is that which stands firm after all that is temporary and accidental has been excluded from consideration.

Now let us consider such terms as " wife",

"husband", "father" "son", "mother", "daughter", etc. They are all of them terms indicating distinctly human or, in other words, animal relationships. This should not distress us, and I at any rate am not in the least distressed by the thought that what is human is as truly animal as what is canine. Man is an animal - howbeit the highest of them— and, as is the case with all animals, he lives but a brief span. " As the flower of the field, so he perisheth". When the sages speak of wifehood or husbandhood or sonship, I gather that they mean just what, and all of what, these terms imply in human relationships. When they talk of spiritual progress including the renunciation of wife or children or husband, it seems to me that they mean in reality that the Bráhman-knower is one who no longer is confused by, or concentrates his love upon the *perishable*. He sees husbandhood or wifehood as fleeting expressions—though by no means lacking in significance on that account—of something deeper and more real that lies behind and finds its clothing for a time in terms of these human relationships. Before he attained to discrimination he lumped all the temporary and accidental together with the reality that was expressing itself through them, and thought of the whole as an indivisible unity.

The Self's identification of itself with its Vehicle.

Sankara well says of the individual soul that has not attained to discrimination, that it, " erroneously considers itself to be limited by name and form, and mistakenly attributes their attributes to itself ". It thinks of these accidents as part of its essential nature, and in the same way it looks upon that which it experiences

under the guise of human wifehood, or husbandhood, or sonship. The "dear" is thought of as essentially *human*—as human son, or wife, or husband, or father.

But he who has attained to discrimination, does not see himself as *Man*, though he knows that he is at present experiencing in the terms of human nature. He no longer loves that which is dear to him, thinking of it primarily as human wife or son or father. On the contrary, the wifehood, the sonship, the fatherhood are dear to him because they are seen to be expressions in terms of human experience of underlying dear realities.

Let me attempt to say, along the lines of my own experience, and in my own way, what I think Yajnavalkya was saying to Maitreyi: "Dear one, I love you; sit down while I try to explain to you what my love has come to be. This bond that subsists between us—between me the human husband and you the human wife, with all that is implied in it of human name and form and association—is very dear to me. But my experience of love now goes deeper than it once did. There was a time when I saw you and thought of you as a *human being*. What was *you* included *necessarily* those fleeting factors—your face, your form, your voice, your manner. I felt these to be an essential part of you, and missing these I should have felt that *you* were gone. Had these died, I should have felt that *you* had died. But now I have learned to see deeper, and have discovered that all these are but the fleeting human expression—however vital their significance may for a brief moment be—of an underlying reality, and that it is this underlying reality—your inner Self which in the terms of human experience expresses itself

through human wifehood—that is dear to me. This does not mean that its human expression is not dear; it is, but no longer on its own account. I see it as the clothing of my beloved—dear by association. Thus it is no longer as the shadow that I love you, but as the abiding reality—as Ātmán, as personal, conscious, deathless, distinct from and in essence independent of that which temporarily manifests you to me in human experience."

The Im-pilcations.

I do not, of course, suggest that the sage said or even meant to say all this, but that in what he did say these implications are present, and that this is somewhat the form they would take if I applied his words to my own experience. And if I should say this it would not for a moment mean that my love for you had become a theoretical emotion for some abstract, characterless, unknown thing. A love of that kind is inconceivable to me. The experience of loving is personal and completes itself—is fulfilled—in what is experienced as personal. A love such as I have been trying to express, far from belittling or detracting from the dearness of human experience, glorifies it. For it implies that, at the present stage in the evolution of our growing and developing personalities, the name and form and human expression of our relationship has truly—if temporarily—translated what the underlying reality of that relationship is, into the terms of human experience. It has not hidden it, but revealed it. The human expression is what it is *because* the underlying reality is what it is.

More than that—as I hope to make clear

later on, the underlying reality evolves, grows deeper, richer, through the instrumentality of this temporary garb in terms of which what it experiences is presented to it.

Nor, in fact, does what I have been saying deny reality even to the temporary garb in which the underlying reality is clothed. It does not imply that human husbandhood or wifehood have not any reality—that, to use a word of Sankara's, they are (अलीक.). Our relation to each other as husband and wife is the *true* expression in terms of fleeting human experience, of a deeper reality in the Ātmán. It is only "ásat" (unreal) in the sense that it is not the thing itself, and that it is a limited and transitory expression of it.

From what we have just been saying another point emerges, with which also I expect to deal later. It is that in the underlying reality—in the realm of conscious relationships—that which in human experience finds its expression in the love of husband and wife, cannot be identical with that which finds its expression in the love of father and son, or mother and son, or mother and daughter, or brother and sister, or friend and friend. All these differing human relationships are, for the time, expressions of aspects of conscious communion which underlie them, and which are as diverse in their texture as that which here clothes them. Indeed, as you will see later, I conceive that the progressive evolution of the conscious under the mode of personality, at present experiencing through the medium of human relationships, will be intimately involved with a progressive exploration of the deeper implications of personal communion, and that as we grow more and more cognisant of the

underlying nature of these relationships, our experience of them will be clothed in garbs increasingly adequate to both reveal them and give them expression.

I know that what I have just written is not strictly in line with ideas often held about the implications of the philosophic thought of ancient India. Yet is it not, in fact, closely akin to what the thinkers of this land have been telling us? I think so. Does not what I have been saying also imply that the path of spiritual growth means a growing beyond the stage where human husbandhood and wifehood and fatherhood and sonship, and other human relationships with all their human adjuncts and associations of name and form, are looked upon as anything more than the fleeting expressions of deep underlying non-human verities in the realm of conscious experience? I hope to be able to show you that it does.

We must not, however, devote any more space here to the implications of the Upanishads and the various lines of thought that have subsequently developed out of them. Enough has been said to make it clear as we go on that they contain much that is apposite to what I am developing, and you will find their influence through all that I write.

Paramatman, Purusha, Prakrti.

Let us now return to what I was discussing before this long digression. You will remember what I said about the Divine Nature being a nature infinitely needing, and perfectly able

to satisfy its need to experience its inherent potentialities for infinite-sided love. We saw that this conception implied that "in beginningless time" the Divine Nature does so experience, and finds in the endless diversifications of a subordinate aspect of reality which it timelessly sustains in being, the field not only for self-expression but for the realization of that infinite-sided potentiality to experience inherent in it.

Love, as I have pointed out, if it is to be complete in its richest form, implies not only the joy of loving, but of being conscious that it is loved by that which it loves. This factor of *mutuality* is essential for the plenitude of loving experience.

The Divine Nature not Self-sufficing.

The Divine Nature has inherent within it the means for the perfect satisfaction of its essential need, but were it possible to conceive of the Divine Nature as apart from that which its need impels it ever to sustain in being, we should not be able to think of it as perfect or self-sufficient. *In itself,* and apart from that which we conceive of as essentially associated with it, it could not be said to experience perfectly. For it eternally realizes itself—eternally expresses itself—in its relations with that. Thus the Divine Nature is incapable of being conceived as existing apart from that in which it eternally realizes itself.

From this it would appear that the Divine Nature *alone* and *apart* is *not* a perfect unit of experiencing being. The perfect unit of experiencing life is the Divine timelessly self-sustaining Existent One *plus* that complementary and subordinate area of reality timelessly sustained in

being by it. This latter, as I have said, exists by reason of the essential need for it inherent in the nature of the former, finds its meaning in it, has no existence apart from it; but neither of them is capable of being conceived as without the other.

That which is complete

Thus, viewed together, these two timelessly co-existent aspects of being—the one self-sustained, the other relative and dependent—are the unit of complete experiencing. There would also appear to be another element associated with the above, which has been known by various names in Indian philosophy—among them "Prakṛti". Personally I prefer this, and as we shall have to use some name or other, shall call it by this in future. As I make use of the term, it would not be permissible to call this "material" or "inanimate" or "non-spiritual". All, in fact, that we need to say of it is that it seems to be a *third* aspect of what is, about which we can predicate nothing beyond the fact that on the one hand we do not experience it as conscious and personal, and on the other that our experiencing seems to express itself in terms or values of it. (I shall find a better way of explaining what I mean later). It is—to make use of a scientific term—the "stuff" of experience, its clothing. What it may be *in itself*, as apart from our experience of it, we have no means of knowing, nor is this of present significance.

All this, I know, is put very crudely, yet let us attempt to see what the outcome of it is.

The Arya Samaj, following in this the

Saṃkhya modified by Patanjali's Yog say that Paramâtman, the Jīva and the Material Cause of the World (जगत काकारण) are beginningless. Our reasoning leads us to somewhat similar but not entirely identical conclusions. I will here only try to point out certain of the similarities and differences. Of course you will remember that, whereas the Samaj claims to base its philosophy upon the Scriptures, I seek to base mine upon the experience of the timeless Spirit the Púrusha--evolving under the mode of conscious personality in me.

The three Categories of Being.

I am at one with Samaj in believing that there are three timelessly subsistent modes of *being*, of which Paramâtman alone stands by His own nature. ("His" is not really the right word to use, but neither is "her" or "its", and we are limited to the use of one of them.) I agree with them that the second and third modes stand timelessly in Him (i. e. they are (ब्रह्मस्थ) and that they are not in essence identical with Him—that is, all three are (पृथक).

Upon the other hand I am not led to feel that the Jīvá ("the individual soul") is timeless *as such*, but rather that all Jīvás are evolving modes or modifications (विकार) of a more ultimate timeless substrate, for which I have selected the term 'Púrusha' as more suitable than any of the others at our disposal. Jīvás seem to me to be countless; their substrate I hold to be *one* and in essence indivisible. It is timeless; they are in time. They, as *Jīvás*, may cease to be; as *Púrusha*, never. I have not said "must" cease to be, but "may", and shall later discuss this possibility. On the contrary, I feel that though, *as individual Jīvás*, they have each a beginning in time, the tendency of

their evolution is towards endlessness in time—a position no more open to objection, surely, than that of those who hold 'karma' and 'avidya' to be beginningless, yet believe that it may be brought to an end by *jñána* (enlightenment). *Time* itself I hold to be a timeless factor in Bráhman.

The Samaj holds that Paramâtman is the "efficient cause" (निमित्त कारण) of all change and evolution, but disagrees with Sankara by denying that He is the "material cause" (उपादान कारण) of phenominal existence. I have to state my own position somewhat differently.

Just as the followers of Shankara hold "Māyā" (the illusory cause of the visible universe) to be beginningless, and as the Samāj holds Paramâtmán, Jīvá and the Material Cause of the World to be beginningless, so I hold that the three categories under which *being* appears to me to subsist are beginningless. It would seem, therefore, that so far as our various subordinate and relative categories are concerned, none of us are dealing with what this or that was "before" —in a *time* sense. We are not concerned with *time*, but with *order* in approach, toward the ultimate or basial reality.

How you are Brahman.

It is from this point of view that I must state my own position. It is this—that, though *being* has timelessly subsisted under three modes, nevertheless the second and third of these exist timelessly by reason of the necessity for them inherent in the first—in Paramâtmán. His nature, then, is the timeless cause of the being of these other two. There is no question of what they were *before* they were Púrusha and Prakṛti; there never

was a "before". No question arises of their having ever been constituted out of the *being* of Paramâtmán, for the existence of Paramâtmán is timeless, and the necessity for their existence is implicit in His nature. He *is,* and *therefore* they are. He is the self-subsistent, the "Sát", the absolutely existent aspect of *being.* His nature is self-subsistent—not because it finds within itself all the factors essential to its self-realization—but in that it subsists because it is its nature to do so; it does not exist because of the need of its existence to any other aspect of reality. Whatever else is, exists by reason of *it,* because of the need inherent in *it.* Its existence is positive ; the existence of the other two categories of *being* is relative. It's is absolute existence ; they are derivitively existent. The existence of Púrusha and Prakṛti has no significance apart for the need for them inherent in the Divine Nature (Paramâtmán), and from the *desire* (काम) and the dynamic will (सङ्कल्प) begotten of that need, that timelessly sustains them in being. Thus He is their Cause (कारण) because the implications of His nature demand their being, and *efficient* (निमित्त) because He ever fulfills the demands of His nature thus. The question of their "*material*" (उपादान) cause does not arise. They are not in essence what Paramâtmán is. Rather they are timelessly and essentially what they are because Paramâtmán is timelessly and essentially what He is. Their being is not His but their existence is implicit in His, and He would not be what He essentially is if they were not. In the timeless Bráhman Paramâtmán is the "standing-ground" (आश्रय) of their timeless being. Therefore we can rightly say of Púrusha or Prakṛti that it is Bráhman, for

what they are, in conjunction with what He is, constitutes that inseparable unity which is Bráhman. Therefore you, too, are Bráhman, for, apart from what you *essentially* are, Bráhman is not. Yet you are not Paramâtmán; He is the "*Mūla*"—the self-subsistent core of Bráhman; He is Para-Bráhman. You, as timeless Púrusha, are real (सत्य), and your realness rests upon His reality. That is why the sages have called Him "the Real of the Real" (सत्यस्य सत्य).

And yet, using the words in a slightly different sense, it is proper to call both Púrusha and Prakṛti *unreal* (असत्य), because they are not self-subsistent realities. By this we do not mean to imply that they have not a reality of a kind, but rather that their existence is of a relative and dependent nature. By "Sát" I understand the sages to have implied that which exists *of itself*, without reference to anything else. Of the Paramâtmán—"the Sát"—I conceive that it *is*, and of all else—all other aspects of being—that they are *with reference to* and *by reason of* the Paramâtmán. My former familiarity with and deep interest in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity has been of immense suggestive value in arriving at my present position.

The complete Unit of Expericneing.

I have expressed my conviction that, apart from its eternal relation with the Púrusha evolving under the mode of personality, the experiencing life of the Paramâtmán is inconceivable. In other words, its experience is dependent upon the Púrusha. If this be so, it is evident that *The Complete Unit of Experiencing Being* is *not* the Paramâtmán as viewed apart from the Púrusha,

Experience implies not only the Paramâtmán, but the Púrusha and that third element which functions as the clothing and medium of Púrusha experiencing. The eternal relation of these three aspects of existence makes possible experience—makes possible self-realization. It is *All-that-is* subsisting under these three modes—two of which exist by reason of their significance to the third (Paramâtmán)—which is the complete unit of experience. It is this, any aspect of which is inconceivable part from the other two, which is Bráhman, both personal, and impersonal existent and non-existent.

Brahman is being.

But how can Bráhman be both personal and impersonal, both existent and non-existent? Such questions as these may seem far-fetched and useless to you, dearest, but they have their place. For they permit me to deal in my own way with certain questions that have engaged the attention of the old thinkers of India.

For some pages I have been considering that ultimate unit of experienceing being, and have called it Bráhman. We have seen it as the sum-total of existence—the *All-that-is*, subsisting timelessly as a triad. I have also pointed out that any one of the three modes is incapable of being conceived as existing apart from the other two. I have used the term Bráhman to indicate this indivisible unity which makes *experience* possible.

Now, considered from one viewpoint, this Bráhman is non-existent. You will wonder how this can be; let me explain. Bráhman—approaching the question from this particular angle—does not denote a *thing*; rather it denotes the three

aspects of existence in their timeless relation to each other. It is the name for these three seen as an inseparable unity. Now each of the three aspects of being that compose the sum-total of reality is undoubtedly existent, but the *relationship* in which they timelessly subsist is not a fourth existent something. Indeed, if we attempt to view it as apart from those three timeless realities, we find that we are attempting the impossible—that the relationship is, apart from the related modes, a mere abstraction. In other words, the experiencing Paramâtmán *is*, the experiencing and experienced Púrusha *is*, the Prakṛti through which and clothed in terms of which the Púrusha experiences that too *is*. These are the modes under which the *existing* subsists timelessly. But the essential relationship, viewed in the light of which Paramâtmán Púrusha and Prakṛti are seen as *One*—as the indivisibie unit of complete experiencing, any aspect of which is inconceivable as existing separately—that essential relationship is a something of which existence cannot in the same way be predicated.

Hence Bráhman—viewed as the three aspects of being in timeless and inseparable relationship—is non-existent. It is not only (as a thing) non-existent, but—as Bráhman—it is impersonal, for the seats of personality are not in Bráhman *as such*, but in two of the three modes under which Bráhman subsists.

So far as the question of existence and non-existence is concerned, I can make my meaning clearer by a simple example. Take our own family; viewed as ourselves existing in relation to one another, we know it is an important reality—I should say the most

important reality of our experiencing life. But the family *as such* does not exist. We cannot say that you and I and the children and the family exist. You and I and the children *are* the family; apart from us it is nothing. But the family does surely exist as you and I and the children, viewed in our relationship to one another. It is one and indivisible—the complete unit of our experiencing life. Yet, *as* the family, it is neither personal nor experiences. The seat of conscious experiencing is in the modes under which the family subsists—in you and me and each of the children.

So also we may apprehend the significance of the term Bráhman. It signifies the complete and inseparable unity of *that-which-is.* The categories of existence that compose it are real, but their indivisible unity has of course no existence apart from them. Thus Bráhman is the Real—the "Sát"—the great Reality—when we view it as this traid subsisting in essential unity. But Bráhman is unreal—"Asát"—nothing—when we attempt to disassociate it in thought from those three categories of being under which it timelessly subsists.

The deepest truth is Patmatman.

Yet Bráhman—the All-that-is—Being—"One without a Second"—to which I have been referring, is not the most ultimate reality. It subsists timelessly, and includes time and change, but its deepest, inmost reality is the changeless, self-subsistent Paramâtmán, timelessly sustaining in being all its subsidiary aspects. It is *real,* for so far as its essential nature is concerned it is beyond all time and change. But its reality has its "standing-ground" in that which is its innermost

truth—in Paramâtmán, the one absolutely existent, "Without Parts". He is its Real, and the Upanishads call Him "The Real of the Real". Such is Bráhman—the "All-that-is" viewed as an essential Unity—and Paramâtmán is its inmost reality—Para-Bráhman—God, blessed for ever.

Ancient Aryan sages and āchāryas have stressed the fact repeatedly that our salvation lies in apprehending—not merely intellectually but in the inmost depths of the spirit—our oneness with Bráhman. To us what does this mean? As I later unfold to you my conception of the evolution of personality, you will see that the factor of "Ahaṃkāra"—the tendency of each evolving centre of personality in the Spirit (Púrusha) to conceive itself a separate entity, and to act upon that assumption—plays as important a part in this philosophy as in other Indian systems. The constant attempt of the ancient rishis was to make the thinker realise his oneness with the existent whole. "You are not a separate unit of existence, other than Bráhman and separate; overcome this illusion; learn to know yourself as one with Bráhman". This seems to me to be the meaning of the often repeated admonition to know that "That art thou" "*Thou* art Bráhman".

Let us see the application of this to the point-of-view I am attempting to put before you. We have seen that, in accordance with this conception, the Divine Nature (Paramâtmán) is not the complete unit of experiencing being, though it is the causeless eternal cause of all else that is. The complete unit is Bráhman—Paramâtmán, Púrusha and Prakṛti in their essential relation to each

other. As has been said, any one of these aspects of being is inconceivable as subsisting separately. That peculiar aspect of divine experiencing which is rendered possible by the particular evolution of personality represented by *me*, would be impossible of realization did not *I* exist as one of the countless realizations of the Púrusha's capacity to evolve under the mode of personality. I therefore,—that is the timeless Púrusha evolving under this particular personal mode—am essential to the completeness of a certain area of the divine self-realization. There are potentialities for the experience of love in the Divine Nature that would be incapable of realization if the relation with God (Paramâtmán) did not exist which my particular personality makes possible.

What does this mean? It means that apart from me—apart from you—the divine experience would lack something in its progressive realization—that the divine potentialities would be unable to perfectly find their fulfilment. Apart from the conscious relationship which your personality or mine makes possible, the capacity for self-realization inherent in the timeless relationship of the Paramâtmán Púrusha and Prakṛti —of Bráhman—would not be limitless. *My* personality makes possible an aspect of the divine experience: the relation existing between the Divine Nature and my personality cannot and does not otherwise exist. *I experiencing* am thus a part of the completeness of the experiencing whole. In this sense too I—this personal I—am Bráhman.

And yet I am not Bráhman because I am *all* that Bráhman is, but because Bráhman is that

All-that-is which, apart from me, is not. Apart from Paramâtmán, Bráhman is not; apart from Púrusha, Bráhman is not; apart from Prakṛti, Bráhman is not; apart from what you are, Bráhman is not. For Bráhman is *all* this.

I am Brahman, but not all that Brahman is.

The last few pages, dearest, have been rather a digression, and I know you will have some difficulty over them unless I am with you to explain. As a matter of fact I have chosen this method of dealing with the subject so that the affinity of my position to ancient Indo-Aryan thought may be more easily seen, as well as where and how I am led to differ from it.

The essential inseparateness of Being.

I am especially anxious, however, that you should not get the impression that I conceive of Bràhman as another Being existing, as it were, "back of God". I do not; He - Paramâtmán— is the eternal, personal, cause and "standing-ground" of all else that is—the *core* of Being. He is the innermost truth of Bráhman. What I do want to make clear to you is that the Divine Nature is *not* in itself a complete self-sufficient unit of being, with Púrusha and Prakṛti subsisting as a sort of unessential "by-products", as it were, of its activity. They *are* because they are essential. The complete, the perfect self-realization of the Divine Nature is made eternally possible by the existence of Púrusha and Prakṛti. It is in its timeless relation with these that the Divine Nature eternally realizes itself.

With me this conception fills the need which Christian theology has sought to meet by the doctrine of the Trinity. And as that theology

holds that the Divine Nature, subsisting under three personal modes is yet indivisible—one God, so I see Bráhman as One and indivisible. For it is that *Whole*, apart from any part of which the remainder is inconceivable. Apart from anything that *is*, it is not. It is *essential existence*. No part of it is conceivable as existing apart from the rest.

I struggle with my pen to put my thought before you. It is very difficult, but I hope I shall be able to make you understand. For, believe me, it is no question of things that do not matter; it is vastly important. If what I have been trying to say is correct, it means that God *needs you* needs me—and that fullness of experiencing life is impossible to Him without us. With all my heart and soul I believe that this is true, and in the rest of this book I shall try to gather the threads which will weave this conception into a complete whole.

Time and Eternity in Creation.

In what has gone before, dearest, I have striven to give you my conception of *All-that-is* as an indivisible entity subsisting from eternity under three different modes, the second and third of which find the cause and meaning of their existence in the first. To indicate these three aspects of reality we have used the ancient Aryan terms—Paramâtmán, Púrusha and Prakṛti, and we have called these three viewed as subsisting in an eternal, inseparable and essential relationship to each other, Bráhman.

Now before we proceed to the question of Spirit-Evolution which will later engage most of

our attention, it is essential for us to consider what is commonly called "Creation" in its eternal and temporal aspects. In other words, we must séek to discover the nature and place of *time* in timelessness, and of *change* in that which is ever Paramâtmán, Púrusha and Prakṛti.

I have, it is true, from time to time referred to the evolution of centres of conscious personality in the Púrusha, and to Paramâtmán as fulfilling the need of His nature in them. They have been hardly more than references and, strictly speaking, such points should not have been touched upon until I had reached some place where I could deal with them adequately. However, while it must be admitted that so bringing them in without due explanation was poor arrangement, I have simply been unable to help myself. They *had* to come where they did without explanation, and will of course have to be fully explained later on. I cannot really at this time find a more orderly and systematic method of putting my thoughts on paper. All that I would beg of you, therefore, is to patiently read the whole, and you will come at last to see the wholeness, and how the various parts fit themselves together.

Until now our chief concern has been with what I conceive as *timeless*—with Bráhman viewed as the inseparable Unity of Paramâtmán, Púrusha and Prakṛti. That is to say, we have been dealing with underlying aspects of reality which exist quite without reference to such factors as *time* and *change*.

We must now take up the question of 'time' and 'change'. If Bráhman is All-that-is, then 'time' and 'change'—should they prove to have any reality at all—will be found to have that

reality in Bráhman. The problem seems always to have presented considerable difficulty to thinkers, but its solution should not be impossible.

"Creation"

With the problem of finding the part which 'time' and 'change' play in the timeless being of Bráhman, the question of 'Creation' is, of course, involved. What is the nature of the activity which we call by this name? Does it mean a bringing into existence of that which had no existence before? Or the bringing into manifestation of what was before unmanifested? Or is it the real or apparent projection of the Divine Nature (Paramâtmán)—a sort of self-expression in terms of the "world"?

If it means—as it has usually meant in the thought of the West—that God has given to a concept timelessly latent in His consciousness an objective existence that it did not have before, then it implies either that He has called into being something that before was non-existent—"created something out of nothing", to put it crudely—or that He has, as it were, projected Himself, or a portion or aspect of Himself, *as* creation.

I find myself unable to accept either of these conceptions. In the first place, a thought or a concept is always just that; it is, by its nature, part of the subjective life of the thinker. To give it "objective expression" can never mean more than to make or build up *outside* the conscious self of the thinker a something that will give expression to, or correspond with or realize his thought. That something obviously cannot be made or built up out of the thought. If it has no other substrate than thought or concept, it surely can have no

objective reality. It must then—assuming that it has objective reality—be either called into being out of nothing, or be built up out of something already existent.

The idea of a bringing into being of that which previously had no existence whatever, should only be entertained as a last resort. It seems to me that the Vedāntins and the Sāṃkhyas—indeed all schools of Indian philosophic thought—were profoundly right in holding that there are no grounds in experience for our assuming that the existent can spring from the non-existent. That which exists now has presumably, existed either in its present or some other form, and will always exist. And, conversely, whatever has at any time not existed—had no existence in any form—neither exists now or will ever exist.

Consciousness is indivisible.

As to the other alternative—that He has, as it were, projected a portion or an aspect of Himself as what we call "creation"—that too is difficult of acceptance. For if we hold Paramâtmân to be One—"Without parts"—as we must, if we hold Him to be conscious and intelligent—we are then precluded from thinking of His nature as being able to be "split up", so to speak, in such a manner that it could be the conscious subject in countless forms of limited and mutually exclusive experiencing. To do so would be to split up consciousness, and I agree with Ramanuja that consciousness must, by reason of its very nature, be centered in the one subject of it. For I cannot, with Sankara, accept the idea of conciousness as a sort of metaphysical "fluid" that is capable of being held in many different

vessels without losing its integrity. Sankara was, you know, the greatest exponent of the most famous system of Vedāntic philosophy, and he and his followers insisted upon the essential identity of the conscious Self of Paramâtmán and the conscious self of you or me. He held that the one conscious Self is the *only* experiencer through all intelligences (buddhis), and often illustrated his position by the example of many jars in the Ākāsha (ether), saying that it is the one unmodifiable ether in all jars, and that its unity and identity is in no sense affected by the fact that the walls of the various jars appear to separate the ether within them from the ether without. He held that the illusion (ávidyā) inheres, not in the ether (i.e., the all-prevading conscious Self), but in the *jars* (i.e., the Buddhis, Antánkaraṇas or individuated mentalities, etc.) that for a time, as it were, inclose it. Smash the jars and the ether that filled them will be seen to be one with the infinite Ākāshá.

As I apprehend it, conciousness *must* inhere in a subject of consciousness, and cannot be treated as though separable. Conciousness as apart from a subject is unthinkable. If this is correct then it is impossible for Paramâtmán to remain the subject of an integrated all-inclusive experience and be at the same time the subject in the limited and mutually exclusive experiences of such as you and me.

Possibly a homely example will help you to understand my meaning more clearly. Let us take the example of our own family. Because of my love for you all, and deep sympathy and interest in all that each of you does and thinks and feels, I am able within limitations to enter

into your experiencing and, in a sense, make it my own. But clearly, whatever I experience of the feeling and experience of you all, it is still strictly *my* experience, and is one unity, correlated and integrated in the consciousness of one experiencer. So I can conceive of Paramâtmán, the timelessly conscious, as experiencing in a manner and with a completeness infinitely beyond my finite capacity, all that I experience, but always as *His* experiencing of what is experienced by me. The totality of all finite experiencing would thus be His experience also, in that it would also be experienced by Him in the terms of His own timeless and changeless nature. Just as the content of the experience of each of us is an integrated whole, unified in one conscious "I", so would the content of *all* experiencing be integrated in the consciousness of that beginningless and self-subsistent "I" who is Paramâtmán, by whom and in whom the being of all subordinate reality is timelessly sustained.

But to say that He is the *only* conscious experiencer in all Buddhis (mentalities), and that His conscious experience in each of them is—even for a time—or in any manner—cut off and excluded from His experiencing in all others, would seem to imply the absence in Him of a conscious integrated experiencing life. As *consciousness* (चित्) except in the "fluid" sense I have referred to—He would subsist, not as the conscious "I" of a unified and all-including experience, but as the conscious basis in countless not merely different but mutually exclusive experience-contents. Thus, though this hypothetical fluid consciousness might be conceived as retaining its "material" unity, it would nevertheless be

unconscious of the totality of finite experience *as a unity.*

For surely we cannot say that the Highest Self experiences an integrated experience through each individual buddhi, with all the limitations which our own experiencing shows us that this implies, and is also the *one* subject of an integrated universal experience received through all buddhis, since the experience of one Self—one conscious "I"—cannot be at the same time limited and unlimited, inclusive and exclusive.

Any conceptions of "creation", therefore, which are based upon the idea that the Highest Self—Paramâtmán—either brought into being that which previously had no existence, or that He can so divide Himself, as it were, as to be at the same time the universal experiencer and the primary subject in the limited and mutually exclusive experience of various individuals, seems unacceptable for the reasons given.

Divine Self-sufficiency—what it is not.

For another reason too I hold them unacceptable. All such views are an outcome of the idea that the perfection of the Divine Nature necessarily implies its absolute self-sufficiency—self-sufficiency in the sense of *completeness within itself.* My whole philosophy, or attempt at an interpretation of experience, or whatever else you may choose to call it, is a repudiation of this conception; it is based upon the conviction that the perfection of the Divine Nature implies nothing of the kind, and that if divine perfection means this then "the world" (जगत) and experience as we know it are deprived of any very profound significance. If that conception be correct then at its

best "creation" is seen only as a sort of benevolent but unessential side-activity of God; viewed in a less favourable light, 'jar-smashing' must constitute the highest purpose of life. Surely neither of these outlooks is much more satisfactory than the old orthodox Christian conception of "The Fall", in accordance with which God at the beginning created a perfect world which subsequently went wrong, and that ever since He has been trying more or less—principally less—successfully to repair the damage.

All conceptions based upon the belief that "the world" is something evil or unclean, or that it is a "Paradise gone wrong", or that it is an unfortunate (real or apparent) entanglement of the spirit from which escape is to be sought as from something defiling, appear to me to cast a reflection upon the perfection of God. Nor do I think that the Upanishads teach any of these things. As regards questions of this nature it seems to me that the robust optimism of Swami Dayānand is far truer to the outlook of the most ancient Indian scriptures than much of the subsequent metaphysical puritanism that claimed to find its foundations in them.

For I see in "the world" (जगत्)—in the experiencing life of the individual—the reflection, as it were, of the glory and the power and the goodness of God. I see it, not as something *from which* we must seek salvation, but as that *through which* we are to achieve salvation. And I see *you* and *me*, dear one,—you and me as conscious experiencing individual expressions of the timeles Púrusha —not as part of some non-essential side-activity of God, created for a hypothetical "glory", nor as the unreal pupets of a "līla" (play) spread

out for mere sport, nor as the poor captives of a beginningless karma (chain of cause and consequence). I see us rather as *needed*. I see God as *needing* us—His perfection of self-experience as impossible without us—your "I" and my "I" as stimulating and inspiring realities, essential to Paramâtmán's infinitely unfolding experience of His inherent potentialities.

Completeness may only be predicated of Brahman.

I have explained to you before how I conceive the Divine Nature—Paramâtmán—to be perfect and self-sufficing, *not* because it has in it that which eternally satisfies it, but because it has inherent in it the knowledge and the *power* to perfectly satisfy its infinite need.

I have tried to make it clear to you that the realization of perfect divine experiencing depends upon the correlation of three aspects (प्रकार) of reality subsisting in some such relationship as I have described.

I have also pointed out that though the two subsidiary aspects of timeless being derive the reason for their existence from the essential need of Parmâtmán, it is impossible to conceive of the latter as existing *apart* from them, or of them as existing apart from Paramâtmán. As a consequence, while recognizing that Paramâtmán is the conscious and intelligent cause of the two subordinate modes (प्रकार) of timeless being, I have stressed the point that *completness*—independence of anything not found within itself—may not be predicated of any one of the modes under which that which timelessly *is* subsists. Completeness—perfect self-sufficiency, in the sense in which I have been using the term—may only be predicated

of the sum of these three modes of reality in their timeless relation to each other as *Bráhman*, the All-that-is. *This* is the only perfect ONE—the complete unit of infinitely progressing self-realization. At its "core"—as its "hub" (नाभि) is the self-existent, underived, absolutely existent, in the fulfilment of whose need all else *is*. That is Paramâtmán, the Source (मूल) in whose inherent need all else finds its meaning and significance.

Time in the Timeless Brahman.

Let us now turn again to the problem of *beginning* in the midst of beginningless—of *time* as a factor in the timelesss Bráhman.

Suppose we make a number of dots with a pencil in such a way that they lie in a straight line and that each touches the next one to it. If we make a sufficient number of them, they will form what appears to us as a straight line on our paper.

Now were we able to continue adding dot to dot indefinitely, placing them all in a straight line we might also extend our line indefinitely.

Let us imagine ourselves as having *always* been engaged in adding dot to dot. In that event the line we were constructing would be without beginning. This would, of course, imply what we ourselves were without beginning, and—if we were engaged in doing what we would never cease to do—that we were endless as well. As eternal dot-makers—as engaged always in the one operation of dot-making—it would imply that we ourselves, as far at least as this activity was concerned, were *changeless* and

consequently *timeless*. Yet *time* would not be non-existent in our operation. It would exist not merely relatively but absolutely. The beginningless line would ever be extending as dot was added to dot; each of them would follow the one before it, and, with reference to any given dot, the rest would have been made either before or after it. So also with the factor of *change*; it would be real—an actuality. The dot-maker would be changelessly a dot-maker, but the line would be constantly extending from beginninglessness toward infinity; with the addition of each new dot it would cease to be exactly what it was before that dot was added. (My explanation lays no claim to be mathematics, either Euclidian or Einsteinian.)

The dot-maker too might be said to be both in time and *beyond* time. Viewing him as "he who makes dots", and dot-making as a process without beginning or end, he might be considered as *beyond* time. Viewing him as the maker of any specific dot, he is seen to be in time. Were one able to see any part of the line, he would be able to say that the dot-maker had made a particular dot *before* he had made the one succeeding it in the direction in which the line was building up.

Change and the changelessness of Paramatman.

Our dot-maker would, as I have said, be changeless in that it would be changelessly his *nature* to make dots. To this extent, however, we might say that he was subject to change that with each new dot he might be said to be the maker of one more dot than he had made before. Yet obviously the making of another dot would not imply a change in his nature; on the contrary his nature would have to undergo a change for

him *not* to make another dot—and another, and another, everlastingly.

I suppose that you are wondering what all this talk about dot-making is leading to. It is a rather clumsy way of making my point clear, I know, but it will help me to explain how I conceive Paramâtmán to be both in time and beyond time. The line built up of contiguous dots through "beginningless time" (अनादिकाल) represents the beginningless activity—beginningless dynamic *willing*—of Paramâtmán. Each of the "dots" of my example, represents a point where the *will*—the active expression of the *need*—of Paramâtmán is concentrated, as it were, upon the subsidiary aspects of Bráhman, energising them to mutual reaction and consequent evolution. Each such point marks the beginning, so to speak, of a new "creation"—not the bringing into being of what was before non-existent, but the calling into manifestation (व्यक्ति) of timeless realities at a point where they were before unmanifest (अव्यक्त), unevolved.

In each such operation—in each such purposive concentration of His dynamic will—the changeless nature of Paramâtmán may be said to undergo no change. It is timelessly His nature so to *desire*, so to *will*. Should He not so will, we should see Him as not changeless. He is changeless in that He *ever* makes provision for the need that is timelessly inherent in Him.

I think you have seen search-lights casting their long rays out across the darkness, concentrating them sometimes here, sometimes there. In the same way I conceive the Divine Desire like a great shaft of light shining forth from the depths of the Divine Nature into the darkness—into

the unmanifest (अव्यक्त)—concentrating now here, now there. As in the world of our experience we see seeds waking at the call of the warm rays of the sun, and plants growing and putting forth flowers, so I conceive that wherever the dynamic ray of the Divine Desire falls, the darkness—the unmanifested—the unevolved—those infinite potentialities timelessly inherent in Bráhman—begin, as it were, to move and react with reference to each other, evolving under each other's influence that which will become more and more perfectly the fulfillment of some aspect of the infinite need of God.

And with each moving there comes another measure of *time* and *change*. Another dot is, as it were, added to the line representing the beginningless and endless activity of Him whose nature is timelessly and changelessly such that it must have this expression. He—Paramâtmán—is timelessly what He is, and *because* of what He is time and change are timelessly associated with Him.

Time and Change are Actualities.

Mark that I believe in the *actuality* of time and change. I am unable to accept the "pattern-idea"—the conception that there is no present, past and future to the all-seeing vision of Paramâtmán—that in His sight present, past and future are no more than different points in the pattern or design that exists spread out timelessly to Him in an eternal present. I hold that to the consciousness of Paramâtmán there are "dots" that have been placed and "dots" that have still to be placed—that which is now evolving and what is as yet only unevolved potentiality. The present, past and

future may be seen by Him with equal clearness—probably are—but the future is seen as that which is *yet to be*, as the chess-player with a perfect knowledge of all possible moves and an equally perfect familiarity with the mentality of his opponent would be able to tell the course of a game to its conclusion, yet would recognize an *actual* difference between the move to be made and the moves that had been made.

A parent taking his little child to a surgeon to undergo an operation, may be fully familiar with the nature of the operation, may feel happy in the certain knowledge of the restored health of his dear one that he knows will result from it, but though he has knowledge of what will follow the operation, the distinction between the present and the future is by no means eliminated. The child, conscious only of the present, experiences that only. The father suffers in the present suffering of his child yet rejoices in his knowledge of the health to be restored. He sees further than the child, yet his sense of the difference between what is *now* and what *will surely be* is no wit less clear.

But I am again getting away from my point. My purpose during the last few pages has been to show you how *time* and *change* and beginnings of unfoldings, and evolution may be eternal factors in the timeless Bráhman. Of course in using illustrations I have had to talk of "dots" and "points", but I have used such words only in a metaphorical sense. As I shall, I hope, make clear later "hereness" or "thereness" or "anywhereness" cannot be predicated of Paramâtmán, or of the timeless substrates of time and change and name and form. Bráhman is not in

time and place, but time and place are in Bráhman.

I have spoken more than once of the *divine activity*. When I speak of Paramâtmán as "active" we are not compelled to think of Him as "rushing round and doing things". As I conceive it, *doing* in the above sense pertains to Púrusha and Prakṛiti in reaction—not to Paramâtmán. I may be mistaken but it seems to me that His is what we might call a "passive activity"—a something which produces results by reason of what it *is* rather than of what it *does*. Let me try to give you an example from the world of every-day experience. There are in Chemistry certain substances which act as "Catalytic Agents"—that is, without apparently undergoing any change themselves, their mere presence makes reactions between certain other substances possible. May it not be that we find here an analogy to Paramâtmán's relation to the activities that take place in Bráhman? Is it not reasonable to think that if Púrusha and Prakṛiti subsist by reason of the necessity for them implicit in Paramâtmán, then the very presence of the Divine Need *willing* its fulfilment through them would act, as it were, 'catalytically' upon them, impelling them to fulfill the meaning and reason of their being by undergoing modification through mutual reaction? If that were the case then the relation of Paramâtmán to the activity manifiested in the subsidiary aspects of Bráhman may be thought of as "catalytic", so to speak, and that activity as the product of the mere presence of His *will* rather than the outcome of any

Can Activity be predicated of Parmatman?

intervention. Should this be so it would not mean that, lacking His positive intervention, the world evolves independently of Him. Rather would it mean that nature evolves with reference to what Paramâtmán is and feels and needs and wills rather than as a result of any active interference by Him. This then would be "the law of nature".

A more Particular Consideration of the Categories of Being

Since we have been using the terms that I have chosen for the three modes of Bráhman rather frequently in the past pages, I should like now to give a somewhat more particular consideration to each of those modes (प्रकार) under which *Being*—Bráhman—timelessly subsists.

Paramatman. Of Paramâtmán I need only repeat what I have so often said before:

(1) He is the self-subsistent (स्वयम्भू) cause and reason for the being of the two subordinate modes of timeless reality.

(2) His *need* is infinite.

(3) His knowledge of how to satisfy it is perfect.

(4) His power to do so is limitless.

(5) His desire (कामः) to do so is eternally expressed in dynamic purpose (संकल्पः) cencentrated, as it were, upon the subordinate modes of Bráhman in which infinite potentialities for evolving that which will be its *satisfaction* are timelessly inherent,

time and place, but time and place are in Bráhman.

Can Activity be predicated of Parmatman?

I have spoken more than once of the *divine activity*. When I speak of Paramâtmán as "active" we are not compelled to think of Him as "rushing round and doing things". As I conceive it, *doing* in the above sense pertains to Púrusha and Prakṛiti in reaction—not to Paramâtmán. I may be mistaken but it seems to me that His is what we might call a "passive activity"—a something which produces results by reason of what it *is* rather than of what it *does*. Let me try to give you an example from the world of every-day experience. There are in Chemistry certain substances which act as "Catalytic Agents"—that is, without apparently undergoing any change themselves, their mere presence makes reactions between certain other substances possible. May it not be that we find here an analogy to Paramâtmán's relation to the activities that take place in Bráhman? Is it not reasonable to think that if Púrusha and Prakṛiti subsist by reason of the necessity for them implicit in Paramâtmán, then the very presence of the Divine Need *willing* its fulfilment through them would act, as it were, 'catalytically' upon them, impelling them to fulfill the meaning and reason of their being by undergoing modification through mutual reaction? If that were the case then the relation of Paramâtmán to the activity manifiested in the subsidiary aspects of Bráhman may be thought of as "catalytic", so to speak, and that activity as the product of the mere presence of His *will* rather than the outcome of any

intervention. Should this be so it would not mean that, lacking His positive intervention, the world evolves independently of Him. Rather would it mean that nature evolves with reference to what Paramâtmán is and feels and needs and wills rather than as a result of any active interference by Him. This then would be "the law of nature".

A more Particular Consideration of the Categories of Being

Since we have been using the terms that I have chosen for the three modes of Bráhman rather frequently in the past pages, I should like now to give a somewhat more particular consideration to each of those modes (प्रकार) under which *Being*—Bráhman—timelessly subsists.

Paramatman. Of Paramâtmán I need only repeat what I have so often said before:

(1) He is the self-subsistent (स्वयम्भू) cause and reason for the being of the two subordinate modes of timeless reality.

(2) His *need* is infinite.

(3) His knowledge of how to satisfy it is perfect.

(4) His power to do so is limitless.

(5) His desire (कामः) to do so is eternally expressed in dynamic purpose (संकल्पः) cencentrated, as it were, upon the subordinate modes of Bráhman in which infinite potentialities for evolving that which will be its *satisfaction* are timelessly inherent,

(6) Though His nature is not subject to change, He experiences *progressively*.

In this connection it cannot be too often pointed out, dearest, that the fact of Paramâtmán's experience being progressive, does *not* carry any implication of progress on His part toward perfection. His infinitely progressive experiencing is experience progressively of that potentiality which is *essentially* and *inherently*—and therefore *timelessly* part of His nature. Nothing is *added* to the nature of Paramâtmán by what He experiences; no change is wrought in that nature by its reaction to experience. It is a progressive "stretching forth", so to speak, to find an expression for, and an answer to, the implications of His nature— implications ever present, ever the same. Change there doubtless is; evolution (परिणाम:) is eternally going on. But all this takes place in the subsidiary and subordinate areas of reality -not in Paramâtmán. He stands changeless in the midst of change, and experiences progressively that which change brings forth in answer to His need—in fulfillment of the implications of His unchanging nature.

Let us take *love*, for example. I conceive that there is present in the Divine Nature the capacity to experience love in every one of its countless expressions and manifestations. As I see it, there is no question whatever of a *progressive capacity* upon God's part to experience lovingly. The capacity is there, timelessly, changelessly —an essential part of His perfection.

Yet think ; the *actual experience* of loving and of being loved is dependent upon the factor of

relationship—upon the presence of an element of *mutuality*. The "other side", therefore, of this relationship which the experience of loving necessitates, must be provided for timelessly in the divine economy.

To me it seems that it is this very necessity which constitutes the reason for the existence of the two subordinate modes of Bráhman. It is in the *Púrusha*, ever evolving consciously through countless centres of personality—centres constantly forming and developing in the process of its reaction to Prakṛti—that this "other side", so essential to the divine experiencing of love, is eternally in the course of being built up and extended.

Yet here, you see, there is no question of *change* in the changeless perfection of the Divine Nature. There is *progressive experience*, it is true, but not because Paramâtmán is growing in His capacity for experience. His infinite capacity is changelessly present; His experience is progressive only because it is dependent upon the building up of "our side" if I may call it that, of the relationship that makes the experience of loving possible.

Obviously here there is no impinging upon the changelessness of the Divine Nature. The subordinate modes add nothing to it—that is to say, they are not instrumental in any growth of divine capacity. That does not grow; it is timelessly present in changeless perfection. What it was, it is; what it is, it will ever be.

As to the subordinate modes of Bráhman—the modes that are subject to change (परिणाम:)—they *are* timelessly because Paramâtmán timelessly *wills* their being, that through them He

may find expression and realize *in experience* the implications of His changeless nature.

Purusha.

Some pages back I explained how I conceive that *time* has an actuality of its own in Bráhman, and in the experience of the timeless Paramâtmán. In order to understand my conception of *creation in time* it is necessary for you to get a rather clear idea of the nature of Pùrusha and Prakṛti. We shall take Pùrusha first.

As I apprehend it, Púrusha is

(1) An essential mode of the timeless Bráhman.

(2) Not self-sustained (स्वयम्भू), or independent (स्वतंत्र) being; therefore not real (सत्) in the sense in which Paramâtmán in is real (सत्); yet real (सत्) in the sense that it is, so far as its essence is concerned, beyond *time*, and because apart from it Bráhman is not.

(3) Not *essentially* conscious, but potentially so, and finding its significance in Bráhman through conscious evolution.

(4) Has inherent in it the potentiality of reacting in terms of awareness, and of evolving under conscious mode, when in association with Prakṛti, and in response to the dynamic *will* (संकल्प) of Paramâtmán.

Yet we must be careful not to permit our minds to think of Púrusha as "a thing". We use the term to designate an aspect (प्रकार) of

timeless being—an existent factor in the Timeless—in Bráhman—concerning which, in its unmanifested (अव्यक्त) condition, we can predicate nothing save infinite capacity for evolution in conscious mode. I conceive—though this view would be considered highly unorthodox—that the consciousness of the individual personality (जीव) is a modification (विकार) of the timeless Púrusha—that Púrusha in manifestation *is* Púrusha evolving consciously. I hold that what is *timeless* in Púrusha is not conciousness, but the potentiality of consciousness.

(As the above is a point where I clearly differ from those who believe that the individual soul (जीव) is—*as* individual soul—beginningless, and that there are countless beginningless individual souls or "Jivas", I shall not attempt to go into my reasons at present. I have them and hope to go into them fully later, but at present I would merely state my conviction that you and I are beginningless, but as *Púrusha*—not as *you* and *I*.)

I have more than once spoken of the potentiality for evolution inherent in the Púrusha as "infinite". This is because I hold such potentiality to be commensurate with the necessity for infinitely progressive experience and self-expression inherent in the Divine Nature (Paramâtmán).

"Creation" a Response.

"Creation" may then be conceived as the reaction of unmanifest, unevolved Púrusha (in association with Prakṛti) to the dynamic willing (संकल्प) of Paramâtmán, at some specific point in the eternally progressing divine experience. A "creation" might be said to take place whenever the latent

potentiality of the unmanifest (अव्यक्त) Púrusha passes over into actuality, and (in association with and reaction to Prakṛti) begins to evolve consciously at the point I speak metaphorically - where the dynamic, purposive will (संकल्प) of Paramâtmán is concentrated.

Making use, therefore, of the rather crude illustration that I have given, " creation " may be visualized as *dot-making*. Each particular " act " of creation may be thought of as a *dot* made at a given point upon the beginningless line that is building up dot by dot through eternity. Each *dot*—each creation—marks a point, as it were, in the divine activity extending endlessly " from everlasting to everlasting ", as the Divine Nature progressively explores its inherent potentialities for experience. Each marks the point—the juncture in divine experience—where some aspect of that infinite potentiality to respond to the divine need that is latent in unmanifest Púrusha, passes over into actuality.

We must not, however, allow ourselves to be limited in our conception by the nature of our illustration. We have been thinking in terms of a beginningless line formed by the constant addition of dots placed contiguously in one given direction. Should we cling too closely to this illustration, it would limit us to the conception of single " creations " merely following one another eternally. We should be limited to what one might call a "linear" conception of the beginningless divine activity, and be in danger of losing sight of the probability that it has other extensions as well. Yet there is no reason whatever for such a limitation.

The *plane*, as an illustration, will help us to

avoid this. We may liken the subordinate modes of Bráhman to a boundless plane extending endlessly in all directions. The past and present may be thought of as the area of it that lies in manifestation (व्यक्ति), and we may envision this area as a vast extent of contiguous *dots*—composed of them, indeed. To this we can see new dots constantly being added—vast numbers of them springing simultaneously into view—the dotted area continuously extending further and further as the limitless unmanifest (अव्यक्तं) springs progressively into manifestation.

For, having in view the infinite-sided capacity for experience inherent in the Divine Nature, is it not presumable that the process of divine expression and self-realisation has—as far as what we call "the present"—an infinite "lateral" extension as well.

The illustration of the plane that we have just been using, gives us two dimensions. If we pursue the analogy further we might represent the *third* dimension by the evolution *Godwards* of Púrusha (in association with Prakṛti) at each of the points of dawning consciousness. This is, however, a question with which I shall be dealing later.

In the *progressiveness* of this creative activity which we have been discussing the relation which we know as *time* is clearly inherent. Each "creation" marks a point in a beginningless activity, but its beginning—its passing over from the unmanifest into manifestation—has a *beforeness* or an *afterness* or a simultaneousness with reference to other such beginnings or passings-over or "creations". Seen as a *whole*—as dot-making—the activity of which endlessly extending creations

are the manifestations is as eternal, as timeless, as Paramâtmán Himself. And yet, though this creative activity is without beginning, nevertheless each of these creations—each of these springings into manifestation—had a beginning.

Necessity of avoiding the idea of Externality.

Before passing on to a consideration of Prakṛti there is one other thing to which I wish to call your attention. The illustrations which we have been using have their value but they also have one defect. They tend to give the impression of an *external* Paramâtmán. That is always the dangerous side of the use of words and word-pictures; we must keep their limitations always in view or they will get us into trouble. The same difficulty is also apparent in the Upanishads. When the sages speak of Paramâtmán as saying "Let me enter into" this or that, the mind promptly paints a picture of His being *outside*. And yet we know that this is just what the Upanishads do *not* teach.

And so, when I liken the dynamic purposive *willing* (संकल्प) of Paramâtmán to the long ray which a search-light casts out across the darkness, concentrating it sometimes at one point and sometimes at another, or to the dot-making of an eternal dot-maker, there is danger of our thinking of Paramâtmán as influencing the subordinate modes of Bráhman *from without*. This is a dangerous conception and has always shown itself so in religious experience.

Certainly it is not mine. As I have so often said, Paramâtmán is the "Core"—the central self-subsistent verity of Bráhman. Bráhman is

Paramatman the deepest verity of Brahman

Paramâtmán and Paramâtmán's essential implications. Bráhman is *the timeless*—as timeless as Paramâtmán. But the terms "Paramâtmán" and "Bráhman" may not be used interchangeably. Paramâtmán is not Bráhman, but Bráhman is Paramâtmán *plus that,* the existence of which is necessarily implied by the terms of Paramâtmán's nature. Paramâtmán is not *because* Bráhman is. But Bráhman *is* because Paramâtmán *is,* and Paramâtmán is the innermost, most ultimate verity of Bráhman. "Bráhman", as I use the term, is Ápara-Bráhman; Paramâtmán is Para-Bráhman, the deepest truth of existence.

We must therefore grasp the conception of Paramâtmán—God—not as influencing us *from without,* but as deep down at the centre—Himself *the* centre—of that Bráhman in which we "live and move and have our being". We must feel Him as the inmost self-subsistent (स्वयम्भू) verity. We must realize that our spiritual progress depends upon our seeking *within*—of turning *inward* rather than *outward.*

We must envisage the eternal purposive volenting activity of Paramâtmán as a surging up of divine desire from the innermost depths of infinite Bráhman, as the vast hidden forces within the Sun tear their way up through its successive envelopes.

Paramâtmán is the life of Bráhman. Paramâtmán's need is the *urge* begetting desire (कामः). Desire finds its expression in purposive willing. This is the "creative energy"—the dynamic power (संकल्प, तपस्) that calls forth answers eternally from the subordinate modes pregnant with infinite potentiality.

Thus you can see, dear one, that the path to the meaning of Life turns *inward.* We must seek the meaning of the Individual Self—your conscious personality and mine—in the Púrusha (and Prakṛti). And the meaning of these in Paramâtmân in Whom stands their existence. In so far as we can apprehend this, we shall discover the meaning of ourselves in Bráhman.

Prakrti.

Now what shall I say to you of the third mode (प्रकार) of being—of Prakṛti? I confess that I feel more in the dark as yet about it than about the others. Here is how Ramanuja describes it in his commentary on the Vedanta Sutras (2.2.43):—

> "The nature of Prakṛti consists therein that she is non-sentient, for the sake of another, eternal, ever-changing, comprising within herself, the three gunas (i. e. the three qualities of sattva, rajas, and tamas), and constituting the sphere of action and experience for the agents.
>
> With her the soul (púrusha) is connected by the way of inseparable association, that soul (púrusha) is known to be truly without beginning and without end."

The "three gunas" referred to by Ramanuja are the qualities of goodness, passion and darkness of which, in unstable equilibrium, the "prakṛti" of the Samkhya system is held to be constituted. They have always played an important part in Hindu speculation, but—possibly because my approach to the problem of life's meaning is somewhat different—they make no appeal to me. They represent a line of thought for which at present I can find no place in my philosophy.

Apart from this I am inclined to accept Sri

Ramanuja's definition of Prakṛti as sound so far as it goes. I am at one with him in believing that it is "non-sentient", "for the sake of another", "eternal", "constituting the sphere of action and (at any rate *partially*) the sphere of experience for the agents". I would also agree that, in the timeless unity of Bráhman, Prakṛiti and Púrusha are "connected by the way of inseparable association"—an association which ceases to be of a negative and passive nature wherever Púrusha passes over from the unmanifest (अव्यक्त) to manifestation (व्यक्ति).

But, having said this much of Prakṛti, I cannot feel that enough has been said if I am to give you at all a clear conception of the part it seems to play in Bráhman.

All Scientific Research based upon an assumption.

What further then can be said of Prakṛti? The term cannot certainly be translated by the English word "matter". For, as I see it, *matter* is a word that belongs of right to science, not to philosophy.

Scientists, starting upon the assumption that whatever is grasped by the senses has objective reality, proceed to examine material phenomena as facts *real in themselves.* The assumption is that things are *in themselves* as they appear in experience. I am not, of course, opposed to scientific research; on the contrary, it has a great fascination for me. What I would point out, however, is that—though both in Science and Philosophy the field must of necessity be *the experienced*—the Scientist starts with a basic assumption which it would not be safe for those to make who set out through philosophical

speculation to arrive at the meaning of things. They are not dealing with "things" but with *experience.*

Every investigator of natural phenomena upon entering upon any line of work, either does or *should* begin with some such thought as this, "*Assuming* that what I am about to study has a reality of its own as apart from my experience, and that the reaction to it in terms of conscious experience corresponds to what it is *in itself* apart from the terms in which it is experienced, I shall now proceed with my investigation". If scientific men would keep this reservation living at the back of their minds throughout those wonderful researches that so fill us with admiration and interest, I think they would save both themselves and humanity in general from many of the materialistic misconceptions and conclusions that tend to mar the beauty of modern experience.

Science thus starts with an assumption—or rather a double assumption, and thereafter tries as far as possible to "stick to facts". Philosophical speculation must pursue a different course. Since, in its subsequent development it must perforce attempt an interpretation of "life"—of the content of experience, that is to say—it can hope for no success in arriving at any intelligable conclusion unless it avoids starting with assumptions. As far as possible, therefore, it must place the first stone of its foundation upon *certainty,* and then seek to build with the apparent implications of that certainty as its bricks and mortar.

Hence it must necessarily be that the *values* in philosophical speculation will differ from

those used by the scientist engaged in the study of "natural phenomena." The philosopher's method of approaching his problem, however, should be scientific.

Philosophical values are different.

To the scientists, *water* is water. His task is to find out what consitutes it. He pursues his investigations and finds it composed of certain gases. Next he seeks to discover what these gases are made of, and pursues his search as far as observation and deduction will carry him.

Philosophy does not start with an assumption.

To philosophy, on the other hand, *water* is not necessarily water. All that can be said is that there is *experience* which is expressed in terms of water. *Experience* is a certainty; there is consciousness—awareness—of it; but of existence of water (as a thing *in itself*)—or of earth, sky, stars or sea—we are not justified in speaking with equal assurance. All we can say—to start with—is that *experience* is a *fact*, and that water—and all other phenomena of which there is awareness—have reality in experience. They are *real* factors in experience—real *as experience*. Whether they exist as apart from consciousness, or whether existing, they exist in the form and nature in which they are present in the content of experience—that is quite a different matter.

Thus to philosophy *water* has a reality; it is real in the only world that philosophy knows—the world of *experience*. In that world water is real—real *as* experience; what it is—or what anything is—apart from experience, philosophy cannot claim to know.

What is known, is known only in terms of experience; experience is that whereof there is

consciousness or awareness. That which is conscious or aware—the "witness" of experience—is known in India as the experiencer. It is also known as the "Self". Its "world" is whatever is present to it in terms of experience. It is this *experience-world* of the self which must be explored by philosophy. But all the values in it must be accepted and examined—not as *things in themselves* but as experience-values.

No denial of the reality of things in themselves.

Now please do not get the impression, dearest, that I am denying the reality of things *in themselves* and apart from the consciousness of the experiencer. If that were so what would be the point of my trying to put *you* in possession of life's meaning? You would be merely one of my experience-dreams—non-existent as apart from them. With all my heart and soul I believe in your *reality*, existent quite apart from my experience of you. Even my reason, struggling with things too great for it, is convinced as a result of its study of the implications of experience that it is logically necessary to admit the existence of differentiated reality quite without reference to any consciousness of it. It is a fundamental principle not only of philosophy, but of all science as well, that *the same causes always produce the same effects*. Were the cause of experience undifferentiated, then the reactions in experience would be undifferentiated also. The fact that experience is present now in terms of *chair* and again in terms of *table* implies that the causes which produced these different reactions in consciousness could not be identical. That cause to which consciousness reacts in terms of *you* must be

utterly different to that which results in *door*-awareness or *floor*-awareness. It must be so, not only because the terms of the reaction in consciousness are different, but because the nature of the reaction and its emotional concomitants are so utterly different.

But they cannot be known as such.

And yet, after having said all this so positively, I say again that I know you only as you are expressed to me in the terms of this experience-world of which this "I" is aware. So far as this "I" is concerned there is no knowing of you except as you find expression in terms of that experience-content that is correlated in it. It can never know God except so expressed; only in so far as He is manifested in experience.

This must sound the most awful "stuff" to you, but believe me it is not, dear wife. I am really trying to get at something—something that matters. What I want you to appreciate is that all the "things", "persons", etc., that we are in the habit of assuming we know *in themselves*, we really only know in the terms of our experience-reactions. The world in which the "I"—the witness—lives, is not what we casually assume it to be—a world of things *in themselves*, the mutual relations of which are *external* relations—but a world of *conscious experiencing*, centred, correlated and unified in an experiencing subject. Its world —the only world it knows or can ever know—is not something outside it, and to which it stands in the relation of separateness; it is something, on the contrary, that has its being as a unity in the consciousness and stands knit together in the "I". For the world of the "I" is *not* the totality

of what things may be *in themselves*, but the totality of what they are *in experience*.

Philosophy not a study of 'Things in Themselves'.

My meaning is that if we would rightly approach the problem of the significance of "Life", we must first divest ourselves of the idea that we are engaged in an examination of things *in themselves*—external things—and come to realize that we are engaged in a study of *experience*, and nothing but that. We must come to appreciate the fact that the facts and factors with which alone we can deal, are *facts in an experience* and *factors in an experience* centred in the conscious subject of it—not facts *in themselves* and factors *in themselves*.

It seems to me that this is at least one of the meanings of the ancient sages who wrote the Upanishads, when they directed us to turn inward to discover the meaning of things. I know it is not the only one. Man imagines that his conscious life consists in a continuous *looking-outward* upon what is outside himself.

The Rishis did not teach that there was no existence of that which was not present to consciousness. What they did teach was that *whatever is to be known* is to be known *by looking inward* —by "seeing all things in the self"—by apprehending that we cannot know "things" as themselves, as externals, but we can know them as expressed in experience, and in experience find their significance, because *as* experience they are part of a unity—the unified and integrated experience-world of the Self. If Bráhman is to be found, it is to be known there—"all true desires are to be found by turning in there." It is in

there that the implications of whatever is are to be found.

Here is no denial, as I have said more than once, of the existence of things in themselves and apart from our conscious experience of them. It is rather a pointing out of the fact that, even if things have a reality apart from our conscious experience, that reality is not what we know. What we know are the terms in which consciousness's reaction presents itself. We know *not* the things *as such*, but the sort of reaction they produce in experiencing consciousness. What the "thing" actually is, the reaction to which in consciousness is in terms of a *chair*, we do not know. All we know is that if there is some cause existing outside and independent of consciousness which produces a *chair*-reaction in consciousness, then the reality of that cause or "thing" *in experience* is a chair. Our "world"—the only world we know—is the aggregate of the reactions present in consciousness, *not* what produces the reactions. Or rather, we should appreciate that whatever other reality it has is only to be arrived at by a study of it in the aggregate of consciousness-reactions correlated in the unity of an ever-present "I"—the world present in consciousness.

My own feeling is that the recognition of this, and the consequent turning of our scrutiny upon it *as something within*, is the essential first step toward the rediscovery of its reality *outside* of consciousness. We must first learn to "scrap" all our usual conceptions of its reality *outside* ourselves and accept it purely as a conglomoration of consciousness-states. Having done so, and having studied its implications as such, we shall be in a position to reappropriate its reality, both as

expressed to consciousness and existent apart from consciousness, upon a sounder basis. We must first lose it, as it were, that we may more truly discover it.

But even then—even when we have achieved a justifiable conviction of its realness *in itself*—we shall *know* it only as expressed in experience, —only in the terms in which it presents itself to consciousness. We shall know it only as we find it in the Self. All its values will be experience-values. They will be the real expressions of what is otherwise unknowable, in the terms of the Self's experience. They will be known *within*, and seen *within* and experienced *within*. In other words, "that which is to be known" is not a multitude of disconnected entities outside and apart from us, but *a unity*—a conglomorate experience centered in consciousness about a single "I". Though knowing that whatever is experienced has a reality of its own, we shall appreciate that for the "I" it has its reality *in experience* and its place and significance in that which is a unity, and can be studied and examined as a unity—as *One*.

The Reals of the "world" with which Philosophy deals.

All this discussion about *things in themselves* and *things in experience* has been with one object. It is to remind us that we are not engaged in the study of a number of externals but of *experience as a whole* to see how much it can teach us of "the meaning of life". We are looking at the content of consciousness as we look at the ground-glass in a camera in which the lights and shadows, rustling leaves, moving figures, etc., appear though in reality we see none of them.

In studying this " ground-glass " of consciousness we must constantly refer to matter, organisms, names and forms—to the whole prakṛti of our experiencing—and refer to them as if to external realities. What we want to remember is that though we are not dealing really with externals, we are nevertheless dealing with *reals* —reals in the experience-world—reals in the content of the consciousness of the self. What "matter" is *in itself*, and apart from consciousness, I do not know; what name and form and colour are *in themselves* I do not know; what the realities of coming and going and the various other forms in experience are *in themselves* I do not know; what atoms and electrons and sound-waves and electricity are *in themselves* I do not know. But real experience associated with these terms I know well. There—in the world within the Self—rocks and sticks and lands and seas, all the beautiful colours of nature, all sounds and voices—all the *prakṛti* of experiencing—are reals in consciousness.

This having been said, in future I can deal with the various reals in experience as though dealing with externals, for, though they are known in the consciousness-content of the Self, they are known there with an expression of externality about them. And this sense of externality is also a real in experience.

Thus the Self is the research worker. The content of consciousness is its laboratory stocked with the materials of multifold experience. The criterion of reality is *reality in experience.* The importance of the various experience-factors is to be gaged, not by whether they are experienced as *material* or otherwise but by their dynamic

power upon consciousness, for they all belong equally to the category of experience. The measure of their reality there is the measure of their potency.

What then is Prakṛti? It is that element in the experience world of the conscious subject which clothes and gives form to experience. It is that in terms of which experience is expressed. It is, moreover, all that is experienced as non-conscious—all in the experiencing of which there is no sense of coming in touch with something that is felt as *conscious* in the same manner that the subject of the experience is conscious.

But it is more than this. Not only is it itself the form in which experience is clothed, but it functions as the very channel and instrument of experience, as we shall see later when we come to study the *vehicle* more carefully. Though consciousness can never be predicated of it, it plays none the less an essential part in the building up of the conscious personality of the various Púrusha individuations, and will ever continue to do so. For, though the timeless Púrusha is the *sole* substrate of our individuated personalities, not one of them is achieved apart from Prakṛti. It is, and always will be, that in terms of which experience is formulated. From beginningless time it has been the instrument for the building-up and progressive evolution of the Púrusha's capacity to experience personally. This is its function eternally in Bráhman, and in this lies its significance, for I truly believe that the emergence and subsequent growth of individuated Púrusha personality, with all that this implies, is the be-all and end-all, the meaning and purpose, of the subsidiary modes of Bráhman,

and that it is only in Púrusha, as it comes with the aid of Prakṛti to subsist in personal mode, that the implications of the Parmâtmic nature are fulfilled. As Paramâtmán is the *supreme fact* of Bráhman, so the ceaseless emergence of Púrusha under the mode of individuated personalities is –timelessly—the *supreme event.* And in this emergence and subsequent evolution Prakṛti plays—timelessly—an indispensible part.

Not an impediment to Self-Realization.

Hence it is that I look upon Prakṛti as in no sense an impediment—as something from which to become, as it were, disentangled—but as an essential factor in the continuous divine self-realization.

It is not from Prakṛti that we must seek to free ourselves, but from *a wrong conception* of our relations with it, and from our tendency to identify it with ourselves, and think of it as an essential part of our personalities and those of our dear ones.

How haltingly, how stumblingly all this has been written, dear one! I see so clearly, and yet when I try to write what I see mind and hand and pen serve me so poorly that at times they almost drive me to distraction. However it is the best I can do, and so I shall bring this section to an end.

Brahman

Referring to Bráhman as the "True" "Real" —"Satya"—the Chandogya Upanishad proceeds to devide that name into syllables and give to each a mystic significance.—

"These are the three letters—*Sa,ti* and *yam.* The *Sa* is the immortal, *ti* is the mortal, and by the *yam* one binds both."

Using this old method of exposition, I too might say, "*Sa* is Paramâtmán, self-subsistent, changeless, deathless; *ti* Púrusha standing timelessly in Paramâtmán, subject to experience through birth and death; *yam* is Prakṛti the instrumentality of that conscious experience in which Paramâtmán, and Púrusha (evolving in conjunction with Prakṛiti under the mode of conscious personality) are timelessly bound together.

And—again to quote the Upanished—"Bráhman is all this" for whatever *is* is Bráhman—is Being — beyond time, changeless in essence, inseparate.

PART III

Beginningless Time and Change in Brahman.

In the first part on this book, dearest, I attempted to put before you my conception of Paramâtmán as the self-subsistent—the timeless cause and "standing-ground" (आश्रय) of Púrusha and Prakṛti. I tried to picture to you these three categories of reality in their essential unity as "Bráhman".

Brahman not a Fourth mode of Being.

But I would not have you think of "Bráhman" as a *fourth* catgory of being. It is not so; nor is it the *source* or the *substrate* of the three modes of being, for it is only under these three modes that I conceive of being as timelessly subsisting. Nor is it "back of them" or more ultimate than they. *They* themselves, seen in their essential non-separateness, are seen as ONE—as Bráhman. *As Bráhman* it has no being; it has no existence; it is what the scriptures call "non-being". Its being is the being of Paramâtmán, Púrusha and Prakṛti. It is the great final truth of them—their Oneness; it is *they* seen as One Completeness. Therefore, though Bráhman is the plenitude of conscious, experiencing being, we do not say that Bráhman is *conscious,* but that it is *consciousness.* Paramâtmán is essentially conscious; Púrusha is potentially conscious under the mode of evolving personality; but Bráhman is not conscious nor experiences. I wonder if you get my meaning.

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Possibly it will make it clearer if I apply this same line of thought to the Christian conception of the Trinity. According to this doctrine One God subsists timelessly under the three modes of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. No one of these three modes is all that God is. Nevertheless the doctrine is that there are not three Gods, but One only, and that God is *Love.*

The Christian conception of the 'Trinity'

This seems to me to imply that according to the teaching of Christian theology, God viewed in His *oneness* is a *whole* in which is implicit the necessary implications of a nature which is declared to be Love. Those implications include the loving subject and the object which alone can render love more than a mere abstraction. They also include *individuality* —that which marks the difference between subject and object—and *personality* because an impersonal lover in an impossible conception.

But obviously in this conception, though God is the One—the Whole, the Completeness—it (I use this pronoun advisedly) is not, *as One God*, the seat of personality. It is not *Loving*, because to be loving it must be personal, and if God were personal and loving it would be dependent upon that which was not God to realize itself. Therefore it is not written that God is *loving*, but that God is *Love*—that is to say, the entity in which the experience of loving is implicit.

This real and timeless Wholeness—God—is a wholeness of parts. These parts or modes ("hypostases") of the being of God—*not* the whole —are the seats of personality and of consciousness. You will remember the reasons I gave why I hold that one consciousness cannot be divided

among various experiencing subjects. Therefore it is that the Father is called *loving*, the Son is called *loving*, the Holy Spirit is called *loving*; but only God—the One God—is called LOVE. And Love is a quality, in itself abstract and impersonal.

The doctrine of the Trinity is that the Father is not *of* the Son or *of* the Holy Spirit, but these two are *of* the Father timelessly. He is the eternal fountain-head. As He *is* not, without them, so they *are* not apart from Him.

Here again are close analogies with my conception of the nature of Bráhman, for as Paramâtmán, is the "core", the inmost ultimate verity of Bráhman, so the Father is the ultimate verity of the One God—the self-existent, conscious, personal "standing-ground" of the being of the Son and the Holy Spirit, from Whom they timelessly "proceed".

But the One God is not something different from and *beyond* the Father—a more ultimate mode of being—but the Father *plus* the essential implications of the Father's nature. Thus the Father, in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, is the innermost truth of the One God.

Let us carry the analogy one step further, and then I will leave it. As Bráhman has no existence except in Paramâtmán, Púrusha and Prakṛti, so the One God of Christian theology has no being as apart from the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. *They* are that One God; their timeless and personal relation, standing ever in the being of the eternal Father, is that LOVE, and the implications of that love, which is God.

Here the analogy ends, for along with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, is the doctrine

of the establishment of a relationship with a previously non-existent something which is not an essential part of that timeless, unchanging Wholeness which is the One God of Christian theology. I refer to the doctrine of Creation, of course. My conception of Bráhman permits me no place for anything that has not timelessly its standing-ground in the timeless being of Bráhman. For I hold, for reasons which I think I have already given, that whatever *is*, in its ultimate essence lies beyond time. Whatever *is* has in essence always been and will always be; whatever *is not*, never was and never will be. This, at least, is my conviction. As the Gita says—

> The unreal hath no being;
> The real never ceaseth to be.

The 'world' with which we have to deal.

Though in the preceeding pages I have touched upon many aspects of my conception of the meaning of "life" and experience, I have especially been occupied with two — the timelessly existent categories of *being* as Bráhman, and the "world" seen as *the content of experience* in the consciousness of the personal Self.

As regards this last question, you will remember that I made no denial of the independent existence of that which is experienced; I did not take the position that the world (जगत्) has no objective reality. What I did call to your attention, and earnestly desire you to keep in mind, is that whatever "the world" may be *in itself*—whatever "things" *in themselves* may be—it is not with such a "world" or such "things" that we have to do. We cannot know them as such—as lying outside ourselves. Granted that they

have an existence of their own, quite apart from what our experiencing of them may be, still *our* world is the sum of the reactions of consciousness to them in terms of personal experience.

I have laboured this point so much because of the vital importance of our realizing *with what we have to deal* in our investigation if we would attain to a true philosophy. Those who imagine they are dealing directly with *things* outside themselves, fail to find the meaning of life because of its apparent multiplicity. Looking "outward" they become bewildered. But those who appreciate that they are dealing with one thing only—with the "stuff" of experience—and that its content is correlated in one conscious subject, know that they are dealing with *a unity*.

Such an appreciation does not prevent us from accepting the reality of "the world" and all the numberless "things" which compose it. He who sees all things "in the self"—as *experience* present to consciousness—sees each of them as real. Each is a real in the content of the experience-world of the conscious subject. The world with which he has to do, which he has to study, and of which he has to find the meaning, is composed of these reals. Here he finds mountains and rivers, sunshine and shadow, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, man and God—all *reals*. Here I find you, my beloved, as real and dynamic experience, to which this conscious subject reacts with joy and the sense of need fulfilled. Here in this world of the self you are known and felt as a dynamic personal reality, enriching and glorifying it. In the experience of you this Self, conscious and personal, feels itself in touch with

the conscious and the personal. You are no shadow there, but tense reality.

No denial of the independent reality of things in themselves.

Of course I do not mean that you are *only* my experience—that you do not exist as apart from it. Did I so believe, my joy in what you are to me in this world would be destroyed utterly. With all my being I believe that you *are* and that my experience is *the truth* of you as expressed in the terms of this conscious experiencing at the present stage of its evolution. What I see and know is the truth of you—your true expression—in so far as it has entered into this world of the personal self. And as that world grows and broadens and deepens, so shall that which you are find deeper and more glorious expression in it.

It is the sense of this truth, felt so keenly, grasped so dimly, expressed so vaguely and clumsily, that makes the real difficulty in stating one's philosophy—one's vision—of the meaning and significance of that experiencing which we call " life ".

Sankara felt it. I read it between the lines in all his work. It is that which makes the whole of his exposition so difficult—all those laboured attempts of his to keep unconfused the ultimate (परमार्थ:) and the realistic or "working" (व्यवहारिक) treatment of the questions with which he had to deal in expounding his philosophy.

Though I may appreciate that in dealing with a *chair* I am not dealing with a chair itself but with experience that clothes itself to consciousness in chair-terms, and though to me a *chair* is only a real in the world of the self, I still have to

treat it—treat all experience-reals—as externals. I have to write this book as if I were dealing with a world and phenomena that I know outside myself.

So I write of life, and of the evolution of Púrusha and Prakṛti under the mode of personality, as if dealing with things *in themselves* and apart from what they are *to* me and *in* me. But always, always bear in mind, dearest, that it is the conscious personal Self at work in its experience-world—its laboratory—examining experience, interpreting experience, comparing experiences, trying to find their relation to each other and their combined implication.

In this third part we shall consider those changes (परिणाम) which from eternity to eternity take place in the timeless being of Bráhman, and I shall try to make clear to you what I consider to be their nature and significance.

Purusha potentially, but not essentially conscious.

You will recall that upon more than one occasion I have spoken of Púrusha as potentially conscious but not essentially so. This seems a fitting place to attempt to make my meaning clearer.

My position arises out of the conviction that we are not justified in thinking of *consciousness* as capable of existing as an independent entity—a sort of psychic fluid. To me the existence of consciousness necessarily implies the existence of a basis or subject in which consciousness may inhere, and an object of which there may be *awareness.* Should the subject alone exist, without an object, I would be able to admit the existence of

potential consciousness but not its realization as an actuality.

Now this is how my thought stands as regards Púrusha. The term represents to me a category of being in which there is timelessly and essentially inherent the potentiality of consciousness—of awareness. In so far as that consciousness-potentiality attains realization as a consequence of the presence of an object, *Púrusha* is the Experiencer since it is in it that the capacity to be aware is inherent.

What is the Basis of Personality.

But what is experienced is *personally* experienced. Here we are confronted by an important question. The basis of consciousness is Púrusha; what is the basis of Personality? When we speak of Conscious Personality do we mean something which is not *essentially* Púrusha—a complex, rooted in both the subsidiary categories of being, with its basis of consciousness in Púrusha and its basis of individuation in Prakṛti? Or is Púrusha not merely the basis of consciousness, but *itself* that which evolves under differentiated personally conscious modes as a result of its reaction to diverse forms of experience?

The first theory considered and rejected.

In the first event Púrusha would be merel the consciousness-centre of individuat ed personality, and that which gave i its individuality would be Prakṛt Personality would be a unity, but unity brought about by the conjunction of the tw subsidiary modes of being in experience. Th line between the *nature* of consciousness and th *form* present to consciousness would be sharp

drawn. Not only would the Vehicle (Buddhi, manas, etc.) and the "Field" (Kshetra), through which or in the terms of which experience is presented to consciousness, be Prakṛtic, but whatever reaction there was to experience would be purely Prakṛtic also. The Self—consciousness—would be merely *aware.* A very similar view has been held by many Indian thinkers.

It is not, however, without its difficulties. For one thing, it compells us to the position that upon the dissolution of the Prakṛtic vehicle the Self is just where it has always been—in which case "spiritual progress" is reduced purely and simply to an evolution of the vehicle of conscious experiencing, with its dissolution as the supreme goal. And even the continued evolution of the vehicle only becomes possible if, in addition to the "gross body" (including whatever is specifically dependent upon its individual brain and nervous system), there be postulated another "subtle" evolution of the Prakṛti that survives physical dissolution and continues to function as an individualizing factor, sustaining across all births its association with the pure consciousness that experiences through it. This is commonly known as the "Subtle Body" (सूक्ष्म शरीरं) of the Self, and in it the individuation is sustained until its final dissolution.

The necessity for the survival of this individuation-factor is maintained on the ground that "actions" (karma) must work out their consequences. The doer must reap the fruit of its deeds. But if the Self is pure consciousness and nothing more, then obviously *it* is not the doer—only the experiencer of that which is done by the Prakṛtic individuation-unit in terms of which it experiences. The deeds are, then the deeds of

Prakṛti; the "fruit" is as obviously fruit to Prakṛti; the joy and pain are Prakṛti's, and the Self—pure consciousness—is merely conscious of them. It is quite natural, following this line of reasoning, to assume that the highest aim is to free the Self from the reflection of pain and joy by the dissolution of the Prakṛtic individuation-unit, and that consequently we should strike at that which sustains this unit—karma and its fruit and the "ávidyā" (not-knowing) that produces them—by "jñāna" (knowledge), or the "bhaktí" (loving-devotion) that begets it.

Aside from the fact that, following this line of thought, we have to postulate a division of the Prakṛtic evolution along lines "subtle" and "gross"—the one sustaining its association with the timeless Self through its (Prakṛti's) various births, and the other in temporary association in each birth—this conception involves a further difficulty. If the basis of the association of the infinity of Prakṛtic individuation-units with the Self is *karma*, how did that association first come about? The answer given is that it had no beginning; each of the individuations has existed from "beginningless time", The karma of each is beginningless.

But if the Self (Ātmán)—pure consciousness—is not a *doer*, if Prakṛti alone is the doer, then it seems impossible to conceive how that which in association with Ātmán, has from eternity sustained itself in individuation by karma, under the mode of Jīvas, could bring about the dissolution of the beginningless association. It would seem that what had always been would always continue to be, unless some *extraneous factor* should interfere to break the continuity. If the Self is

conceived as changelessly pure consciousness and nothing more, then what remains in accordance with this theory to function as the extraneous factor?

Of course, in this vision of life's meaning that I have been trying to put before you, you will also find something existing beginninglessly and yet at a given point undergoing a change of mode. Púrusha is conceived as standing timelessly in the being of Paramâtmân, but as only potentially conscious apart from the focusing upon it of the dynamic *willing* of the Paramâtmic desire begotten timelessly of His essential need and willing its association with Prakṛti. But it is just here that we have the *extraneous factor* essential to the breaking of the beginningless continuity of mere potentiality that is absent in the other conception.

The difficulty with which I have been dealing is an intellectual one. There is another and—to me at least—a deeper one. In this world of the Self's experience I find "Ānandá" (joy) reach its highest *in* experience—in that solemn feeling of need drawing ever closer to its fulfilling through the sense of communion with that which is experienced as conscious and personal, even as I am. I am personally conscious of being nobler, better, reaching higher, going deeper, in those aspects of experience where thought of the self is lost in thought of the beloved—in you, dear wife, in the children. Even though this experience be interwoven with pain, it is high joy in which all thought for self is lost. I am conscious that in it. I am at my best—my highest, and that as this aspect of experience widens and deepens, so I become more worthy. This I can test in the

laboratory of experience. Here I see the growth of joy in experience, the sense of deepening and of "spiritual well-being" in and through experience. This being so, I should require very substantial reasons indeed to convince me that the road of spiritual growth has as its highest consummation a state of non-experiencing in which the Self—pure consciousness—might be likened to a mirror turned up toward the cloudless sky, reflecting nothing. The nature of the road is no preparation for such an end. The end is less noble than the road. This is not the joy—the Ānandá—that I envisage, bereft as it would be of all sense of mutuality. For I see the goal not as need-removed but as need-fulfilled. I am conscious of the deepening and enrichment of personality in the unselfishness and self-forgetfulness begotten of true love. Is there then, in reality, nothing to love? Is all this joy and sense of *need-satisfied* but the result of that which has only a temporary and lower reality? Is it something for the dissolution of which I am to work? Am I to realize my true ānandá by the vanishing from consciousness of all that which has made me conscious of an ever deepening joy? That would indeed be a poor consummation.

I do not want you to think that I understand the broad teachings of the Upanishads have these implications, but it does seem to fairly represent the tendency of certain of the commentators on them. My point is that if we hold the Conscious Personality to be the Self—pure consciousness—individuated merely by a terminable association with a non-Self (Prakṛti), then what I have been saying would logically appear to follow. The

highest state (परम गतिः) would mean salvation from the consciousness of fleeting pain and pleasure, and of "birth and death," it is true, but it would also mean salvation from deep self-forgetful love, from the joy which comes in the sense of finding one's fulfillment and completion beyond the "I", from the joy of the sense of *giving* and *sharing*—in short, salvation from experience. This I cannot hold to be a goal worthy of that which is conscious personally and feels itself growing in depth and nobility by the path of loving self-forgetfulness.

Nor, as I have said, do I see it as the goal of the Upanishads. In that goal is no cessation of experience, but the fulfillment of the essential need of the Self. There, stripped of the ephemeral and non-essential, "true desires" are fulfilled, for

> "These same are real desires (satyā kāmā) with a covering of what is false……For truly, whoever of one's departs hence, one does not get him to look at here.
>
> But those of one's who are alive there, and those who have departed, and whatever else one desires and does not get—all this one finds by going in there; for there truly, are those real desires of his which have a covering of what is false.

This, surely, is not the language of one who conceives the finding of the goal in the Self to be salvation from experience.

Indra and Prajapati.

There is a wonderful old story in the Chandogya of how Virocana and Indra came to the sage Prajapati to be taught "the Self which is free from evil, ageless, deathless, sorrowless, hungerless, thirstless,

whose desire is the Real, whose conception is the real."

Virocana soon went away satisfied with appearances, but Indra persisted. Prajapati would teach him a half-truth and send him away under the impression that he had learned, the whole. Indra would depart joyfully but on his way home he would see that the teaching he had received was not the ultimate reality, and back he would come.

I cannot tell the whole story here, but the last return of Indra is of special interest. He had served Prajapati for ninty-six years and the sage had dismissed him saying

> "Now, when one is asleep, composed, serene, and *knows no dream*--that is the Self, that is the immortal, the fearless. That is Bráhman."

The narrative continues

> "Then with tranquil heart he went forth. Then, even before reaching the gods, he saw this danger. Assuredly, indeed, this one (i.e. the Self just taught him by Prajapati) does not exactly know himself with the thought '*I am he*', nor indeed *the things here*. He becomes one who has gone to destruction. I see nothing enjoyable in this."

So he went back to the sage, who admitted the validity of his objections, and after another five years of discipline taught him of the Self-rising from the body and reaching "the highest light" which he describes as replete with experience.

You will appreciate why I have given so much space to this story. What can be more obvious than that the sage Prajapati's conception of the "highest light" was not I-less or experience-less. The substance of Indra's objection was, "Such a

one as you have pictured as in dreamless sleep, would not know the "I"—would not be personal; would not know *things here*—would not experience. He would be as one destroyed—his consciousness would be equivalent to unconsciousness."

The sage agreed and carried him farther. So, whether I am in agreement with Prajapati as regards other details, we are at one—and I am convinced that the Upanishads taken as a whole are with us—in holding that the Self is not merely pure consciousness, but something which in "the highest light," as well as in this transitory phase, is conscious, personal and experiencing. Such a self must be viewed as a conscious personality.

"And," says the sage in summing up his teaching to Indra, "He obtains all worlds and all desires who has found out and understands that Self."

Personality a Mode of Purusha.

At one time I inclined to believe that individualized conscious personality is a complex—the joint expression, as it were of Púrusha and Prakṛti. I conceived that it had its basis of consciousness in Púrusha and its individuation and form in Prakṛti. I thought of it as Púrusha, but more than Púrusha; as Prakṛti, but more than Prakṛti. It seemed to me that in it Púrusha and Prakṛti achieved, so to speak their joint *consummation*, that in it each brought about the highest fulfilment of the other, and that (though they did not mix like the waters of two rivers) they together formed one true conscious and individuated personality, fitted to be the fulfilling of the timeless need of God.

I have been trying to tell you in the last few pages why I was led to discard this conception. It was not based upon the vision of the Púrusha as that which is potentially or actually conscious —*that* in which the potentiality of consciousness is essentially inherent. It rose out of a lack of clarity in thought which caused me to think of Púrusha as that of which necessarily *nothing* could be predicated but potential or essential consciousness. There is a vital difference in these two conceptions. In the first, consciousness is a *quality* of that something in which it is inherent, and its presence does not preclude the possibility of the inherence of other potentialities. In the second, consciousness would be the pure essence of Púrusha, and the Púrusha could only function as that in which individuation is reflected. For reasons I have already given, and for others that will appear later, I had to reject this second conception.

Paramatman essentially conscious and personal.

I would not have you confuse the conception for which the term Púrusha stands with that which I have denominated Individuated Conscious Personality. As we proceed you will see that I use the latter to describe a mode (परिणाम) under which Púrusha evolves through the instrumentality of, and in reaction to evolving Prakṛti. I do not hold Púrusha to be essentially conscious or essentially personal, but only potentially so until its manifestation (व्यक्ति). Here, if at any point in my vision of the meaning of life, I am at variance with the usually accepted thought of this land. Remember that Púrusha is not, of course, Paramâtmân in the view that I am placing before you. I hold

Paramâtmân to be *in essence* both conscious and personal; in whom there is no change of mode, no growth or evolution, but who progressively finds through the instrumentality of us and our experiencing the expression and fulfilment of that which is timelessly present in His nature.

But to return to the Púrusha. As I have said, I cannot conceive of consciousness as more than a potentiality apart from *experience*. Therefore, if I accepted the idea of Púrusha as *essentially* conscious, I should have also to conceive of it as experiencing from beginningless time. I should also have to conceive of that beginningless experiencing as in personal mode, for it is in that mode that there is consciousness of it.

When I get to this point I must draw one of two conclusions: Either the "I" represents a conscious and personal subject of experiencing, *or* the "I" is nothing more than a part of the experience present to an impersonal consciousness. In the latter event it is Prakṛti and extraneous to the Self (pure consciousness). Here the personal is unconscious and the conscious is impersonal. I have said why I cannot accept this position.

The conception of *Ahaṃkāra* (individuated self-consciousness) plays, as you will see shortly, an important part in my interpretation of life, but it does not stand for a Prakṛtic process of "I"-building. The "I", as I apprehend its significance, is not the *"I" in experience* but *the conscious and experiencing "I"*. It is not Prakṛti but *Púrusha* realizing its inherent potentialities personally.

If this be so then conscious individuated Personality is in its ultimate essence Púrusha.

Why Purusha cannot be essentially conscious or personal.

But personality is undoubtedly something which grows and develops. I am quite conscious of my personal growth and development in reaction to that small area of experience of which there is memory. There appears to be evolution of Personality—not merely evolution of experience. The reaction to an identical experience is quite different now to what it would have been thirty years ago, or ten, or even five. I appreciate, of course, that the significance of every experience depends considerably upon the colour it receives from the whole content of memory, but memory (I will discuss this more fully later) is an essential factor in personality, and the growth of its content does not influence me against belief in Personality's growth and evolution; on the contrary, it strengthens my conviction.

But if Personality grows, if it becomes clearer, more defined as the basis of character, then can we doubt that—as Personality—it had a beginning? If it is more clearly cut now than it was five years ago—I am using time-values to express a sequence in evolution—it was at that time less clearly defined than it is today. And going back, there must have been a day when it was not defined at all—when there was nothing that could be rightly described as personality. In other words, that which becomes *more*, which grows, must have had a beginning. But what kind of beginning? Surely the beginning of its growth and evolution. Does this mean that before that it was nothing? Surely not; nothing does not evolve as something. There must, then, have been a something that, before evolution commenced, was impersonal, and which with the commencement of evolution

either suddenly or gradually manifested itself as personal. That something is what I have called Púrusha.

Take consciousness in the same way. If consciousness is only a *potentiality* apart from something of which it may be conscious, then what have we? I am conscious of an ever enlarging experience-content. It was less yesterday than it is to-day. Pursue it backward and we reach a point when the experience-content of consciousness must have been *nil*. At that point consciousness is conscious of nothing; it is only a potentiality. But can a potentiality be inherent in *nothing*? Of course not; it must inhere in something. That something, unconscious of anything, but in which the potentiality to experience consciously was inherent, is again what I have called Púrusha.

Now I hope you can appreciate, dearest, why I think of Púrusha as in essence neither conscious or personal, but as having inherent in it the capacity to evolve under the mode of conscious personality. Therefore I see you—I see myself—even after we have stripped off that "covering of the false" (i. e. the purely temporary and non-essential)—as still personal and conscious, and withal Púrusha. And as such, I hold that we too—we as consciously experiencing individuated centres of personality—are Bráhman, evolving modes (विकार) of one of the essential aspects (प्रकार) of timeless being.

We are essentially Timeless but personally in Time.

Comforting Arjuna who was filled with distress at the thought of the impending slaughter of his kinsmen at Kurukshetra, Krishna said—

> "Not at any time, verily, was I not, nor thou, nor these princes of men, nor verily shall we ever cease to be hereafter."

So I also believe. Not at any time were you not, nor I. For I hold us to be very Púrusha and as such, beyond time. But as *you* and as *I*—as personal individuations—I think that we are not timeless, and that there was a beginning.

Yet this does not mean that these personal individuations must have an end—that as they are evolutions of that which before was unconscious and impersonal, so they will revert to that condition of unmanifestation (अव्यक्ति). As you will see later, I do not consider the dissolution of a centre of conscious personality and its devolution into primal unmanifest Púrusha, to be absolutely impossible under certain abnormal conditions. But the normal course of personal evolution would seem to be in the direction of greater definition and more clearly marked individuation, associated with a progressively widening and deepening consciousness-content. This does not seem a path that will lead back to unconsciousness and impersonality, or to the fading away of individuality.

My own feeling is that the passing-over of the Púrusha from a state of latent potentiality to that of manifestation is one that timelessly has its place in Bráhman. It is a beginningless and endlessly progressive passing-over into manifestation of that Púrusha in which is inherent a potentiality for conscious and personal evolution as unbounded and limitless as the infinite need of Paramâtmán.

Nor must we think that this conception of a

permanent passing-over in time of a timeless category of being, from one state to another, is arbitrary, and peculiar to me. The same conception is present in some of the most important philosophic thought in this country. Think of Prakṛti subsisting "from beginningless time" (in association with the Self) under the mode of numberless "Jīvâs", each of which ceases to exist as such when Prakṛti has become disassociated from the Self at the time of the destruction of Avidya. Have we not here a good analogy? For we are told in the Upanishads that there is no return.

The Reality Underlying "Human" Experience.

I think, dear one, that you must be getting tired of so much abstraction, and that possibly my meaning will become clear if I work it out in the terms of the life of our present experience. I hope to be getting to this before very long, but there are a few points which I feel we must consider first. I am sure you will be patient with me.

We must, as I have said would be necessary, deal with the world we really know only as experience, as though dealing directly with things in themselves. This is the practical (व्यवहारिक) and indeed the only workable method. Moreover, as I have told you more than once, I believe that the reals of the experience-world of the Self have expression there just because of the existence of corresponding causes independent of the content of consciousness. The reals of the experience-world of the Self are the *truth* in terms of its experience of those differentiated causal factors which can be known nowhere else and in no other

way. Or, to be more exact, they are the *truth* of them in so far as that truth has been presented to consciousness in terms of personal experience. They are the true expression of them in the *present* terms of an evolving and growing experience. And obviously it is only on its present terms that we can depend for our interpretation when we set out to apprehend the significance of experience as a guide to the meaning of life. In these present terms—in *human* experience—you are my beloved wife and dear companion and the mother of the children in whom our love finds a united expression. This is the *true* expression in the terms of our human experience of a truth—a reality—which itself lies beyond human nature, and being human it is only a temporary expression of that truth. Our relation as man and wife is only a fleeting expression of the truth of our relationship. But there *is* a relationship; that is why we have a human expression of it. What you are to me is *humanly* expressed in terms of wifehood; what I am to you is *humanly* expressed in terms of husbandhood. Deep in the Self—in yourself, myself—lies the reality so far as it has evolved, which we know here garbed in the forms of this human relationship.

Of course I am not referring to the mere marriage relationship. That may be a mere form with nothing behind it. I am speaking of what *our* wedded life has been to us.

"Not for the sake of the *wife* is the wife dear," says the sage Yajnavalkya to his wife Maitreyi, "but for the sake of the Self the wife is dear." The wife—wifehood—the fleeting expression of the reality behind, is dear because it is an expression of that dear reality. That which

you truly are, that which I truly am—these two conscious and personal modes of the Púrusha—have realized a relationship with each other so precious that the human expression of it is dear as associated with the reality. It would not be dear if that did not lie back of it.

The relationship itself is "real"; the human expression of it is "false" (असत्) not in the sense of being an *untrue* expression of it, but because it is neither its permanent or essential expression. This, for me, is what the Sage means when he speaks of our desires as "true, but with covering of what is false."

In that real—that inner life of ours, which is temporarily interpreted to us in terms of human experience, we are beloved realities to each other. Through experience clothed in the terms of human relationships, a real relationship has been established *there.* That relationship we only know so far in terms of its present interpretation, but as it grows the human interpretation will not be wide enough to express its implications. Our evolving life—that real life of Púrusha, conscious and personal in its modes of you and me—will, as it grows ever richer and deeper, reveal to us ever richer and deeper implications in our relationship, requiring ever richer forms to implement them. What those forms will be we of course cannot know, as they will depend upon what we are. But as my thought carries me forward, on down the reaches of endless time, I see us growing more and more capable of knowing what we are to each other, and ever more capable of being more to each other, as we progressively realize the Púrusha's limitless potentialities for conscious and personal experiencing in us. The future

alone can reveal the ever richer and more wonderful interpretation in terms of experience that our love will require to adequately clothe it as we progressively explore its implications. But I must not allow myself to be led any further along this path at present. I would only add that I see it all as an evolution, orderly, gradual, each new phase of experience a consequence of what life has meant to us in the phase before it, growing out of it, as it were, and linked to it; that which can no longer express our growing capacity for experience fading away to be replaced by what will. As Krishna says—

> "Just as a man casts off worn-out clothes
> and puts on others which are new,
> So the embodied (Self) casts off worn-out bodies,
> and enters others which are new."

The Two-fold Evolution.

As I go on to work out my conception of Bráhman and its implications in the terms of the life of "this world," we shall see two distinct (though intimately related) processes of evolution taking place—the evolution of the Prakṛti, arising from its association with Púrusha, whereby slowly through the ages ever more efficient vehicles of experience are being built up; and the evolution of the Púrusha under the mode of conscious personality with evolving Prakṛti as the instrument and clothing of its ever growing experience.

The story of the parallel evolution of the two subsidiary categories of the timeless Bráhman, is, as I read it, the story of the manifestation of Personality in a world of conscious experiencing.

It is a story of action and re-action in which the timelessly inherent potentialities of the Púrusha and the Prakṛti, called into manifestation by the impelling desire arising from Paramâtmic need, find their realization. Each is seen contributing its essential share to the elaboration and evolution of the other. On the one side the vehicle and the field (क्षेत्र) of experience are being built up; upon the other the *Experiencer* is having its capacity to experience evolved. Each process is strictly dependent upon the other.

The Experiencer is Púrusha in manifestation, realizing its potentiality to evolve under the mode of conscious personality—that is to say as a conscious subject of experience.

Its vehicle, as we know it in experience, is the *body* and all that the body implies. This includes, of course, the brain and nervous system, and consequently the mind.

(We must, however, avoid confusing ourselves with the thought of the Experiencer as *in* the body, which it uses—to employ telegraphic phraseology—as the receiving and transmitting station. We very naturally tend to do this because *place* is a very important factor in the prakṛti of our experience. But though we may think of *place* in relation to that which we expernce as *body*, we are not justified in doing so in relation to the Experiencer. That may not be said to be either *in* the body or *outside* the body, or at a distance from it. It is not *here*; it is not *there*; it is not *anywhere*. It is Púrusha and does not come within the category to which the conception of *place* may be applied. The most we can say is that the body is the vehicle for an experiencing centre of personality.

My body is that *through* which I at present experience. The form in which the experience is presented to me strictly depends upon the idiosyncracies of the brain, nervous system, and resultant mentality, which this body has inherited from the bodies from which it is descended, as a consequence of their reaction to what other centres of personality have experienced through them. But though this is the case, and though the nature of my experience is vitally affected by the peculiarities of the body through which I experience, and I myself am largely limited as to the extent of my experience by that body, it must be clearly recognised that there is no question of "a bit of Prakṛti with a bit of Púrusha in it." I should hold this to be an altogether mistaken conception. I see the body, rather, as an evolved and elaborated mode of Prakṛti which functions as the vehicle for the expression and experience of the Púrusha as evolved under personally conscious mode in me. Neither is *in* the other.

As to what we find in experience as *place*—we know it there as the expression of a certain sort of relationship between experience-reals. What the independent truth of it is, as apart from the clothing of that truth in experience, it is quite impossible to say.)

The Evolution of the vehicle.

Let us now return, dearest, to the question of the two-fold evolution with which we were engaged some paragraphs back. Although they are intimately bound up with one another, and each is as far as our experience carries us—strictly dependent upon the other, it will be convenient to first approach the subject on the side of Prakṛti.

You will recall how Drummond in "The Ascent of Man" showed that all the higher forms of organic life have been slowly developed from an ultimate form of great simplicity. You will also recall his pointing out that the process of evolution is one of progress from the simple to the complex—from the ultimate undifferentiated plasmic form to the most wonderful and varied developments of those potentialities that must have been present in it. He traced, as you will remember, the evolution of the single cell; showed how it divided and became two; how these two each dividing became four; the four, eight; the eight, sixteen, and so on; and also this is the process by which the highly complex structure of man's body has been built up from the tiny impregnated cell clinging to the side of the womb.

This building up of the elaborated structure of the human body—and of all other organisms, for that matter—has been possible because the process of evolution has not merely been in the direction of numerical increase. Had this been the case our world would have been filled with vast masses of simple cells, or—to be more exact —of the first and simplest life-forms, whatever they may have been. These forms, however, had inherent in them the capacity to undergo modification in response to differing stimuli, and to transmit the modifications. We are not concerned with the details of this process, or the exact manner in which reactions to differing environments resulted in different realizations of the potentialities present in the primitive life-forms. It is sufficient for us to appreciate that all the wondrous complexity of organic life is the

outcome of a process of progressive differentiation from the simple to the complex.

Gradually wave and tide and current distributed that earliest life-form—the far-off progenator of all the organic life we see about us now—so that its representatives were compelled to sustain themselves under widely divergent conditions of light and darkness, heat and cold and food. The result was modification. The potentiality was identical in all representatives, but it was a potentiality to react in one way under one set of conditions, and another way under other conditions. Slowly through millions of years the differences between the evolving forms increased and were handed on. More and more complex aggregates of modified cellular life were built up into organic structures, each of them evolving from the cell in which was inherent all of its particular heritage. The modifications transmitted from life to life in each chain of evolution were gradually added to. Thus the differentiation grew ever greater, resulting in the crowded organic life of our world today in its endless variety, divided into its animal and vegetable manifestations, and these again into various genera, species and varieties—all of them still probably more or less subject to modification as their inherent potentialities are called upon to react to new stimuli.

Progressive Differentiation.

Probably a man of science could find fault with my attempt to describe the evolutionary process, but I make no profession to an exact knowledge of details. Neither am I greatly interested in them; they are not essential to my purpose here. It is

the great central truth of Evolution—progressive differentiation—that has a philosophic significance to me, and it is only in this connection that I venture to make use of it.

From this viewpoint what does the evolutionary process reveal to us? In the first place we see that it is one which, starting from the utmost simplicity develops toward an ever increasing complexity. We also see *continuity*—a process at work whereby the (relatively) permanent *type* continues its slow evolution undisturbed by the birth and death of the countless fleeting organisms that sustain it. Standing at the beginning of its evolution in the undifferentiated, gradually through the ages building up along lines which at some point become peculiar to itself, the type transcends birth and death.

As regards these types another thing must strike us. Some of them evolve to a greater degree of complexity than others. Some appear to reach a certain point in their evolution and stop there. At least there are living representatives of certain types that appear to differ not at all from their ancestors of a million years ago. Nor is there anything that leads scientists to think such types are all merely pausing on their road to a higher development comparable, say, with that of man. Whatever the inherent potentialities of the human type may be—and doubtless it has its definite limitations—no one imagines that a mud-turtle, for instance, will ever evolve human characteristics. Some types will probably remain very much what they are now until their elimination; others may be destined to evolve along their own lines in the remote future to a complexity and a level

of intelligence far above the human. But once differentiation has come about there is no going back; all advance thereafter must be in the direction of greater difference. Evolution is not *toward* a common type but *away* from it.

So here we have a vast variety of relatively permanent types, sustained in the countless brief-lived creatures that constitute the animal and vegetable life of our world. Some of these are highly evolved, as man; others are in comparison extremely simple. Yet in each is the capacity to function as a vehicle of experience for forms of experience which must necessarily differ according to the nature and limitations of the types and the individual organisms representing them.

Each of these types—species, varieties—represents a specific bodily and mental organisation. The *mentality* of the horse—and by this I mean the *form* which the activity of thinking or experiencing must necessarily take as a direct consequence of the structural peculiarities of every horse's brain, nervous-system, etc.,—is definitely different from the mentality of the dog. The field of experience open to that which experiences through the horse-mind differs from the field open to that which experiences in terms of canine mentality. These type-mentalities, as diverse and as multitudinous as the different forms of organic life with which sky and earth and sea are teeming, are all of them differentiated channels through which and moulded into the terms of which, the experienced reaches the experiencer.

In addition to this vast diversity of type-mentalities, there are also the less clearly marked

but very real differences between the mentalities of the various representatives of the same type. No two of them—at least among the higher organisms—are probably exactly similar.

Reasons for rejecting the conception of a "Subtle Body".

I hold all these "mentalities" to be purely prakṛtic, the product of organic evolution. What the mentality, or "mind", (the two words mean the same to me) is in any type or individual representative of a type, seems to me to be entirely dependent upon the structural peculiarities of the organism. If this view be correct, it naturally follows that each mind is as short-lived as the organism; the dissolution of a body would necessarily involve the dissolution of its mind.

Of course I do not claim that this is an orthodox conception. The *Manas* and *Buddhi* (intellecting faculty) in the various Indian systems are also considered to be Prakṛtic, but here they are associated with a "Subtle Body" (सूक्ष्म शरीर) which survives the dissolution of the gross body, and, as included in the former, maintains its association with the individuated Self from birth to birth until the final illumination (the मोक्षः or लयः of the Vedānta.)

If I could bring myself to think of "Pure Consciousness" as the Self, and all individuation as of the non-Self, I should doubtless be compelled logically to postulate a "Subtle Body", or an "Upādhi" transmigrating from one gross body to another. Without it continuity would not be possible; for otherwise the dissolution of the gross body would immediately "release" the Self from the consciousness of individuated

experience, and actions would fail to produce their fruits. The believer in the Self as Pure Consciousness—and not as *That which is conscious*—had to postulate the "Subtle Body" as the instrument of continuity, just as the Christian believer that God is Love was compelled to postulate more than one "person" in the Godhead. Had the Self been conceived of as *conscious*, instead of as *consciousness*, it seems to me that there would have been no need to postulate a subtle body. Had the object of God's love been conceived of as timelessly existent by and with reference to the Divine Nature, there would have been no necessity for developing a doctrine which appears to militate against the unity of Divine Personality.

But for my part, as you will see more clearly when I attempt to interpret life in terms of my vision of it, I see Paramâtmán—God—as One, Personal and eternally experiencing; and I see Conscious Personality—yours, mine, all others—as essentially one in substrate, since they are modes (परिणाम) of the timeless Púrusha, permanently roused to consciousness and set evolving through the medium of experience upon a path of ever-growing individuation. At the starting-point of each such evolution, where timelessly existing potentiality under the impelling urge of the Divine willing (संकल्प) emerges from unmanifestation into the path of progressive realization, I see the Púrusha as *One* and unindividuated—undifferentiated—just awaking to conscious experience. And at the goal I still see it as *One*, but with a Oneness of infinitely deeper and richer significance. But it is not the time for me to go into that yet.

It will be safer, however, for us to keep in

mind that the usual conception of the "Jīvâ"—the individuated Self—and my conception of the individuated conscious personality are far from identical. In the conception of the Jīvâ, the individuation is only of the non-Self—the upādhi; it disappears from consciousness with their dissolution. But the individuated Conscious Personality which looms so importantly in my view is not *one thing plus another*. It is *Púrusha* in the process of realizing its essential and timelessly inherent potentialities—Púrusha and nothing more. It is Púrusha consciously realizing itself in the mode of personality along various paths in response to differing aggregates of experience. For I hold that the *texture* of Personality undergoes modification in reaction to what is experienced, that Personality (using the term in its widest sense) and consciousness cannot be separated, and are qualities characteristic of Púrusha when the latter is in the process of unfolding or realizing its inherent potentialities. In the first conception it is the *upādhi* which is evolving up to the point where it is eliminated; in my view it is the *Self*—my very self, timelessly and changelessly Púrusha—which is evolving personally and consciously under the stimulus of experience.

It is because the evolution is in the *Self* that there is no necessity for its being accompanied by a subtle body in order to sustain the continuity of the process from birth to birth.

But if it is Púrusha itself that is in evolution under the mode of conscious Personality, individuated in me, in you and all other subjects of experience, it would seem to follow that the

various centres of conscious personality are not equally evolved. How should they be if that which differentiates them is the modification of texture (as personality) which each has undergone as a result of its reactions to a differing aggregate of experience? Some would be more defined, more evolved and individuated than others, and each would be able to experience efficiently only through a vehicle properly adapted to its needs at the level it had reached. To me, at least, this last seems obvious. For example, take my own personality, with its deep capacity for feeling, sympathy, yearning, love, its urgent sense of need to reach out for the truth at the back of phenomena—feelings deeper than thought and at present only capable of a slight appropriation in terms of the intellect. Let us suppose that this deeply feeling Personality with its consciousness of need too great for thought to interpret, or even human nature satisfy, full of an urge for self-expression before which the mind reels and tongue and pen are well nigh impotent, were dissociated from its present vehicle of experience and expression—from this particular human brain and nervous system with their inherited capacity to function as the channel and instrument of the experience-life it knows at present, and were compelled to depend for the terms of its experience upon a less complex vehicle—say the body etc. of a *rat*. I can imagine the agony—the sense of frustration and limitation that would result. The apparatus of experience in a rat, strictly limited as to its potentialities by the structure of its brain etc., is, as compared with that of my present vehicle of experience, extremely simple. It would be utterly incapable

of functioning as the adequate instrument of my present experiencing life. It would not supply the mental form for more than an insignificant part of what I feel or seek to express. The situation of this personal Self under such conditions would be in some ways similar to that of an old friend I remember who had been stricken with paralysis. Before the stroke I recall him as a strong, intelligent, self-reliant man. I saw him afterwards when he could hardly speak and his movements were feeble and uncertain. He would try so hard to express himself, and when he failed the tears would come into his eyes and he would look so pathetic that my boyish heart was filled with intense pity. The analogy, of course, cannot be pressed; I find it, however, in the agony and sense of frustration manifestly experienced by one who was compelled to depend upon an inadequate vehicle.

No; the organs associated with the processes of thought and expression in a rat could only function satisfactorily for a conscious Experiencer whose needs were proportionately simple. The evolving centre of Personality for whose experience the terms of rat-mentality are adequate must obviously be less complex than mine. My conclusion, therefore, is that each body with its specific faculties is only capable of functioning as an efficient vehicle of experience for an evolving centre of Personality at a specific stage in the evolution of the latter.

The Significance of Heredity.

When the matter is viewed in this light it becomes apparent that the problem of *heredity* is concerned purely with the structure of the body, brain, nervous system,

and with those faculties that depend upon them. There is no place for "spiritual heredity". There is no handing on of personality from parents to offspring in the organic evolution; the two evolutions, though inter-dependent, are distinct and dissimilar. Heredity is a matter of the vehicle—not of the Experiencer. In accordance with the laws of organic evolution the Prakṛti which functions as the vehicle of experiencing, is what it is because of the peculiarities and modifications embodied in its physiological forbears.

My body, for example, is a link in a long line of evolving organisms. It is what it is just because they were what they were. Its mental faculties, capacity as an instrument of thought, nervous idiosyncracies, etc., are due primarily to a certain specific combination of factors inherited from a net work of preceding organisms. Whatever development is taking place in it as a result of environment—or, in other words, of external stimuli—is the expression of the reaction of this particular bodily inheritance to such stimuli. The *nature* of the reaction is strictly dependent upon the nature of the heritage. Later I shall attempt to show that among the most potent of these external stimuli is the texture of feeling and willing of the centre of Personality experiencing through it.

We should be able to appreciate, then, that from this standpoint the whole significance of the process of organic evolution lies in the fact that it is calculated to build up vehicles for experience of great variety and differing degrees of complexity, each of them fitted to function as an instrument and channel of experience and

expression for Púrusha evolving under the mode of individuated conscious personality.

Viewed thus the question of *heredity* acquires a new significance. If organic evolution is engaged in building up vehicles of experience for the Púrusha, together with the sustained cultural and idealistic environments which its continuity renders possible, then it is of vital importance that these vehicles should realize their highest potentialities. Were it appreciated that the progress or retardation of Púrusha-evolution is dependent upon it, the duty of working for the progressive ennoblement of the vehicle would become clear. There would be a new and nobler conception of the function of Eugenics.

Could we but envision organic life as the noble and wondrous vehicle built up through the ages with limitless travail and pain, we would treat it more reverently. We would not lightly or in passion mutilate and disintegrate it for selfish ends. The "survival of the fittest" and "birth-control" would no longer be preached merely upon grounds of petty national or individual expediency for little immediate ends. We would seek to control and influence the vehicle's evolution that it might become ever a more efficient instrument for Púrusha whose further progress is so strictly dependent upon it. For to misuse it is to be a traitor to Púrusha.

The Evolution of the Purusha.

Hitherto I have been discussing the evolution of the vehicle, without special reference to the influence of the evolving personal mode of the Púrusha upon it. Yet, as I have said more than once, I conceive that the evolutionary developments

of the two run parallel and are mutually dependent.

Of course it is not difficult to describe the evolution of the vehicle; the work of scientists has revealed so much of this that I need go into no details. But what of the evolution of the consciously experiencing centre of Personality as distinguished from its vehicle? Are we in a position to say that this too undergoes evolution? I think that we are, though of course it is not so easy to describe it, for here we are dealing with that which lies back of the senses, beyond the mind, more ultimate than thought. How are we to describe it with the means at our disposal? All I can do is to flounder on as best I may and hope that somehow or other I shall find a way to put something of what I see into words. Indeed I never realized the weakness of words till I tried to use them for such work as this.

The question before us is whether the *texture* of personality undergoes a change as a result of its reaction to experience. Let us see. Have you ever heard it said of some one that after a certain experience "he was a changed man"? *What* was changed? The same man was there, the same bodily and intellectual constitution. Of course the experience may have been of such a nature as to produce some great functional alteration, in which case it obviously should be attributed at least in part to a modification in the vehicle. But sometimes one becomes a "changed man" or a "different man" as a result of experience which could have entailed no functional disorder producing abnormal conditions in the vehicle. I remember such an occurrence in my own life—the hearing one Sunday in my boyhood of a hymn

that I had not only often heard before but knew by heart. There was no question of the hymn's having wrought a sudden intellectual change; I was familiar with the sentiments it contained, intellectually, from childhood. All I can say is that on that occasion it was experienced in a manner that produced a profound change in me. I was the same youngster, with the same mental and physical capacity, but I felt somehow *different* (not merely differently). I was the same and yet not the same. The world was the same old familiar world I had known, but my relation to it seemed to have shifted. There were all the old things, all the interests just where I had left them a couple of hours before, but *I* experienced them differently, and *willed* differently in relation to them.

This was, of course, what James calls a 'variety of religious experience', and not an uncommon one. I am convinced of one thing, however: the change took place, not in my physical or mental constitution, but in *feeling*. It was not that I felt a different *life*, but that *I* felt life differently. I took up life at the same point, and it was not the life but the *I* that was changed. There was no shock to the system, no sudden intellectual illumination; the change was in something other than these. I hold that here was no change in the vehicle of experience, but in the *Experiencer* in reaction to experience; the texture of this personality had undergone modification as to the character of its feeling and willing.

I have taken this example from my own life, and because "religious conversions" are among the commonest and most striking illustrations of how deep changes are suddenly brought about in

that feeling, personal something which I call personality, and hold to be a mode of Púrusha. Yet why confine ourselves to such examples? Does not all that we know—you and I—show how personality undergoes modification in reaction to experience? Would you—the conscious, feeling *you*—be what and as you are, had not love for me entered into your life? Has not each great experience that we have met left us the same yet different than we were before?

Of course, those who believe that the Self is *pure consciousness* would say that the change had taken place in the *antáhkarana* (i.e. seat of thought and feeling in the vehicle) and was present to consciousness. I, on the contrary, —holding consciousness to be a *quality*, not an independent entity—would say that Púrusha, evolving in personal mode, is conscious of itself as "I" and conscious of that "I" as progressively undergoing modification as to the terms of its personality in reaction to experience. Nor do I hold that it is only the profounder reactions that give rise to modifications in it; rather, it is steadily undergoing modification and evolution in the texture of its personal feeling and desire (formulated through the vehicle as purpose) as a result of its progressive reactions to all sorts and forms of experience, each of which exercises its influence in drawing into manifestation the potentialities timelessly inherent in the Púrusha.

We see, then that the personality undergoes modification in reaction to experience, and this necessarily implies differentiation as between personalities that have evolved in reaction to different experience-aggregates, but it might be object-

ed that when the intellect, mind, temperament, etc., are assigned to the Prakṛitic vehicle, what is left as conscious personality is such a tenuous thing that it is hard to see what place remains for individuality. I think our difficulty here lies in our circumstances—in the fact that our experience-life is so completely dependent upon our vehicle that we tend to largely identify its highest manifestations with ourself. This is not only natural but to some extent almost inevitable. If the processes of thought are prakṛtic, if the garb in which our conceptions are clothed belongs to the non-self, if the factors to be compared and distinguished must be presented to us prakṛtically before the intellect can be instrumental for their apprehension, we can hardly be surprised that the conception of Conscious Personality, as apart from these, seems dim and hard to grasp. Fortunately there is no reason for our attempting to do so except in an investigation such as this, unless we believe that the goal of personal evolution includes severance from dependence on Prakṛti.

Though I strongly incline to believe that the conscious centre of evolving personality must *always* have a vehicle, this does not incline me to confuse the one with the other. Even if such a conjunction is permanently essential to endlessly Personal life, the Self and the non-self will never merge in each other. The evolution of the Personality will be sustained and continuous but its vehicles many—put off like worn-out garments as each in turn ceases to adequately implement its capacity for experience. Our only alternative is to accept the idea of the "subtle body" and that the individuality of the personal self lies

only in its vehicle. My reason for not accepting this, I have already given.

But dispite the difficulties that confront us, let us try to grasp as clearly as our limitations permit us, the nature of these personal modes of Púrusha, and see how the differences in the texture of each would make themselves felt in the world of our experience.

The Purusha is That which Feels.

When dealing with the centre of Personality as *apart* from the vehicle, I conceive that we are dealing with *that which feels.* Of course it is also that which *thinks* (the subject in intellection) and the *user*, but here we see it in connection with its vehicle. So it is as *that which feels*, as apart from thought, etc., that we must attempt to study it.

Now *feeling* is also experience, but the area of feeling to which I refer might be described as one very real and deep but without form (अरूप). That is to say, it is not feeling in terms of this thought-form or that thought-form; it is simply *feeling*. For example, there might be a deep sense of incompleteness, of need, of yearning, quite apart from any formulation of ideas. Such experience might be very real, very poignant in consciousness quite apart from any mental image. As we proceed you will see that the conviction of the presence of such experience as an *essential* element of Púrusha in conscious mode plays a most important part in my vision of the meaning of life.

Sense of *incompleteness, need, yearning* I hold to be static experience in conscious Púrusha, and the dynamic factor in its evolution when

once Púrusha has been brought into relation with Prakṛti by Paramâtmic volition.

Primary Experience

But this, what I should call *primary experience* ever present to Púrusha in conscious mode, cannot itself be the basis of differentiation between the various centres of Púrusha personality, for it is common to them all. If we wish to discover where the differentiation lies we must look further.

I hold, as I have said, that the sense—the *feeling*—of incompleteness, need, yearning was primary experience, present from the dawn of consciousness in Púrusha at the point where its evolution begins. They were present to consciousness from the first, independent of thought or form, as immediate experience. It was their presence that "started everything going" in the world of thought and concept and formulated purpose. It was the first dim groping for their satisfaction that started the great adventure of Personal growth through formulated experience, and resulted in differentiated modifications in the *feeling* of the Experiencer.

For I do not conceive that there was either personality or individuation immediately upon the dawn of consciousness. There was a dim sense of incompleteness, need, yearning—nothing more.

Modifications in the Texture of Feeling.

Starting unindividuated with the as yet *unformulated essential* experience of incompleteness, need, yearning, I hold that modification in *the texture of feeling* took place in reaction to *formulated non-essential* experience. We all of us, as I said a little while ago, are aware that our whole *feeling*

toward life has undergone modification in the course of our experience of it. As a rule this modification is gradual and imperceptible, but most of us can point to definite experiences which have produced profound changes in our whole emotional attitude. Great joys, great sorrows, spiritual victories and defeats, associated with formulated experience, have left their definite marks upon our *feeling* toward life. We would not be what we are had we not experienced them. Our *feeling* of life is just what it is because of the nature of the experience we have had; each experience, great or small, has been *felt* and has modified to a greater or less degree the texture of feeling. Conscious Personality is that *"I" that feels*, and different experiences have produced different reactions in feeling; it follows therefore that one "I" feels in one way and another "I" in another. If this is true, it means that there is at least as much differentiation between the feeling "I"s as we see in the different bodies, or vehicles, which have also been modified and diversified by a somewhat analogous process.

How would such differentiation in the feeling "I"s affect them in their association with their vehicles of formulated experience? Profoundly, it seems to me. What we are to each other what we *purpose* toward each other—depends primarily upon how we *feel* toward each other. It is in our *feeling* that we are attracted or repelled by what we experience. We may be brought up in the midst of the same environment and tradition but it will be *felt* differently by each of us. This will be partly due to differences in the vehicle, but more to differences in the texture of feeling in the experiencing "I"s.

I admit, of course that what we feel depends to a considerable extent upon our environment, up-bringing, intellectual and nervous equipment, etc. *What it is that we feel*—the form in which we receive what we experience—doubtless depends on these, so far as non-essential formulated experience is concerned. I hold, however, that *how* we feel what is felt or experienced depends much more upon the texture of the centre of personality—the feeling "I". Different centres, because they feel in different ways, will feel differently what may be presented to them in the same formulation. Their reactions will be different; their very intellectual processes will be made to subserve the *feeling* of that personal something which is the subject in thought, and yet is beyond and other than thought. The *form* in thought, just as the form in visual experience, will without doubt determine the nature of the reaction and consequent modification in the texture of the feeling "I," but only to this extent—that the reaction and modification will be inevitably what would result when that particular form of ex-experience was presented to that particular development of feeling personality. Also, what the reaction to that which has been experienced will be when expressed as purpose in terms of thought or action through the instrumentality of the prakṛtic vehicle, will depend always upon the texture of the feeling "I" behind. As the Upanishad has said, 'Buddhi' (intellect) is 'the driver of the chariot,' but it is not the Master; and it is in accordance with the desire of the owner of a vehicle that the driver uses his knowledge to shape the course.

If what I have been saying is correct, it is

obvious that *feeling* is the deepest and most dynamic force in life, the master of thought and action, the final determiner of the nature of experience and of the expression of the Experiencer's reaction to it. If then, the seats of feeling are the personal modes of Púrusha, if that which constitutes the difference between personalities and individuates them is the different way in which each of them feels and wills with reference to what is presented to it, it is clear that we are not justified in thinking of them as lacking in individuality. As I have said, the difficulty lies in our situation, as dependent upon the intellect, senses, etc., for our experience. Yet these are *externals*—the "covering of the false" referred to in Chandogya; external, in that they are not an essential part of the personality; false, in the sense of being transient, ever giving place like worn-out garments to new ones.

"Character"

But if our dependence upon these "externals" —a condition quite natural, and about which we need not worry - impels us to seek for the expression in familiar experience of that Conscious Personality - the feeling "I" that lies beyond thought and the senses--I think we can say that it has its expression here in what we may call *Character*. In doing so, however, we must remember that Character should not be confused with things that do not essentially pertain to it. *Character* is not the character of *thought*, but the character of the *feeling* back of thought; it is not the character of action, but the character of the feeling that finds its expression in action. Though we are probably more or less confused as to what we mean when we speak of

'a man's character,' it seems to me that in the main we are referring to his *feeling* as it expresses itself in his relations with life—to that factor which, more than anything else, determines what he is to life and what life is to him. It is that too which, in each of us, is loved for itself; whatever else is dear to us in one we love is dear because it expresses or is associated with this.

So I conceive that in speaking of one's "character" we are referring especially to the individuated feeling personal self. Character is the character of the centre of Púrusha personality—of *the "I" feeling and willing.* (I am conscious that in making use of the word *feeling*, I lay myself open to misinterpretation. But I am not referring to the surface moods and states of mind—the "Vṛittis" of the Vedānta—though I hold that these wavelets of feeling clearly traceable to experience, have just the form and expression that they do because of the texture of feeling of the personal experiencer).

The influence of the Experiencer upon the Vehicle.

We have seen that the Experiencer—Púrusha in conscious mode as the *feeling "I"*—undergoes a progressive modification of the terms of its personality as it reacts to experience. It remains to be seen how this modification affects the vehicle of experience itself and the whole development of organic evolution. Let us first consider the individual vehicle.

A modification in the texture of a personality results—to put it crudely—in its *feeling differently;* this change soon affects the form of thought; purpose is oriented afresh; activity receives new expressions; and as a consequence the vehicle is

subjected to new environments and stimuli. It is the *feeling* of the "I" which, other factors permitting, will lead the vehicle into a Leper Asylum or a luxurious home. It is *feeling* which determines both our interests and the direction of our efforts. The mind and body stand ever ready to go anywhere and do anything at the call of the feeling of the "I". Had there not been that modification in the feeling of this particular "I" to which I referred some time ago, its vehicle would have been subject to entirely different environment and its mental and physical potentialities would have been drawn out upon different lines.

Again, it is the texture of feeling that determines the development of the mental potentialities in the individual vehicle. Were the feeling of this "I" not what it is, the intellect would not have been driven so remorsely to seek an answer for its yearning. Among other things, this book would never have been written, for it has not been undertaken as an intellectual amusement. Can we believe that the constant use to which this intellect has been put would have no effect upon it--that it is exactly the same instrument of experience that it would have been had no such demand been made upon it? I do not think so. Thus it would appear that the precise texture of feeling of a centre of personality profoundly affects the lines upon which the vehicle developes its inherent potentialities, placing it in situations where it may find its highest expression or the opposite. *Feeling* will drive it to do its best, or let it "eat its head off" till its inherited capacities degenerate by lack of use or by misuse.

So much for the influence exercised by the feeling "I" upon its own vehicle. Does this influence extend beyond that to the organic type as well? I shall deal only with the human but what is true of that is probably true in greater or less degree of all other vehicular developments.

The influence of Feeling upon the Organic Type.

Not being a scientist, I am rather diffident about touching the question of whether the modifications in an individual vehicle, for which the character or texture of the feeling of the "I" is responsible, can be transmitted to the offspring. Those who are engaged in the study of heredity at present seem of the opinion that acquired characteristics probably cannot be handed on. But this need not necessarily mean that what a body has become as a result of the conditions it has been subjected to, will have no relation to *the form* in which it hands on its heritage. Will it have no effect on the development of an organic type if its heritage is handed on through debauched or stunted vehicles, or the reverse? Surely the type or species will realize its highest potentialities to the extent that its individual representatives realize the highest potentialities of their inheritance. Will they be able to hand it on in its entirety if a majority of them over a considerable period are stunted by malnutrition or impaired by disease?

Yet, in the last resort, it is apparent that the texture or character of the feeling of an "I" experiencing through a human vehicle is the primary factor in determining the condition of the vehicle through which the heritage is to be handed on. The essential sense of incompleteness, need, yearning of the Púrusha in conscious

mode, formulated in the terms of the texture of feeling of the individual "I", will be implemented by thought in purpose, and find its expression in activities which, subject to certain limitations, determine whether the vehicle that hands on the heritage of the type is sound and healthy or diseased and unfit.

But the feeling context of the individual "I" does not merely affect the vehicle of its *own* experience. This particular "I" has been fortunate in having a healthy and well-developed vehicle for its experience-life; it might have had one that was less efficient—one, for example, that had its development in the midst of an adverse environment. And why were not squalor, neglect, and the other conditions responsible for mental and physical stunting, the environment of this vehicle—this body—during its growing-time? For one reason only. There were *loving* "I"'s implementing feeling through the instrumentality of thought and action, expressing feeling in loving purpose, that created the environment in which this body could realize its potentialities mentally and physically. Here have we not an example of how the character of the feeling of an "I" determines the nature of the development of the vehicles of other "I"'s? For remember that though love is born through experience presented in terms of the vehicle, it is *in feeling* and represents a modification in the feeling-texture of the "I".

And this has far wider implications. All loving acts, all helpful and uplifting efforts - efforts for the amelioration of conditions unfavourable to the development of the highest potentialities of the vehicles—the minds and bodies of men—have their initiation in *feeling*

beyond thought and form. All unloving deeds, all selfish activities too, find their source there. The determining factor is the feeling-texture of the "I" or aggregate of "I"s. In obedience to that, thought is called in to give form and action to give expression. (An interesting feature is that the higher evolved the personality—the nobler and more loving the texture of its feeling – the more it "takes a hand" in the fortunes of the vehicle. What the implications of this may be for the future of the latter's evolution, or for future vehicles of the evolving personality, who can tell?)

"The Lord of the Chariot".

If you think the matter over you will appreciate how truly the *feeling "I"* is the 'Lord of the chariot'—the master of the vehicle—and that thought and action are the instruments that implement what it feels. True, the vehicle evolves in accordance with its own inherited potentialities, but those potentialities are called into expression by the sense of incompleteness, need, yearning of the feeling "I" experiencing through it and making demands upon it.

Not only do I feel that the feeling "I" is 'lord of the chariot,' but that it is for Púrusha conscious under the mode of personality that the vehicle exists. For it and by reason of it, and with reference to its needs I see the whole web of organic life spreading itself out, and passing on its heritage of potentiality through the ages.

And the "I"s that experience through and in terms of it are not vague colourless

complexity does not necessarily mean progress in the better sense, and may mean just the opposite. For me, however, the significance of evolution lies in its progressive differentiation.

Though I believe that much is yet unsettled as to the manner, there are no schools of scientific thought which do not accept the broad fact of organic evolution. Where it is still opposed the resistance is by the ignorant or the narrow-minded who think—it seems to me quite mistakenly that such a conception of the development of life would undermine "faith". Such people really show a lack of faith when they live in constant fear of having their beliefs "upset". True faith is above fear, and confidently welcomes whatever light research can throw upon the nature and relationship of the factors that are present to experience, strong in the belief that whatever is *true* will sooner or later reveal its relationship to Him who is the Truth.

Copernicus and Galileo had a hard time of it for suggesting that the Sun does not rotate around the Earth, but the movements of the solar system could not be made to conform to the demands and prejudices of men. As the Shāstras have said, it is the *truth* that eventually conquers, and you may rest assured that before long no educated person will doubt that all the manifestations of life we see about us are the product of a process of evolution extending over millions of years, and that all are derived from a form or forms of the utmost simplicity.

It is, of course, not impossible that the ultimate form from which organic life has been evolved was not in each case identical, though

I understand that such a theory has not at present the support of most authorities. Yet even if it should prove that this were the case—that all organic life had not one progenitor—it comes to the same thing in the end. For the first life-form in each case would have been the product of the same cause—the result of the same law working through the instrumentality of somewhat different conditions. That is to say, different conditions present in the constituants forming the physical basis of ultimate life-forms, or the same constituants in somewhat different environments would have reacted differently in obedience to the same natural law. So far as the processes of organic evolution are significant to my vision of the meaning of life, either view is equally acceptable. Whether there was originally a single life-form from which the whole elaboration of organic life in the world has been evolved, or several somewhat different forms, all products of the same law working under slightly different conditions, or even a general flowering of such simple life-forms upon an extended scale, I would see the one or the many as the first vehicle or vehicles of the *one* Púrusha as its awareness of "this world" came to the dawning.

The origin of organic Life.

("You will have noticed that I have been speaking unreservedly for some pages past of vehicles, organic life, evolution, species, varieties, animals, vegetables, etc., as though I knew them directly as *things in themselves*. I said that I should find it necessary to deal with the prakṛti of our Púrusha evolution as if it had in reality exactly the nature, form and properties under the mode of which our perceptions interpret it to us in

experience. But this is only a *working* (व्यवहारिक) method. It is because organic evolution is an experience-real that I conceive its expression there to represent the reaction of this conscious Self to a causal reality independent of it. I am not concerned with what it is *outside* the terms of my experience; it is sufficient for me that *in* the experience-world, which alone I know, its reality has *this* expression, and expressed thus I experience it as affecting both the vehicle and the field of my conscious and personal evolution. It is from the deductions which we are able to make from experience as it interprets itself to the experiencing self that we must judge its significance, for we are cognizant of it only to the extent and in the terms in which we experience it. What it is *there* is the truth of it for us—a truth that will progressively unfold itself in the terms of a progressive experience; what it is *in itself* is what it is to Paramâtmán.)

The multi-personal Evolution of the one and Indivisible Purusha.

As I have said, it is immaterial to me whether there was one ultimate life-form or many. However, for the sake of convenience I shall assume one common "protoplasm" as back of all subsequent variations, and that all living organisms whether animal or vegetable have been evolved from it by a process of progressive modification.

Now I conceive that a somewhat analogous process has been taking place in Púrusha. It too, from the point where it entered a state of awareness, has been undergoing an evolution from

simplicity toward complexity of conscious mode —from *sameness* toward variety or differentiation. This road of Púrusha-evolution is one wherein its potentialities for *feeling* are unfolded through the instrumentality of experience toward the goal of ever more defined and ever richer personal life.

I believe that just as all organic life has been evolved from the simple, undifferentiated "protoplasm", so simple and undifferentiated Púrusha is the starting-point and the basis of all the countless differentiated conscious and personal modes of it with which we are familiar in our experience-world.

In describing this evolution of the Púrusha from the point where, through the urge of Paramâtmic need willing its association with Prakṛti, it is rendered capable of proceeding to realize its inherent potentiality for evolution under conscious and personal mode, we must bear carefully in mind that its course of evolution is *not* one of disintegration. Púrusha, having begun to evolve personally and consciously, does *not* split up, as it were, into a number of evolving entities. The evolving centres of Personality are *not* separate units of Púrusha each pursuing its separate existence. No; we are not dealing with "fragments" (अंश) of Púrusha, but with conscious and personal developments *in* Púrusha—with *feeling "I"s* each having Púrusha as its essential being. To use the language of Indian philosophy, Púrusha is their material cause (उपादान कारण). The Paramâtmic *willing* is their efficient cause (निमित्त कारण). (This may sound strange but my meaning will become clearer as I proceed).

The vital point to remember is that we are going to study the evolution of the Púrusha *one*

and indivisible, taking place under the mode of evolving centres of personality—of "I"s—the texture of whose *feeling* is constantly undergoing modification in reaction to experience. It is *the one Púrusha* which is evolving and achieving personality through these countless centres of progressively personal experience. Just as in the conception of the Trinity the seat of the quality of personality is not conceived to be in the divine essence *as such* but in the modes or "hypostases" under which it is thought of as subsisting, so in the evolving Púrusha the seat of personality is not in its essence *as such* but in the modes under which it comes progressively to subsist.

Don't bother if this is not clear at present; it will become so. Keep only in mind that in all that I am going to write about the evolution of personality, the evolution is of one undivided Púrusha under its many personal modes not of countless separate púrusha-entities each evolving an independent life of its own.

The two-fold Goal of Purusha Evolution.

We shall now attempt to interpret the meaning of life—our life as we know it in experience—in the terms of my vision of it.

I look upon this "world" as the medium in which evolving Púrusha progresses from blind groping to awareness, from awareness to self-consciousness, from self-consciousness to ever more clearly defined and clear-cut personality, from personality to a multi-personal unity. I see its evolution as a process which, beginning with the oneness of undifferentiation, carries it to the richer, nobler unity in which its oneness is multi-personally realized.

What we experience as "organic life", in its all but endless variation of type and individual, is its vehicle to which it reacts and upon which it impresses the results of its own progressive modifications, dragging it ever higher through one or other of its types or individuals and thereby preparing it to function as the vehicle of more significant experience.

It is under the mode of Conscious Personality that Púrusha is ever evolving in the direction of greater capacity for self-realization by the road of experience.

I see two goals, the one dependent upon the other—our goal as Púrusha and our goal in the timeless Bráhman. The first probably, and the second certainly, will never be completely realized, though ever more closely approximated as the evolution of Personality progresses and Púrusha as the *feeling "I"* becomes increasingly conscious of the implications of its essential and non-essential experience.

Let me first attempt to show you what I conceive to be our path and goal *as Púrusha*, largely omitting for the time being the goal of Púrusha in its relation to Parmâtmán, except in so far as the first reveals itself as dependent upon the second.


Preliminary Discussion of Diagram.

Perhaps a diagram will help me in explaining my conception to you, as to the manner in which the evolution of Púrusha takes place, and the end toward which that evolution is tending. The one that I have given here does not attempt to explain anything as regards Púrusha's relation with the Divine Nature (Paramâtmán), nor does

it show the relation of this specific evolutionary activity, in which you and I have a part, to the infinite-sided and limitless manifestations of progressive experiencing that "from beginningless time" constitute the response of Púrusha to the Paramâtmic need. I only hope to be able to explain very crudely with its assistance the nature and the significance of the evolution of personality and experience as we know them "here". And, of course you will have to remember, dearest, that for purposes of this nature diagrams are at best imperfect instruments, and able to give us very limited help.

You will notice at the bottom of the diagram a point marked X. This represents the point at which Púrusha-potentiality passes over into actual realization under the impelling urge of the Paramâtmic will (संकल्प). (As I have already pointed out, the particular act of willing which resulted in the evolutionary development of Púrusha to which you and I belong, marks but one point in the infinitely extended volitional activity—an activity as extended as the Divine capacity for many-sided experience and need for self-expression are infinite.)

Let us consider Púrusha at the point X. What can we say of it? In the first place, it has become *conscious*, yet its consciousness—or awareness—is of the most rudimentary character, unassociated with intelligence, unevolved, impersonal. X represents the precise juncture at which, awareness dawning, Púrusha begins to experience. Probably there was a sort of blind groping so faint, so primitive in character, that we are quite unable to picture it—a feeble flickering, nothing more. Yet (so far as this



व्यवहारिक दृष्ट्या

(Read from the bottom upwards.)

particular development is concerned) the great, the glorious adventure of *time* is about to commence in the timeless being of Púrusha; beginningless potentiality is emerging as actuality, and endless evolution is about to begin. Conscious Púrusha at X is, as it were, *spirit protoplasm*—undifferentiated, but having inherent the capacity for evolution from its primitive simplicity to limitless complexity and modification. (This analogy, like all others, must be used cautiously.)

The Cause of Personal Individuation.

The question now arises: why did not conscious Púrusha evolve as *one* centre of experiencing personality? Inasmuch as it was *one* Experiencer at X, how did it come about that this conscious and experiencing *one* evolved its personality in more modes than one? In order to understand this it will be necessary for you to give me your closest attention.

As I have said before, I hold that consciousness is non-existent as an *actuality* unless there is something of which there is consciousness. When, therefore, I speak of Púrusha as conscious at X, I admit that there was awareness of something. The awareness of that something was undoubtedly the first experience and conscious Púrusha was the one subject in this act of experiencing (as of course it always is in all experience). I hold that even that first inconceivably simple experience must have had its effect upon the experiencer resulting in *modification*, but it would not have resulted in *differentiation* for there was up to then but the one vehicle and therefore but one mode of consciously experiencing. We see then that the

mere fact of experiencing cannot be held responsible for differentiation, but merely for modification. Conscious Púrusha might have gone on experiencing and its conscious evolution might have had its expression in a single centre of personality (though, I imagine, a very weakly one) had it not been for the intrusion of another factor.

That factor was the particular process by which organic life builds itself up and multiplies its forms.

You will remember my describing the manner in which the ultimate undifferentiated life-form is supposed to have begun its evolution—how the single cell divided and became two; how the two became four, etc. I pointed out how various units of this "protoplasm" must have been carried by wind and tide and current, and in the course of time so distributed that they had to make their fight for existence under widely differing conditions of light and darkness, heat and cold, with the result that they underwent divergent modification as they adapted themselves to the different surroundings in which they were called to live. It appears to me that it was the differentiation of *organic forms* resulting from reactions to divergent experience that was in the first place responsible for the multi-personal mode under which the evolution of the conscious Púrusha has taken place.

Purusha does not undergo Disintegration.

But, though we see the ultimate life-form which functioned as the vehicle of the first experience, undergoing division and being multiplied by the process referred to above, it must *not* lead us

multiplication and modification of the primitive life-form was of vast importance to the evolution of conscious Púrusha. Had it not taken place differentiated experience would have been impossible and consequently the evolution of individuated personal modes under which the conscious Púrusha could extend its awareness.

The relation of 'Organic Differentiation' to the Personal Individuation of the Purusha.

All formulated experience reaches the Experiencer—conscious Púrusha—through and in terms of the vehicle. This latter is Prakṛtic; that is to say, it is not a real part of Púrusha. More particularly, it is the prakṛtic *mind*—by which I mean the whole apparatus that functions for mental processes—upon the evolution and elaboration of which the evolution of conscious Púrusha in the mode of Personality is dependent. The formation and building up of the mind or mentality is the result of experience. Let us consider how it comes about.

The nature of experience depends upon the mind, etc. in terms of which it is presented to the experiencer. You and I might be conscious of the same thing, but your experience of it would be in the terms of your mentality and my experience would be in the terms of mine. Our experience would not be the same, and as a consequence the reactions to it in our respective personalities would be different. But though our minds, etc. are the instruments through and in terms of which the experience is transmitted to us, we must remember that it is not the mind or intellect that experiences, but the personality—the *feeling "I"*—that experiences through them. The consequence of an experience is two-fold: first there is

the reaction of the feeling "I" resulting in a greater or less modification in the texture of its personality; then the modification that has taken place in the centre of feeling makes new demands upon the vehicle and causes new adaptations in it. The changed mode of feeling demands a changed conceptual implementing, gives rise to modified processes of thought and different expressions of purpose in bodily activity. Thus we see that the secondary consequence of experience is modification of the vehicle—the mind, etc. But I have gone into this more fully elsewhere.

What bearing has this double reaction to experience, with its accompanying modifications in the texture of the Experiencer and the vehicle, upon the problem of building up differentiated modes of the conscious Púrusha? A very important one surely. We have seen that portions of the as yet undifferentiated "protoplasm" were forced by the agency of wind, wave, etc. into environments so dissimilar as to subject the conscious, but as yet personally undifferentiated Púrusha, to experience through them as vehicles of *differing* experience. Now just to the extent that the as yet undifferentiated Púrusha was capable of reacting differently to the differing environments of the various protoplasmic vehicles through which it experienced, there would have resulted modifications in its texture, and also differentiated modifications in the various vehicles.

I have just said that there would result differentiation in the hitherto undifferentiated, unevolved, impersonal, dimly conscious "spirit protoplasm". Púrusha experiencing through one vehicle would experience differently from Púrusha

—the same Púrusha — experiencing through another. The reaction to experience through one vehicle would produce one modification in the texture of Púrusha *feeling*; the reaction to a different experience through another vehicle would produce a *different* modification.

I conceive that the point where each of these modifications took place, each differing somewhat from the others, marks the juncture when the first steps, as it were, were taken for the differentiated evolution of Púrusha. At this point the *feeling* of the hitherto undifferentiated conscious Púrusha toward the object of its awareness, would cease to be *uniform*. Púrusha would *feel* in one way as a result of the modification that it had undergone as the Subject of experience through one vehicle; and Púrusha would *feel* in another way as the result of the modification it had undergone as the Subject of a different experience through a different vehicle. It would not merely feel in two different ways as long as the two different experiences lasted, for the differentiation in feeling would be the consequence of two or more actual modifications in the hitherto uniform texture of Púrusha feeling.*

If the process of differentiation was as I here describe it, then, in the terms of each of these different modes of feeling, Púrusha would have "looked out on life"—felt its object—differently. And because each mode in which Púrusha felt would undergo progressive modification in reaction to subsequent experience, we see *one* Púrusha becoming the *differently feeling Subject* in all

* For a much fuller development of this thought, see the appendix. I should, however, advise its being read after the reading of the book has been completed.

experiencing. You, dear—*the feeling you*—are the Púrusha actually, truly evolving under one mode of progressive feeling; I—*the feeling "I"*—am that same Púrusha evolving in another mode of progressive feeling. We are *one*, and yet we are definitely and *permanently* not identical. In what, then, do we differ? I answer that we differ *in mode* as Púrusha feeling—Púrusha conscious—and that it is in these modes that Púrusha attains *personality*, not apart from them. These are the grounds upon which I speak of us as one Púrusha but different personalities of Púrusha. When I speak of a "centre of Púrusha personality" I refer to one of these modes under which Púrusha feels personally.

Individuated Personality not a "Sheath", but a true Mode of Purusha

In the Vedanta philosophy there is the theory of the "sheaths" (कोश), one within the other, which inclose the Ātmán, and must be successively stripped away by the individuated self seeking liberation. But I do not hold that the differentiated personal modes, of which I have been writing, are "sheaths" of Púrusha. A sheath is extraneous to that which it encloses. I hold, on the contrary that the individuated personal self is nothing else whatever than the Púrusha. I can hold this view because I believe that the Púrusha *actually* undergoes evolution—actually develops consciously and personally the potentialities timelessly inherent in it. This being my conception, obviously no question arises of "freeing" Púrusha from individuated personality. On the contrary, I hold that it finds its consummation and the reason for its *being* under these modes only, and that evolved

Púrusha—Púrusha differentiated personally—is as beginningless a mode as Púrusha unevolved. For as the necessity for Púrusha is timelessly inherent in Parmâtmán, so is the need for it to realize itself under the mode of personality. It is *as* personal—not apart from personality—that Púrusha is timelessly the fulfilling of Paramâtmic need.

I am not Man, but Purusha.

One often hears laughter at the "presumptuousness" of tiny man, member of one of the animal species upon an insignificant planet of a third-rate sun, because he dares to dream of an immortal destiny and of communion with God. His relationship to the apes and probable descent from some marine worm are pointed out to him, and he is told to stop dreaming. If I thought of myself as *man*—as human—I should agree, for surely man is "as the flower of the field", and like all other species he must fulfill his time and pass away.

But *I* am not man; I am the timeless Púrusha evolving under the mode of this particular personality, experiencing in the terms of human nature.

Not for me—*man*, but for me—*Púrusha*—the sun shines and the stars roll on their courses in the shoreless ocean of experience. I am a mode of that Púrusha to whose multi-personal experiencing life this little world is but a moment in eternity.

You are that Púrusha which, conscious in the innumerable modes of personality, sees with all eyes, hears through all ears, experiences in the terms of countless minds, and through countless

vehicles from beginningless time "looks out on life".

It is not the descendent of the sea worm but Púrusha that in the terms of human experience seeks to express its yearning and find its goal.

And we shall find it, dearest, despite all scoffers, in each other and in God.

Recapitulation of the process whereby Personal Individuation of the Purusha takes place.

But I must not allow myself to be led away from the subject with which we are at present dealing. Indeed the view of life that has been taking possession of me gradually during these years of our married life, is so full of inspiring suggestion, that I could start at any point in this book and find more than enough to fill another and greater one.

At the risk of some repetition—and you must have accustomed yourself to that long before you have read so far—I should like to go over again what I have been writing about the initial differentiation of Púrusha in conscious mode. This matter is so important and the thought it represents so far from our usual way of thinking about these questions that a repetition will probably help you to grasp it better than you otherwise would.

As I said, representatives of the as yet undifferentiated ultimate life-form—"protoplasm"—were driven by the agency of tide and current into surroundings so dissimilar as to subject that conscious Púrusha which experienced through them to *differing* experience. Now just to the extent that primitively conscious Púrusha was capable of reacting differently to the diverse conditions confronting these various separated

representatives of the primitive life-form through which it experienced, there would have resulted modifications in it, and also modifications in the extremely elementary apparatus of experience—the rudimentary mentalities—of the various separated life-forms.

I conceive that at the point where these differing modifications took place in that dimly conscious, hitherto unmodified, as yet impersonal "spirit protoplasm", the foundations were laid for the evolution of the Púrusha by as many different paths of conscious experiencing life. In a manner so primitive that it is quite impossible for us to appreciate it, the "attitude" of Púrusha at and in consequence of these differentiated experience-situations, ceased to be uniform. Various centres of differing *feeling*, at each of which Púrusha "looked out at life" in a different way and consequently experienced it differently, were established. The deflections resulting from primary differences of experience must, of course, have been minute in the extreme, but it would take no more than the slightest deflection to ensure progressive differentiation. It is in some such manner as this that I conceive differing centres of evolving and conscious individuality as brought into being in the Púrusha, or—to express it somewhat differently—the conscious Púrusha began to evolve by differing roads of experience, and in each evolved individuality—personality—differing from that evolved in any other.

You have doubtless noted that according to this view, though you are timeless as Púrusha your *personality* has definitely had a beginning.

In this connection there is only one point

that I am anxious to stress again before we proceed further. Assuming that my view, as given above, is correct, upon what grounds do I consider that after the disintegration of the rudimentary mind, at the dissolution of the primitive vehicles through which the differentiated experiences had been undergone, the modifications in the Púrusha will remain? Why are we not justified in assuming that the variations of experience having come to an end with the disintegration of the vehicle, the variations in the conscious mode of Púrusha will cease simultaneously?

Experience results in Real Modification in the texture of Personality.

In the first place it should be remembered that I do *not* conceive the Púrusha at X to be a cognizant and intelligent expression of the divine consciousness at all, but look upon it, rather, as a subsidiary category of reality at a juncture where, under the urge of the impelling need of the Divine Nature it evinces *awareness* and starts upon the path of its self-realization through experience. As a consequence I do not see the *mind* as a sort of prism which deflects its pure and ineffable light, or feel that by the removal of that prism the light will shine clearly again and undeflected. No; this is not my view at all. On the contrary I see the Púrusha at X as the Púrusha started on an endless evolution of its own inherent potentialities. I therefore look upon the differentiated experience that it underwent through its various vehicles of experience as resulting in *actual* modifications. These modifications in the conscious mode of Púrusha, though brought about by variations in experience, having once for all taken place must have

continued to exist without reference to that peculiarity of "matter" which we associate with death.

What is "Death"?

For what after all is "death"? Is it not the state to which matter is immediately reduced, if in organic form, when it ceases to function as a vehicle for Púrusha? Why should we think that just because inorganic matter is for ever building up into the complexities of organic life when associated with Púrusha, and as constantly falling back into its inorganic constituants when that association comes to an end, this peculiarity is characteristic of the Púrusha as well? There is no such thing as *death*; there is this characteristic or trait of matter. When built up organically it is seen undergoing a purely temporary change but always falls back into that which it originally was. There is here no actual or essential modification.

But the conscious Púrusha through the instrumentality of the vehicle and in its reactions to differentiated experience through different vehicles, undergoes actual modifications in the mode under which it subsists. Obviously, then, the mere fact that matter under its influence is constantly building up and subsequently sinking back into its original condition, has no significance with regard to the modifications produced in the Púrusha through its instrumentality. They have come about, and there they are, quite without reference to how "matter" may behave itself when not functioning as a vehicle of Púrusha. (I am here treating this whole area of experience quite externally, but you know my position.)

Our conclusion is, therefore, that through its first differentiated experience, coming to it through different vehicles, *permanent* modifications were produced—*not* in its essence as Púrusha, but in the mode or modes of feeling under which it evolved consciously.

Permanent Modifications.

These various permanent modifications in the mode under which the conscious Púrusha subsists—each of them a development of the conscious—are the beginnings from which clearly defined centres of Personality are gradually evolved in reaction to progressive experience. Whether the beginnings of these were simultaneous or not, we have, of course, no means of knowing, but a consideration of the phenomena of "the organic world" as we know it in experience, would not lead me to think so. Possibly new centres are continually being formed through life-forms so low as to be far beyond our ken, which open up the door of conscious evolution to Púrusha. This is, however, mere surmise.

We now have for our study two distinct evolutionary processes, as I have already pointed out. They are entirely dissimilar; indeed they necessarily would be, since one is of the Púrusha and the other of the Prakṛti; and yet they are absolutely inter-dependent. Neither would be possible without the other. By the evolution of the conscious Púrusha *personality* is achieved; by the evolution of the Prakṛti the vehicle of experience including the whole apparatus of thought is built up.

The whole meaning of organic evolution, viewed in this light, is the building up of not

The whole meaning of Organic Evolution.

only all kinds and conditions of minds (and bodies) but, up to the limitations imposed by the nature of the organisms, ever more elaborated minds, fitted to function as efficient vehicles of experience for countless centres of conscious and individuated experiencing. Everything animate that I see is significant to me because I see it as a vehicle capable of functioning as the channel of experience for a *feeling* "*I*" at some stage in its evolution toward full personality.

The exact manner in which the thing experienced presents itself to the experiencing personality, depends upon the nature and idiosyncrasies of the particular mind through which, and in terms of which, it experiences. But this is not the only thing which enters into the determinaion of what the experience will be to the experiencer. In the last resort it is the terms in which the experience reaches the experiencer *plus* the exact texture of the personality experiencing that must determine what the experience is to it.

Significance of the various vehicular Types.

One more word before we discuss the diagram. All the paths of variation by which different types of mental apparatus are evolved do not lead to equal development and elaboration. If we study the organic developments in this world of our experience, we shall see that certain paths only lead a short distance before a species or type is evolved that appears to remain stationary over vast periods of time. Other types represent a far greater evolution of physical and mental characteristics. In the case of the human we appear to be in touch with the highest type of

vehicle yet evolved in this particular evolutionary development.

What is the significance of these divergent types, genera, species, varieties? I conceive that the apparatus of thought, sensation, etc., of each of them is suited to act as a vehicle of experience —as an adequate interpreter—for the conscious and growingly personal at some stage or other of its evolution. In each insect, bird and beast, high or low in the scale of living things, in vegetable as well as animal, I conceive that a particular area for experience has been opened to the conscious Púrusha, and that through each—as one of the stages along its way—a centre of personality is finding a vehicle for its evolution.

Further considera- tion of the Diagram.

If you will now turn back to the diagram you will see that I have divided it into zones, or areas, separated from each other by dotted black lines, except in the middle where there is a thick line, by which I have written the word *Ahaṃkāra* (Egoism). You will notice that, starting from the point X, thirteen lines, ever getting farther apart from each other, run up to this line.

Now of course you understand, dearest, that with such a diagram I can only very roughly represent my meaning. For example, in reality, from X as many lines should run toward Ahaṃkāra as there are evolving centres of Personality —countless millions of them. Obviously it would be impossible to put them down even if I knew how many of them there are, so I have taken these thirteen simply to show my meaning. Each line represents the course of a centre of evolving personality from the point where it starts as

simple, unevolved, conscious Púrusha. The zones through which they pass represent broad stages in the organic evolution of vehicles.

The zone lying just above X is supposed to cover the lower stages of organic life. (When I use the word "life" here I am referring to that quality of the *organism* that manifests itself when the latter is functioning as a vehicle for Púrusha. It is a condition or state of the *Prakṛti*—not of the Púrusha.)

In this zone lies plant life and the lower animal stages. Even at the lowest stages these organisms are obviously living—obviously in some utterly primitive manner far beyond our ken acting as vehicles of experience, but the experience presented by them can hardly be in other terms than simple hunger—the field of activity afforded by them merely a blind groping for food. The Experiencer would also experience their faint reactions to heat, cold, light, etc.

The Initiative in the earliest stages lies with Prakṛti.

Here a most interesting fact comes to light; the initiative in the earliest stages of this double evolution seems to lie with *Prakṛti* rather than with Púrusha. In the first place, it was the method by which the primitive life-form multiplied itself that made available differentiated areas of experience for the conscious Púrusha, thus rendering possible its differentiated reactions and consequent modification. Again, it would appear that throughout the earlier stages of its evolution the essential feeling of completeness, need, yearning, in the conscious Púrusha was completely implemented in terms of the physical *hunger* of its vehicle. It was thus the physical

needs of the vehicle that dictated the path of progress and forced the Experiencer to new experience. It would almost seem that in those early stages, when *self*-consciousness and the capacity for *personal* experience had not been developed in any degree, the conscious Púrusha had to depend quiescently for its modifications upon the dynamic furnished by the material needs of its vehicle, together with the reactions of the latter to such environmental factors as heat, cold, etc. Thus "Nature" was the first teacher of Púrusha; the needs of Nature as embodied in its vehicle were its first lessons, and its own dim sense of incompleteness and need was identified with that of its vehicle. At this early period in its evolution the "germ" of what would ultimately be personality might be likened to a babe at the time of its first faint movements in the womb of its mother.

What I have been saying above does not apply exclusively to the lower stages of the evolution. Almost up to its highest development through the terms of human experience the evolving personality not only is dependent upon its vehicle for experience, but is largely, if not entirely, influenced in its conception *of what is to be desired* by the needs and peculiarities of the vehicle itself. Owing to the fact that it tends to identify itself with its vehicle, the evolving personality assumes its own inherent sense of incompleteness, need, yearning to be the body's, and that in the satisfaction of the body's needs and demands that yearning will be satisfied. But I shall deal with this aspect of the question later.

In the lowest zone and in the least evolved

organisms *blind hunger* thus seems to be the chief force that urges to activity. This hunger is probably the first form in which experience is presented. This is the garb in which we probably learned our first lesson in the school of individuality. It is in this lowest zone that the foundations of all future differentiation are laid. Here too "instinct" seems to play an important part; the higher expressions of purpose in which intelligence and thought increasingly influence action, are little in evidence here. Exactly where the *sex* instinct is first evidenced biologists may know; I do not. It appears, however, long after *hunger*. It would be interesting to show you, though I have not space to go into it here, how great a part these two forces play in the evolution of the developing Personality throughout all but the very highest stages, where first *Ahaṃkāra* and finally LOVE assume in turn the supreme control. And even in these highest stages associated with the finest terms of human experience we know—and it is nothing to worry about—both hunger and the sex instinct continue to hold an important place. Here, however, they are no longer the mastering factors, but servants and under control.

Hunger and the Sex Instinct.

The zone lying below the line of Ahaṃkāra represents the whole area of evolution in which individuated conscious Púrusha is experiencing in the terms of all the higher sub-human vehicles. It will be worth while for you to read what I have noted about it on the diagram.

Ahamkara.

At the top of this zone you see the line of Ahaṃkāra—literally, the "I"-Maker. This word has a rather different significance for me than it usually has in Indian philosophy. There it stands for an illusion that must be overcome and eradicated before complete illumination is attainable. I, on the contrary, view it as a stage upon the road to self-realization that must be achieved by the evolving personality in its progress toward illumination. It does not appear to me that it is the experience of one's own individuality that is to be overcome; it is the failure to grasp its true implications that gives rise to so much trouble.

Emergence of the feeling of "I"ness.

The first great step in the evolution of the Púrusha was the dawn of consciousness—awareness. The second was when uniformity of feeling in the conscious Púrusha was broken up and centres of differentiated feeling established. The attainment of the Ahaṃkāra stage by the evolving centres of personality may be considered the next great step, for it is at this juncture that we may say Ego has at last been fully achieved—the *self*-conscious personal individuality for which all the lower stages of Púrusha evolution have been preparing through the ages. Here the feeling "I" first becomes fully capable of *experiencing itself as "I"*—of, as it were, turning thought inward upon itselt and through its vehicle intelligently regarding itself.

And yet this stage may well be considered the most troublous, the most full of painful

experience, of any that has been encountered upon the road of Púrusha evolution.

The Great Illusion.

For with the achievement of Ahaṃkāra comes *the great illusion.* The centre of personality having achieved the sense of itself as "I"—its *self*-conscious individuality—and not yet apprehending itself as a personal expression of a reality infinitely greater and more inclusive, feels itself a *separate entity* with a separate *good* and a destiny exclusively its own. This is that great illusion (मोह) that keeps us from passing on promptly to nobler personal life, "binding us to the wheel of birth and death". This is the great obstacle to our setting our feet upon the path of "Eternal Life"—an obstacle not to be surmounted by the intellectual mastering of this philosophy or any other, but by the feeling "I"s *own inner experience* of its oneness as Púrusha with all other "I"s. I shall later attempt to show you what I believe to be the road to the attainment of that experience; for the present I would merely point out that it is *not* the feeling of self-conscious individuality that is to be overcome, but the illusion of its *separate* and *independent* existence.

Under the influence of this misconception—this "Moha"—*selfishness* (स्वार्थः, ममता) with all its painful consequences, becomes the controller of thought and action. The "I" at this stage dreams of a good that can be exclusively its own; it goes even further and dreams of a good that it can have *at the expense of* other "I"s. The essential sense of incompleteness, need, yearning inherent in it as conscious Púrusha, and as yet not conscious of where completion is to be found and need satisfied, stretches out here and there and everywhere among the "things" of

experience presented to it by its vehicle, seeking in first one and then another that which may satisfy its yearning. Where the "things" upon the acquisition of which it mistakenly pins its trust of happiness are experienced as belonging to other "I"s, it seeks to wrest them away. Why should it not, since it believes its good is independent of the good of other "I"s? Why should it not concentrate upon its own welfare, its own salvation, while it feels itself alone—an independent and separate entity with interests that may be in conflict with other entities? That such a conclusion outrages all that is deepest and best in us, dear, is because dimly, vaguely we have become conscious of the untruth of separateness (अन्यता).

During this stage of illusion, while on the one hand the feeling "I" fails to realize its essential oneness with all other "I"s, on the other it tends to identify its *vehicle* with itself. It thinks of its body as a part of itself, or even of itself as a conscious body. Out of all this confusion arises the selfish struggle of the world of our experience where one thinks to profit by the loss of others, and where one is satisfied and complacent with the thought of his own salvation (material or spiritual) in which other "I"s have no share.

Now it is that the unilluminated Personality fully conscious of itself as "I", and not knowing that "I" as the Púrusha personal in all other "I"s, implements its essential yearning—seeks to fill its essential incompleteness—in the fleeting forms that clothe experience. Unenlightened yearning finds expression in selfish acquisitiveness; from the consciousness of "I" comes the dream of

"My", "Mine". As the Gita so tersely puts the feeling framed in terms of the mind—

> "This have I obtained today; this desire I will obtain; this wealth is mine; and this also shall be mine; this foe have I killed; others too will I destroy……"

Out of this illusion also arises all the sorrow and despair associated with "death". It is natural when the body is identified with the Self to think of its dissolution as something very terrible and final. If I think of myself as *Man* what right have I to hope for survival when the human organism exists as such no longer? If I think of myself as having a "*human* soul" it seems to me that I am in no better case.

How are we to escape from this illusion—how gain the true apprehension, "By which" as Krishna says, one sees "one indestructible Being in all beings, inseparate in the separated"?

The way pointed out by the Vedanta lies through the destruction of Ahaṃkāra. Holding (as I do *not*) that the whole of the individuation is illusory, Sankara likens the individuated self to the ether enclosed by an earthen vessel. There is no individuation except that which seems to be made by the vessel; destroy the latter and whatever individuation there seemed to be will have disappeared. Sankara says to destroy the conception of individuation by realization and you will see that no individuation exists, or has ever existed. It is of the Upādhi and therefore of Māyā—illusion.

My solution is, of course, different, and Ahaṃkāra has a different significance, as I have explained. To me individuation is *not* illusory;

it is a real state of the timeless Púrusha in the process of a real and endlessly progressive evolution. There is no question for me of smashing the vessel—of the elimination of the individuated personal modes of Púrusha. Illusion is there, and is to be eliminated, and *must* be eliminated before further progress is possible. But it is the illusion whereby Púrusha personalized in each centre as a feeling "I", feels itself under each separate mode to be a separate entity of being, independent of the rest. Again it is the illusion whereby the feeling "I" tends to identify itself with the temporary vehicle of experience. Finally it is the illusion whereby the as yet unilluminated personalities seek to find the answer to their feeling of incompleteness and need in what will never satisfy. Thus it is not the personal individuations of Púrusha that are to be eliminated or proved unreal, but the *illusion* under which Púrusha labours at a certain stage in its evolution in the mode of personality.

Further considera-tion of the Diagram.

But to return to our diagram. In the lowest zone we see the faintly modified centres of individuated feeling driven almost quiescent along the path of experience by the urge first of hunger and later of sex-impulse begotten of the needs of the various animal organisms which function as their respective vehicles. Gradually, as the dimly defined centres of differentiated Púrusha feeling react to varied experience, we see increasing variation, the growth of individuality, and the laying of the foundations of what will later develop into clearly defined personality. At the same time higher and higher forms of organic life are

evolved, each fitted to function as the vehicle of experience at some stage in its evolution for Púrusha in one or other of its countless personal modes.

(I do not conceive that all the evolving modes of Púrusha have travelled the same path, undergoing progressive modification in reaction to exactly similar experience or through an exactly similar series of vehicles. Indeed, the fact that no two personalities are exactly alike would incline me to believe that no two paths of experience have been exactly similar.)

In our diagram we see the lines representing the various centres of individuated Púrusha-feeling each following its own path, each achieving an ever more complex and more clearly defined individuality, each developing increasingly its capacity to be the subject of intelligent experience, and finally at the Ahaṃkāra line (reached by some sooner, some later) we see these various centres of personality become *conscious of themselves*, as I have already said.

At this line each of the evolving centres of personality has reached the point where it is clearly conscious of itself as " I ". Its awareness also includes a sense of itself as an " I " entirely *distinct* from the other " I "s of its experience. From this arises the illusion about which I have been writing, whereby the Púrusha under each of these modes experiences itself as a separate entity of being essentially independent of the others.

As I have pointed out, the achievement of this stage was essential. It *had* to be reached and—so far as the illusion is concerned—passed,

by every centre of evolving personality before higher evolution was possible. The manifestations of egotism and selfishness associated with it are the natural expressions of the feeling "I" at this point in its development. They are, none the less, the product of illusion and the sooner the centre of personality frees itself from that illusion the better for itself and others.

The essential part played by Egotism in the evolution of Personality.

Now it is in human nature at its lowest—whether found in a cave or a palace—in Man "out for himself" and acknowledging no good but his own, that the evolving Personality at the line of Ahaṃkāra has its manifestation. In him we see the personality as a distinct and clear-cut individuality but steeped in a misconception of its own significance. The attitude of the feeling "I" at this stage, functioning through the mind suited to it, is the cause of all the sin, the violence, the pathetic mess of things that we witness in the world of experience. Or, to put it another way, in so far as evolving personalities are approximate to the line of Ahaṃkāra, they are individually or collectively the cause of the sin and violence and sorrow that is experienced. Not apprehending that all other personalities are nothing less than different personal expressions of that which is personalized in it—not realizing that all its deep sense of incompleteness, need, yearning is for that which will only find its joy of completion and need satisfied in other "I"s, and with them in Paramâtmân, the egotistical personality—the "I" as it emerges at the line of Ahaṃkāra—is constantly in conflict with that which is its very self.

The Unifying Factor.

Were all "I"s to remain entangled in this great illusion of essential separateness, and were the evolution of each of them to continue indefinitely along the lines it would naturally dictate, we should have what would amount to a progressive disintegration of the Púrusha. Up to this point the function of the evolution has been to establish differentiation and individuation; beyond this point the process is one of *unification*. The instrumentality for the achieving of this unification is a factor in experience which we have seen making its influence increasingly felt in the latter part of the evolutionary process in the zone of experience acquired through the medium of the higher sub-human vehicles. That force is *Love*.

(At this point I should like you again to carefully study the diagram and what I have written in the several zones)

Love.

We saw the first signs of this influence far back upon the evolutionary path in the short-lived love displayed by animal mothers for their young, and in the love of animals for their mates. It undoubtedly becomes more marked, more sustained, and more approximate to Love as experienced in the terms of human nature, in the higher sub-human vehicles, but the limitations of even the highest sub-human minds obviously would prevent Love from becoming the wondrous force that we see it in human experience. For it to become so, fully developed *self*-consciousness and a personality capable of being the subject in complicated processes of thought, comparison, etc. is essential,

together with a vehicle fitted to implement them. It is in the human stage of experience that Love first reveals itself as a force potent to take complete control of the destinies of evolving Púrusha. Here first begins to dawn upon the "I" its supreme significance.

Let us take our own case, dear one. You and I are each of us personal modes of the Púrusha. Your personality and mine are each of them the product of ages of evolution through experience. And yet we are not two separate beings existing independently; we are two personal expressions of the one Púrusha. Our personalities are distinct and non-identical, and will be so for ever; our *being* is one. Having passed through the lower non-self-conscious stages of our evolution toward full personality, we have both of us crossed the line of Ahaṃkāra and are become fully conscious of ourselves.

Now had no other force come into play after we had achieved self-consciousness, the process of individuation and differentiation begun far back at X would have proceeded, and we should have continued to grow further and further away from each other. This is illustrated by our diagram where we see the lines that start from the point X, and cut the Ahaṃkāra line at A, B, C, etc. Obviously the further they are extended the greater will the distance between them become, unless some factor arises to deflect them from their original course.

My position is that at some point after the evolving centres of personality have crossed the Ahaṃkāra Line, such a factor *does* begin to make its presence felt and brings about a progressive integration of what would otherwise

become more and more disintigrated. That factor is the strange force which we call *Love*, and from the point where it first makes its appearance it occupies a more and more important place in the experience-life of the evolving personality.

Let us suppose that the path of the evolution of your personality is represented by the line XA, and that of mine by XB in the accompanying diagram. Now at some point after each of us had crossed the line of Ahaṃkāra and achieved clear-cut personality we began to love each other. We shall represent that point by R on each line. You can easily see that up to the point R on each of our lines of personal evolution we were drawing farther and farther apart; our experience-life was having, and would continue to have less and less in common the further we progressed. The dotted lines up from R show what the directions of our respective evolutions would have been, were it not for Love. The further we advanced along them the less capable we should have been of entering into each other's experience, and of the sympathy which is the essential adjunct of true love.


The Great Illusion of separateness and an independent good would have naturally carried us in the diverging directions represented in the diagram by the dotted lines, thus taking us ever farther apart from one another, had not Love intervened at some point represented here by R. Love was the deflecting factor that stood in the way of further divergence—Love such as had only become possible after we had achieved *self*-conscious individuality. With the advent of Love the paths of our evolution began to be deflected


toward each other. We began to share experience,

become more and more disintigrated. That factor is the strange force which we call *Love*, and from the point where it first makes its appearance it occupies a more and more important place in the experience-life of the evolving personality.

Let us suppose that the path of the evolution of your personality is represented by the line XA, and that of mine by XB in the accompanying diagram. Now at some point after each of us had crossed the line of Ahaṃkāra and achieved clear-cut personality we began to love each other. We shall represent that point by R on each line. You can easily see that up to the point R on each of our lines of personal evolution we were drawing farther and farther apart; our experience-life was having, and would continue to have less and less in common the further we progressed. The dotted lines up from R show what the directions of our respective evolutions would have been, were it not for Love. The further we advanced along them the less capable we should have been of entering into each other's experience, and of the sympathy which is the essential adjunct of true love.

The Great Illusion of separateness and an independent good would have naturally carried us in the diverging directions represented in the diagram by the dotted lines, thus taking us ever farther apart from one another, had not Love intervened at some point represented here by R. Love was the deflecting factor that stood in the way of further divergence—Love such as had only become possible after we had achieved *self*-conscious individuality. With the advent of Love the paths of our evolution began to be deflected


S (X"?)
R
AHAMKARA
R
A
B
X


S (x"?)
R
AHAṂKARA
R
A
B
X

toward each other. We began to share experience, and as our love for each other grew we entered increasingly into each other's experience-life.

S in the diagram represents the point in our evolution when by Love we shall have completely entered into and appropriated each other's experience-life. I have put X" in brackets with a question-mark because I think it probable that this completeness of mutuality will only be reached at X" of our first diagram. That may be never, in spite of the fact that we shall be ever approximating it. If the infinite potentialities of our Púrusha-being are not only to find expression in an infinite number of personal modes, but their whole expression in the terms of the personality of *each* of the modes—as seems to me far more probable—then indeed the path of progressive experience of what the Púrusha potentiality is in the terms of each of us would be an endless path.

Love does not bring about a merging of Personalities.

As we proceed, the significance of what I have been saying will become clearer. There is only one point that I would call your attention to at present. The lines representing the converging paths of our personal evolutions meet at S and are *one* at that point. From this you should not get the impression that at S our two personalities merge into each other and become *one*; nothing can be further from the truth. At S all that you feel, all that you experience I shall feel and experience too, *but* I shall feel it as it finds reaction *in the specific terms of my own differentiated personality.* It will be the same as regards my feeling and experience fully

present to you. What it is to you will depend absolutely upon what you personally are—upon the texture or character of your feeling "I". And the same in my case. *Personally* you will never become merged in me or I in you. *As Púrusha* we are and always have been one. *By perfected Love* all that I personally am and experience will be yours, and all that you personally are and experience will be mine.

Difference between Love and Passion.

There are various forms of experience called by the name of "love". All of them have their root in the essential sense of incompleteness, need, yearning of conscious Púrusha. But not all of them may be termed *true* love; some are only of preparatory significance, since, having brought about modifications in the texture of the feeling "I" experiencing them, they are forgotten; others are the sad and evil expressions of the selfishness arising from the Great Illusion. Of such is *passion*, though it is often mistakenly called "love". The two are as different as light and darkness. They may be distinguished by this—that though both spring from the sense of incompleteness and yearning inherent in the Púrusha under conscious mode, Love is forgetful of self, delighting to sacrifice itself utterly in the interest of its beloved; but passion is ready to sacrifice the welfare of its object upon the altar of its desire. Love ennobles its object; passion destroys it.

Now, in the light of what I have just been saying, let us turn again to the consideration of our love for one another, and examine the bond that binds us together.

Before we loved we did not miss each other

the eye? What if our love continues to grow deeper and fuller, and with it our mutual sympathy as we have felt it doing in the past? Is it not reasonable to expect that as our love grows and our communion becomes deeper, the ability which we now sometimes momentarily experience of entering directly into each other's inner life, will likewise increase? Certainly it is reasonable, if our ability to sense feeling and thought has a connection with the mutual sympathy arising from our love for each other, for with the growth of love should be growth of sympathy and intuitive perception. The fact that the less love there is, the less this sympathetic intuition is in evidence, would indicate that the reverse is also true—that the more the love the more this capacity will be present. It seems to me, therefore, that this capacity which we now so feebly and fleetingly possess, points on to a stage in the evolution of our relationship when the thought you think, the joy you feel, the hope you entertain, the whole content of your experience-life, will be present to me; when whatever is mine of feeling or experience will be experienced by you also.

My personality will, through perfect sympathy with yours, be enriched by all your feeling and experiencing life, and in like manner yours by mine. And yet this *inter-living* of each other, and our mutual enrichment, will not be at the expense of our respective individualities. During the last ten years we have advanced some way along the road and are conscious of the fact that neither your personality nor mine is being sacrificed. We have also before us the example of others who have lived long lives of ever

increasing devotion to each other and of progressive self-forgetfulness, and we know enough to say that their increasing unity has not been at the expense of their personalities. My own parents' devotion was a case in point; from it and many another I feel justified in inferring that the *oneness* toward which Love is taking us, is not a oneness that eliminates personality or individuality.

The "love" that weakens or undermines the personality of its object will be found impure—grounded in selfishness. True Love, valuing above all else the personality of its beloved, will be instrumental in enriching and ennobling it.

One Life lived in the terms of two Personalities.

But you and I, dearest, as our love and feeling for each other grows, will approach ever closer to that perfect relationship when we shall perfectly inter-live each other's lives—perfectly enter into each other's most inner experience. We shall have *one life*—one content of experience constantly building up and becoming richer by the contribution that each of us makes to it. It will no longer be, as at this stage, a matter of two experience-contents largely shut off from each other, between which there is only occasional and relatively feeble inter-penetration. It will no longer be dependent upon the mediation of vehicles—hearing, or seeing, or the mind—to be known. Our mutual experience will be immediate; it will be *felt* when perfect love brings perfect sympathy and perfect intuition. Whatever you experience will be formulated in consciousness to your personality through and in the terms of your vehicle at that stage of your personal evolution, but once present there, no vehicle

will be necessary for me to experience it. It will be immediately present to my consciousness, but it will be present as the feeling or the experience of my beloved, and re-experienced in the terms of my own personality. In the same way the whole of what I feel and experience will be present to you—as present to you as it is to me—but present as the experience of your loved one, and experienced by you in the terms of your personality. Thus the experience-life of each of us will enrich the content of our common, growing and progressive experience. In us the oneness of the Púrusha will be realized bi-personally.

But what we *are* to each other will, I am sure, become increasingly independent of vehicles for its realization. Probably throughout eternity the Prakṛti and its vehicles will be the instrumentality whereby the evolving centres of personality realize ever more and more their infinite potentialties for progressive experience, but when once they have achieved a certain stage in their personal evolution, and have come by great love to immediate experience of each other, then the relation subsisting *between them* is a purely Púrusha relationship, no longer dependent upon Prakṛti. This does not however mean that the Prakṛti is no longer indispensable. That purely Púrusha relationship will grow deeper and richer, and its implications be more perfectly realized in proportion as the evolution of the centres of personality progresses; and the progress of that evolution will doubtless be still largely dependent upon the instrumentality of Prakṛti. But the immediate relationship of two feeling "I"s, when once it has been achieved, will through all subsequent stages of experience be a

purely personal relationship of the Púrusha, though constantly further enriched through Prakṛtic instrumentality.

I wonder if I have made my meaning clear. You cannot imagine how difficult it is to turn such thoughts as these into words, because they are about that which lies deeper than thought. But even if you do not entirely grasp my meaning, I beg you not to be discouraged; read through to the end and understand as much as you can, and then read the whole book through again. Gradually what I am trying to express will emerge to you. And if you find the attempt to grasp what I have written exhausting, I can assure you, dear, that the attempt to express it has not been less so.

Attainment of Oneness not at the expense of Individuality.

I think that in those marriages where the love is deep, mutual and unselfish, the *bodily* expression of that love is the expression of emotions which explain in an illuminating manner the aspiration of which the unity discussed in the foregoing paragraphs is the fulfilment. What *is* the highest ecstasy associated with the bodily expression of deep love? Is it not the sense of *utter oneness*—of mingling and becoming, no longer two, but *one*? To me it has always been that, dearest. And yet, though it is that very sense of *oneness* which is the joy, it would cease to be joy—it would fail to be ecstasy—were it a oneness which excluded the sense of *mutuality*.

To me this experience is a great help toward understanding the nature of the oneness which

Yajnavalkya's Illustration.

love will work between us. The great sage Yajnavalkya saw, I am sure, its significance, and used this aspect of the relationship between man and wife to illustrate the relationship that would subsist between the individuated self and the Divine Self* when the former had attained to perfect union.

> "As a man when in the embrace of a beloved wife, knows nothing within or without, so this person, when in the embrace of the intelligent soul, knows nothing within or without. Verily that is his true form in which his desire is satisfied, in which the Soul is his desire···"

Yajnavalkya was the loving husband of a beloved wife, and as such knew full well the nature of the truest and noblest ecstasy expressed in the bodily relation of marriage. I am quite confident, therefore, that he would *never* have

* [NOTE:—It is apparent from the Upanishads that many of the sages were mystics as well, and it is by no means impossible that lesser and more literal-minded men of subsequent periods have misapprehended them when they spoke of oneness.

The mystical experience of union with God lies beyond the province of the mind and those who attained to it have often tended to describe that Oneness in language that laid them open to misinterpretation by those who had not shared their experience.

Christianity is not without its own examples. For instance, Bernard of Clairvaux while writing to a friend of the highest state of love for God says, "Then oblivious of himself he will pass to God and become one spirit with Him". And again he says of the same state, "*This is to be made God*" (deificari).

In fact he makes use of similar expressions repeatedly, and one could easily gain the impression that he believed in the soul's losing all personal identity did not a further study of the writings of this great saint and mystic make it abundantly clear that he is never referring to a merging of *personality* but to a complete merging of *will* in the divine will, "when God only is loved, and we love ourselves only for His sake".]

chosen it to illustrate the nature of the relation of the individuated self to Paramâtmán, if he had wished to teach the attainment of a oneness that destroyed the sense of mutuality.

Yajnavalkya was, of course, dealing with the nature of the oneness which the individuated Self is to attain with Paramâtmán. We are not; our present concern is the nature of the oneness which you and I—personal modes of the timeless Púrusha—are to attain as our love for each other grows with our growing. But in both cases it seems to me that the goal is a oneness attained *by the achievement of perfect mutuality*; in neither by the loss of individual identity.

That goal of perfect inter-living lies far ahead—far beyond our present personal limitations and the limitations imposed by the terms of our 'human' vehicles. We have only begun to discover what Love is and does, but we have learned enough to know what effect its increase has had already upon our relationship, and consequently to understand what that relationship must necessarily become if Love goes on increasing.

And the question of its increase lies largely with us. There is a Prema Yoga—a discipline of Love—just as there is a Jñāna Yoga (discipline of Wisdom) and Karma Yoga (discipline of Action). When Love comes it must not be treated carelessly or taken as a matter of course. We often find people expecting to see Love grow and flourish in the face of a neglect that would destroy anything else. The wonder of Love is that it often does so—but never in the neglectful and careless. How many there have been who, taking their little love for each other carelessly and as a

matter of course, have seen it gradually dwindle and die.

For love is a thing to be reverenced, to be meditated upon, to be given conscious and thoughtful expression. Its implications are to be studied in all our relations. What are they in sonship, fatherhood, wifehood, for a husband, a brother, a friend?

The Immediate Problem.

There is a personal relationship—a relationship between two feeling "I"s—the truth of which, as expressed in the temporary terms of human experience, is your wifehood and my husbandhood. How can we give that personal Púrusha relationship the highest, richest noblest expression that the values of human experience make possible? How can we implement human husbandhood and wifehood to most beautifully express the relation of the feeling "I"s as they experience in terms of them? How can we utilize the *humanly* experienced so that it will enrich our non-human personalities and minister to the evolution of their mutual love? Such is the problem as I see it, and for one who sees it in this way, that which we know as "death" has no fears, for he does not identify the Experiencer with the vehicle.

Outgrowing Limitations.

My darling, I am here in jail, while you are far off in our home. And yet it is only because of the limitation we have not as yet outgrown that we seem distant from each other. I am confident that as we grow deeper into each other's life and experience, the limitations that now seem so real will become

more and more shadowy. The factor that we experience as "distance" will play a less and less important part as our inter-personal life is built up. For distance is a prakṛti-value, and that life, though achieved through the instrumentality of Prakṛti, will exist independently of it. There *time* will be sequence in memory, and the "near" and the "far" will be equally present to consciousness. There "death" will be seen merely as an episode in the growing experience of that which never dies.

But as yet we have not reached that stage and *distance* is still painfully real. Nevertheless I am firmly convinced that neither time, nor space, nor death can adversely affect that which has been realized in terms of true love. I pray daily that you and I may live *this* phase of our experience-life to a "good old age" seeing our children grow up and themselves become happy fathers and mothers, and that we may be permitted to spend our declining years in the quiet of the forest, by prayer and meditation and loving communion preparing for our next stage upon the beautiful road to the heart of God. But if this should not be, my wife—if I should pass on before you—remember that by love I shall be ever near you, that my love will envelop you, and that I shall be still living and experiencing in you whom I love more than life. We must never permit that which we experience as "death" to make either of us imagine that we have lost the other. Rather let us confidently think of our love for one another in terms of eternity.

For I do not think that an "I" of "Púruṣha, having entered upon the endless road of

everlasting life—life made *one* by continuity of experience—life that has become free from that round of "birth and death" which is recurrent forgetfulness—will be separated by the "death" of its last human vehicle from the dear ones who are still living in terms of human experience. Its "eternal life" was entered upon while it still experienced through that vehicle—*not* subsequently. Its relations with those "I"s it loved had assumed an eternal significance *before* it had cast off the "outworn garment"; *they are a part of its eternal life in communion with God.* This is true whether those who are dear have as yet entered upon eternal life or not.

The "I" that has passed beyond 'Death' not separated from its loved ones.

It would seem obvious that those who had not yet passed beyond the terms of human experience could not be in a position to enter into the experience-life of the loved one whose life had become vehicled in higher terms. This would sufficiently account for the fact that the passing on of one we love cuts us off for a time from conscious communion; for few or none of us at this stage of our evolving relationship have grown to so inter-live each other's inner life that we can experience it without the mediation of the vehicle. The feeble beginning of that immediate relationship which true love achieves here is significant by reason of its implications for the future, but it is not so developed at this stage as to render us independent of the vehicle for communion with those we love.

But I do not see why the "I" that has passed beyond the human phase of experience should cease for a moment to be in touch with the feeling and experiencing life of its loved ones—those

who had become dear to it in the course of that phase of its experience during which it entered upon eternal life. For are not its relations with them a *part* of that life? Indeed, if the Personal evolution is a deepening and enriching of the capacity to feel and experience personally, and if "eternal life" is a sustained continuity, it would seem reasonable to believe that the feeling "I", having entered upon it, will be *closer* to all that that its dear ones feel—more deeply in touch with what is present to their consciousness than before.

Of course, the "I" which has not as yet passed beyond the terms and values of human experiencing will not be able to participate in experience expressed in different values and through higher vehicles, but from this it does not at all follow that the "I" whose experience-life has become vehicled in terms higher than the human would be equally cut off from experience presented in human terms. If those higher terms of experience are still a closed book to us who have not passed beyond the human, there is no reason why the terms of our experience-life should not be understandable to the "I" which had traversed them and passed beyond them.

Moreover, if we assume that the 'opening chapter' of its eternal life had come to the "I" in the terms of human experience, then that life would necessarily include the experience content of that human 'birth', or phase of experience, in the course of which it entered upon eternal life. If I have entered upon that life—and I am confident of it—then you, and all those dear ones the relations with whom form an integral part of this new life of mine, cannot be separated

from that life without my being separated from it also.

More than this. If my love for you all is one of the deepest and most illuminating aspects of this new life—and I know that it is—then I can well imagine that the 'activities' of this "I"'s higher experiencing life will be largely related to you. After all, I should have to become other than I am for this not to be the case. The problem of your entry upon that higher phase of experience and of the re-establishment of mutuality in my personal relations with each of the "I"s that I love would probably constitute my greatest interest. Indeed, it seems that this must necessarily be so, for if the personal relations with those it loves constitute the deepest and noblest aspect of the experience-life of this "I", revealing to it ever more deeply, as they deepen, its need of and dependence upon God, then its further evolution along the road of growing personal life will be largely dependent upon the entry into, and advance along that road, of those in relation with whom it is to ever more deeply realize its implications in Bráhman. Thus, even if I should pass on before you, there can be no question of my leaving you far behind, for I *must* take you with me if I am to advance myself. For it is by what our *love* for each other progressively reveals to us that we are to grow in capacity for ever deeper experience.

A further considera-tion of the Diagram

But let us return to our diagram—the first. Viewing it as a whole we shall be struck by the fact that the progress of the evolution is from X to X"—from a point to a point, from *oneness* to

oneness. Another thing to be noted is that, although all the evolving centres of Personality are differentiated personal expressions of the one Púrusha, their essential unity with each other appears to be absolutely repudiated at the line of Ahaṃkāra. At this stage in its personal evolution each feeling "I" feels itself as a separate and independent entity.

Yet, although the attainment of the Ahaṃkāra stage by the evolving centres of Personality is undoubtedly attended with immediate results and accompanying phenomena of a most distressing character, it is none the less necessary for them to pass through it and to entertain for a time the illusion of essential independence. The phase of Egotism was necessary for the ultimate perfection of individuality; individuated personality could not have become clear-cut and defined without it.

When, however, clearly defined conscious individuality has once been achieved through the instrumentality of Ahaṃkāra, it is vitally essential that the evolving "I" should pass beyond the accompanying illusion. There can be no doubt that the achievement of a well defined Ego was essential to clear-cut and well defined experience, *but* that individuated personality having been attained, the illusion must be stripped off in order to prevent it from functioning destructively and frustrating progress to nobler experience. The *grand problem,* therefore, of Purusha evolution in its higher stages is two-fold—to bring about the elimination of the illusion of independent being with the misconceptions arising from it, but to do it, in such a manner that the clear-cut individuality of the evolved

personal expression of the Púrusha may not be impaired.

A few pages back, dearest, I attempted to show how this was being accomplished to a certain extent in our own case. Forgive repetition but I want to touch on this again.

"Salvation" through Love.

Let us think of ourselves in relation to each other. You are fully conscious of your personal Self—of the "I" in terms of which your personality has been built up by its reactions to that which it has experienced—of your "I" as the Experiencer. I too am conscious of my personal self in the same way. Now if we were only conscious of our respective "I"s—if each of us experienced only with reference to itself—we should be growing farther and farther apart as our respective personalities each evolved along its own line. Our respective contents of experience would have progressively less in common. But I can say with deep thankfulness that this has not been the case. The mighty force of *Love* has gripped these two "I"s and has robbed them of that sense of separateness and independence. Our lives have become, to use an ordinary phrase, "wrapped up in each other"—not perfectly as yet, it is true, but ever increasingly. Even now we are far more anxious about each other's good than about our own. We joy in each other's happiness; we suffer in each other's pain. Yet none of this experience is at the expense either of your individuality or mine; on the contrary it is possible just because of them. And though this is so, our love has shown itself instrumental for the destruction of

self-centredness, and of the sense of living purely with reference to oneself.

But let us, in imagination, carry the process which Love has begun here, to its logical conclusion. Let us attempt to conceive the personal relationship which has been established between these two "I"s, as being evolved along the same lines to a perfect consummation. What should we have then?

That sympathetic intuition begotten of Love, which even now makes us from time to time conscious of each other's thoughts, and even more often conscious of each other's feeling, would go on increasing with the increase of our love. Ultimately the stage would be reached when my intuition of all you thought and felt, and your intuition of all I thought and felt, would become so deep—so complete—that all my feeling life, together with all that was present to my consciousness, would be fully present to you. All that you felt—the whole content of experience present to your consciousness—would be present to me also. So far as our mutual relationship, we should have no need of mouth, eye, or ears to communicate with each other; for our *life* would be *one*. My personality would be enriched by the whole of your feeling and experiencing; yours by mine. Our life would be *one life* to which two different personalities each contributed that which it only could contribute. For there is an aspect of experience the acquisition of which is open only to *your* personality reacting to what it experiences as presented to it in the terms of *your* vehicle. This is closed to me until by indwelling your personal life through the sympathetic intuition begotton of Love, I make it mine—

re-experiencing what is yours and making it mine in the terms of my own personality. Then, to the extent that our mutual inliving, each of the other, is perfected in perfect love, all that is yours and all that you are will be mine, and all that I am and all that is mine will be yours.

To me there seems no doubt that it is in such relations as this which has come to exist between you and me that the force of Love grips the Púrusha as it evolves under its countless modes of developing personality—grips it, I mean, with sufficient power to deflect it from the " Moha " of self-centredness and from its illusion of a separate good of its own. It is through such love as ours —of a man for the woman he truly loves, and of a woman for her beloved—that the ecstatic vision of utter oneness of life and being with another "I" first dawns upon the Ego. That is why I who have had years of asceticism glorify the married life, and look upon it as capable of implementing the highest and noblest experience for which our evolving centres of personality are yet qualified. Of course I am speaking of marriage as the embodied expression of that experience of oneness or as the means to its attainment. For, as I conceive it, the "Salvation" of the Púrusha is attained to precisely the extent that the centers of personality through which it is evolving and experiencing, come by the power of intuitive sympathy to indwell one another. (Their fulfilling and fulfilment in Paramâtmán, I shall deal with later). And therefore I am firmly convinced that " Salvation " is not to be attained by *freeing* oneself from the bonds begotten of love for wife or child or other dear ones. Rather must we come to a right apprehension of the truth underlying

these human expressions of experience, and seeing that, give ourselves joyously to the bondage of the realities that find these expressions at this stage of our experiencing. "Not for the sake of the wife is the wife dear; but for sake of the Self the wife is dear". You are not dear to me *because* of your human wifehood; but this human wifehood in all its expressions is dear to me because of the precious reality which it at present expresses—the loving relationship of these two non-human and deathless personalities of the timeless Púrusha.

The Unifying Power of Love.

We must understand, however, that this love of which I have been writing is not the only form in which Love destroys the "Moha" of self-centredness and belief in an independent good. Your experience and mine teach us this, dear one: that in so far as we are bound by *love* to other personalities, the process of growing one with them is taking place.

Let me give you an illustration from the life of our own home. Some years ago I suffered from a bad abcess which had to be opened. I vividly remember the various sensations as I mounted the table, as the knives were brought out and the place cleansed with alcohol—finally the way I held my breath and nerved myself for the cut.

Several years after this came our little Sāvitrī's illness, and you will remember that the doctor had to open several abcesses. I held the little daughter in my arms while it was being done. I have since told you that as I sat there watching the preparations of the doctor, I underwent one by one exactly the same sensations, though in a more acute form, that I had experienced

when the same thing was being done to me in Simla. I was astonished—not so much because I suffered more acutely, but because the sensations experienced by me were identical, even to the holding of my breath and to my muscles becoming all tense when the cut was about to be made. And yet there was a strange difference: I felt the whole experience as my own, and suffered as I had done when the operation was performed upon me, but I suffered it *myself* as the pain of Sāvitrī that was my pain also.

To me this is a striking example of how Love tends to unify. I suffered in the suffering of my little daughter *because* and *to the extent* that I loved her. I have held other children in my arms while such operations were being performed, and have, it is true, felt for them, but the feeling was vastly less acute. This was because I have not yet learned to love so greatly beyond the circle of my immediate dear ones. Indeed, I am doubtful if it is possible so early in the personal evolution as this stage in terms of human experience. Here it is true that we can, by what seems to me an unnatural and harmful process of discipline, teach ourselves to love our dear ones *no more* than we do others, but this by no means implies that we have thereby learned to love those others as deeply as we *could* have loved our dear ones. After all, we are only beginning to learn to love, and I am inclined to believe that in the human stage of experience the capacity for the extension of really deep love is strictly limited. We can, and must continually strive to extend it as far as present limitations will permit at this juncture, but we need neither be surprised or discouraged if we find ourselves

unable to love all others as much as we do those whom we feel to be the nearest and the dearest. Just as the experiencing life of the Púrusha in this "creation" of ours began through one single life-form and was gradually extended through an ever increasing number of forms, so our experience of love must begin with the one and gradually extend so that it comes to include the many, even until it comes to include the all. But we must not expect to be able to run before we have rightly learned to walk. Nor must we think it disloyal to others if we love a certain limited number of personalities more than the rest. Be assured that it is *by* learning to love deeply, nobly, unselfishly those who are closest to us in experience, that we are developing our capacity to love the others more and enter into their lives more completely. What is it that makes me feel so tenderly for all old women, and hurts me so if I see them in trouble? It is love that I feel for my own mother, and the thought that this might have been her condition. In widows I see what you might have been; in the fatherless I see our children. This is no mere theory; I speak of my own experience. And I do not think that real pity, tenderness, sympathy are possible to one who has not loved some one greatly.

But we must not get away from the main question. What I was trying to point out is that it is *to the extent* that we love that we are able to enter into the thought and feeling of our beloved and make it our own. You and I are happy when we see the happiness of our little ones. We react to their pain. And to the extent that we love them we shall enter into their feelings and share their experience. Yet, although we love them

greatly, our love even for them is still too limited for us to be able to enter into all their experience. Our personalities are as yet only penetrating the fringe, as it were, of their inner life. But if our love for them and their love for us continues to increase—and why should it not if we recognize the importance of its doing so?—we can appreciate that by the power of sympathetic intuition their pain, joy, sorrow, hope, experience, will become ever increasingly ours, and ours increasingly theirs. Finally, with love's consummation, (at the X" of our diagram) the whole content of feeling and experience that was the life of each would be fully and completely a part of the feeling and experiencing life of all—the whole present to each feeling "I" as experience appropriated by it in the terms of its own personality.

The contribution of the "I" to the evolving Purusha life.

Yet it is worth keeping in mind that each element in this perfectly shared and multi-personally experienced life of the aggregate of loving "I"s, would be the specific contribution of one or other of them. The presence of each element of feeling and each aspect of experience—the fact that each was just what it was—would depend strictly upon the texture of the personality that had originally contributed it and the nature of the vehicle in terms of which experience had been presented to it. Only the fact that each personality was what it was would make possible the presence in the multi-personally shared whole of the share that each contributed. Each would enrich the whole by contributing to the whole what it alone could originally contribute. In this we can see the significance of each personality to

the plenitude of the multi-personally experiencing and feeling life of the Púrusha. Each "I" as it entered by love into feeling and experiencing oneness with other "I"s would bring its treasures with it, placing them thereby at the disposal of each other "I", to be re-appropriated and re-experienced by it in the terms of its own personality. So as love extends its area including more and more of the personalities which rise to a point of sympathetic intuition rendering them capable of inter-living each other's life, the sum-total of what is experienced and felt individually will become the richer, deeper, more many-sided heritage of all.

If we conceive the whole phenomenon of evolving Púrusha life, in so far as we are conscious of it in the noblest phases that we have yet experienced, we shall be able to appreciate that Love has only begun to draw together the countless evolving personalities. Most of them seem to be still obsessed by the "Moha"—the illusion—which makes them think of themselves as separate and independent entities. Most of them still seem to think that each has a good that is all its own, and that its "salvation" is not essentially related to the salvation of the rest.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the power of illusion is so extended and its results seen on all sides in the selfishness of men and nations, with all its accompaniment of sorrow and suffering, we are still in a position to see that the force of Love is at work everywhere tending to drive the deflecting paths of the illusion-blinded centres of personality *inward* and upon each other. The process is seen commencing with the relations experienced in the family—love of the child for

its parents, of the husband and wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters; and gradually where the capacity for love becomes more developed, it extends to include other relations in greater or less degree—friends, the nation, humanity. As yet, however, all these drawings-together by love, of the evolving "I"s, are but the feeble promise of what they may be. It is only occasionally, in the light of some great and unusual love, that we are enabled to imagine what they will become.

PART IV

Outgrowing "This World."

As I said at the beginning of this book, I feel that until we have learned to find our deepest and most precious experience in those things which are not "of this world", we shall still continue to evolve personally through the terms of this world. When our 'treasure'—to use the words of Christ—is no longer here, when our enjoyment of that which is most precious to us ceases to be dependent for its expression upon what are essentially the values of this world, we may take it as an indication that the usefulness of the present field of experience is, so far as we are concerned, drawing to its conclusion. For ages upon ages the evolving centre of personality finds in Prakṛti experienced as "this world" whatever it thinks it needs, but a point is at last reached when the area of experience which has hitherto seemed sufficient ceases to be so. When it finds that it needs to experience that which may not find expression in the terms of "this world" we may be certain that it is passing beyond it, as a zone too limited for the expression of its deepening personal life.

As we grow in mutual love and understanding, dearest wife, we draw constantly nearer to this juncture in our experiencing life. At last the stage will be reached when the lessons we have to learn will be such as cannot be taught us in the terms of this world. Or, to put it in another way, we shall be no longer dependent upon an

experience-world such as this for the acquisition of what is next to be experienced, since we have learned while " here " to enter into those aspects of experience which are " not of this world." We shall then be ready to continue our progress upon a higher level than that which has hitherto been sufficient for us. That higher level of experience, better fitted as a medium for the realization and expression of what is best and deepest in us, will be our *next stage*, so to speak, upon the endless road into the heart of God. This is that *next life* to which all will pass who are no longer dependent for their joy upon that which may only be expressed in the terms of " this world ".

In speaking of "the next life" or "the next zone" through which the evolving personality would pass, it should be understood that I am not dealing with questions of *place* at all. Experience in terms of *locality* is most probably one of the factors in that as in this for reasons I shall shortly give, but we must be very careful not to think of "this world" as a *place* and that as *another place*. We are dealing not with places but with the garb in which experience is clothed. The "next life", as I apprehend it, means conscious personal experience presented in terms somewhat different from those with which we are at present familiar, and better fitted for the needs of a more evolved personal life. There is no question of *here* and *there* involved in the relation of the zones at all, though these values in experience undoubtedly represent real factors apart from it.

Yet, although in "the next life" there would

of course be a difference in the terms of experience, I am strongly inclined to believe that there would be no vast and sudden revolution in the manner of its acquisition or in the interests of the evolving personality that had attained to it. In many ways it would at first closely approximate to that which had been left behind. That the vast majority of personalities that have reached a stage indicating their fitness to pass beyond the terms of human experience still appear dependent upon having what they experience clothed in phenomenal garb and expressed in terms of name and form, and that they clearly shrink from the idea of life independent of such expressions, would seem to indicate that they actually have not reached independence of them. In other words, while these individuated centres of Púrusha personality positively shrink—as I know this "I" does—from the thought of being no longer able to experience in terms of seeing, hearing, touching, etc., we would seem to have an indication that they have not as yet outgrown the necessity of experiencing in some such manner. For I hold that this *feeling* about its experience is in the "I"—not in the vehicle or field (क्षेत्र). The mere fact of having discarded a certain set of experience-terms would not cause the individuated self that had hitherto been experiencing through them to undergo any change or become suddenly more evolved than it had been before. Surely its evolutionary progress as a personality would be lacking in continuity if that which today most suitably experiences in the values of "human experience", should tomorrow—by the mere fact that it was no longer in association

The Next Stage.

with a particular vehicle—suddenly become so transformed that it is fitted to acquire its experience in terms altogether different. It seems to me that such an assumption would be quite as unjustifiable as that of certain Christians I have met who appear to take for granted that *the mere act of dying* will work some extraordinary change in them (provided that they die "believing") as a result of which they will rise free from all defects of character—their pettiness, selfishness, etc., and ready to enjoy a communion with God from which these very defects excluded them while here.

I think, therefore, we may be certain that there will be no such abrupt transition as to the terms of our experience in the next stage of our personal evolution. Whether of the vehicle or the experiencer the process is doubtless a continuous growing of one thing out of another. The fact that our feeling conscious "I"s still demand that their experience be expressed in terms of space and sound and shape and colour is to me a sufficient indication of their need for it to be expressed in such terms, though the media will doubtless not be exactly identical with those at present familiar to us. As the personality evolves to a point where it becomes capable of experiencing in terms of a higher Buddhi, etc., so the Buddhi will doubtless present the experienced in wider and nobler yet not utterly dissimilar terms.

So when the evolution of your personality and mine, dear wife, carry us beyond the present terms of experience which we think of as "this world", we need look for no utterly cataclysmic change. The higher expression of what we experience will not be so high, and the media which in

that zone perform the functions of what we here know as "the senses" will not be so different, that there will be any tremendous chasm between our experiencing life in this and in the next step of our personal evolution. We shall not find our "life" and our relations with each other expressed in terms so unfamiliar that it will seem strange to us. On the contrary, I imagine we shall find the new life a far more perfect medium for our self-expression and self-realization, and for the realization of our relation to each other than the life we have outgrown. Indeed that will have been left behind just because it has become a limitation to our growing capacity for experience, and its terms are too limited to fully express what we are becoming to each other. In other words, we shall leave 'this world' when we have outgrown it as an efficient medium of experience for our evolving personalities. By the *world* I mean, of course, the "name and form" garbed in terms of which Prakṛti functions as the stuff or frame-work of our experience at the present stage of our personal evolution.

The Reality of "this world."

This does not mean, however, that *the world* is not a reality as apart from our experience. It is as much of a reality as Prakṛti. But for us it is reality translated into the terms of our capacity to experience it at this stage in our personal evolution and in the evolution of the vehicle through which our experience of it is acquired. As our personalities outgrow the presentation of Prakṛti by their present Buddhis, etc., and

arrive at the necessity of experiencing through a higher vehicle, the Buddhis, etc., through which they will then experience will doubtless frame the Prakṛti to them in terms of a modified and higher experience.

But not merely *as Prakṛti* do I imagine the "world" to have a reality as apart from my personal experience-life. Prakṛti is, to be sure, its essential or what we might inexactly call its 'material' reality. Yet even experienced as "this world" I believe it has a reality to other personalities than mine. We may say with perfect justification that *if*, other conditions being identical, like causes will produce like results, then in so far as a given number of evolving personalities approximate each other in the nature and degree of their capacity to experience, and in so far as the various Buddhis through which that which they experience are similarly and equally evolved, to that extent what they all alike experience will present itself to them in the same guise. By *equally evolved* I of course mean generally so. For example, I should consider that all "human" buddhis represent a sufficient approximation of prakṛtic evolution to ensure that they would interpret *the experienced* to the personalities suited to function through them in very much the same set of values. Viewed thus, we might say that what we know in experience as a *species* is a classification of Buddhis fitted by the similarity and degree of their evolution to interpret what the evolving centres of personality experience through them in nearly identical phenominal terms. A *variety* would stand for an even closer approximation.

Thus it seems to me that all evolving

personalities passing through (or rather *being passed through by*) that area of experience where the experienced is clothed or interpreted in terms of the " human " buddhi, so approximate each other in the degree and nature of their evolution that " this world " is the phenominal clothing of experience to all of them. If this be so then " this world " as it appears to human eyes and ears has a reality as such to more personalities than mine. Of course, what that reality is *in itself* as a part from what it is to the common experience of the group of personalities experiencing it "humanly" we cannot say.

The Over-lapping of Zones of Experience.

Before going on to discuss what in Indian philosophy is commonly called 'Transmigration' there is just one other aspect of the question we have been discussing to which I would draw your attention. You will remember towards the end of Part III the reasons I gave for feeling that the centre of personality which in the terms of human experience had entered upon eternal—or *non-forgetting*—life, and the noblest and deepest aspects of whose experience and feeling related to its relations with other loved personalities still limited in their experience to the terms which we know as " human ", would even after passing to the next higher stage in its personal evolution find its love for them an integral part of its personal life. I even ventured to think the " activities " of such a personality would be largely concerned with the higher interests of those beloved who had not as yet passed beyond the terms of human experience and even of those

who in the terms of human experience had not yet waked to eternal life. Indeed I said that it seemed to me that the higher personal evolution of such a personality would in large measure be dependent upon the entry of the personalities beloved by it into the higher zone of experience in which it moved. For it would only be then that "contact" upon the part of those who had been left behind could be re-established and still deeper implications of love explored upon a loftier level of experience. You will also remember my saying why I felt that though personalities still limited by the potentialities of the "human" Buddhi, etc., would of necessity lose contact with a loved personality that had passed to a level of experience beyond human terms, it by no means followed—was on the contrary highly improbable—that a personality that had entered upon the life of non-forgetting and thereafter passed to a level of experience envehicled through a supra-human Buddhi, would in so doing lose contact with the experiencing life of those personalities whom it loved. My reason was that in so doing its personal life would be mutilated in some of its most vital aspects and it would be cut off from further evolution in its deepest and noblest part. Moreover I pointed out that the area of its loving experience that was implemented in human terms formed a vital part of its eternal life and must be as a consequence capable of being apprehended by it.

If this be so, does it not mean that at any rate the earlier part of the zone of experience of the personality which, having entered upon eternal life, has passed to life in higher terms than those of human experience, *must* include

within its content consciousness of and touch with the experience-life of those loved personalities still limited to experience in terms of "this world"? This would mean that for those who have entered upon eternal life each succeeding zone of experience will merge gradually into the one that follows it. There will be an over-lapping, so to speak, that will sustain the continuity of experience and ensure the unity of the whole.

"Transmigration" and the place and significance of Memory in the personal evolution of Purusha.

Of course all that has been written above about the evolution of Púrusha under the mode of individuated personalities implies my belief in what is ordinarily called *transmigration*—the passing-across (from one vehicle of experience to another). In the following pages I propose to go into this question at some length, dealing with it in connection with the problem of *memory*, and answering to the best of my ability certain of the objections that are raised against it.

Probably the chief of these is that "transmigration" could have no significance in the evolution of a progressively experiencing personality because the transmigrating ego has no *memory* of its experience in previous births. Those who oppose the conception upon this ground say, that since there is no memory of what has taken place before, there can be no continuity of experience.

Undoubtedly this is a valid objection if memory is *never* to play a part in the progressive evolution of personality, and, as a matter of fact we know that up to the stage where experience is expressed in "human" terms—the highest at

present known to *us*—there is no memory of past "births". Moreover, we are none of us in a position as yet to declare from actual knowledge that in higher levels of personal evolution there *is* sustained memory, for the simple reason that we have not attained to them. Nevertheless it seems to me that even within the present content of experience there will be found indications for those who seek, sufficient to guide them in arriving at certain positive conclusions, and that there is no necessity for our hopelessly taking up an agnostic position on the subject. For in a real evolution the present surely contains the implications of the future. What the future will be depends upon what the present is. If only we knew the exact nature of what has been taking place in the past and the significance of every factor involved in the present we could tell unerringly what the next step would be. Even to the extent that we can arrive at a right conception of the implications of present experience the same is true.

Answer to the objection.

My own answer to the objection is that *up to a certain point* in the evolution of personality there is no necessity for sustained memory. On the contrary, up to that point it would be a positive obstruction to sustained personal evolution if memory were sustained as well. When, however, a certain definite stage in the evolution of experience has been reached, further and higher evolution is only possible through the instrumentality of memory. I shall now try to explain my meaning and you must let me approach the problem in as round-about a manner as I find necessary.

We know that in the course of the nine months after its conception and in the first three years of a child's life it makes enormous progress —more, I have heard said, than in all the rest of its life put together. This is at least true of the vehicle through the medium of which it establishes touch with what it experiences. During this period the centre of personality is receiving impressions and undergoing experiences which definitely affect its subsequent evolution as well as that of its vehicle. Is not this one of the reasons why we try to keep a woman happy during the months of her pregnancy, and subsequently her little child free from terror and shocks of various kinds, knowing that they may not merely affect its body but its whole character as well in the years to come? Yet none of its experience during this period will be remembered.

Let us also consider our own children. There is little Satyavati: does she not experience? Is she not ever reaching out for new experience? Is not her personality evolving and developing before our eyes? And yet we both know well that she will not remember any part of what she experiences now. In the course of a few years her knowledge of this vitally important part of her evolution as a personality will be absolutely nil.

Thus we see that this period during which we so carefully protect our little ones from adverse experience is one of which they retain *no memory at all.* If the objection referred to above is entirely valid why do we protect them? Why do we not say that since our children will retain no memory of them, the impressions which they receive are of no importance? Here, in the homely affairs of our ordinary life we can

appreciate the significance of experience as apart from any sustained memory of it.

The evolving personality, as I have pointed out before, can be viewed from two aspects. We can consider it as it is *in itself*—its individual texture or character at a given point in its evolution. Or we can view it in its reaction to what it is experiencing in the terms of a given buddhi. Considered as apart from the experience it is undergoing at a specific juncture, we may think of it as that in the fibre of which the results of countless reactions to vast areas of unremembered experience have been "banked" in the form of modifications. In it are gathered up, *not* merely memories of past experience, but the enregistered *results* of past experiences now unremembered. Indeed it is what it is personally and individually as a result of them.

Let us now consider the personality in the process of experiencing, for it is only by means of experience that the personal evolution is carried further. The personality as we thus know it is experiencing through a buddhi, etc. and constantly reacting to that which it experiences in terms of the particular buddhi functioning for it. A more highly evolved personality can only experience fully in the terms of a more highly evolved vehicle, and one that is less evolved in the terms of a vehicle suited to its greater simplicity.

Modifications in the texture of Personality

The acquisition of any experience results in a modification in the texture of personality. The nature and extent of the modification depends upon the terms of the specific buddhi through which the experience is transmitted, as well as

upon the particular texture of the centre of Púrusha personality undergoing it. (I think there is also full justification for believing that it depends as well upon the nature *in itself* of what is experienced, but, as I have so often said, we can never know what things are apart from their expression in the experience-world of the self.)

A modification in the texture of a personality having taken place it will no longer experience in exactly the same way that it did before—that is, it will react in a somewhat different manner to whatever it subsequently experiences.

Broadly speaking, therefore, I am inclined to class the significance of experience under two heads. In the first I would place all those experiences whose *only* permanent significance lies in the modifications they produce in the texture of the evolving personalities undergoing them. In the second would be placed those which are not merely valuable by reason of the modifications brought about by them in the texture of the experiencing personality, *but* the retention of a memory of which is essential for the purposes of higher experience. (With this second category I shall deal presently.)

Let us now look at the forms of experience that would come under the first head—those which fulfill their function apart from any necessity of being remembered. These are the ones which serve to develop in the evolving centres of personality qualities of feeling, willing, etc., without which higher experience would be impossible to it—such qualities, for example, as aggressiveness, perseverance, patience in the pursuit of a purpose, etc. These and many more, though greatly influenced by the vehicle in the

extent and manner of their expression, have their seat in the personality and are evolved during the process of its modification in reaction to experiences of various kinds.

Let us consider individuated Púrusha experiencing personally through the medium of a lion's buddhi and the terms of lion-life. In this case the patience, quiet perseverance and cautiousness so essential to a lion's very existence are among the important reactions which lion-experience would tend to produce. These reactions which the texture of the personality undergoes as a result of what it experiences, and of the terms in which the experience is transmitted to it through the lion-buddhi, affect the nature of its evolution and result in certain modifications in its texture. At this stage, as at all stages in its evolution, it *is* what its reactions to previous experience have made it.

Ever since the far-off dawn of consciousness each slowly evolving centre of personality has been undergoing constant modifications of texture as a result of its reactions to manifold experience through countless buddhis each adapted to function as an efficient vehicle at some particular stage in its evolution. It is through such constant modifications in the texture of the divergently evolving personal modes of Púrusha that progressive individuation takes place. Each personal differentiation differs from all others because each is just what past reactions to its own particular past experiences have made it. The individuality of each is the outcome of the sum-total of the modifications which it has undergone, though none of the experiences that have been instrumental in bringing about the result are remembered.

Thus you see that the significance of large areas of experience is very great, quite apart from the factor of memory. It is found not in the *remembrance* of the setting of this or that specific experience but in the *modifications* actually produced in the texture of the personality. It was far more important, for example, that the texture of the personality experiencing through the lion-buddhi as its vehicle should undergo modification as a result of the situations in lion-life, than that the 'stage-setting' of each of the acts through which the experience was undergone should be remembered after the modifications resulting had taken place.

The Significance of Unremembered Experience.

If this conception be correct it would follow that the results of past and forgotten experiences (up to a certain stage) are "banked" in the form of individuated character in the texture of the conscious personality. I would go further and assert that—up to a point—any long sustained retention in memory of the settings of past experience would be a positive hindrance rather than an aid to the growth of individuality. What is required in the earlier stages is the *result* of experience expressed in terms of modified character, *not* its stage-setting.

Let us take a rather crude example to illustrate how it would be a hindrance. Suppose an evolving centre of personality had reached a stage where its capacity to experience could function most adequately through the buddhi of a lizard. Suppose further that it had through the lizard-buddhi so reacted to the field of experience opened to it that it had added the results of what it had experienced through this

medium in the form of modifications in the texture of its personality—in other words, had "banked" its reactions to experience in the form of modified individuality. Surely *nothing* more than this would be either necessary or desirable. The modifications in the evolving personality undergone through the medium of the lizard-life would undoubtedly have extended its capacity for the acquisition of experience upon a slightly higher plane and in slightly different terms. Not memory of the manner in which the experience had been undergone but the modification of the texture of personality resulting would be the thing that mattered.

But let us suppose that, *retaining* the capacity to remember the setting of its experience undergone while it was developing personally through the medium of the lizard-buddhi, its next vehicle for the acquisition of experience were a lion-buddhi. (Of course there would be no such tremendous jump, but I am taking it for the sake of showing my meaning more clearly.) Would it find that a memory of the "stage-setting" of the experiences, in reacting to which it had become capable of acquisition through a more evolved vehicle, was an advantage? Of course it would not, for the terms in which these past experiences had been interpreted were those of an inferior buddhi. The *manner* in which they had been presented by the lizard-buddhi would be of no value to the more evolved personality functioning through a more elaborated vehicle. There would be no significance in the more evolved personality's remembering *how* it had experienced through the lower vehicle. No; in giving rise to the reactions of the evolving

personality which resulted in its further modification and evolution these past experience-settings had performed their part; their *garb* was without any permanent significance. It represented *the experienced* in the terms of a lower buddhi, and as interpreted through that to a less evolved centre of personality. A memory of the *details* of these past acquisitions would, had they been possible, have merely "littered up" the area of conscious experience, and have tended to blur the clearness and unity of the experience in terms of the lion-buddhi.

The point at which Remembrance becomes essential.

In the last pages I have been trying to show why the value of experience *up to a certain point* does not at all depend upon its setting being remembered "from birth to birth", and that such a remembering would even act as an obstruction to the evolution of clear-cut personality in the lower stages. But in putting forward this view I have been careful to say only up to a point, for I think a very clear distinction must be drawn between that area of experience which is in no sense dependent upon being remembered beyond a single "birth" for its value, and that other area which it would be disastrous to forget.

At what point does further progress in the evolution of personality begin to depend upon a sustained continuity of memory? What is that area of *the experienced*, progressive penetration of which is impossible without memory of what has gone immediately before? Or, to put the question in rather a different way, up to what

point may the evolving centre of personality progress before the necessity for a recollection of experience undergone "in a lower birth", or in the terms of a simpler buddhi, arises? Let us see to what extent this question can be answered.

As we have seen, at all stages of progressive experiencing below that in which the individuated personality functions through the medium of what we know as the "human" buddhi, a retention of a memory of the circumstances under which, and the guise in which, the experience took place would have no significance whatever. Indeed, what we know of the life of the lower animals would indicate that, even within the limits of a single life, capacity to remember is far less essential to them at that stage than it is in the zone we are humanly traversing. All those ties of affection which in man are so dependent upon his capacity to remember and co-ordinate, are in the case of the lower animals extremely fleeting for the very reason that memory plays a less important part. Even far up in the scale of sub-human experience it is clear that though love for the young is strong while it lasts, it is still very short-lived. In a greater or less degree the same applies to love for the mate. The experience-world of the self is on these lower levels not largely commensurate with the animal's life, but limited by the portion of it that is present to memory at a given time in that life. Yet there is as much power to remember as is necessary for full lizard-experience or full lion-experience, As we survey the areas of experience made available to the Púrusha through buddhis lower than the "human", it will become apparent that in the lowest levels

the experience-world of the self is limited to what is being experienced at a given juncture. But gradually the horizon widens and a larger and larger section of the experience-life is co-ordinated through the steadily growing power of memory. Doubtless a much larger section of life in lion-terms is illuminated by memory than of life in lizard-terms.

The whole of our experience, in so far as it is present to consciousness at a given moment, may be said to be bounded by Memory. The greater the capacity to remember the wider the terms of life. This, of course, does not mean that the attention of the Experiencer at any instant of experiencing is concentrated upon each of the details present to memory, but that the *form* of what is instantaneously experienced depends upon the active or latent presence in consciousness of the whole of its contents. As the Chandogya Upanishad says:—

> "Therefore, even if many not possessing Memory (smara) should be assembled, indeed they would not hear anyone at all, they would not think, they would not understand. But assuredly, if they should remember, then they would hear, then they would think, then they would understand."

This undoubtedly applies to the conscious life of the Experiencer—the "I"—experiencing in terms of the sub-human buddhi as well as to the more evolved personality experiencing in higher terms. As a consequence, and for the purposes of this philosophy, we may say that the stage in the personal evolution of the "I"s—whether experiencing through "human" or sub-human buddhis —is determined by the extent to which past

experience is co-ordinated by Memory in the consciousness of the experiencer.*

But though, as regards experience through sub-human vehicles, Memory does play a progressively important part as the evolution proceeds, it has not precisely the same significance that it has later. Here its *only* function would seem to be that of making possible more elaborated forms of experience whereby further modifications in the personal texture of the experiencer may take place. In other words, the value of Memory, even up to the highest phases of sub-human experience, lies *only* in its being an instrumentality for the modification of the texture of the evolving personality. Its work is to aid in the production of modifications which will make further modifications possible.

For there seems little to indicate that even in the highest terms of sub-human experience anything *worth permanently remembering* is present. If even during an individual "birth" it is not essential at this level for the "I" to remember more than a few hours or weeks or months of experience—more than a small section of the "life" it is experiencing through a certain vehicle—it would assuredly follow that Memory here has no significance beyond the modifications it renders possible in the texture of the experiencing personality.

Thus it seems evident that, in the building up of the centres of personality of the Púrusha, Memory sustained for more than insignificant periods does not begin to play a part of primary importance before the "I" has evolved to a point

* Sc. Note 3 at end of book on "The seat of Memory."

where it is capable of reacting to experience expressed in the terms of the "human" buddhi, etc. In stages below this its evolutionary progress does not appear to be dependent upon memory of a very sustained nature. We may therefore conclude that—below experience in "human" terms, at any rate—there is no need for more than an evanescent memory of what is experienced. Up to this point it functions purely and simply in the interests of the textural modification of personality.

When we come to consider the significance of Memory—of relatively *abiding* memory, I mean—to those evolving personalities whose experience is coming to them in terms of the "human" buddhi, we find ourselves upon rather different ground. Even in this area of experience there appears to me to be much without permanent value so far as a memory of the circumstances or "setting" of its acquisition is concerned. Also we must remember that there are vastly differing grades of "human" buddhi. Some stand only higher than the highest sub-human vehicles; others are, comparatively speaking, of a very high order indeed. From this it naturally follows that the nature of the experience acquired through these widely differing mediums must itself differ greatly. Some of it is, as I shall attempt to make clear to you, experience which *must* be remembered because higher experience depends upon the memory of it: some of it, on the contrary, is obviously of no permanent value at all in terms of memory.

Let us, with the aid of an example, try to understand how part of our human experience is neither remembered nor needs to be remembered

to fulfill its function. We shall take the acquisition of knowledge. How does one become a 'learned' man? He usually starts as a small boy and through a period of years learns thousands upon thousands of lessons and reads millions of sentences. Does he become *learned* by retaining in his memory each sentence and each lesson he has read? Not at all; on the contrary he forgets most of them. Yet each lesson learned and each sentence read was an experience, and the reading of each of them, the solving of each of the tens of thousands of problems in mathematics, was undoubtedly an act of experiencing in greater or less degree. Each of them undoubtedly produced its reaction—however faint it might be—in the experiencing personality, and each such reaction with its resultant modification in the texture of the evolving ego, was as certainly accompanied by a modification of the buddhi reacting to the reaction of the ego experiencing through it. The effect of each such experience was doubtless so slight as to be imperceptible, but the effects of the constantly recurring reactions was cumulative. Its result was an ever increasing capacity for experience transmitted in terms of the intellect upon the part of the personality, and of progressive adaptation to intellectual processes upon the part of the vehicle.

And yet we recognize at once that the *learned* man is not worthy of that appellation because he has remembered these thousands upon thousands of details of his experiencing. Very probably he has forgotten much the larger part of them. And yet each lesson he learned as a child—each sentence or problem he studied and later forgot—it was from the

reactions of his experiencing ego to these subsequently forgotten details that the texture of both the ego itself and the vehicle of thought were developed and modified. His intellectual capacity, without which he could never have become a learned scholar, was as dependent for its existence upon all that he had acquired and forgotten as upon the knowledge that had been retained and co-ordinated through the instrumentality of memory. Nay more: it was *all that largely forgotten experiencing* which had made the man worthy to be called *learned.* This is so because without having undergone it, it would have been quite impossible for him to have subsequently experienced in a manner and in terms that would entitle him to be considered a man of learning. Surely the above example shows us the value of experiencing, even in human terms, quite apart from any retention by the memory of the circumstances of its acquisition.

It seems to me I have written enough to make it clear to you that even upon the highest plane of experiencing with which we are yet conversant—that in which the evolving personality's reaction to what it experiences is the result of the *experienced* being interpreted to it in the terms of the "human" buddhi—*memory* of all the details of life is not essential for progressive personal evolution. In fact, we have most of us probably forgotten much more than we have remembered, and yet each one of these forgotten experiences has had its definite part to play in making our personalities what they are.

We have now reached a point when we can consider the part which Memory has to play in

"eternal life". It has been seen that *all* experience undergone through sub-human vehicles, and *much* of the experience undergone through the "human" vehicle is of value only because of the modification which results in the texture of the personality reacting to it. We have said "much" of the experience acquired through the human vehicle; why have we not said "all"? Why have we differentiated? I propose now to show you, if possible, that though there are many experiences of which it is quite unnecessary for us to retain any memory, there are others of such a nature that, *unless* we retain a memory of them, further progress along lines of the noblest experience would be impossible.

The relation of Memory to "Eternal Life."

In his midnight conversation with Nicodemus, Christ laid stress upon the necessity of "being born again"—becoming twice-born—before one could enter into, or even see, the 'Kingdom of God'. What did he mean?

"Being Born Again"

Here in the jail I have a great opportunity of appreciating the significance of his words. Surrounded night and day by a score of personalities I am able to devote considerable attention to studying them and their buddhis. I have been with them long enough, I think, to reach fairly reliable conclusions and am convinced that there is not one of them who has undergone "second birth" in the sense in which it seems to me that Christ used the term. If you had had the opportunity to study them as I have done, and to consider their reactions to what they are experiencing, you would easily understand what I mean.

It is not because the whole of their conversation is filthy and full of profanity that I have reached my conclusion. For the use of various phrases and terms is, after all, a matter of habit, and those who here use such extraordinary language to express their thoughts and emotions mean little or nothing by it. They are obviously trying to say the same thing when they use a revolting string of filthy adjectives that others would express in terms much less objectionable. When therefore I say that they obviously have not entered upon that stage in their personal evolution which the great teacher of Nazareth called being "born again" I am not at all led to do so by the peculiarity of their language. Nor do I say so because of the nature of the crimes that have brought them here, for it seems to me that a "twice-born" man who had not as yet escaped from the fetters of the illusion begotten of Ahaṃkāra might well fall as these men have fallen. Indeed, my own past experience proves to me that this might be the case.

By what standard then do I judge when I confidently assert that not one of them has undergone that experience which Christ calls "second birth"? I think I can possibly make it clear to you. If you were able to study the zone of experience which is being traversed by the personalities of these prisoners, judging it by their conversations, activities, and manifest aspirations, you would be struck by the fact that not one of them is interested in any thing which is not of the most purely temporary significance. Sexual excitement in its grosser animal aspect, material comfort associated with the gratification

of material ideas of ease and self-indulgence, self-aggrandizement in matters as fleeting as life itself—these seem to cover the whole field of experience of which these personalities are as yet cognizant. Their ideals of *the desirable* embrace nothing which is of more than temporary significance, and the direction of their efforts, hopes and activities is very clearly controlled by the Great illusion manifesting itself in a pronounced form.

To me it seems obvious that the very poverty of the field traversed hitherto by these experiencing personalities shows that they have as yet learned very little of what the world may teach them. They are nevertheless experiencing all the time. They are being buffeted by the consequences of their own actions but as yet they do not understand the significance of the process. They doubtless must be here to acquire the experience of which their evolving personalities are at present capable, yet, in the light of what I know of their viewpoints and of the terms in which their buddhis interpret *the experienced* to them, I find it impossible to conclude that any *memory* of the details and 'setting' of their present experiencing would be of more than the most temporary value to them.

The "Once-born"

The fact is that these people do not seem as yet to be cognizant of any thing of permanent significance. I mean that nothing as yet forming part of their experience is expressed in terms worth remembering. Their desires, hopes, associations activities are all with reference to "this world", —"this life". What they desire only has a

significance *in* the terms of this world. I incline to believe, therefore, that in their case and in the case of others who have not advanced beyond this stage, we are justified in concluding that there would be neither use nor possibility of retaining in memory beyond the present "life" that which has no meaning except in terms of "this world". Personalities so situated those whose experience has a purely temporary reference—may be understood as not "twice-born." Such a personality is only conscious of the *guise*; the reality behind it does not exist as yet for it. The guise is, as it were, the *only* reality to it; it is conscious of nothing else but that. And since all that it experiences—so far as its form and expression in experience is concerned—has a purely temporary significance, the evolving personality after having undergone a modification of texture as a consequence of its reaction to it, loses nothing by failing to retain the memory of those experiences by which the modification was brought about. We may therefore conclude that *as long as the evolving personality continues to be entirely engaged with the purely temporary factors and manifestations, it has undergone no experience the terms of which are worth remembering*. For it is only when the personality has reached a stage in which what it experiences has deeper implications to it than are contained in the terms of this "world" that the garb of that experience may come to have a more than temporary significance. When its experience comes to have this character the Experiencer is beginning to exhibit signs of that "second birth"—that opening of the eyes to the things "which fade not away"

In using these phrases of Christ I have merely

in experience, and I to you. This personality has undergone profound modification as a result of what it has experienced in our love for each other. As a result I am more capable of loving you than I was before these reactions took place. But to think that this was *all* would be to miss a very important part of the truth. My love for you has been a gradual growth—a progressive experience. Moreover, its further advance at every stage has been absolutely dependent upon the capacity to remember and contemplate the nature of its expression under various circumstances in the past. For it is by means of memory of the manner in which I have experienced your love for me in the past, that I gain ever new understanding of it and consequently *new experience* of it. If it were possible to take from me my capacity to remember the *manner* in which I have progressively experienced whatever has made me love you more and more, my experiencing life would be impoverished. The noblest part of my personal life would suffer greatly.

In so far as I am able to analyse my feeling toward you I find it inextricably bound up with constantly recurring reactions to the memory of what our relations have been. When you were so fine and true at the time the submarine attacked us on our voyage to India, my personality reacted to its experience of your brave loyalty conveyed to it in the terms of my buddhi. As a result of that experience you were more to me than you had been before. *But* there was not only one reaction to that experience; every time when, through the instrumentality of Memory, the circumstances of that long past experience present themselves to

becomes capable of more inclusive memory, the once-born lives in and for the things that pass away. Just as the eyes of sheep are fixed ever upon the ground and they are oblivious of all else—the sky and the clouds and the stars—so the once-born's attention is exclusively occupied with the temporary expression of things. It neither is conscious of, nor desires anything beyond that which is in reality only as lasting as the terms of human experience. The little area of experience which is clothed phenomenally in the terms of "the world" as seen by human eyes, contains the objects of all the desires of which it is conscious. All that it as yet desires is capable of being *completed* within the limitations of human experience. The needs of which it is as yet conscious are so limited that the limitations of human life do not render their fulfilment impossible. I wonder if you get my meaning; it is clear to me but I find it far from easy to express.

Experience of the "Twice Born."

When I compare the area of my own experiencing life with such a one as I have been above describing I find a very definite contrast. It is true that I am still greatly influenced by the factors which impel the once-born to effort, and the objects which seem to him desirable. This is doubtless because my experience is still in human terms and I have only *begun* to be born anew. Like the steps of a little child so are mine faltering and uncertain as I cross the border which separates the area of non-remembering from "eternal life". But, although I know myself as still having much in common in experience with the once-born personality, I am conscious that the

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me, a further reaction takes place. There is not merely memory but re-experiencing. Indeed, in the course of its evolution, as my personality undergoes progressive modification, the character of its reaction to the memory of this past experience undergoes modification also. Therefore not only am I what I am personally as a consequence —in part at least—of that long past experience progressively re-experienced in terms never quite the same, and capable of loving you in exactly the way and to the extent of my present capacity for so doing, but what you are to me now depends—in part at least—upon my experience *now* of that which is long past. In other words, upon the memory of it.

Again, my experiencing personality reacted to and underwent modification as it felt your tender love and courage at the time of my arrest and in these months that have followed. And every time, when through the coming years I remember how bravely you stood with me, that memory will be the cause of a new experience to which my personality will react. And each reaction will produce its further modification. Thus the exact nature of my love for you in the present is the result of my constantly re-experienced consciousness of your love as it has in the past manifested itself. And the vehicle of this re-experiencing is Memory.

Ask yourself this question? Is not your love for me and for those other personalities that are so precious, the noblest area of your conscious life? Are you not conscious of it as the highest part of you *personally?* And, apart from the ability to re-experience those experiences by which your love has grown to be what it is,

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through their presence in consciousness—in other words, through the instrumentality of memory—would your present love be possible? I know well what your answer would be: Love may be felt in all its fullness in the present, but *what* it is in the present depends upon the presence in consciousness of what it has been in the past.

For myself, at least, I feel that this holds true. What am I as apart from what you are to me? I am conscious that in my love for you all, I am my best and noblest self. And my love for you—what you *are* to me—is not something that can be separated in consciousness from what you have been to me in past experience. Blot out from consciousness what you have been to me in the past, and what you are to me in the present will be blotted out as well. Blot out the noblest aspect of my experiencing life in the present and you deprive me of the opportunity for those modification—producing reactions which will fit me for still nobler experiencing.

Summary.

Let me now attempt to sum up what we have been considering for some pages:

(1) Whatever the evolving personality experiences in the terms of the various vehicles that from time to time function for it, must be considered as falling within one of two categories.

(2) The first of these categories includes all experience which, while of the deepest significance to the evolution of personality, may still be *forgotten* without any loss being entailed. The value of this type of experience lies in the modifications produced in the texture of the personality reacting to it, as well as in the resultant modifications that take place in the vehicle through which it is at the time experiencing. These various modifications result in an

elaboration of individuality which increases the capacity for acquisition of experience upon a plane that would have been impossible apart from them. The vehicle too becomes capable of functioning as an instrument of higher experience than it was before.

(3) The second of the categories of experience includes all experience which is not merely significant for the modification in the texture of personality which it produces, but the circumstances associated with the acquisition of which must continue present to consciousness for the perfection of higher experience—in other words, that must be *remembered.*

(4) All experience in sub-human terms and much of that in human terms comes under the first category. In the lower zones nothing of what is experienced, and in the "human" zone none of the experience that falls within the first category, needs to be remembered. Here we find a continuity of personal evolution resulting from reactions to progressive experience, associated with a continuity of evolution of the vehicles of experience, but only a more or less limited continuity of memory. Here the *modifications* only matter; these having been brought about, the terms of the experience producing them need not remain present to consciousness. Memory of them would add nothing; on the contrary it would *litter up* the content of consciousness and tend to blur the outlines of the personality experiencing on a higher level.

As long as an evolving centre of Púrusha in personal mode experiences only what falls within this first category, we may think of it as "once-born". In the course of its journey across the great plain of experience it has as yet found nothing worth picking up and taking with it. What it has encountered so far is only of temporary interest to it—to be glanced at and then thrown aside. The time will come when it will find that which not only will hold its interest but without which it can no further pursue its journey.

And because this region contains nothing worth remembering, beyond at most the terms of a single "life", we may think of it as *the area of recurring forgetfulness*, in escaping from which we enter upon our *second* birth. This is the region which in my vision of the meaning of existence corresponds to the '*round of birth and death*' that plays such an important part in the thought of India. All this "birth

and death" is preparatory for that higher stage of deeper and more significant experience where the continuity in memory is not broken. "Birth and death" comes to an end when the evolving Personality attains a stage—enters a zone—where the *terms* of that which is experienced *must* form an integral part of the next higher stage of experience--when further and higher experience depends upon memory of the circumstances of past experience.

We do not enter upon "Eternal Life"—the Christian way of saying "freedom from birth and death"—as a consequence of the dissolution of a vehicle of our experiencing. We enter upon it when we become *twice-born*—when first we experience that the memory of which is relevant to our spiritual progress in higher terms of experience.

That factor in experience which we at present know as "death", and from which at lower stages the evolving personality is so anxiously seeking escape, is *not* in reality the dissolution of the vehicle but the dissolution of *memory.*

(5) As long as the evolving personality is experiencing in terms that fall exclusively within the first category it remains bound to the wheel of birth and death—to the broken road of recurrent non-remembering. What it experiences, having no memory-value to the personal evolution of the Self, is only as permanent as the evanescent vehicle in terms of which it is experienced. Freedom from this—from Samsāra, as it is called in the philosophy of India--means to me entry upon a zone of higher progressive experiencing, where memory of the terms in which certain experiences were expressed—the experiences themselves—is essential to higher experience inasmuch as they form a relevant part of it.

Whereas in the earliest stages of the personal evolution of Púrusha the area illumined at any one juncture by consciousness was so limited that it only included a tiny fraction of the experience-life covered in the terms of a single vehicle, and whereas through progressive zones of the evolving "I"s experiencing life we see the illuminated area growing ever wider until at the terms of "human" experience it may be said to be almost commensurate with the duration of the "I"s association with the vehicle, I find "eternal life" beginning at the point where the ever widening area illuminated by consciousness assumes such dimensions that the terms of a single "birth" can no longer adequately include it.

The *passing-over* from the stages where the evolving personal self is "bound to the wheel of birth and death" is not a sudden transition with which the dissolution of the vehicle has anything to do. It is marked, rather, by the inclusion within the area of our experiencing life of that which the evolving personality *cannot afford* to forget. "Eternal Life"—freedom from birth-death is that in which the correlation in consciousness through memory of a wider area of experience than is included within the terms of a single "birth" becomes essential to further progress.

Significance of the above to the Divine Experience.

There is another and wider significance for the experience-world of the evolving personality so extending its borders that they pass beyond the confines of its experience in the terms of a single vehicle. Hitherto we have been treating almost exclusively of the significance of *memory* in the evolution of the inter-personal relations of the Púrusha. I should like to devote a few pages to making clear how it seems to me that this passing over into "Eternal Life" is significant to that "I" in whom "we live and move and have our being"—that is, to Paramâtmán.

The whole of the experience-life of Púrusha in personal evolution may be considered the "field" (kshetra) of Paramâtmic experience. He experiences all that is experienced by each conscious and feeling "I" from the least to the most evolved. But though He experiences *all* that I experience, the "I" of His experience is not the "I" of mine. This "I" is Púrusha in one of its countless growingly personal modes; that is the timelessly personal "I"—Paramâtmán. It is true that He experiences all that I feel and experience, but not as I do. With Him it is

his experience of my experience; He experiences it as *mine*—not His.

Thus all the felt and formulated experience-life of the multi-personally evolving Púrusha is present to Paramâtmán, but I am unable to hold the conception that this "field" is like a Līla (a play) which He spreads out "to while away" the timelessness of His existence. I hold that He is not, as it were, an amused spectator, but that there is a deep and essential significance *to Him* in the evolution of Púrusha. Nor do I think that the "field"—merely as an instrument for the re-appropriation of Púrusha experience in terms of the divine would have any such significance.

In any Púrusha experience up to that which has its formulation in the terms and values of the "human"—and in a large area of experience in "human" terms as well—there appears to me nothing that has any significance to Paramâtmán, beyond the fact that it is preparatory for something else. My meaning is that there is nothing in the terms of "once-born" Púrusha experience that is directly relevant to the *Divine Need*, with reference to which the two subsidiary modes of Bráhman find their significance and reason timelessly to be.

Not before Púrusha has evolved to a certain stage in personal mode is it in any wise capable of feeling its need for God or of groping for communion with Him. Yet until that personal relationship between an "I" of Púrusha and the timeless "I" has been established, the terms of the experience of the former have no direct relevancy to its share in the fulfilling of the need of God. It is only after the evolving Púrusha "I" becomes conscious of the timeless "I" as That in which it

must find its fulfilling and completion—only after it begins consciously to turn to and long for fulfilment in God—that its experience-life has significance in relation to the divine need. Then only does it itself begin to be a fulfilling of that need, and in its subsequent evolution fulfil it progressively.

But its further progressive personal evolution is dependent, as I have tried to show elsewhere, upon *memory*. Thus, when once the Púrusha "I" has become 'awake to God' all its deeper, nobler experience life has an essential influence upon the nature of its relationship with God. It is what it is to God by reason of what its dear ones are to it; they are what they are to it because of what God is, and is increasingly becoming, to it. Deprived of its loving relationship with those personalities that are dear to it, it would not be the same "I" to God. Its love for God would not be the same; it would be deprived of its richness and individuality. It is hard to put this in words, dear one, but I who love you know that if I should lose all memory of you and all the sense of what you are to me, then the love I give to God and the sense of need I have of God, would be other than they are, and I would have less to give Him and less to receive from Him.

And love for you must—to be what it is—include memory of what you have been to me. Past experience of love must be available to be constantly re-appropriated in terms of ever deepening and growing personality, through the instrumentality of memory. What you are to me today is strictly dependent upon the memory of what you have been to me in previous experience.

Continuity of Memory.

This does not mean to me, however, that all the details of our loving relationship must eternally be present to memory. On the contrary I think that slowly one by one, they will fade away as deeper and richer expressions of loving experience crowd them out and replace them. What I do mean is that there will be *continuity* of evolving experience in our relationship, past experience upon a lower plane being slowly and progressively replaced in memory by higher and richer—just as we see in the page of life we know here, where things become dim and fade away (the lesser first, the greater and more out-standing experiences more slowly), but the continuity of the relationship is fully maintained in the gradually changing content of consciousness. To enter into personal relationship with God—to enter into experience in which God is felt present and loving and filling the need and yearning of the personal self—is to enter upon a relationship as lasting as personality. Here, in the highest sense, the "I" is entered upon "everlasting life", and the continuity of that eternal life includes continuity of experience. All that Paramâtmân is to it in each new experience of love felt and need fulfilled must depend upon the consciousness of what He has meant in past experience—felt to the "I" in relation to itself, felt to it in relation to those who are dear to it. "Birth and death" is *dying* again and again just because it is an experiencing that has not yet achieved this continuity of experience co-ordinated by memory. To escape from death is to escape from this.

It seems to me for the reasons I have given that—so far as the world we know is concerned—

the evolving Púrusha "I"s cannot escape from this repeated "dying" through any stage in their evolution lower than that which experiences in "human" terms. Also that vast numbers of "I"s have reached the stage when they experience humanly without entering upon "eternal life", and I feel that they will continue to experience in these terms, being "born" and "dying" again and again until they pass over into everlasting life either by entering upon conscious and personal relations with the timeless "I", or realizing inter-personal relations among themselves of a nature that can only find their fulfilment in God. For those who have not reached to this level of experience I see not continuity of consciousness beyond the terms of human experience.

For those "I"s that have entered upon everlasting life there will be progressive evolution of personality and of experience, but it will not be broken by failure of memory. It will not be a *broken road.* If this be so, and to me there seems justification for arriving at such a conclusion, then obviously that 'human life' in the course of which, or terms of which, the Púrusha "I" enters upon eternal life, will be its last in those terms, and its loving personal relations established in that 'life' will be the last to be established through the values of human experience.

The Experience we know as "Death".

At the conclusion of the "I"s experience in 'human' terms comes that heart-breaking experience that we know as "Death" —heart-breaking because of the break in the experience of the relationship between personalities that have become dear to each other and feel their need of each

other. Yet it seems to me to be only a partial and temporary separation due to a 'break-down' in the means of communication.

Of course, those "I"s that are still experiencing 'humanly' will– by the very limitations of the terms of their experiencing life—be shut out from any consciousness of experience that is framed in higher than 'human' terms. They are unable, in the very nature of the case, to "get the wave-length", so to speak, of experience upon a loftier plane. But the situation of the "I" that has passed on to experience framed in deeper and richer terms, is altogether different. Bear in mind that it has *not* passed over into *another* life, but into a higher envehicling of that "eternal life" upon which it has already entered through and in the terms of human experience. That area of its experience too is an integral part of its eternal life and as such must be present to it. There is consequently no question of the experiencing life of its dear ones being an "unknown country" to it. Experience in human terms is not something *beyond* it—as the terms of its own higher than human experience are beyond the grasp of those personalities still limited to what is expressed humanly. On the contrary, the terms of its next phase of experience will be such as are suited to implement personal life that has *grown out of* experience expressed in human values, and to interpret and give formulation to a content of consciousness in which that which was experienced humanly is included.

If this be so, those who are left behind in the 'humanly' experienced are cut off from the experiencing life of those who have passed to experience in higher than human terms—that is

the life of the latter passes for a time beyond the area of which they are able to be conscious humanly. And this 'cutting-off' is what we know as *death*. But the "I" that has passed to experience in higher terms is *not* cut off from that in human experience which is relevant to the eternal life it is experiencing in higher than human terms. That part of its eternal life that has *human* expression —the conscious life of its dear ones still experiencing humanly, into which it enters with the sympathy and intuition that great love begets— can be grasped by it and becomes part of its life in the higher terms of its experience. Yet though the area of its loved ones' experience may be entered and appropriated in the higher terms of its own, what it itself experiences cannot be given any expression which those experiencing humanly would be conscious of, for though it may experience the experience of its dear ones it does not experience it *humanly*. This would seem to me the probable reason why there is no satisfactory touch between us "in the world" and those who are dear to us but have passed beyond its terms. There *may* be some partially successful means of bridging the gulf, such as spiritualists think they have found, but I do not exactly see what it could be, nor, indeed, does it greatly interest me, who wish to re-establish communion with my dear ones in those higher terms of personal experience where I can be more deeply and truly one with them in life and love than the limitations of the present terms of my experience make possible.

It seems to me, then, that though our dear ones who have gone before are unable to com-

municate with us for lack of a vehicle of expression that comes within the limitations of our experience, they are nevertheless probably more conscious of and closer to us personally than they were when experiencing less deeply and in the lower terms which as yet alone we know. And since, judging from one's own highest experience, a deeply loving "I"'s profoundest interest would be bound up with those it loves, I can well imagine —as I think I have said before—that the "activities" of its higher experiencing life would be largely related to the entry of those whose relations with it were an essential part of its eternal life, into those higher terms in which that life was being lived by it. Indeed, it seems to me that its own further evolution along the road of deepening personal experience would be largely dependent upon the entry into and advance along that road of those in communion with whom the "I" was to more deeply explore its own Púrusha implications in the timeless Bráhman.

The probable dependence of our departed loved ones upon us.

I do not mean to imply that the terms of human experience will permanently form a part of the conscious experiencing life of an evolving personal mode of Púrusha. It is highly probable that a centre of personality would in time reach a stage in its evolution when the long discarded human terms of experiencing would be like a lost language to it, and have become so utterly inadequate for implementing its experiencing life that it could make no more use of them than the "I" that has become capable of experiencing humanly would find it possible to make the terms of the 'rat'-vehicle function adequately for it.

By the time it had arrived at such a stage, however, its experience in human terms would have long since been completely replaced by that in terms of far higher vehicles. The growth away from the power to enter into human experience and appropriate it in higher terms would be a gradual one.

Viewing the process of the modification and development of personality as a true evolution—a slow and ordered growing of the future out of the past, I feel that there is no possibility of this contingency arising as between the Púrusha "I" that has just entered upon life in higher terms than those of human experiencing and its dear ones who have not. For it would seem to be in the very nature of an evolution that such an "I"'s experiencing—and evolved capacity for experience—will not suddenly have undergone so great a modification that human "life" and the terms of human experience would be utterly strange to it.

Capacity to remember is steadily growing.

We have already noticed the fact that in the world of our experience the capacity to *remember* presents itself as something which is steadily growing. The lower down in the scale of personal evolution an Experiencer is, the weaker appears its capacity to remember—the more restricted appears the area of past experience illuminated in consciousness. It has been demonstrated, it is true, that experience through life-forms that belong to very lowly categories is not absolutely disassociated from memory. Confronted with a difficulty to be surmounted two or three times, the "I" experiencing through those forms learns how to avoid it without difficulty. Nevertheless

the memory is very fleeting. In experiencing through higher forms we find greater power of sustained memory—in the rat, for example, where there is memory for a considerable period of the form in which poison has been administered. But within a year it will be ready to take poison administered in precisely the same way. In still higher forms, there is memory upon the part of dogs and horses, etc., extending over a considerable period. It would seem, however, that memory of groups of experiences in their relation to each other is much less developed than at even the lowest stage of the Púrusha's evolution in 'human' terms.

The inference to be drawn from this, as we have already seen, is that the formulations of the experienced in the consciousness of the personal modes of Púrusha become increasingly capable of continuing present to it as its evolution progresses. (We must remember that although these formulations are in the terms of the vehicle, they are not formulations *to* the vehicle but to the conscious personality. They are present to consciousness, *not* to the vehicle. The growing power of memory is therefore nothing less than growth of capacity on the part of the personal self to maintain in consciousness what has once become present to it through the formulations of its vehicle.)

The place of Forgetting in Eternal Life.

Nevertheless the power of the "I" to maintain permanently in consciousness what has been formulated to it in terms of its vehicle will probably never be absolute. *Forgetting* will always continue to be a factor in personal experi-

ence. Just as in an experience "here"—first the unimportant details of experience will fade away, then the "high lights" of a given present will slowly recede as that present merges into the far-off past, become "low lights" less and less distinct, and gradually in their turn sink beyond the horizon. The more outstanding the particular experience, the longer it will be present to consciousness, progressively changing its significance in relation to the constantly changing content. It is more than possible that certain of the "I"'s deepest experiences will never pass from memory because their import to the self is such that they will tend to be constantly dwelt upon and re-experienced again in terms of an ever growing experience-capacity.

However, when the Experiencer has passed "the bandha" (the dyke)—to use an old Upanishad expression—that lies between "birth-death" and eternal life, I should liken the content of his consciousness to a great plain, through which as a traveller passes, he sees new lights coming up over the horizon in front and those left behind gradually sinking below the horizon—the loftiest and brightest keeping longest in view. It is so we know our experiences here. The difference would be that the plain present to consciousness will grow progressively more extended, w il include ever more lights. Yet I imagine that as there will always be new vistas of experience waiting to enter the content of consciousness, so there will always be an horizon of *forgetting*, although it will recede further away at least as regards more significant experience.

For example, after coming to experience our relations with those who have "here" become

dear to us in a manner that has greater implications than the terms of "this world", I do not think we should be in a position to carry on the evolution of Personality in the next higher area of experiencing life unless that experience were included in it. As I see our experience life from the time we "pass the dyke", it must be a progressive exploration of the implications and potentialities of those personal relations that we have "here" learned to re-appropriate in the terms of eternity, and a progressive extension of relations with other personalities in the terms of higher stages of experience. For this, extension of memory—a progressive widening of the content of consciousness—is absolutely essential. Yet it would appear almost certain that as the implications of our inter-personal relationships are more fully realized and the potentialities of those relationships more deeply experienced, even the *at present* most outstanding expressions of them will slowly but surely sink below the horizon of consciousness, as deeper and still more wonderful revelations of what in very truth we are to each other make them sink to comparative insignificance.

Our Path across the Ages.

You and I, my beloved, for age upon age have each pursued our path across the zones of lower experience through "the ocean of birth and death". We have "died" as often as memory died, and yet our forming personalities have been ever building up, ever adding to their respective individualities by their reactions to what they have experienced in terms of progressively discarded buddhis. Probably we have each of us passed through various

"human births"—each of them traversing a zone of experience in which no element *worth remembering*—no factor of more than temporary significance—formed a part.

And now at last our *eternal life* has begun. Our experience has come to include factors which *must* be remembered to make higher experience possible. We have reached the point above the line of Ahaṃkāra where Love has begun to unify us. It has now become essential for us to remember what we mean to each other apart from those purely "human" expressions of the relationship that has come to subsist between us—to realize that we have reached a point in our personal evolution where the completeness of each is *in the other.*

For us there will be no more of "birth and death" in the lower sense—in that sense in which all sages and saints have sought to escape from it. We shall pass through many zones and possibly experience through many buddhis, and *the experienced* will doubtless be clothed in ever nobler Prakṛtic terms as we advance together along the road which leads deeper and deeper into the heart of God, and the hearts of each other.

But all the future of our eternal life will be free from that "dying" which is the death of memory. All our future living will be a progressively enriched unity of correlated experiencing—each ever richer experience depending upon the memory of that which passed before. As we advance, life will possibly express itself—unfold itself—to us in the terms of ever loftier buddhis but it will be *one life,* sustained by undying memory. It is probable that as we leave each zone behind, with the buddhis in terms of which

we have experienced in it and reacted to it, the unessential details of experience which have no deeper relevancy will be forgotton. But each factor of our loftiest experience relevant to that mutual relationship in which we are conscious of ourselves at our highest, will remain clear-cut and complete because its presence in consciousness is essential to richer and deeper experiencing life.

Truly, you and I and all those who have come to love with a love in which there are elements of which "this world" is not an adequate expression, and for which the limitations of "human" experience do not afford sufficient scope, *have* entered upon eternal life. I do not mean a life of *perfection attained*—of *eternal rest*—but one of eternally increasing self-realization and of eternally more complete at-oneness with each other, the continuity of which will never be broken by failure of memory. As to perfection—it is a goal as far away as the infinite is from the finite.

It will be a road of ever increasing beauty, dearest. Just as travellers in the Himalayas ascend to the top of one pass and from there it seems to them that they can see all that lies ahead, yet proceeding onward reach a loftier one and see spread before them an even more glorious vista, so will be the road of our evolving life and relationship. As we progress, ever attaining we shall see ahead ever more to attain. Ever more glorious visions will be spread out before us, ever nobler vistas will beckon us on. Eternal life will be for us a life of eternal achievement—of ever growing vision. We shall not be growing *nearer* to God and to each other, but deeper and deeper

into the divine experience and into each other's feeling and experiencing. All that I am and feel and experience will be ever more perfectly yours. All that you are and feel and experience will be ever more perfectly mine. All that we are to each other and to Him will be ever increasingly the fulfilling of our meaning to Paramâtmán.

PART V

The progressive self-realization of the Timeless Purusha.

We have considered the timeless Bráhman—a unity, its being standing in its central verity, Paramâtmán—subsisting essentially under three categories, and including *time* and *change* within it.

We have also considered the rise and evolution of the personal and individuated modes in which the Púrusha "from everlasting to everlasting" is passing over from a state of unmanifested potentiality into conscious and increasingly personal manifestation.

We have, moreover, considered the world of the experiencing personal Púrusha and have seen that it is to be known in *the Self*—not *in itself*.

Let us now attempt, beloved, to envisage to ourselves the beginningless and endless, multi-personal, boundlessly experiencing life of the timeless Púrusha. For though time and change are realities of Púrusha experience, it itself is beyond time.

Let us first attempt to picture to ourselves Púrusha realizing itself in the time and the terms of this world of our human experience and the particular evolutionary development of Púrusha of which it is one of the expressions. Of course, the poor limited "human" buddhi can only grope weakly to formulate in its own feeble terms the wondrous reality that lies so much beyond it, and my still feebler pen can with difficulty catch on paper a part of what little is seen and felt. This impotency to turn into thought and reduce

to writing what I feel I see, used to almost drive me to distraction, but I have become used to it now, and no longer hope to more than imperfectly and haltingly express what is present to me. If only words could fully implement thought and the mind give form to what is felt and experienced I would write a book worthy of my love for you.

When I think of Púrusha the picture comes to me of a great pillar rising up out of dim obscurity, gray, shadowy and indistinct of outline toward its unseen base, but growing in definition and beauty the higher it ascends, until it is lost in light too dazzling for human eyes. And yet this figure is an imperfect one; it is not something static—standing with its foundation in the shadows and its summit in the light—but rather like some river sweeping up in a great column from the impenetrable deeps of shadow into the equally impenetrable depths of light, vague and dimly discernible where it emerges, lacking form, more like an upward drift of the shadow below it, obscure as to detail. But higher up movements may be seen within it though what they are is hardly apparent. Higher still it seems to be a mass of surging activity, of currents separate yet all streaming upward. And the higher up I look the more it shows definition and the more instinct it appears to be with life—life in the sense of conscious feeling, thinking, experiencing. It does not seem personal but multi-personal—one stream of many currents which compose it but are never lost in it. And as it draws toward—or rather deeper into—the resplendent light above, it seems to grow more and more luminous—to glow and flash like a column of fire. Beyond this the eye cannot penetrate, as the great stream, like a

palpitating, throbbing river of light is lost to vision in the splendour of the light above.

And my mind pictures other streams, countless in number, that through eternity are surging upward from their sourse in the unmanifest toward their goal in the infinite light—towards and into that plenitude of experiencing which is timelessly the divine life. And as they draw towards the light I see them converging approaching and mingling like rivers sweeping onward to the sea.

How ineffectual and crude the picture as I have succeeded in drawing it! But I have no words —nothing to trace it with beyond the poor figures of present experience.

What I would have you keep in mind is that it is always Púrusha—Púrusha unconscious, unexperiencing, impersonal, until under the urge of Paramâtmic will (संकल्प) it begins to manifest its potentialities through the instrumentality of the Prakṛti—Púrusha ever more conscious under the mode of individuated personality as it evolves further and further through experience—Púrusha progressively evolving through an ever deeper experience of love multi-personally realized, toward a stage in which *the whole* of its experiencing life—all the riches of loving experience realized by it personally under its countless personal modes—will become the experience-life of *each* of the modes in which it subsists personally, yet the life of each as realized in the terms of its own individuated personality. Where that level of experience is reached, Púrusha which in essence is timelessly *one*, will consciously realize its oneness—seeing its one conscious experiencing life from countless angles, in countless terms of

personal experience. Thus, by the perfect intuition of perfected love it will appropriate the whole of its personal life in the terms of each of its personalities.

We must, therefore, come to think of Púrusha as *growingly* personal as it evolves under its many modes, and of the nature of its personal life as increasingly loving as it rises from height to height of experience. Moreover, we must appreciate that the higher the stage of personal evolution reached by the Púrusha in any of its modes, the more that conscious and personal expression of Púrusha will be a conscious and personal expression of *the whole* conscious experiencing life of Púrusha. This will be so because in its terms the whole of the multipersonally experienced life of Púrusha will be most nearly perfectly appropriated—appropriated of course, as it would be present to a personality perfected in those specific terms.

A Path that has no End.

It is clear that at the stage of Púrusha evolution where you and I have arrived, the "I"—though it is undoubtedly the timeless Púrusha conscious and experiencing—is in no position to think of itself considered personally as the conscious subject of *all* the experience life of Púrusha. It represents the Púrusha personally conscious of only an infinitesimal fraction of its personal experiencing life. It is still cut off from the plenitude of that experiencing life by its limitations of capacity to enter into and appropriate the feeling and experience present to Púrusha conscious in other personal modes. Therefore its own experience-life has not yet become to any extent co-terminous

with the experience-life of Púrusha. It probably will attain to a point where it will have become so :' that is, at least, so far as the particular evolutionary development of Púrusha potentiality is concerned which begins at the *X* of our diagram. On the other hand, there remains the question of whether it will ever *completely* appropriate in the terms of its own personal experience the multi-personally experienced life of the timeless Púrusha evolving from beginningless time at the numberless points where it has been—and ever will be—passing over from unmanifestation into personal self-realization. To me it seems that here too—as in the question of its progressive realization of its implications in Paramâtmic experience—the path is one of eternal progress, but the goal as far off as infinity.

I have had a very definite object in drawing your thoughts along this line, dearest. You will begin to see what it is before long.

Divine Incarnation—"Avatars".

Two at least of the great world religions—Christianity and later Hinduism — centre round the conception of God revealing Himself to us *humanly*. On the one hand they are grounded in the belief that the words of those wonderful personalities in whose divinity their followers have come to believe, reveal a consciousness of oneness with God that is more than human, and a sense of majesty and authority not compatible with the limitations of human nature. On the other hand it is recognised that we are at present limited to an understanding of what can be expressed to us humanly, and it is felt that if God is to reveal Himself to us it must be by a *human* revelation.

Far be it from me, with my little knowledge and manifest limitations of understanding, to deny dogmatically the possibility of such a method of revelation. If Paramâtmân can experience our experience, it might not be impossible for Him to make use of a human vehicle to reveal to us what of Himself our limitations permit us to grasp. This might at least be true for the Hindu conception of Incarnation. The Christian teaching on the subject presents—for me, at least—greater difficulties. For according to this, and interpreting it in the terms of my vision of the meaning of life, two "I"s—the personal Paramâtmân and an individuated personal mode of Púrusha would have to be merged and become one "I" in Christ. This would mean a merging into undifferentiated oneness of two categories of Being that I feel to be timelessly non-identical. Or if there were no merging then we should have to think of Christ *not* as a personality but as two essentially non-identical personalities finding a dual expression through one vehicle, and this is obviously foreign to the Christian teaching in which he is set forth as "true God and true Man"—as *one*, not two.

No; it seems to me that if the idea of divine incarnation is to be accepted at all, we shall be compelled to admit only *one* personal self as finding expression in human terms, and that Self Paramâtmân. If the personality that reveals itself to us in the great teacher of Nazareth is not the personal Paramâtmân—or, as the Vaishnavas would say, Paramâtmân individuated and personal as Ishvará—then there would seem to me to be no question of a *divine* incarnation.

Although, as I have already said, I do not

presume to deny the possibility of the divine "I" revealing Himself humanly to the Púrusha "I"s experiencing in human terms, I do not incline to believe in the probability of it. In the first place the vehicles of Púrusha seem to me to have been evolved as a result of their progressive reactions to the reactions of Púrusha in personal mode as it experienced in terms of them. They are, as a consequence, in a very real sense vehicles of *Púrusha—not* in that same sense vehicles of Paramâtmân. I doubt very much if they are fitted to implement anything but the conscious and personal life of that Púrusha of which they are—so far at least as their terms are concerned—the product. Again—and this goes deeper than the intellectual argument—in the world of my own deeper experience I am conscious of a sense of relationship with a Personal Reality—with *That* which is personal to me in an utterly different way than Christ or any other personality has been. My own personal reaction to the experience of communion with that Personal Reality is quite other than the reaction that I experience when I feel myself in personal communion with whatever else I experience as personal.

Christ, in so far as he is experienced as personal by me, is experienced as you and other loved personalities are experienced. Though the reaction in the case of each differs, the sense of all these contacts with the personal puts them in the same general category. But the experience undergone in sense of personal communion with *That*, present and personal, falls into a category by itself. It is experienced as other and wholly different, and the consciousness of it gives the feeling of stability to all else.

In it one feels all one is and all one loves enfolded, upheld and established.

I am not putting this forward as an argument but merely stating a fact of experience.

Christ & Krishna.

My own conclusion is that the personality of Christ is *Púrusha* personality in precisely the same sense that yours is, and mine. He is another personal expression of the timeless reality in Bráhman of which you and I also are expressions. As such he has a significance and an inspiration for me that he would never have were he something other and essentially different. For in the beauty of his character and the all-embracingness of his love I gain a vision of something to which I too may attain. Were he, even to the slightest extent, other than what I essentially am, his personality would not have that message for me. In the light of my own weakness and unworthiness and failures I might well lose hope did I not know him as very Púrusha. But knowing him as such I can say to myself, "Since he is what I am, that which I am is capable of rising to the heights he has attained." Therefore, meditating upon Christ I gain great hope.

But, it seems to me, when this has been said all has not been said. The world has seen many great teachers, saints and seers and sages. Each of them has delivered his "message" and gone his way, but there have been two at least—there may have been others; I do not know—whose personalities as revealed in their words, seem to set them apart from the rest. Of each of them it might be truly said, as it was said of Jesus if the report be true, "Never man so spake." For

the words of each were as of "One having authority", and through them shine a sense of oneness with Man and God, and a majesty and profundity beyond the bounds of human experience.

Prophets and saints have always showed a deep sense of their own infirmities, but not so these two who bade men come *to them* for salvation, and made love *for them* the highest means of attaining it. Both of them appear to have showed consciousness of a life in terms far wider than the narrow limits of a single birth, and both of them have profoundly moved the spirit that is in man. I speak, of course, of Jesus and the author of the discourses in the Gīta.*

"Before Abraham was I am", said Jesus. "I am the light of the world; he that cometh unto

* Note: It might be objected that the historical character of Krishna is on by no means as secure a basis as that of Christ. For my purpose this does not greatly matter.

Whether the son of Devaki and the Yadava prince of Dwarka were the same, or whether the hero Krishna came to be identified with Vasudeva is of no material importance. I am in fact no more interested in the veracity of the accounts of Krishna in Puranic literature than in that of Christ in the apocryphal 'Gospel of St. Thomas.' Nor does it matter whether the teaching of the Gita was actually given to Arjuna on the field of battle or was later incorporated into the Mahabharatta from another source.

Indeed it matters little if the personality whose message is embodied in the Gita was actually Krishna or someone else whose words have been attributed to him.

One thing seems certain. *Someone* saw the vision that we find expressed in the Gita. It is to that seer, whether Krishna or another, that I refer. And as the Gita is traditionally associated with Krishna his name is as suitable as another.

Someone saw what the Gita expresses, and to me the Gita reveals a depth of spiritual understanding and has made such a profound appeal to spiritual natures in India for so long a time that I am inclined to feel its message may well have come from heights of Purusha experience far beyond my own.

me shall not walk in darkness. Come unto me and I will give you rest."

"I am born from age to age", said Kṛishna. "Fix thy thought on me, be devoted to me, worship me, do homage to me. Thou shalt reach my self. The truth do I declare to thee: thou art dear to me. Abandoning all ceremonial duties, seek me as thy sole refuge; I will liberate thee from all sins; do not thou grieve."

Yet surely no Púrusha personality that has attained to the stage of experience attained by you and me—no "I" that is limited to what is experienced "humanly"—would dare to dream of making such claims as these. What is there in the limited little world of our conscious experiencing on the basis of which we could issue such an invitation? In the utterances of both these great personalities we feel ourselves in touch with the majestic calm of a consciousness far transcending the limitations that still fetter us. We feel ourselves in the presence of heights and deeps far beyond our ken. And through the ages the spirit within us has burned and thrilled in response to the "Come unto me" that both so lovingly uttered. Small wonder that men have thought of them as God revealed humanly!

What are they in Brahman?

Some years ago, as I pondered the meaning of life and death—when the thoughts I have been trying to express in this book were slowly taking shape to me—I was troubled because I could not clearly see what Christ and the author of the Gīta were to me. I could not "locate" them, so to speak, in my vision of the meaning of things. I had come to feel that they were not God—not

Paramâtmán; my whole soul cried out that they were immensely more than *Man.* I was acutely conscious that any vision not assigning them their rightful place in the world of conscious experiencing would be incomplete if not futile.

But at last I feel that I have found them—found what they are in Bráhman. Of course I may be mistaken, though not for lack of long years of meditation and earnest effort to arrive at the truth. For who that has once felt the thrill of the presence of either of them could rest until he has found its meaning?

You will recall that some pages back I was speaking of how in the course of the "I"'s evolution through progressively loving experience a stage might be reached in which the love entertained by it—the need felt by it—would reach out and include *all* other "I"'s—a stage in which the "I" would, by the perfection of sympathetic intuition begotten of perfect love, enter *completely* into the feeling, experiencing life of those dear to it (i.e., all other "I"s) and make it its own. Were such a stage to be reached then *the whole* of the personally experiencing life of Púrusha would have become co-terminous with the content of the consciousness of the "I" that had attained to such a capacity for perfect, all-inclusive love. *All* the multi-personally experienced life of Púrusha would be its life, experienced by it in the specific terms of its own individuated personality. Having so attained, it would no longer be *cut off* from anything that was within the boundless content of Púrusha consciousness. Each "I" that had so attained would feel *all* that conscious Púrusha felt, experience *all* that conscious Púrusha experienced. If it were to

"speak"—to use human terms of experience—it would be voicing the whole of the conscious experiencing life of Púrusha; it would be *all* Púrusha speaking in the terms of one of its "I"s.

The Joy of the Cross.

If greater love means greater need—and this is the clear indication of experience—then would an "I" that had attained to such heights of loving experience as I have been depicting yearn for fulfilment in all other "I"s of Púrusha. For it is of the nature of love not only to need, but *to need to be needed.* Such an "I" would love with a power and all-embracing sympathetic intuition that our poor experience affords us no power to appreciate. All the joy and pain of all the countless "I"s of Púrusha would be its joy and pain also, yet not as they are ours. It would rejoice in our joy and suffer in our sorrow, feeling all that we felt but seeing what we see in its inner, deeper, truer significance. Just as the loving father or mother suffer in the childish sorrows of their children—not because there is real reason for sorrow but because there *is* sorrow—just as they suffer in the fear and pain of a little one whom they take against its will to a surgeon, knowing that relief is to come, and rejoicing at the thought of it—so would such a loving "I" feel and enter into all the hopes and joys and pains and anxieties of each of the "I"s still fettered by them, feeling what was felt but seeing the reality stripped of "the covering of the false" which caused the pain. Such an "I" would accept joyfully the crucifixion that is implicit in becoming one by perfect love with "I"s that suffer and are "heavy-laden". Their burdens would be its burden,

their pain its pain, but it would also experience the deep and wondrous joy that comes from seeing 'the end of road', as the parent, while the child is in the hands of the surgeon, sees health and happiness beyond. Such joy is not incompatible with pain, or with carrying in one's heart the " burden of the world ".

We know from experience, beloved, what love makes us do. Does it not impel us to share the burdens of those who are dear to us—to feel them sometimes even more than they do? Does it not make us scorn the idea of a joy from which they are shut out? Does it not make us long for their happiness, all forgetful of our own? And the greater our love the more this is true.

Can we then imagine that "I"s whose life of loving experience has grown too broad and deep to be held within the limitations of " human " terms, will suddenly deny their nature and become indifferent to the joy and sorrow that moved them as long as they experienced on a lower plane? I cannot think it.

Yet even for such "I"s—those that have not reached the loftiest heights of love—there will be limitations only to be gradually surmounted as their personal life and capacity to love more deeply and widely evolves and developes. With the entry upon " eternal life ", here in the terms of " human " experience, the capacity to love deeply, sympathetically and intuitively entering into the feeling of one's beloved, undoubtedly begins to increase. But, as I see it, progress in that eternal life is strictly commensurate with the progressive development of the capacity to love each dear "I" more deeply and to include ever more "I"s within the spreading orbit of that

love. It is gradual, and far, far above us where the life of Púrusha glows in the depths of light, deep in the ocean of God's love, must lie those areas of its personal experiencing where the whole content of its conscious life is multi-personally present to it. Only upon such a level of experience could a Púrusha "I" speak *as Púrusha* in the widest and fullest sense—be *the voice* of all that Púrusha consciously is. And only from such depths of its experience could Púrusha voice personally the wideness and all-inclusiveness of its love.

To Púrusha conscious and personal under the mode of such an "I", your experience-life and mine would be present. For we and all other Púrusha "I"s would have come to be included within the orbit of its all-including love. Such a love, having left the lower terms of Púrusha experiencing far behind—yes, and having gradually forgotten them as it rose to areas of experiencing immensely beyond them—would find them again a part of its experience-life when it had reached such a stage as this of which I am speaking. It would be like the traveller who at the end of a hard day's climb, comes out at last on the summit of a mountain and sees below him and about him the whole panorama of what he had only been able to see previously a little at a time.

And if you and I, dearest, were so loved by such an "I" that it felt our burdens and sorrows and fears as its own because they were ours—if all "I"s experiencing in "human" terms were so loved and their burdens so felt, and their freedom from "birth and death" and pain so desired, what might follow?

The Quest.

Might not such love seek to raise its beloved from darkness to the light? Would not such love yearn to show the way? I think it certainly would were that possible.

But is it possible?—that is the question. Our dear ones who have passed beyond the terms of human experience and its vehicles are unable to communicate with us, though I believe we are still fully within the orbit of their understanding and love. They are not able to do so because they lack the means to do so; they cannot make their presence felt in the terms of experience upon which we are still dependent. Evidently these are essential if we are to come in touch with them. If we are to know any "I" of Púrusha at this stage in our personal evolution, we must know it *humanly*.

Is it altogether inconceivable that an "I" that has risen to such all-embracing love that it was able through perfect sympathetic intuition to include all we felt and experienced in its own feeling and experience, would be in a position to envehicle as much of its personal life in terms of ours as we could grasp and "human" values implement?

I wonder, dear one, if you are beginning to see where my thought has led me.

Purusha calling to us from the heights of Love.

May it not be that in these two personalities, which are known to us in the terms of our "human" experiencing and of "this world" as Christ and Krishna, *Púrusha* is calling to us from the loftiest heights of its loving experience, seeking to draw us onward into the fullness of its boundlessly loving multi-personal life? Seeking to

convey to us—in so far as we are able yet to grasp it—that we are not in reality many and separate, with separate salvations and each its separate good, but that we are *One*, and that in finding through an ever more inclusive love our *Oneness* we shall find our highest Self, and the true boundlessness of our eternal life.

So only can I find an explanation of what these two wondrous "I"s mean to me, as they reveal their personalities through the Gospel and the Gita, and in experience. They seem to me to be two quite different personal revelations of the Púrusha in its loftiest, noblest, most loving experience, calling us to enter by love into the unity of its experiencing life.

Should this be true, when that loving, yearning "I" speaks through the Gospels or in experience to your heart or mine, it is not *God* or *Man* that is speaking to us. When through the discourses of the Gita that other "I" calls to its beloved, it is not *Paramâtmân* or *Man* that calls. It is *Púrusha* voicing its deepest personal experience, achieved in the terms of these two different personalities through the instrumentality of all-embracing and all-experiencing love.

Purushottama.

That timeless reality, of which you and I are also evolving personal modes, in these two "I"s (and how many more I know not) subsists consciously and experiences personally, even as it subsists and experiences in us. But whereas in us its conscious and personal life is limited by our present limitations, in "I"s that have achieved the capacity for such all-embracing loving experience as seems to shine forth through the Gita and the Gospels,

these limitations no more exist. Love has transcended them. Here Púrusha life, lived under its countless different personal modes, is not lived by it in mutually exclusive "compartments" of experience. There are no longer, as it were, many lives of Púrusha, but *one* multi-personally experienced Púrusha-life, in which each "I" participates, and to the fullness of which each contributes what it alone can bring.

When, from this far-off height of Púrusha experiencing the call comes to us who have not yet attained, it is the call of our Self—of that which we essentially and timelessly are—voiced by one or other of the "I"s that have attained. Púrusha out of the highest area of its experiencing life is calling—Púrusha at its highest—Purushôttama, our Highest Self.

Paramatman and the Individuated Self.

As this "I" sorts and examines the materials in its laboratory—in its experience-world—it becomes conscious of certain things.

One of these is that its deep elemental need cannot find a fulfilling within the terms of its own personality—that is, the "I" cannot be satisfied merely with what it experiences as "I". It feels the need to seek a completion of itself as "I" beyond the "I". It *does* actually find an answer to its deep feeling of need in that which it experiences as personal in the same sense that it is conscious of itself as personal, yet not present to it as "I". It finds that the "I", in order to overcome its sense of *fragmentariness*—of being *a part*—must seek completion in what it experiences as a personal "You",

This particular "I" does find, beloved, that in you and other dear ones, each experienced as personal, the pain arising from the sense of incompleteness is partially overcome. In other words, I am conscious of being partially completed in you, and am certain that you are finding your partial completion in me, and that as our love grows we progressively become each more completely the filling of the other's need. So it is in the case of all those we love; we find ourselves being completed in them.

As love grows greater the consciousness of need to be fulfilled outside the terms of the "I" increases also. As I have said earlier in this book, the less we love the less we are conscious of need. Love is a stretching out to find fulfilment in other "I"s, and also the yearning to be the fulfilment of them. All-embracing love would be conscious of a need so boundless as to be capable of finding its fulfilling in nothing less than *all* other "I"s. Therefore, in the loftiest areas of Púrusha experiencing—where Púrusha is Purushôttama—the need to fulfil and be fulfilled or completed would find its answer, so far as this aspect of personal need is concerned, in the loving inter-personal relationships implicit in *the whole* multi-personally experiencing life of Púrusha. Joy—ānandá—lies not in *need unfelt* but in *need satisfied.*

Purusha not self-sufficient

I have been speaking, however, of only *one* aspect of that sense of incompleteness of which the individuated Púrusha "I" is conscious in the higher phases of its "human" experience. There is another aspect of need—of sense of incomplete-

ness or fragmentariness—which my experience reveals to me as *not* finding its completion in those "I"s that I am conscious of as *you* and my other loved ones. There is a sense of longing, of yearning, which does not find its fulfilment in loving you and feeling that I am loved by you.

It is this sense which is responsible for all that area of loving experience associated with what we know as love of God and the feeling of being loved by God. Being an experience beyond the Buddhi we may not be able to demonstrate its existence intellectually, but those who have had the deep sense of communion with *That* which they experienced as personal, yet not in the terms in which they have experienced other contacts with the personal, one and all bear witness to the deep reality and joy of that experience.

That this deep yearning does exist for a personal communion with something other than the "I" present to us in the terms of "human" experience, is amply demonstrated by the lives of saints and mystics in all ages and religions. We see them giving up all that "this world" can offer and joyfully suffering all that worldlings shun in their longing to find a filling of that need. If experience has any reality—and I hold that it is the one fact whose reality calls for no demonstration—then this aspect of need and longing on the part of the Púrusha "I" is a tremendous and dynamic reality.

That wherein it finds itself completed.

There are, moreover, sufficient grounds for believing that this hungering need can and does find its satisfaction. Here again the experience of

the saints and mystics may be cited as the most striking illustration. Has not the whole course of human history borne witness to the presence of those who, in hunger and thirst and poverty and physical suffering, living apart from others and deprived of all opportunity for personal relationships with "I"s experienced humanly, still are more joyful and fulfilled than the vast majority of those surrounded by luxuries and friends? Their joy—their Ānandá—is patent to those who come in contact with them. From the writings and hymns and words, as well as from the manner of these it is apparent that their yearning has found something to satisfy it. "For my inward man was famished" says one of the great Christian saints, "for want of the inward food, Thyself, O my God. Thou hast created us unto Thyself, and our heart finds no rest until it rests in Thee". And their joy finds its expression in loving adoration felt or uttered—a joy that is independent of any of the values that move worldlings, of life and death, and of loving relations with such personalities as yours and mine. Often it is a joy that utterly fails to find any form in which it may be expressed in words, yet—to use the words of a sage in the Upanishad —those who find it "shine like a knower of Bráhman". Speaking in the language of ordinary life, if there is any one thing that is certain it is that the loftiest heights of joy and fulfilment and peace that have been attained by Man, have been completely independent of wealth, bodily comfort and fame, and are possible apart from human companionship.

I too have experienced that joy under somewhat similar conditions—in the old days before

you entered my life to bless it. I know personally what it is to some extent, and what it was when it had not its present relation to other beloved "I"s. I need not therefore any intellectual proof or demonstration of its existence. It is a joy that arises from a profound sense of a need in the process of being fulfilled—of the "I"'s finding itself completed in conscious and personal relationship with *That* which is experienced as personal yet not as "I". It is a sense of deep, exultant love arising out of the consciousness of being loved. It is a sense of " everlasting arms " beneath, of infinite Love enfolding and sustaining —before which the little pains and pleasures of ordinary experience dwindle into insignificance. It is a joy which glorifies the pain it calls on us to bear, and the heart sings amidst the silences of an experience life untroubled by the comings and goings of the world about it. Those who have once experienced that sense of communion need no demonstration of its reality, and having known it they know well that *here* the "I" finds the filling of an aspect of its need that it does not experience in sense of communion with any other of the "I"s it loves.

More than this. I am conscious that my love for you and all other dear ones, would not—*could* not—be what it is, did I not experience the presence of that "I". It is in the sense of contact with—personal communion with—that which is experienced as infinite love beyond the bounds of time and change, which gives me the sense of eternity in my relationship with you. In it " time is no more "; there is a sense of " coming home "—of being healed of one's incompleteness in that which is its essential fulfilment.

In that communion one feels all that is deep and precious in one's experience lifted out of the category of the *temporary* and given eternal values. There you and all those who are near and dear assume another significance; you are included in that relationship—are essential factors in it. You are seen and felt in it as infinitely more than you could be apart from it. As St. Augustine once said, " He alone loses no dear one, to whom all are dear in Him who is never lost ".

Strange and wonderful.

It is a strange and wonderful thing that the more that "I" is experienced and loved, the nobler and more needing becomes the love for you and those others who are dear to me, and also the more are you all its fulfilling. It is true that there was a deep joy in sense of communion with that "I" before you became beloved realities of my experiencing life, but now there seems to be a joy still deeper and a even richer experience. Because of what you have become to me in my sense of communion with that "I", *It Itself* becomes more to me; whereas before I found my refuge in It, now I experience it as your refuge also. Whereas I experienced you first as " in the world ", now I see you in the light of His presence, beyond the world and beyond all worlds. For communion with that "I" *is* my world and in that world I have found you and my dear ones anew and know you after another manner. I could not know you so or love you in the way I do, did I not rest in that infinite, loving "I". This is not intellectual demonstration; it is experience.

As a result of my study of these factors in the

only world I know—the world of this personal "I"'s experience—I have arrived at certain conclusions. Let me try to put them in order:—

Certain conclusions.

(1) So far as its conscious experience life is concerned, the "I" is in itself incomplete. It is, as regards its individuated personality, what one of the sages of the Upanishads called, "a half-fragment". That is, it must find its complete life *outside the terms of its own personality*—in that which is experienced as personal yet *not* as "I".

(2) This "I" is not only conscious of the fragmentariness of its personal life, but it is at the same time conscious that its life is *partially* completed in its experience of communion with "I"s that it experiences as belonging to the same personal category as itself.

(3) But it is equally conscious of an aspect of its need that does *not* find fulfilment in this area of its experience of communion with the personal. This other aspect of its need *does* however find itself being progressively filled, but in the experience of communion with an "I" (or "You") that is not experienced in the same terms of personal relationship as is the case with all other "I"s.

(4) To the degree that the experience of this unique personal relationship is entered into, all other experience of personal relationship is lifted to a loftier plane and assumes a wider and deeper significance.

(5) So far as my experience indicates, such other personal relationships could not have assumed their present form or have grown to be what I find them in my experience-world, were it not for the existence of a sense of communion with that "I". It is *in That* that they have become to me what they are. Taking them, therefore, as they are in experience, it would seem that any further evolution of these other personal relationships is dependent upon the continued experience of that unique personal relationship, and that the nature of the evolution will be dependent upon the nature of the progressive experience of communion with that "I".

And that "I", in the sense of communion with whom one feels that one has reached "solid

ground" after being buffeted about and bewildered in the ocean of instability — that "I", resting in whom one has a sense of resting in that which is fathomless yet personal and tender and infinitely loving—that "I" in experience of communion with whom this "I" feels its deepest and most essential hunger satisfied—is, I conceive, Paramâtmán.

Higher Purusha experience is dependent upon communion with the timeless "I".

If these conclusions be correct, at which I have arrived as a result of meditation upon the nature of this experience-world of mine, would it not seem to follow that the higher evolution of the inter-personally experienced life of Púrusha is dependent upon a progressive experience on the part of the various evolving centres of Púrusha personality of communion with and fulfilment in Paramâtmán? In other words, it is in the experience of finding our fulfilment in that timeless "I" that we achieve the capacity both to fulfil and to be fulfilled in the other "I"s of Púrusha. Should this be the case, then—at least after a certain stage has been reached—the Púrusha's progress toward ever higher realization of multi-personally experienced life rests in and is dependent upon a constantly developing experience of personal communion with Paramâtmán.

It would also follow that as our love, and consequent capacity for at-oneness with each other, grows and deepens, Paramâtmán—the timeless "I"—will come to mean more to us personally by reason of what our dear ones have come to mean. Out of our experience of love for them (itself made possible by our experience of the timeless "I") will continually arise the capacity to love that "I" still more, depend upon It still

more, experience the need of resting in It still more.

Thus, upon the one hand, the progressive achievement of the Púrusha's multi-personally conscious life is seen as dependent upon realization of communion with God by the various "I"s under mode of which it subsists in evolution; upon the other, those loving inter-personal Púrusha relationships which communion with God raises to a plane otherwise unattainable, develop in the various "I"s so experiencing a capacity to love God more deeply, and a deeper sense of the need of resting in Him. So it would seem that we are rendered capable of achieving ever higher experience of either relationship by the experience of the other, and that the perfect realization of the one is bound up with the achievement of the other.

Hence the conscious multi-personally experiencing life of Púrusha in the higher stages of its evolution—where Púrusha is *Purushôttama*—is seen to be dependent upon and intimately interwoven with profound experience of personal communion with Paramâtmán on the part of all the Púrusha "I"s that have attained to it.

The "Highest Abode" of Purusha.

Paramâtmán is thus seen to be *the highest resting-place* (परमधाम) of Purushôttama. In it Purushôttama ever rests multi-personally experiencing the joy of fulfilment in communion with the timeless "I". And the joy—the Ānandá—of that communion, present in a somewhat different aspect to each "I" of Purushôttama by reason of the specific terms of its own particular personality, enriches and glorifies the whole multi-personally

experienced life. For what Paramâtmán is to each "I" becomes part of the experience life of all those "I"s that have attained to the power of entering wholly into each other's feeling and experience through perfectly intuitive love. Each contributes to the experience-life shared by all, that which it alone can bring.

The outcome of what we have been considering in this section seems clear to me. Perfected love of Paramâtmán (towards which we shall eternally advance but never completely achieve because of His infinite fullness there will ever be more to experience) is rendered possible through loving experience of inter-personal *Púrusha* relationships. Also the perfection of the interpersonal life of Púrusha is not attained apart from progressive experience of communion with and love for Paramâtmán on the part of individual Púsusha "I"s. Growth in capacity for one aspect of experience is rendered possible by experience of the other. It is therefore only in the whole inter-woven experience that the conscious personal life of the Púrusha "I" is completed.

Is "Salvation" only through love of God?

There remains, however, one other point to be considered in this connection. Does the Púrusha "I" *always* pass over from "birth-and-death" to "Eternal Life" through its sense of communion with Paramâtmán? Must that come first? Or may it pass over through its experience of loving communion with other "I"s, or through some other "I"s experience of love for it?

This is, of course, a question to which no positive answer can be given by us at this stage of our experience. There are, as we have seen, those

who have obviously passed over in and through love concentrated entirely upon the timeless "I". So far as these are concerned, I feel certain that the higher areas of experience of that "Eternal Life" upon which they have entered will *not* be achieved by them apart from their entry upon loving personal relationships with other Púrusha "I"s, and from their growing through these to complete participation in the fullness of Purushôttama's multi-personally experienced life. Doubtless, for this their experience of loving communion with the timeless "I" is wonderfully preparing them, and either in the terms of "human" experience, or in higher terms, they will surely enter and lovingly share the Púrusha life, enriching it by their experience of what Paramâtmán has been to them.

But what of those who have attained to noble heights of self-forgetful love for other Púrusha "I"s—love which the terms of this "world" cannot completely embody—but have as yet experienced no sense of communion with that other "I"? Can any such be said to have entered upon "Eternal Life"? The answer to this would appear to depend upon the nature and degree of the personal evolution of the "I" in question, as well as upon the nature and implications of the relationship existing between it and other "I"s. Personally, I do not see why really noble love for other Púrusha "I"s might not be the first step toward entry into communion with the divine "I", and why the *forgetting* of that experience might not impair the capacity of such an "I" for entering upon communion with God. In such cases the "I"s experience of loving relationships with other "I"s, and memory of it, would seem distinctly

relevant to—and consequently *a part of*—its "Eternal Life". If this be so, it would mean that the Púrusha "I" may, under certain circumstances, pass over into "Eternal Life" through its loving experience of communion with other "I"s of Púrusha even before it has become conscious of the timeless "I".

There is also another way in which the interpersonal Púrusha relationships of such an "I" might—in so far as the *memory* of them is concerned—have a more than temporary significance. For these relationships might be with "I"s that had already passed over into "Eternal Life". In such an event they would form part of the experience-content of the latter, where they would have more than a "this world" value. For if I have passed over into "Eternal Life", and what you and I have been to each other is a vital part of that experience life of mine, then it cannot be lost because of its relevancy *to me.*

Our love for them may be the salvation of our dear ones.

And here you may see, beloved, the part which our love may play in the entry upon "eternal life"—the "salvation"—of those who are dear to us. Where a loving "I" has come to live in communion with Paramâtmán, each of its deep personal relations with other "I"s takes on a more than "this world" significance in its higher than "this world" life. In their personal relations with such an "I", the experience of "I"s that have not yet attained to communion with Paramâtmán becomes of a deeper significance than they apprehend, and cannot afford to be lost. We have somehow felt

this all along, sensing if not understanding the significance of the prayers of a mother for a wayward son or daughter, or of a wife for an unworthy husband. Their prayers, if not mere faithless petitions to the mercy of one neither believed in nor trusted, are the expression of the fact that they rest in communion with the timeless "I", and in that communion those they love are in very truth lifted up to a place in that eternal life of God.*

The two-fold path.

Yet, though there appears to be ground for believing that the Púrusha "I" may pass over from "birth-and-death" to Eternal Life either by the path of noble loving experience of communion with other Púrusha "I"s or by first entering upon experience of communion with Paramâtmán, it would seem equally clear that at some point or other in the evolution of its personally experiencing life the necessity will arise for it to advance by the other path as well. In other words, the higher areas of experience of *either* are not to be entered upon apart from the experience of the other. For even as Bráhman is *One*, so the ever evolving consciously experienced life of Bráhman is *one*—an ever growing content completely present to Paramâtmán and progressively entered into and shared by all Púrusha "I"s in the terms of their respective personalities and through the instrumentality of ever deeper loving experience.

Paramatman and the Multi-personal Purusha

In the last section, dear wife, we considered what Paramâtmán was *to Purusha* at that stage

* Sc, note 2, at end of Book.

in the multi-personally experiencing life of the latter where each Púrusha "I"s experience of communion with Paramâtmán is appropriated and re-experienced by all other "I"s through the power of a loving intuition vastly more developed than anything to which we are able to approach in the terms of "human" experience. Here the consciousness content of each personal expression of the Púrusha is co-terminous with the whole multi-personally experienced life of Púrusha. Though in the terms of each different "I" Púrusha experiences the experienced differently, yet in the consciousness of each "I" the whole of Púrusha life is present. Here, if an "I" should "speak" it would be the Púrusha speaking as a conscious and personal unity, though it would be the whole Púrusha speaking in one out of its countless personal terms. It is at this stage of its personal evolution that I think of Púrusha as Purushôttama. Should an "I" that had attained to such a stage of experience say, "Come unto Me" it would be Purushôttama speaking and calling us into the multi-personal fullness of our life. Should it say, "No man cometh unto the Father but by Me" it would be Purshôttama speaking, and saying to us that true oneness with Paramâtmán—perfect communion with the timeless "I"—is only to be achieved in the attainment of oneness with the loving multi-personal life of that which is our essential self.

What part does Purusha play in the Divine Life?

In the present section I am going to attempt a more difficult task—to grasp, as far as is possible at this stage in experience what part Púrusha plays in the experience life of Paramâtmán,

only world I know—the world of this personal "I"'s experience—I have arrived at certain conclusions. Let me try to put them in order:—

Certain conclusions.

(1) So far as its conscious experience life is concerned, the "I" is in itself incomplete. It is, as regards its individuated personality, what one of the sages of the Upanishads called, "a half-fragment". That is, it must find its complete life *outside the terms of its own personality*—in that which is experienced as personal yet *not* as "I".

(2) This "I" is not only conscious of the fragmentariness of its personal life, but it is at the same time conscious that its life is *partially* completed in its experience of communion with "I"s that it experiences as belonging to the same personal category as itself.

(3) But it is equally conscious of an aspect of its need that does *not* find fulfilment in this area of its experience of communion with the personal. This other aspect of its need *does* however find itself being progressively filled, but in the experience of communion with an "I" (or "You") that is not experienced in the same terms of personal relationship as is the case with all other "I"s.

(4) To the degree that the experience of this unique personal relationship is entered into, all other experience of personal relationship is lifted to a loftier plane and assumes a wider and deeper significance.

(5) So far as my experience indicates, such other personal relationships could not have assumed their present form or have grown to be what I find them in my experience-world, were it not for the existence of a sense of communion with that "I". It is *in That* that they have become to me what they are. Taking them, therefore, as they are in experience, it would seem that any further evolution of these other personal relationships is dependent upon the continued experience of that unique personal relationship, and that the nature of the evolution will be dependent upon the nature of the progressive experience of communion with that "I".

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If these conclusions be correct, at which I have arrived as a result of meditation upon the nature of this experience-world of mine, would it not seem to follow that the higher evolution of the inter-personally experienced life of Púrusha is dependent upon a progressive experience on the part of the various evolving centres of Púrusha personality of communion with and fulfilment in Paramâtmán? In other words, it is in the experience of finding our fulfilment in that timeless "I" that we achieve the capacity both to fulfil and to be fulfilled in the other "I"s of Púrusha. Should this be the case, then—at least after a certain stage has been reached—the Púrusha's progress toward ever higher realization of multi-personally experienced life rests in and is dependent upon a constantly developing experience of personal communion with Paramâtmán.

It would also follow that as our love, and consequent capacity for at-oneness with each other, grows and deepens, Paramâtmán—the timeless "I"—will come to mean more to us personally by reason of what our dear ones have come to mean. Out of our experience of love for them (itself made possible by our experience of the timeless "I") will continually arise the capacity to love that "I" still more, depend upon It still

more, experience the need of resting in It still more.

Thus, upon the one hand, the progressive achievement of the Púrusha's multi-personally conscious life is seen as dependent upon realization of communion with God by the various "I"s under mode of which it subsists in evolution; upon the other, those loving inter-personal Púrusha relationships which communion with God raises to a plane otherwise unattainable, develop in the various "I"s so experiencing a capacity to love God more deeply, and a deeper sense of the need of resting in Him. So it would seem that we are rendered capable of achieving ever higher experience of either relationship by the experience of the other, and that the perfect realization of the one is bound up with the achievement of the other.

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Paramâtmán is thus seen to be *the highest resting-place* (परमधाम) of Purushôttama. In it Purushôttama ever rests multi-personally experiencing the joy of fulfilment in communion with the timeless "I". And the joy—the Ānandá—of that communion, present in a somewhat different aspect to each "I" of Purushôttama by reason of the specific terms of its own particular personality, enriches and glorifies the whole multi-personally

experienced life. For what Paramâtmán is to each "I" becomes part of the experience life of all those "I"s that have attained to the power of entering wholly into each other's feeling and experience through perfectly intuitive love. Each contributes to the experience-life shared by all, that which it alone can bring.

The outcome of what we have been considering in this section seems clear to me. Perfected love of Paramâtmán (towards which we shall eternally advance but never completely achieve because of His infinite fullness there will ever be more to experience) is rendered possible through loving experience of inter-personal *Púrusha* relationships. Also the perfection of the interpersonal life of Púrusha is not attained apart from progressive experience of communion with and love for Paramâtmán on the part of individual Púsusha "I"s. Growth in capacity for one aspect of experience is rendered possible by experience of the other. It is therefore only in the whole inter-woven experience that the conscious personal life of the Púrusha "I" is completed.

Is "Salvation" only through love of God?

There remains, however, one other point to be considered in this connection. Does the Púrusha "I" *always* pass over from "birth-and-death" to "Eternal Life" through its sense of communion with Paramâtmán? Must that come first? Or may it pass over through its experience of loving communion with other "I"s, or through some other "I"s experience of love for it?

This is, of course, a question to which no positive answer can be given by us at this stage of our experience. There are, as we have seen, those

who have obviously passed over in and through love concentrated entirely upon the timeless "I". So far as these are concerned, I feel certain that the higher areas of experience of that "Eternal Life" upon which they have entered will *not* be achieved by them apart from their entry upon loving personal relationships with other Púrusha "I"s, and from their growing through these to complete participation in the fullness of Purushôttama's multi-personally experienced life. Doubtless, for this their experience of loving communion with the timeless "I" is wonderfully preparing them, and either in the terms of "human" experience, or in higher terms, they will surely enter and lovingly share the Púrusha life, enriching it by their experience of what Paramâtmán has been to them.

But what of those who have attained to noble heights of self-forgetful love for other Púrusha "I"s—love which the terms of this "world" cannot completely embody—but have as yet experienced no sense of communion with that other "I"? Can any such be said to have entered upon "Eternal Life"? The answer to this would appear to depend upon the nature and degree of the personal evolution of the "I" in question, as well as upon the nature and implications of the relationship existing between it and other "I"s. Personally, I do not see why really noble love for other Púrusha "I"s might not be the first step toward entry into communion with the divine "I", and why the *forgetting* of that experience might not impair the capacity of such an "I" for entering upon communion with God. In such cases the "I"s experience of loving relationships with other "I"s, and memory of it, would seem distinctly

relevant to—and consequently *a part of*—its "Eternal Life". If this be so, it would mean that the Púrusha "I" may, under certain circumstances, pass over into "Eternal Life" through its loving experience of communion with other "I"s of Púrusha even before it has become conscious of the timeless "I".

There is also another way in which the interpersonal Púrusha relationships of such an "I" might—in so far as the *memory* of them is concerned—have a more than temporary significance. For these relationships might be with "I"s that had already passed over into "Eternal Life". In such an event they would form part of the experience-content of the latter, where they would have more than a "this world" value. For if I have passed over into "Eternal Life", and what you and I have been to each other is a vital part of that experience life of mine, then it cannot be lost because of its relevancy *to me.*

Our love for them may be the salvation of our dear ones.

And here you may see, beloved, the part which our love may play in the entry upon "eternal life"—the "salvation"—of those who are dear to us. Where a loving "I" has come to live in communion with Paramâtmán, each of its deep personal relations with other "I"s takes on a more than "this world" significance in its higher than "this world" life. In their personal relations with such an "I", the experience of "I"s that have not yet attained to communion with Paramâtmán becomes of a deeper significance than they apprehend, and cannot afford to be lost. We have somehow felt

this all along, sensing if not understanding the significance of the prayers of a mother for a wayward son or daughter, or of a wife for an unworthy husband. Their prayers, if not mere faithless petitions to the mercy of one neither believed in nor trusted, are the expression of the fact that they rest in communion with the timeless "I", and in that communion those they love are in very truth lifted up to a place in that eternal life of God.*

The two-fold path.

Yet, though there appears to be ground for believing that the Púrusha "I" may pass over from "birth-and-death" to Eternal Life either by the path of noble loving experience of communion with other Púrusha "I"s or by first entering upon experience of communion with Paramâtmán, it would seem equally clear that at some point or other in the evolution of its personally experiencing life the necessity will arise for it to advance by the other path as well. In other words, the higher areas of experience of *either* are not to be entered upon apart from the experience of the other. For even as Bráhman is *One*, so the ever evolving consciously experienced life of Bráhman is *one*—an ever growing content completely present to Paramâtmán and progressively entered into and shared by all Púrusha "I"s in the terms of their respective personalities and through the instrumentality of ever deeper loving experience.

Paramatman and the Multi-personal Purusha

In the last section, dear wife, we considered what Paramâtmán was *to Purusha* at that stage

* Sc. note 2, at end of Book.

in the multi-personally experiencing life of the latter where each Púrusha " I "s experience of communion with Paramâtmân is appropriated and re-experienced by all other "I"s through the power of a loving intuition vastly more developed than anything to which we are able to approach in the terms of " human " experience. Here the consciousness content of each personal expression of the Púrusha is co-terminous with the whole multi-personally experienced life of Púrusha. Though in the terms of each different "I" Púrusha experiences the experienced differently, yet in the consciousness of each "I" the whole of Púrusha life is present. Here, if an "I" should "speak" it would be the Púrusha speaking as a conscious and personal unity, though it would be the whole Púrusha speaking in one out of its countless personal terms. It is at this stage of its personal evolution that I think of Púrusha as Purushôttama. Should an "I" that had attained to such a stage of experience say, "Come unto Me" it would be Purushôttama speaking and calling us into the multi-personal fullness of our life. Should it say, " No man cometh unto the Father but by Me " it would be Purshôttama speaking, and saying to us that true oneness with Paramâtmân—perfect communion with the timeless "I"—is only to be achieved in the attainment of oneness with the loving multi-personal life of that which is our essential self.

What part does Purusha play in the Divine Life?

In the present section I am going to attempt a more difficult task—to grasp, as far as is possible at this stage in experience what part Púrusha plays in the experience life of Paramâtmân,

Obviously we are not in a position to go very far here. What is there in these poor little restricted experience-contents of ours that would fit us to comprehend even feebly what part we play in the infinite life of God? Yet love is daring, and can be humble without being afraid. If it attempts this also the reason is no mere intellectual curiosity, but a hunger to know what it may be to the object of its love.

"I" ness not a whole.

In the first place we should bear in mind that the "I" of our own personal experience behaves like *a true fragment*. It obviously does not find completeness within the terms of its own personality. Its sense of "I"-ness is no wit more static than its sense of needing something that is not that "I".

The Need to be needed.

Again, it would seem clear that this sense of need ever present to the "I" is not merely a need of something beyond the "I", but *a need to be needed* by something beyond it as well.

This *need to be needed* demonstrates its presence even in terms somewhat lower than those of "human" experience, and is likewise apparent in that area of "human" experience where the Great Illusion still holds sway. What, for example, is *jealousy*? I believe it is an intense experience, clouded and confused, of course, by ávidyā (spiritual non-seeing), of the sense of need to be needed. It is the resentment and pain arising from the feeling that one is not wanted—needed—as much as some one else is needed. Therefrom is born hatred for that "some one else", seen in the distorted light of the Great Illusion as other and separate from one's self.

The Need to complete.

What, again, is the joy of service and self-sacrifice present to the "I" experiencing in nobler terms? Does it not arise from the sense of need to complete—to be the fulfilling of the need of something beyond the "I"?

It would thus seem that this essential need of the "I" is not merely *to be completed* but *to be the completing* of something beyond it, and points to its functioning as a true part of a larger whole.

These Needs not satisfied in inter-personal Purusha relations.

Now had this conscious and personal mode of Púrusha—this "I"—experienced a *complete* satisfaction of every aspect of its inherent need in its sense of personal communion with other such "I"s as those of you and my other dear ones, there might be grounds for concluding that *the whole* is Purushôttama, to be completed in the perfect inter-personal experience of its "I"s. But, as we have seen, the need of the "I" only finds itself *partially* fulfilled in its experience of communion with other Púrusha "I"s. Having experienced that, it still continues to need, and finds no relief from that need until it finds it in an entirely different category of experience—until it experiences a sense of personal communion with an "I" that is present to it in an entirely different manner.

So far as it experiences a sense of loving personal communion with other Púrusha "I"s, it *is* conscious of an aspect of its need being fulfilled—of its incompleteness being, upon that side, progressively completed. It is as though parts were coming together to form a whole. But even while this is taking place, the sense of need—of

being incomplete—remains unless the "I" experiences a feeling of personal communion with that other "I". In the two categories of personal communion conjointly, it is conscious that *all* aspects of its need are in the process of being progressively satisfied.

Now the "I" experiences a sense of many contacts with many "I"s of Púrusha, but—at the stage of experience with which this "I" is familiar—there are only a limited number of these contacts in which there is experience of need finding its real satisfaction. This is because of the present limitations of its capacity to love. It is only where it experiences *love* that it is conscious of its need being answered, and it is to the extent of its loving experience that the answer to its need grows toward completeness.

Yet it is not merely in experiencing love for other Púrusha "I"s that it finds its need fulfilled. That is not sufficient. Not only must it feel love but it must feel *that it is being loved.* It must feel that it is needed. It must feel that it is completing the conscious experiencing life of that which it loves. It must feel that there is mutual yearning and a mutual fulfilling in the personal relationship in order for it to be an answer to its need. To *give* love may be the way, but to feel that it is *returned* is the consummation.

Wherein Love experiences its fulfilling.

And what of the "I"s experience of longing and love for *that* "I"? Here there is a sense of giving love to that which was experienced as *first* loving it. We may suffer from the sense of need unanswered before we attain to experience of

communion with that "I"; we may be intellectually convinced that such communion is possible and may strive greatly to achieve it, but I am convinced that we must first *experience* it before we can *love* God. And when the experience comes, it comes as love deep and personal and tenderly understanding—and how much more that words cannot express—and the "I" that has been groping and fretting for it knew not what, knows it is *this*. Then love is given to Love. We may long for Him before we experience Him, but we shall love Him only when we become conscious of Him.

Let us consider the nature of our love for that "I"—for Paramâtmán as He is present to us in experience. For me it is a deep and fearless joy arising from the feeling that He loves me; it is a sense of loving confidence that "beneath are the everlasting arms". It is the natural response that an "I" would give to such love.

But of one thing I am certain. It *could* not be love except in response to what is experienced as love. Did I not feel that I was loved and wanted by that "I", it is possible that I might believe in Him, be convinced that He was just and powerful, reverence Him, but He could never, never have been the fulfilling of the essential need that is one of the noblest factors in my experience. As loving me and yearning for me He has completed me. The deepest and most touching aspect of the joy of communion with the timeless "I" lies in the feeling that it is calling for our love—in other words, that here is a relationship that includes the necessity of *our* contributing something. In this relationship too there would appear to be something which apart

from the conscious personal life of the Púrusha "I" is incomplete.

How can we be needed by Paramatman?

Yet what can it be that needs to be completed in us? Surely not the Paramâtmic nature. Holding God to be timelessly Self-subsistent and changeless in the infinite perfection of His divine nature, I can see no way in which that nature needs to be, or could be, completed or perfected. He is timelessly what He has always been.

And still I hold that in our love for and communion with Paramâtmân a Paramâtmic need is fulfilled. To the extent that we can give love and that our loving personal experience of communion with the divine "I" grows and deepens, there is a completing of something. What is it?

My answer is—the progressive self-experience and self-expression of God's infinite plenitude. You will remember that toward the beginning of this book I spoke of God's nature as changeless and infinite in its potentiality for many-sided experience. But I also voiced my conviction that in the timelessly evolving multi-personal Púrusha life was ever building up that through which His infinite fullness might progressively find realization and expression. I said that the potentiality—the capacity—for one side of an infinite number of mutual loving relationships is changelessly present in the divine nature, and that the function of Púrusha evolution is to build up that other side infinitely which will make infinite divine self-expression possible.

You may ask why the *expression* of what is timelessly present in God's nature would be

essential. Is not the mere fact that it exists there sufficient? I do not think so. The mere capacity *to know* is meaningless apart from knowing. The power *to love* would not find its realization in the mere knowledge that it is present in infinite fullness; there must be *loving* for it to be realized. To be infinitely loving by nature implies the *necessity* for the existence of that which may be infinitely loved. Love is only a potentiality unless it finds expression. I do not conceive that divine self-realization is merely a realization of the existence of potentiality. It is a realization of *actuality,* and apart from loving, Love cannot be actual. Therefore when I speak of the infinite divine need I am referring to the necessity for the infinite fullness to be realized infinitely *as an actuality,* as opposed to the conception of its merely being present to the divine consciousness as an infinite potentiality.

Intellectually, we might arrive at the conception of Paramâtmán as a timeless consciousness of an infinite capacity for the knowing and contemplation of unrealized potentialities. Let those whose "I"s are satisfied with such a conception find what inspiration they can in it; as for this "I"—it is not so that Paramâtmán is present to it in experience.

Some will of course always feel that for Paramâtmán to need anything beyond the terms of His own nature implies His imperfection. I have given reasons earlier in this book why I differ from this view, but let me recall just one more example I gave then. Take *fatherhood* as it is known in the terms of "human" experiencing. Does not its perfection lie in the degree in which there is love for the child, and consequent

yearning for the child's love? Is that fatherhood more perfect in which love is neither experienced nor hungered for, or that in which love and the need to be loved is greatly experienced? May we not even say that the degree of perfection in fatherhood must be measured by the greatness of the need to love and to be loved —and consequently to be needed—by the child? Here imperfection is *absence* of need.

Divine Perfection.

My contention throughout this book has been that an infinite perfection, rich and full and conscious, does *not* imply self-sufficiency in the sense of finding all that one needs within the terms of one's own personal life, and that the timeless Self, needing infinitely by reason of its own infinite richness, is essentially able to provide—and throughout 'beginningless time' *does* provide—that in which the infinite demands of its nature find their answer and fulfilment. For I hold that the timeless "I" cannot, in the nature of the case, find within itself as indivisibly and changelessly "I", the fulfilment of the implications of its being.

Divine Need in the Upanishads.

In the beginning of this book I pointed out how at least the seed of this conception of ultimate need was to be found in the Upanishads. Now that you have had opportunity to more clearly grasp my meaning it will be worth while to review a few of the passages that I then quoted.

> "In the beginning this world was just the Self, one only. He wished: 'Would that I had a wife······' So great, indeed, is desire." (Brihad-Aran. 1; 4: 17.)

> "Verily he had no delight. Therefore one alone has no delight. He desired a second······Therefore this

(is true) '*Oneself is like a half-fragment* (बृगल)', as Yajnavalkya used to say." (Brihad-Aran. 1 ; 4 : 3.)

"Whatever he brought forth that he began to eat." (Brihad-Aran. 1 ; 2 : 5.)

"Oh, wonderful! Oh, wonderful! Oh, wonderful!

I am food! I am food! I am food!

I am eater of food! I am eater of food! I am eater of food!……

I, who am food, eat the eater of food!" (Taithriya, 3 ; 10 : 5.)

This is the way in which these Rishis of old put before us what I am trying to explain, for I am teaching Paramâtmán who timelessly within the terms of his own "I" (sva) finds not that, the need for which is implicit in the infinite fullness of His nature. I am teaching the multi-personal Púrusha as His *food*—as that in which He timelessly fulfills His need-begotten desire. And I am teaching the multi-personal Púrusha as that which from beginningless time finds Paramâtmán its "food". As the sage Varuna exclaimed in exultation to his son, "I who am food, *eat* the eater of food". In other words, "I, in whom Paramâtmán finds the satisfaction of His need, find my essential need fulfilled in Him".

Indeed the passages one could quote are too numerous to be put down here. They show this conception running like a golden thread through the various Upanishads. Here are just a few more :—

"He desired: 'Would that a second self of me were produced." (Brihad-Aran. 1 ; 2 : 4)

"This is that great unborn Self *who eats the food*, the giver of good." (Brihad-Aran. 4 ; 4 : 24)

"This pair is joined together in this syllable

'OM'. Verily when a pair comes together the two truly procure their desire." (Chandogya Up. 1 ; 1 : 6)

"In the beginning, beloved, this world was just Being, one only, without a second······It bethought itself : 'Would that I were many !······" (Chandogya Up. 6 ; 2 : 1, 3.)

"Verily, in the beginning Prajapati stood alone. He had no enjoyment, being alone. He then, by meditating upon himself, created numerous offspring." (Maitri Up. 2 : 6.)

"He desired : 'Would that I were many. Let me procreate myself ! " (Tait. Up. 2 : 6.)

"It is called *Tad-vana* ('It-is-the-desire'). As *it-is-the-desire* it should be worshiped. For him who knows It thus, all beings together yearn." (Kena Up. 31.)

"Two birds, *fast bound companions,*
Clasp close the self-same tree.
Of these two, the one eats sweet fruit ,
The other looks on without eating.
On the self-same tree a person, sunken,
Grieves for his impotence, deluded ;
When he sees the other, the Lord, contented,
And his greatness, he becomes freed from sorrow."
(Rig Veda ; Mund. Up. 3 ; 1 : 1 ; and others),

In this last passage, I would think of one bird as Paramâtmán ; the other, eating food from the tree of experiencing life, as the personal Púrusha. They are, you will note, *not* identical but " fast bound companions."

Of course I am prepared to admit that in *every* particular the conceptions embodied in the above passages are not necessarily identical with my own. For example, though the feeling that Paramâtmán is conscious of a need and timelessly provides for its satisfaction is undoubtedly there, *apparently* we also find the conception of His evolving secondary categories *out of Himself.*

Parmatman timelessly "One, without Parts."

This view I am unable to subscribe to, for I hold the Paramâtmân timelessly "I," "without parts" and changeless—subject to no limitations or mutual-exclusions in what He experiences. It is not conceivable to me that Paramâtmân is the *primary* subject of my experience, for my experience is cut off from the experience of the "I" which is the subject in another experience-content by its personal and vehicular limitations. As I have said before, the Paramâtmic "I" *cannot* be at the same time the subject of an all-inclusive experience and of severally exclusive experiences. Here at least it would appear justifiable to be dogmatic; one cannot be conscious of *all* and yet be shut off from the consciousness of *all* at one and the same time, and yet remain one undivided "I". Therefore I hold that Paramâtmân is conscious of the experience contents of all Púrusha "I"s, experiencing the whole of each as the experience of that particular "I", re-experienced by him in accordance with the terms of His own divine personality. It is *His* experience of yours or mine that is present to Him, and His experience-content includes the totality of all that through beginningless time has been experienced by Púrusha. If this be not so, then Paramâtmân *as such* is impersonal, or if personal He is "with parts"—that is to say *divided*.

I have said that "apparently" there is a difference between my view and that of the sages of the Upanishads regarding the ultimate being of Púrusha. On the face of things it would appear that Indian philosophy teaches that the *material cause* (उपादान कारण) of Púrusha and Prakṛti is Paramâtmân, whereas I am unable to accept such

a view, because it would seem to impinge upon both the indivisible unity and changeless perfection of the divine nature.

Yet I feel that a closer analysis will show that the difference between us here is only one *of words.* Let us consider this question for a moment. We are all concerned to show that the one self-subsistent Verity is timelessly Paramâtmán, and that there are not *two* or more self-subsistent categories of Being which merely interact upon each other. We are at one in holding that Paramâtmán is the one *Reality* (सत्) in the sense that His existence alone is absolute, while all other modes of Being have only a *relative* existence—one that is *by*, *in*, and *with reference to* that.

The sages of the Upanishads have chosen to present this great central truth by saying that whatever else *is* was evolved from that, and lesser minds have taken this to mean that the *being* of Paramâtmán has, as it were, undergone an evolution and that "this world" (जगत्) is the consequence. Such a conception seems to me to directly contradict the truth which the sages were stressing. You can use all the "so-to-speak"s and "as-it-were"s you wish, but a duality in the divine nature nevertheless emerges.

Yet I hold that this is *not* the position taken by the greatest Indian thinkers. We have made mistaken use of such words as "real" and "unreal" or "apparent," and as a consequence have failed to grasp the meaning of the users of those words of which these are far from satisfactory translations. This has, of course, been repeatedly pointed out by various modern scholars. "Real" (सत्) as used by the sages

meant *absolute* or *ultimate* with reference to *category*—not with reference to *time*. A moment's reflection will show that this is correct. For individual souls are thought of as having *always* been individuated; this is implicit in the conception of beginningless "karma". The "Māyā" of the Vedanta is held neither to be Paramâtmán or to have had a beginning. Sankara did not hold it to be *without* existence, but denied it an independent reality of the same nature as that of Paramâtmán. The *Avidiyā* (Not-seeing-of-the-truth) was held to be as beginningless as Karma. All of these, according to Indian thinkers, have existed from "beginningless time", but only Paramâtmán (for whom various names are used) subsists absolutely and by reason of His own nature. His is a category of Being *more ultimate* than the category or categories beginninglessly *in time*. So you see that there is *absolutely no question whatever* of what the category of existence subsisting beginninglessly *in time* was *before* it was in time, for it has been so always. Paramâtmán is *before* it only in the sense that He is a more ultimate category of the real upon which subsidiary categories, in time and subject to change, timelessly rest. Therefore no question legitimately can be raised of what other categories are "made out of"; they have always been what they are—categories of the existent in time, subject to change of form or mode—and having no existence apart from Paramâtmán, upon whom they rest timelessly and in Whom they find the meaning of whatever reality they possess.

Now unless Paramâtmán is timelessly "with parts"—which I am certain neither the Upanishads or the great thinkers of India have ever

held—the implications of this view are little if any different from my own (except as regards the question of the beginningless karmas of individuated Púrusha "I"s. The position taken here on this subject is that the "karma" of Púrusha is as beginningless as its personal evolution, but that the "karma" of its various individuations is *not*, since each of these had a beginning.) For I hold that the necessity for the existence of Púrusha and Prakṛti is timelessly implicit in the terms of the Paramâtmic nature, and that these two relative and subsidiary categories of Being *are not* apart from it, and find their meaning only in it. In this my view is at one with the Upanishads in holding that "All this is Bráhman," and that Bráhman is Paramâtmán *plus* the timelessly essential implications of His nature.

For the "Māyā" or the "Avidiyā" or "Karma" of Indian philosophy must, if the line of thought be worked out, be accepted as implications of the Paramâtmic nature. If not, they must be held to be *independent* of it, and in that case we must be prepared to admit the existence of a *duality* of independent categories of being. The only other alternative is to hold them as *identical* with Paramâtmán. The two last conceptions would be as foreign to the thought of the Upanishads as they are to mine. It therefore seems to me that, on this point at least, any difference between us is one of words, and of the natural difficulty of implementing what is seen, with the mind and language.

Of course, it might be objected that, in a sense, the above line of reasoning begs the question—that there is no question of what the

subsidiary categories of Being were *before* they were what they are *in time*. It might be held that the correct way to put the problem is, "What are they *now* and what have they always been *back of* their existence in time. In other words, what is their *essential* nature as apart from their position in time? Those who put this question might say, "We admit that they are in time beginninglessly, but we hold that *in essence* they are identical with Paramâtmán—or at least that the Ātman experiencing as Jīva (individuated self) is, in its essential nature, Paramâtmán."

Paramatman & Purusha essentially non-identical.

My objection to such a view has already been stated. The *unity* of the conscious personal life of the timeless "I" would be impinged upon by such a conception. That "I" cannot be at once the primary subject of an all-inclusive experience and the primary subject of mutually exclusive experiences. It cannot be an "I" that is conscious of an area of experience, and also *the same "I"* unconscious of it. It cannot be at once an "I" whose consciousness is limited by the limitations of a vehicle, and the same "I" subject to no such limitations. Therefore I feel myself led to conceive of the timeless "I" and the Púrusha "I" as essentially non-identical—as "fast-bound companions", the existence of the latter dependent upon and resting timelessly in the former, but neither "a part" of it or a "mode" of it. In other words, I hold Púrusha, as regards its essential nature, *not* to be identical with Paramâtmán, but to represent a complementary and dependent category of reality in the timeless Unity that is Bráhman.

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It all comes back to the question of whether we are to think of that Ultimate Reality as a sort of metaphysical fluid consciousness in which one "I" or many "I"s are reflected, or to conceive it as *that which is timelessly changelessly and consciously "I"*. As you know, I hold the latter view, for reasons given.

Divine Self-Realization.

But I fear we are getting away from the main theme of this section. That was, if you remember, that the experience-life of Púrusha, experienced by it "from beginningless time", is from everlasting to everlasting present to the timeless "I". Beginninglessly Púrusha has been passing over from unconsciousness and impersonality to conscious and personally experiencing life under the mode of countless personal individuations which, at first only blindly conscious of a need that ever grows, find it at last fulfilled in personal communion with the timeless "I" and with other "I"s of Púrusha.

Through this building up of Púrusha and the instrumentality of Prakṛti the timeless "I" provides everlastingly for the *other side* of the personal relationship, the need for which is implicit in His nature. The field of his *knowing* is the whole content of the experience-life of the multi-personal Púrusha without beginning, bound or end. The field of His *loving* is His personal communion with the countless loving, yearning, needing Púrusha "I"s, as one by one they grow conscious of Him and turn to Him to find completion.

Those who have found their home in Him have experienced Him as *loving*. And the sense

of communion with that "I" gives rise to humble and exultant *love*—not to a sort of intellectual admiration. An "I" might *know* various things without experiencing love, and without the necessity for the presence of other "I"s; but an "I" may not *love* unless there is an object for that love—and that object must be personal—must be an "I".

To be *loving* by nature implies the *need* to love, and to love there must be that which can be loved. But, as I have said, the personal alone can love and can love only that which is personal—personal in other terms than itself. Therefore, if it is by nature personal, no "I"—not even the divine "I"—can fully realize itself as apart from that which it experiences as "You."

My need is as yet small because I have not yet attained to a capacity for greater love. But the need of an "I" that was by the terms of its nature infinitely loving would be boundless. I feel that in the beginningless, endless, boundless multi-personal life of the Púrusha aspect of Bráhman Paramâtmán provides eternally that which He may love and by which He may be loved in accordance with the infinite need of His loving nature. And as the conscious life of each of us is "made whole" in Him, so He ever completes His loving experience-life in us according to the dictates of His nature.

As each of us learns to love Him, our love for our dear ones becomes deeper and more meaningful, extends further, includes more. And through this love for them He comes to mean more and more to us. And loving Him thus more, our love for them reveals still greater implications and in the light of these we can

bring an even deeper love to Him. Thus throughout eternity builds up the inter-personal life of Bráhman, resting ever in the timeless "I" its deepest verity.*

* (NOTE:—There is one other implication arising out of the divine love that must be touched upon before we pass on to the next section. Earlier in the book I tried to make it clear that the nature of the highest loving relationships of Purusha "I"s as we know them in the terms of "human" experiencing, points to the necessity for *remembrance* in the next stage of their experiencing life of what those "I"s had been to each other in the stage before. This is a necessity arising out of the needs of the *Purusha* "I", but a like necessity would seem to rise out of the love of the divine "I".

As we know *love* in the terms of human experience, we are aware that the higher, the deeper, the truer it is, the more revolted it is at any idea of *termination*, the more it shrinks from any thought of substituting one object for another. It is only in the lower and more ignoble areas of experience that what is called "loving" may have one object today and another tomorrow. The highest experience of love that we know might be embodied in the words, "I am yours, and you are mine for ever." As experience grows richer, deeper and more loving there can be no doubt that the demand of love is for ever greater permanency, and the more abhorrent becomes the thought of transferring it from its object to something else. This does not of course imply that it may not include other objects within its orbit.

Viewing thus the evolution of loving experience, it would seem apparent that the deeper and greater love becomes, the less will it be capable of ceasing to love the personalities or personality upon which it is concentrated. The greater it becomes the more permanent it will be.

And how of the divine love? Surely it will not be *less* permanent than that of the Purusha "I". On the contrary, all that we have been considering of the significance to God of Purusha "I"s points to the necessity for the divine love to be as changeless as the divine nature. The "I" that has entered into loving personal relationship with the timeless "I" has entered into something that can have no end.

So you see, dear one, that not merely our own deepest experience demands continuity of personality and experience, but what we have become *to Paramatman* also demands it. His love for those "I"s that are in personal communion with Him being changeless, constitutes the guaranty of the continuity of that experience-life, with reference to which they are *what* they are.)

The Timeless Brahman.

"But that which has been sung is the supreme Brahman. In it there is a triad. It is the firm support, the Imperishable. By knowing what is therein, Brahman—knowers become merged in Brahman, intent thereon, liberated from the womb (*i.e*, from birth-and-death). (7).

"That which is joined together as perishable and imperishable—as manifest and unmanifest—the Lord supports it all.

Now without the Lord the soul is bound, because of being an enjoyer; by knowing God one is released from fetters." (8).

"There are two that are *unborn*: the Knowing and the Unknowing—the Ominpotent and the Impotent. She too (*i.e.*, Prakrti) is *unborn*, connected with the Enjoyer and the objects of enjoyment. Now the Atman is infinite, clothed in all forms, inactive. When one finds out this *triad*, that is Brahman." (9).

"......When one recognizes the Enjoyer, the Object of enjoyment, and the One-who-sets-in-motion, all has been said. This is the *three-fold Brahman*" (12).

There have been many interpretations of these passages from the Svetasvatara Upanishad, and of others of a like nature. In Sri Sankara's philosophy, for example, the "Enjoyer" is considered to be identical with the "Knowing" or absolute Self, only seemingly individuated by the individuations of the *Upādhi* (Buddhi, manas, antakarana, etc.) which have no absolute existence, being the products of a beginningless 'karma' resulting from an equally beginningless 'Avidya'—a sort of deflection of vision—inherent in 'Māyā'. The existence of this 'Māyā' is not entirely denied, but it is held to be existence of another kind and upon a lower plane than that

of the Ātman, from a *time*-standpoint beginninglessly associated with it, yet not a *part* of it. *Salvation*, to Sankara, therefore means the attainment, by means of the Buddhi, of Vidyā (right-seeing) and thereby freedom from the *apparent* individuation in experience for which the 'Upādhi' was responsible. When this is accomplished the Ātman that hitherto has experienced in the individuated terms of a particular Upādhi, no longer does so. It knows itself as the one and only Self, and is no longer apparently limited and individuated. *Actually* it has never been so, as Sankara explains by the example of the earthen vessels and the Akāsha, given elsewhere.

What constitutes Adwaita Philosophy.

At various places throughout this book I have given my reasons for not being able to accept this view, though acknowledging my deep debt to Sankara along other lines. We must remember that his chief aim was to combat the dualism of the Saṃkhya philosopy and assert the *inseparateness* of the existent. His philosophy is the 'Adwaita'—the philosophy of non-two-ness, and was directed especially against the conception of the 'Pradhāna', or non-sentient principle of the Saṃkhyas, as existing independently of the Ātman. He made his greatest contribution to the thought of India in stressing that the final reference of all that exists is to the *Ātman* and that there are not two *independent* categories of existence. In this I am at one with him, holding my own philosophy to be "Adwaita," for it too admits no category of Being that does not have its existence from, for, and with reference to Paramâtmân. But I hold that Paramâtmân and

Púrusha are *adwaita*—non-separate—not that in the final analysis they are identical. The absolute "I"—Paramâtmán—does not appear to me to be identical with the individuated "I" as apart from the Upādhi. On the contrary I hold the two to be personally complimentary and each fulfilling the essential need of the other.

Sankara.

Sankara would admit a distinction in the passage quoted above between Paramâtmán and the individuated "I", but he would say that the difference does not partake of the nature of reality, being the product of Avidya. With the destruction of Avidya it will be seen not actually to exist at all. The apparent Setter-in-motion and the apparent Enjoyer will be seen to be identical and all "name-and-form" factors to exist only in relation to Avidya. Avidya, he would say, is eternal in *the time-category*, but does not really pertain to the Ātman. Salvation is Self-realization—a sort of *stepping out* of the time-change category built up by Avidya "from beginningless time". This category has a sort of existence, resting on the Ātman as it were, yet neither of it nor apart from it—a *relative*, not an absolute reality. Apart from this name-form-time-change category which does not actually pertain to Ātman, the latter will be seen to be *One*, and all differentiations of "Mover", "Enjoyer", etc., to be non-existent. Thus Sankara smashes the earthen vessels in the Akāsa (ether)—to use his own simile—but, as Ramanuja remarks, he does not know exactly what to do with the pieces.

Ramanuja understands these passages from

the Svetasvatara differently. His philosophy,
Ramanuja. like all Adwaita systems takes its stand upon the passage from the Taittiriya Upanishad (III; 1 : 1) as found in abridged form toward the beginning of the Brahma Sutras. The passage is, "That from which these things are born, That by which, being born, these things live, That which they go to and enter into, know That; That is Bráhman". I, of course, am prepared to accept this also.

To him, Bráhman stands for ultimate and essential *Being* and that Being is one and indivisible but existing under three modes (prakāra) whose being is Bráhman. These three modes, though *in essence* One Bráhman, are definitely non-identical. Paramâtmán—called by various names—is the "Mover" (Prêritṛi) and Highest Lord. Púrusha—the secondary category—is conceived of as represented by countless "Jīvas" (individual souls) existing as such from eternity to eternity. Púrusha is the "Enjoyer" (Bhoktṛi) of the objects of enjoyment, and the Eater of the fruits of action (karma). It is essentially conscious (chit) and personal. Prakṛti is the *enjoyed* (Bhógya), "non-sentient, for the sake of another, eternal, ever-changing, comprising within herself the three 'gunas', and constituting the sphere of action and experience for all agents. With her the Púrusha is connected in the way of inseparable association".

As man is not *man* apart from either soul or body, so is Bráhman not Bráhman apart from these eternal modes. Púrusha and Prakṛti are Bráhman's "Body", so to speak, and Paramâtmán is its "Soul". He indwells the two subordinate modes as the soul indwells the body. Thus

Púrusha and Prakṛti are the *indwelt* modes, and Paramâtmán is the *indwelling* mode. He is the inner ruler (Antaryāmi) and the Highest Bráhman.

Paramâtmán—called by various names—is conscious and personal, according to Ramanuja. He is "an ocean of innumerable noble qualities", "hostile to all that is evil", all-powerful, all-pervading, all-merciful. He appoints fruits to the different Jīvas in accordance with their respective actions. *Salvation* of individual souls is not a merging into identity with Him, for this will never happen. Nor is it the realization of an identity that is there already, as with Sankara, for this does not exist. It is to be attained by the knowledge that arises out of devotion, meditation, and faithfulness to prescribed duties, and consists in attaining to a state in which the individual soul is released from "Birth-and-death", sharing the conscious life of Paramâtmán but retaining its own individual self-consciousness, and not partaking of the infinity of Paramâtmán or His powers as "Mover".

In this system the idea of "Kāraṇavasthā" and "Kāryavasthā" play an important part. That is, the *indwelt* modes of Bráhman undergo periodic modification in the *form* of their existence. In the Kāraṇavasthā (causal state) they subsist in a condition of latency. Souls, though not losing their individuality or their respective 'karmas', are not connected with vehicles, and are consequently unable to manifest their intelligence. Prakṛti is not evolved as "name-and-form". From this state, under the dynamic of the Paramātmic will (संकल्प) the subordinate modes pass over into expression. Souls experience

in the terms of vehicles evolved from Prakṛti, and enjoy the fruits of the good and evil of their past actions until the conclusion of the world-period (kalpa) when existence again passes into its latent form.

The souls that have become *released*—that have attained salvation—" do not return." That is, they are free from these periodic expansions and contractions, since, being free from 'karma' they are no longer subject to 'birth-and-death.'

Ramanuja's system, though so different from Sankara's, may still be called " Adwaita," for it is founded upon the conception of *non-two-ness.* Whatever *is* is held to be Bráhman, in *essence* one, though subsisting timelessly under non-identical modes. It is because of this permanent non-identity of modes that the *oneness* is called " qualified."

It was Sankara's great mission to save Indian thought from succumbing to the dualistic conceptions of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, and from certain Buddhist tendencies. As I see it, Ramanuja's mission was to retrieve it from the opposite peril of falling into an unqualified monism in which whatever truth there is in *individuality* would tend to be lost. Sankara taught the *oneness* of All-that-Is; Ramanuja taught that such Oneness is not incompatible with real *differentiation.* Sankara taught that salvation comes with *seeing* (vidyā); Ramanuja taught that the power to thus see is the product of *loving experience* and faithfulness to duty. Both taught that with the direct perception of that *oneness* comes salvation.

You are by this time sufficiently familiar with my own position to be able to appreciate just how

much there is in common between my view and that of Ramanuja. The points upon which we differ will also be apparent to you. There are, of course, very real differences. For example, though I accept with him Púrusha as a beginningless mode of Bráhman, I am unable to accept the individual "souls"—or, as I call them, "I"s of Púrusha—as beginningless. As to their essential *being*—as Púrusha—I hold them beginningless; as to their conscious individuality, I do not.

Where I differ from Ramanuja.

Again, while I admit a truth at the back of the conception of the periodic spreadings-out and gatherings-in of Bráhman, it has not exactly the same meaning for me that it has for Ramanuja and the Bhāgavata schools. As I see it, the process is a *continual* rather than a *periodic* one. A "world-period" (kalpa) would represent, in this view, the emergence of the Púrusha from unconscious impersonal unmanifestation (अव्यक्ति) —at the point X of my diagram; its multi-personal evolution in association with the evolving Prakṛti; and its subsequent personal and conscious entry into the realization of its *oneness* in Bráhman, as the divine love draws it to itself. Thus conceived, this process of "emerging" and "returning" may be said to be ever taking place, the emergence being from the impersonal and and unconscious and the return being, so far as the Púrusha is concerned, with personality and conscious loving experience.

As to the different terms in which we have set forth the qualified oneness of Bráhman, it seems to me that our differences are largely in the way we seek to express the same truth. Naturally I prefer my own, but I feel that the

implications of what I have been trying to say are present to a great extent in Ramanuja's position. We are at one in our conviction that "Bráhman is all this," and that Bráhman is *one.* We both hold that as *modes* of Being Paramâtmán, Púrusha and Prakṛti are not, and never will be identical. Ramanuja likens the two subordinate modes to the "body" of Bráhman, and Paramâtmán to its "soul". I think of the subordinate modes as the area of Being in which Paramâtmán eternally realizes and expresses Himself—an area which exists by reason of the need of it implicit in the Divine Nature. Paramâtmán *without* it is as inconceivable as a man without a body. The essential oneness—that is, *non-two-ness*—of Bráhman is seen in the fact that none of the modes could be what they timelessly *are* if the others did not exist.

But Ramanuja's final reference would be *to Bráhman,* whose essence is *Being,* subsisting timelessly under one primary and two subordinate modes. As of the essence of *Being* he would hold the three modes to be essentially one Bráhman, indivisible and without parts—one as *Being.* Such a treatment of the problem may be necessary for those who feel compelled to accept the verbal accuracy and completeness of scripture, but personally I find it rather too metaphysical, and as such it does not appeal to me.

In consequence my final reference is *to Paramâtmán,* though I accept the three-fold Bráhman as *the supreme fact.* For Bráhman is the timelessly existent—*the One*—including all Being—apart from which nothing is—beyond which nothing goes—so indivisible that no mode of it could possibly exist apart from the existence of

the others. Yet, though it is Being, timeless and non-separate—and therefore *the Real*—it stands in the self-subsistent existence of its deepest verity, the changeless and perfect Paramâtmán whose mode is one and personal. It *is* timelessly because He *is* timelessly.

But I cannot hold that the *Being* of the two subsidiary categories is identical in nature with that of Paramâtmán. It stands in itself—is *svyámbhu*; their being stands timelessly in it, and is of a *complementary* nature. Nevertheless All-that-Is timelessly is Bráhman, and nothing less than that is Bráhman.

I cannot conceive the ultimate self-subsistent Being as existing under three modes, for I hold that it is essentially *personal*, and that the personal cannot be divided. It is possible for the Púrusha to be multi-personal for the simple reason that it is not *essentially* personal. It is an entity as to its essence, but it is *not* one as regards its personal evolutions; these are non-identical and many. Were I to accept the position of Ramanuja and the other schools that hold the individual "Jīvas" to have been beginninglessly personal, then I should not feel justified in thinking of them as *one* Púrusha, but as countless Púrushas, and I have given my reasons for not being able to think of each as without a beginning personally. In the same way, were I able to conceive the ultimate self-subsistent being as *timelessly* differentiated I should feel the necessity of conceiving it as two personalities—or countless personalities—standing timelessly in a common essence (सत्ता) of which personality might not be predicated. The seat of personality would not be in the essence viewed *as such*, but *in the*

modes. Ultimate Being would be of more than one kind (प्रकार)—"with parts". But my philosophy is based upon the conception that back of and beyond all differentiations lies *One*—indivisible, "without parts", conscious, personal—the timeless "I". He is Paramâtmán, the ultimate self-subsistent verity—He, and no other mode of Being in time or beyond it.

Paramatman does not stand in Brahman, nor Brahman in Paramatman.

For Paramâtmán does not stand in Bráhman. That would mean that Bráhman is more ultimate than Paramâtmán. Rather, He together with his essential implications *is* Bráhman—is Being. Nor does Bráhman stand in Paramâtmán; it is the two subsidiary categories that stand in Him, and they *apart from Him* are not Bráhman. They, *together* with Him in whom they stand, are Bráhman. Paramâtmán's Being is self-subsistent (स्वतन्त्र सत्ता); their Being is of a different nature (विलक्षण) subsidiary, relative, and dependent upon another (परतन्त्र सत्ता). This, at least, is the view to which my philosophy leads me. Yet I too hold the *non-two-ness* of Bráhman, for Paramâtmán could not be what He is without the existence of the subsidiary categories; nor could they be at all apart from Him.

Ramanuja's conception and my own regarding the reality of "the world" (जगत्) have also much in common. We both hold that it has its reality *in Bráhman*—not in that factor which Sankara calls "Māyā", and holds neither to be Bráhman nor to have its existence apart from Bráhman. We neither of us hold that it has merely an ideational reality dependent upon the

Buddhi—that, to use Sankara's words, it is *Vijñānmātra* and *avastu.* Sankara is compelled to deny "the world" a substrate (सत्ता) in Bráhman, because for him Bráhman and Paramâtmán are, in the final resort, identical, and undifferentiated consciousness. Therefore he must seek "the world" in its final analysis *outside* of Bráhman. But to us *the timelessly existent* subsists under three modes, and the "world" of name and form is an evolved manifestation of one of them—not a changing form (वृत्ति) of something which is not Bráhman.

Ramanuja probably goes further than I would in his realism, apparently assuming that "things" *are* actually as they appear in their formulation in experience—that a 'chair' is a 'chair', if only temporarily, quite apart from our experience of it as such. I, on the other hand, do not deny that it *may* be *in itself* what it presents itself to be in experience, but I do not know. Whatever it may be *in itself*, its reality *in experience* is a 'chair', and I only know it there. Yet I am convinced that there is a reality *of its own* to that whereof there is consciousness in 'chair'-terms, and that its reality must differ from the reality of that of which there is consciousness in 'tree'-terms. In other words, 'the world' has a reality of its own as apart from my experience, and we are justified in assuming that its reality is as differentiated as we are conscious of differentiation in experience. As Ramanuja says in his commentary on the Brahma Sutras, "The manifold character of cognitions must therefore be held to be due to the manifold character of real things". I agree with him, while holding that the 'world' we know is constituted of our reactions to them—not

of *the things in themselves*. *There* you who have a reality of your own, have that expression which is the truth of you for me. The *absolute* truth of you would be, I imagine, what you are to Paramâtmán, and to become progressively mine as I come by ever deepening communion with Paramâtmán to enter into the sense of what you are to Him.

As a matter of fact, I am not so sure that what you are *in yourself* and with reference *to* yourself, is as important as what you are to God and to me. If we are " fragments " (बृगल) we find our highest meaning in that which is made *whole* in us. Thus *the whole truth* of what each of us is must be found in the other, and the whole truth of what we are to each other must be found in what *we*—not each of us separately—are to God.

Lastly it should be noted that I am in profound agreement with Ramanuja in his conviction that the ultimate reality—Paramâtmán—is not a sort of fluid consciousness in which the "I" may or may not be reflected, but something which is conscious—and conscious *personally* in terms of "I". This holds also for the individuated Púrusha, but not for Púrusha in the state of unmanifestation.

There are, of course, many aspects of the question treated by me upon which Ramanuja has not touched. This is natural, for he was expounding the scriptures, and I have been exploring the implications of this "I"'s experience-world, in so far as I have been able to discover them.

Ramanuja claimed that the Qualified Adwaita philosophy was the correct interpretation of

the Upanishads and of the Brahma Sutras based upon them. So did Sankaracharya, but the meaning he derived from them was a very different one. Mādhavachārya and Nimbarka and various others all believed that they were expounding the scriptures correctly, but their conclusions differ to a greater or less extent. These that I have mentioned only claim to set forth the *Vedānta*—the sixth of the great systems that look to the Upanishads as their final authority.

Scriptures open to divergent interpretations.

My own feeling is that the contents of these great scriptures are open to divergent interpretations, and that it would be better to frankly admit that various views can find support from them, though none can find *complete* support there. Such a view is of course more open to one who, like myself, does not look upon them—or any scripture—as the final authority with which philosophy must absolutely coincide.

What constitutes their greatness.

As I see it, the sign (लक्षण) of a great scripture is not completeness, or even unfailing accuracy. Their greatness and permanent value and validity must rather be gaged by whether, and to what extent, they call to the deepest in us, impel us to long far thoughts, and lead us to deep experience. Those that are really great hold their place, it seems to me, because they are powerful in arousing us to self-realization—because they speak to the deepest in our natures—not because they contain the whole of what the "I" must realize. They differ from even the noblest philosophical systems in that their call is to the *soul*, whereas the appeal of philosophy is

to the *Buddhi*. In this sense I have found the Upanishads true "Shruti"—as I have also found the Gospels and the Gītā. All of them speak to the deepest part of me, and call forth a response from the deeps of my Being. All of them arouse the longing in me to know what I am, what *you* are, beloved, what life is, and what *That* is in which I feel this self to rest and find itself fulfilled. It is thus that these scriptures appear to me to fulfill their highest function—*not* in furnishing a "prescription" for salvation, or complete information about that which is of value only when the "I" has achieved it by *self*-realization.

Their value.

Therefore I quote scripture—*not* as authority—nor even to demonstrate that its authors meant exactly what I find in their writings—but because of what the passages *have called forth in me.* Their value lies in their *suggestiveness*, and in the thoughts to which they give rise, and the experience they are instrumental in begetting. But when all is said and done, it is the "I" that must interpret its own experience-world of which these scriptures form a part.

The significance of Brahman to our personal relationship.

I do not propose here to go into a long discussion of the passages we have been discussing in this section. Having read the book you are by now familiar with what Bráhman means to me. Rather I wish to limit my interpretation to its significance in our own personal relationship. What does the truth contained in it mean for you and me?

The conception, as I find it here and in other parts of the Upanishads, is of the individual self, bound to "birth-and-death"—*not* as Enjoyer but as *the Enjoyer of the "perishable"*. Its desire we have seen elsewhere is a *true* desire (सत्य काम) arising out of its essential incompleteness and need to be completed beyond the limitations of its own personality, but until it is free from Avidya—from the blindness which renders it unable to distinguish between the perishable and the imperishable—its desire is concentrated upon the "false coverings of the real" rather than on the reality that is clothed in them. "These are the *real* desires" as the Chandogya says, "with a covering that is false". Tending always to identify the underlying real with the temporary garb in which it is experienced, the individuated "I" in losing the temporary garb feels that the reality is lost also. As long, therefore, as this "I" is concentrated upon the enjoyment of fleeting forms and has not attained to communion with the Imperishable it is bound. When it knows God—the timeless "I"—and learns to see that which it *really* desires from the standpoint of eternity, it can distinguish between the real object of its desire and the garb in which it is expressed from moment to moment. Then it becomes free from "birth-and-death", for its yearning is no longer concentrated upon that which is born and dies—on the "Kshara" (perishable). It is "free from confusion".

But we must remember that the *Enjoyer* is unborn (अज). This means that it is beginninglessly the Enjoyer. I hold, therefore, that it will be the Enjoyer endlessly. Its freedom from fetters does not lie in its ceasing to be an enjoyer, but in

its ceasing to seek its enjoyment in the *perishable* —in the "name-and-form" which is constantly building up and disintegrating. It is in the imperishable Ātman—in the underlying reality or truth, clothed in constantly changing forms—that true desire based upon essential *need* finds its fulfilment. But the fulfilment is in the reality—not in the fleeting form—although it seems to me more than probable that certain areas of our experience of the real, in the inter-personal life of the timeless Púrusha, will never cease to have a Prakṛtic formulation. In fact, I am certain of it.

Let us go back to a verse quoted by me toward the beginning of the book for an illustration:

> "Not for the sake of the *wife* is the wife dear,
> But for the sake of the Atman the wife is dear".

There is a real personal relationship between two Púrusha "I"s experiencing in the terms of 'human nature'. That relationship is an evolving *Púrusha* relationship; it is *not* human. But in so far as the truth of that relationship can find 'human' expression, it finds it in the 'human' relationship of *husband* and *wife.* Before we were free we thought that the beloved reality—the "Ātman"—was my human husbandhood and your human wifehood. Now we know that these are *not* the reality but only a temporary expression — a 'birth-and-death' expression —of an underlying truth of personal relationship in the evolving life of the timeless Púrusha. And yet this human husbandhood and wifehood are dear to us, beloved,—precious, because they are the expression in the limited terms of our present experience of that reality that lies behind

them. But we are *free*, for we no longer love the expression thinking of it as the reality. We know the expression is temporary (अनित्य) and will fade away, but that the reality of what we are to each other is Akshara—undying—in the evolving life of the deathless Púrusha, and in the boundless personal plenitude of the timeless Bráhman. And there we found ourselves and our fulfilling in communion with that timeless "I"—Paramâtmán—in Whom we, and all else that Bráhman is, has its being and finds its meaning.

The Joy of Oneness in Brahman.

Wherein, then, lies the great joy of discovering that we are 'one with Bráhman'? What is meant by being "merged" in Bráhman? Why is the necessity for this thought throughout the Upanishads and all Indian Philosophy?

Many have sought to answer these questions, and each in his own way. The whole of this book is my attempt to do so. It teaches that our own salvation lies in our waking to what Bráhman is and what we are in Bráhman—in our gaining a vision of the *unity* of Being, and our significance in that unity.

It is not a question of *intellectual* apprehension, but of self-realization. It is to be arrived at, not by a study of metaphysics true or false, but by direct experience (दर्शन, अनुभव). Not by *learning* or by intellectual acceptance of this philosophy or another shall we find ourselves in Bráhman; the realization of it is to be achieved by *love*. It is as accessible to the simple as to the learned. When the eye of the spirit has been sufficiently opened by loving experience we shall see that *Oneness* which is Bráhman, to which

nothing real is foreign (अन्य) and from which nothing that exists is separate (पृथक). Then the conception of ourselves as separate beings with conflicting ends, each with its separate good that may be gained at the expense of others or *apart* from others, will be quite lost. We shall know ourselves as one Púrusha and our life as one life, to the enrichment of which each has his quota to contribute—the glorious boundless life that is building up from everlasting to everlasting in the timeless Bráhman.

For *Bráhman is all this.* Its deepest verity is that timeless, all-knowing, infinitely needing, infinitely loving and experiencing "I", changeless in its perfection, wherein all else that Bráhman is stands timelessly. Bráhman is Paramâtmán and the essential implications of Paramâtmán. Therefore the timeless Púrusha is Bráhman, for apart from it Bráhman is not, since the Púrusha is that in personal communion with which Paramâtmán timelessly realizes His infinite nature and finds His self-expression. Therefore Prakṛti too is Bráhman, for upon the frame-work of it, and clothed in terms of it, the multi-personally experienced life of Púrusha is built up throughout eternity, thereby rendering possible the achievement of personal communion between Púrusha and Paramâtmán. Yet neither Paramâtmán or Púrusha or Prakṛti is by itself all that Bráhman is.

Bráhman is Life Eternal—that in which is included all consciousness though it is not conscious, all experiencing though it does not experience, all the multi-personally experienced loving communion of Paramâtmán and Púrusha. "In it all desires are contained" clothed in endless

forms and the terms of countless vehicles. In it all true desires based on essential need find their fulfillment. It is beyond all time and change yet it is timelessly replete with them, throbbing, pulsating, as it were, with the fulness of personal life.

It is all that Paramâtman, Púrusha and Prakṛti timelessly are, and all that they are through beginningless time to each other. It is all that is manifest and unmanifest—"the formed and the formless"—clothed in all forms (विश्वरूप). "Bráhman is all this."

It is the *Real*—the true—because it is beyond time and nothing goes beyond it. "Whatever *is* is Bráhman". And the deepest truth of it—the self-subsistent inmost reality of it—is Paramât-mán, the "Real of the Real"—the One God—its Life—its Light.

PART VI.

Practical Implications of this Outlook on Life.

In this last section of our book it is my intention to give very briefly an outline of some of the practical implications of this Satyākāma philosophy. This is not because there is little to be said. On the contrary there would seem to be so many implications that another book would be required to deal with them all, and some day I hope to be able to give them fuller treatment. For the present, however, this must suffice, and as usual I must take my own unsystematic road and leave to you the task of getting at my meaning as you read along.

In the first place it will be clear to you that here is no philosophy of *rewards* and *punishments* meted out by a Judge sitting in awful majesty to award to each his due. It is not a philosophy of *fear*; such seems to me only fit for slaves.

Yet this does not mean for a moment that it is based upon a soft and flabby sentimentalism which looks to the "mercy" of a loving God to give us more than we deserve. The law it sees is inexorable and not to be evaded either by our own ingenuity or divine favour. We shall attain to that for which we become *fit*—no more, no less. We shall see what we are capable of seeing —experience in the terms for which we have achieved the capacity. No question arises of divine interference; the divine Love, it is true, yearns for us, calls to us ever; the divine Desire is ever seeking to draw us into the fullness of its life. But what Paramâtmán is to us—what other Púrusha "I"s are to us—depends wholly upon what we ourselves are and may come to be.

Whatsoever we sow, that surely shall we reap, and other Púrusha "I"s will reap our harvest with us; there is no escape from the consequences of good and ill. Others may be compelled to share the fruits of our deeds, but we, at all events, shall each of us have to pay to the full our own debts. It is futile to hope to escape by declaring ourselves "bankrupts". It is useless to think that someone else can pay our debts for us, and thereby free us from our obligations. Indeed, as self-respecting men in the world expect to meet their own obligations, should not we prefer to meet ours?

Of course it is admittedly just that each of us should suffer the consequences of his own actions, but on first thought it seems less clear that there is justice in our having to suffer the consequences of each other's short-comings. This would undoubtedly be unjust were we in reality—as we are so accustomed to think—separate and independent entities. But I would point out, beloved, that in the view of life I have placed before you we are *not* separate; the personally experienced life that is building up in us is *one life*. It is *the Púrusha*—that which you are, that which I am—that in you and me and its other personally conscious modes, reaps the consequences in joy or pain of what the *Púrusha* does or experiences in the mode of this "I" or another. Also I would have you remember that though it is true one "I" may suffer cruelly in the fruits of the actions (or actionlessness) of another "I", it is likewise true it may share in the good fruits of the noble and loving actions of other "I"s. Also it is true that the fullness of Púrusha's multi-personal life is the product of multiple experience

achieved by Púrusha in the mode of countless "I"s. In that plenitude each "I" is destined fully to participate, and in so doing it will be reaping the fruit of experience achieved by Púrusha under the mode of other "I"s. If we can but realize that it is the *one* Púrusha building up its *one* life under its countless personal modes, we shall no longer feel it unjust that the whole of conscious Púrusha life shares in the fruits of its experience in each of its "I"s. Let us also remember that if there is greater pain by the way as a result of this, at the end is greater joy and a nobler fullness of life.

Although I am entirely unable to accept the idea that one who is "sinless" can pay the debts of the "sinner", thereby freeing the latter from the consequences of his actions, I am none the less conscious that a profound truth lies at the back of the teaching of the *Cross*. Over and above the consequences of each other's actions which all must share whether they will or no, there remains that further burden that falls upon *love*. He who loves is surely crucified in the pain and sorrow and bewilderment of those he loves. He who loves all bears the burden of all; the call to love is the call to Calvary. Moreover, if that "I" whom we know in experience as Jesus of Nazareth, represents Púrusha experiencing at a stage in its personal evolution where *the whole* of its conscious life is present to it in each of its personal modes—or even the whole of its life for this particular evolution from X—then it would experience not only the pain but what we also call the "sin" of the world as in very truth its own, and would

suffer for it as such—suffer as we must suffer when we so love.

And here there is a mystery which our feeble love prevents us as yet from more than very dimly grasping: joy—Ānanda—and pain are not absolutely incompatible. We are too prone to think of 'salvation' as escape from pain. In this may we not be mistaken? May it not rather be that the deliverance which we really need is from our *ignorance* as to the truth of pain? The end of this philosophy, at any rate, is not escape from pain, but *fullness of life*. If in that fullness pain has its part we must not shrink from it. It may well be possible that apart from it the deepest joy is impossible.

Salvation.

As we have seen, the great dynamic force at the root of all conscious aspiration and effort is *Desire*. Desire springs from *Need*, which is of the essential nature of Púrusha in conscious mode.

The sense of *need* is there because neither Púrusha in itself, nor any of the personal modes of it, is *complete*. Púrusha *is* with reference to Paramâtmân, and is fulfilled only there. Each of the modes under which it evolves personally is also incomplete and must seek its completeness outside the terms of its own personality—in other "I"s of Púrusha, and with them in the timeless "I" Paramâtmân.

Salvation is not a gift but a condition. It is the outcome of a progressive process, beginning, it seems to me, with the passing over of an "I" into 'eternal life' and continuing to be more perfectly achieved to all eternity. It is a process that will never be completed, for the "I" has

before it the development of an ever increasing capacity to fulfill its essential need in the infinitude of the Divine experience, beginningless, endless, boundless. In that eternally progressive fulfilling—that ever more perfect salvation—lies the significance of the individuated "I" in Bráhman.

Thus the Púrusha "I" is eternally in time, as is the experience-life of the timeless "I". The *being* of Bráhman—Paramâtmán, Púrusha and Prakṛti—is beyond time, but its multi-personal experience-life is in time timelessly.

Impediments.

There would appear to be various factors which stand in the way of the "I"s passing over into 'eternal life' and its progress thereafter towards perfection in it. They seem to me to be of a *negative* nature—*lacks* that give rise to positive defects of purpose and action. In other words, they are the products of *Avidya*—of not seeing things in their real relation to each other, or grasping their real significance. I am not here speaking of an *intellectul* grasping, but of a right consciousness of—a right *feeling* with reference to—that which is experienced.

Avidya is, as I use the term, something quite different from the 'avidya' of Sankara. His Avidya is conceived as not of the Self—the Ātman—but of the Māyā. It is a thing of the Buddhi, etc.,—of the non-self. Such a position was inevitable for him inasmuch as in his view there is one Self, and that Paramâtmán. But Avidya, as I conceive it, and use the term here, is of the individuated Púrusha "I". It is not something positive, but the *lack* of seeing upon

the part of that "I". When the evolving Púrusha in its mode of the individuated "I" reaches a point in its personal evolution where it becomes *rightly* conscious of its relation to the factors of its experience-content, then there is no more Avidya—no more *not-seeing* or *seeing-amiss.*

Avidya is responsible, among other things, for—(a) *Sense of Separateness* (अन्यता). The "I", as I have tried to show earlier in this book, tends to feel itself an independent entity of being, with a good of its own which is separate from, and may be even in opposition to, the good of the other "I"s of its experience. As a consequence it imagines that it may gain by the loss of others, and fails to realize that it is *its own self* that in other "I"s is building up its eternal life—the life in which it must find its own fulfilment. It fails to see that in disfiguring the experience-life of other "I"s, or in impoverishing their experience-contents, it is disfiguring or impoverishing that which is eventually to be its own. It fails to see that the beauty, the richness, the perfection of its own eternal life is being built up in the personal experiencing life of other "I"s, and that in sacrificing them and denying them the noblest experience it is impoverishing and creating empty spaces in its own eternal life. It fails to see, also, that in so doing it is impairing the experience and the self-expression of the divine love of Paramâtmân.

All this holds for aggregates of "I"s—the groups and communities and nations of our world-experience. Here the sense of communal or national separateness (अन्यता) and independence of being and interest operates in precisely the same manner. As the Maitri Upanishad says:—

> "Thinking, 'This is I', 'That is Mine!, they bind themselves with themselves, as a bird with a snare."

Each "I" or group of "I"s dreaming dreams of "Mine! Mine!" is fighting against the fullness of the life for which it unknowingly yearns—bent upon damaging, impoverishing or sacrificing the life that is being so painfully built up for it by other "I"s of itself. There is something very pathetic about this process of unknowing frustration, for as the Upanishad says:—

> There is no otherness (नेह नानास्तिकिञ्चन);
> From death to death goes he who here sees otherness.

The word I have translated *other-ness* (नानात्व), has the idea of being *different from*. As I read the passage it seems to me to mean that as long as we do not escape from our sense of essential separateness and "other-ness" from other "I"s of Púrusha we shall not escape from "the round of birth and death," and enter upon the road of eternal life. It is only when we come to think of every other "I" of our experience thus: "This is another personal expression of my very self—in this "I" *that which I am* is joyously or sorrowfully building up my life for me—is building up, moreover, that which is the Púrusha's answer to the call of the divine love" that we shall treat it as we should. When we have come to think thus we shall see 'the world' with other eyes, and in all the teeming life that we experience as about us feel *the Self* of us pressing upward toward the light through its countless vehicles.

And this will also make us treat the vehicles of Púrusha more respectfully—more reverently. We shall not needlessly, carelessly, rashly, deprive Púrusha of the channels of its experiencing evolu-

tion. When the necessity arises to do what we so mistakenly call "taking life" (जीवहत्या) we shall do it with a greater sense of responsibility—not out of low and selfish considerations, but with reference to the higher exigencies of Púrusha's personal evolution. And in the experience of relations with other "I"s, the thought that we are dealing with this great Self of ours, and with that which God needs and yearns for, will restrain us from maiming our own and the divine experience.

I would not mislead you, dear one, into thinking that I have fully entered into this great truth. I am still far from it. Yet once in a while, for an instant, it does become very deep and real to me. At other times I live in the memory of those brief moments of experience, but I expect that some time the stage will be reached when I shall feel the reality constantly.

The Rider and the Steed.

(b) Another of the more important consequences of *Avidya* is, as I have pointed out elsewhere, the failure of the "I" to distinguish between itself, and its vehicle—the tendency to identify or confuse the one with the other—and consequently to feel that in attending to the needs or humouring the cravings of the vehicle it is ministering to the satisfaction of *its own* essential need.

The ancient Greeks believed in a fabulous creature which they called a "Centaur"—half man and half horse. We tend to assume ourselves to be something of the kind—talk of "human souls" and discuss the possibility of the eternal life of *man.* This results, I think, from our proneness to identify ourselves with our vehicles.

If in fact we *are* identical with them, then it would seem to follow that the conscious and personal "I" must be as fleeting as that which in our experience-world reveals itself as an organism evolved from other and lower organisms, and built up from the same category as all the other factors that have expression in experience as unconscious and impersonal. The only alternative would be to deny the existence of the vehicle altogether, holding that there is nothing but the "I"—or, as certain Western thinkers say, "Mind" —in the consciousness of which the idea of humanity is *inherent.*

But neither of these views are acceptable to me, for reasons that I have either given or implied in the course of this book. In this, at least, I find myself at one with the thought of ancient India. As the Katha Upanishad says:—

> 'Know the *Self* as the Master of the chariot;
> Then verily know the Body as the chariot.
> Know the Buddhi as the Charioteer, and the
> Mind (मनः) as the reins.
> The Senses (इन्द्रियाणि) they say, are the horses;
> The Objects of the Senses (विषयान्) is the Path.'

As I would interpret it, the *Self* of me is Púrusha. It has been evolved in the specific personal mode of this "I", and in that mode is the 'Master of the Chariot.' Its vehicle is as unidentical with it as a chariot with its owner, or a horse with its rider. The significance of the one is utterly different from that of the other. The function of the one is *to ride*; that of the other is *to carry.* One is to reach the goal of its true desire; the other is to help it reach that goal. One is to control; the other is to obey. Each has

needs and longings of its own in accordance with its nature, but these, though they may be made to minister jointly to a common end, are utterly different in character and genesis.

Understand, dear one, this is, no plea to despise the horse or deny our dependence upon it, but merely to remember that it is *not one* with the Rider, and is *for* the Rider—not the Rider for it.

The *need* of the Púrusha "I" is essential—rooted in its very being. It can find its fulfilment only in other "I"s. When it confuses itself with its vehicle, it appropriates the wants and cravings of its vehicle as its *own*, and expects to satisfy its deep essential need in satisfying them.

Suppose a Rider, subject to such confusion, were starting with his horse upon a journey to reach a distant goal. The goal is far beyond the distant hills, but grass is near and very inviting to the craving he imagines to be his own. Presently he comes to confuse the grass by the wayside with the goal of his journey; his horse wanders at will over the surrounding meadows and the goal remains beyond the horizon, while the rider dies of starvation. Or the horse, following its appetites, carries its master and itself over the precipice to lie wounded and broken on the rocks below. But such was not the object of the journey, nor was the horse for this.

Fiery Steeds.

Many years ago, when I was a young lad recovering from a nervous breakdown on a ranch in New Mexico, I was given permission to buy myself a horse. I was not very strong and friends counselled me to get one of the quiet, gentle ponies of which

there were a number to be had locally. I intended to do so, but one day while visiting a neighbour I came across a horse that was about to be sold. It was a splendid creature—a light sorrel, beautifully marked, with rippling muscles and a wonderful mane and tail. It was being disposed of because its temper had proved too uncertain to make it a good 'cow-pony,' and I was so taken with the animal that I insisted upon buying it.

This is not the place to give you the whole history of my adventures with that horse. I never was able to get well mounted before it was off at a hard gallop. Once it went through a wire fence with me. On several occasions it got the bit between its teeth and tried to unseat me as it took me on a run through the low door of the ranch stable. Once it tried to kill me in the stall, and I repeatedly had to limp home on foot after having been thrown by it. One of its tricks was to slacken its pace to a walk, seem to be drooping with weariness until it thought me off my guard, then suddenly leap sideways out of the track and start off at a dead run—more than once leaving me behind.

Finally I learned to manage it and make it obey me, but even to the last I never dared be off my guard.

You will be wondering why I have brought this story into my book. It is because—not at the time, but in later years—the experience, when I reviewed it, taught me many things and encouraged me not a little in the struggle I was having with another horse.

Had I followed the advice of my friends and purchased one of the gentle little nags that they

suggested, I should undoubtedly have had a quieter and more restful time in the months that followed. But do you imagine I regretted the choice I had made, or would have exchanged my beauty for a gentler animal? Not for a moment. He never seemed to tire, or thought of going at a pace slower than an easy gallop—unless he was planning to throw me. I shall not soon forget those wonderful days when we pounded across the New Mexican "mesas" with the wind whistling past us. It was more like flying than riding, and the untiring strength of the animal brought a great area of the country within my reach which would have been entirely closed to me if I had been forced to depend upon the slow plodding of one of the ponies at first proposed. Surely this was worth the falls and bruises—and the dangers—that the ownership of such a horse entailed.

And now I am coming to the reason for the introduction of this little bit of history. It was *worth while* having such a horse as that, but only on condition that it was *mastered.* Had I not learned to control it and make it fulfil my purposes, it would have mastered me and probably killed me. A powerful high-mettled horse is a good servant but a bad and dangerous master. As a *servant* it will carry its rider further and make wider vistas available to him than a gentler and more submissive animal could ever do. As a *master* it will break his back or dash him over some cliff to destruction. The owner of such a horse should not bewail the fact that it is no docile little hack; he should exult in its fierce strength, but at the same time recognize that his very life depends upon his bending it to his will. He must be the

master; it must be the *servant*, respected, valued and duly cared for, but firmly controlled. He is a bad rider who abuses his horse, and a worse one who cannot prevent it from taking the bit in its teeth and bolting. Our salvation depends upon us learning to ride. As the Kaṭha says:—

> "Of him who is not possessed of understanding, and whose mind is not controlled, the senses are uncontrollable like the vicious horses of a driver.
>
> But the man who has intelligence as the charioteer, and a controlled mind as the reins, reaches the end of the journey."

So first it is essential that we learn not to confuse ourselves with our steeds, or their cravings with our needs. Then it is necessary to recognize that they are ours for the purpose of our journey to the goal where our essential need will alone find its satisfaction. Then we must learn to bend them to that purpose—to subordinate them to the real needs of the "I".

Let us not be discouraged if we have been supplied with fiery and powerful steeds. If at first they fight for the mastery let us not be dismayed. If they throw us, even, and wound and bruise us, let us not lose heart. But at the same time let us recognize that life itself depends upon our struggling into the saddle again and fighting them into submission. It is true that those who have received lazy nags know less of danger, but they must tire themselves out with coaxing and spurring to accomplish a tithe of the journey open to us when once we have obtained the mastery.

Let us then not shrink from the dangerous journey; it can be the most fruitful one. But it

will only be so if the "I" determines to make itself master. Let it know its own nature and essential need, and understand what is *not* of itself. When the vehicle—the animal body of our experience—demands this or that, the "I" must realize "It is not *I* who wants this; this will not make *me* happy or content; this will not satisfy *my* need". Rather he should feel, "My steed is craving for this, or trying to obtain that for which it has an instinct. Is what it demands compatible with the real need of its rider, or will it interfere with his journey toward his goal?"

Our steeds are ours to take us on the various stages over the road toward the fulfilment of our essential need—the need of Púrusha as personally experienced in each "I". This is their one and only meaning. They are for the "I"—not the "I" for them. If I ever come to the definite conclusion that my horse can no longer help me on the journey—that it has become an obstruction, incapable of being utilized for the purpose of the journey of its master or in the service of other "I"s, I shall dismount and trust to find one more useful. Such a necessity should, however, rarely arise. In most circumstances, to dismount would mean to accept defeat, and he would be a fool who should do so without very positive justification. Certainly the fieriness or unmanageableness of it would neverbe one.

The Rider and the Goal.

As I think I have said earlier in this book, mere *doing* does not accomplish much unless we have some conception of what needs to be done. Activity may not amount to more than waste of energy unless it is intelligently directed toward a

definite objective. In fact, it may take us further from it. In every department of experience we are conscious of the fact that *directed effort* is the effort that produces results.

This is why I feel that it is foolish and short-sighted to be content to pass our lives without an attempt to grasp their meaning with reference to life as a whole. At the present stage of our experience we may only be able to "see as through a glass darkly", but this is no justification for our failing to see all we can. When a people lacks a philosophy—a vision of the meaning of things as a whole, no matter how imperfect it may be—it gradually tends to doubt even that life *has* a meaning, and to lose its sense of true dignity with the loss of the feeling of its eternal significance. This would not seem to be an atmosphere favourable to the noblest experience of the "I". It is here that the view of life's meaning set down in this book has been my greatest help and inspiration. By its light I walk fearless and collected in the midst of apparent confusion. Each little factor of my experience has its significance in relation to an eternal whole. I see *time* and *change* standing timelessly in Bráhman, and revealing their meaning there. And there I see shining the goal of my desire—that in which my "fragmentariness" is made whole.

The Rider—the envehicled "I"—should know his destination if he is to reach it without aimless wandering. Then truly, knowing himself as not one with his steed, with his steed controlled and bent to his purpose, he can advance to the greatest purpose. What that goal appears to me to be I have told you in this book—the fulfilment of

the essential need of conscious Púrusha in Paramâtmán—its ever-deepening self-realization in the growing fullness of its multi-personally experienced life. And it is in its personal modes—in the modes of *you* and *me* and all its other countless "I"s—that it is ever penetrating further into the infinite depths of the divine splendour, where its *true desires* and essential need find their fulfilment.

The Rider and the Way.

In Indian philosophy, there is usually in addition to the metaphysical part a *discipline*, or "Yoga", recommended for those who desire to attain to self-realization. For example, in the Gita three paths of approach are taught—the Path of Knowledge (Jñāna Yoga), the Path of Works (Karma Yoga), and the Path of Loving Adoration (Bhakti Yoga). The last is the one that Kṛishna recommends to his disciple Arjuna. Its essence is "Do all works as unto Me. Think of whatever you do as a sacrifice offered lovingly to Me. Keep your loving thought ever concentrated upon Me, banishing from your mind any desire for other reward than Myself, and you will surely come to Me".

The Yoga of this Philosophy.

Following the same line of thought we may say that this philosophy of Satyakāma has its own 'Yoga' or *discipline*—its path of salvation from "birth-and-death" and of self-realization in Bráhman.

Such a Yoga would, it seems to me, include at least three factors. It must be grounded in *Right Desire* (सत्यकाम). From this must spring *Right Purpose* (सत्य संकल्प). And these must find

their expression in *Right Love* (सत्य प्रेम.) Let us attempt to discover what each of these would imply.

Satyakāma—Right desire, longing for the real —seems to me to be the yearning of the "I" for completion in that which "passeth not away"—in *the Real* that, as some say, is constantly "veiled" by fleeting 'name-and-form', but—to my mind—is *revealed* through it. I am here, of course, speaking of Satyakāma as the term is applicable to *Púrusha*—not of its Paramâtmic significance.

When the "I" becomes conscious that its deep-seated *desire*, springing from its essential incompleteness and need, is for something other than the name-and-form of its experience—for the timeless Púrusha in personal mode, and for the timeless "I" in which that Púrusha rests—I see its desire as *true*—as Satyakāma. Then it no longer confuses the unreal—the fleeting—with the real; it no longer confuses the desires or cravings of its vehicle with the real—the true—desire of itself. Then it sees the real for what it *is*, and knows the forms to be but the temporary expressions of it, garbing it for experience. Here it knows the Púrusha, personal in all its "I"s, as the Real, and Paramâtmán as the standing-ground (Āsraya) of the timeless Púrusha.

When we have realized Satyakāma we shall no longer be afraid. The "Desires" (राग, काम, इच्छा, etc.) against which the sages so constantly warned us are something altogether different from Satyakāma. They are what the old Christian theologians called "the lusts of the flesh" and "the pride of life". Either they are of *the steed* and arise from the confusion of the Rider when he identifies the steed with

himself and its cravings and impulses with his essential need. Or they are the fruit of the Great Illusion of separateness (अन्यता) and the misconceptions begotten of it. Or they arise from the fact that the Púrusha "I" has not yet reached a stage in its personal evolution when it can grasp the true implications of its experience.

Satyasamkalpa—for the Púrusha in personal mode, means right *will* or determination or purpose. It may be considered the *active* expression of right desire. When the "I" becomes conscious of its personal self as a thing incomplete in itself, and of its need to be completed in what is personal but not personal in terms of its own "I", then arises Right Will—the definite 'stretching-out', as it were, to complete itself in other "I"s. It represents a state of feeling more ultimate than its formulation by the vehicle in terms of detailed purpose. What form Right Will is to take when translated into action is, of course, in part dependent upon the idiosyncrasies of the vehicle and the content of the experience-world.*

* My whole approach in this book has been along other lines than those of "good" and "evil"—"sin" and "holiness". If however we seek to judge the moral significance of a particular action it is here that it is to be judged. What is the nature of the *will* (संकल्प) that gives rise to it? The *will* may be right will, yet the shadow cast by it in the world of deeds may be distorted and fraught with harm in the experience of other "I"s. If this should be the case, we must attribute the form in action to some defect (दोष) and must seek to find the seat of the defect before we condemn the *doer.* For the root of the distortion may lie in the experience-world of the "I" and be due to factors *external* to the "I" but responsible for an adverse content of consciousness; or the defect may be of the *vehicle,* presenting to Right Will a distorted formulation of experience. The possibility of the cause being external to the self must be conceded and searched for beyond it, before we set it down definitely

Satyaprēma—right love, or love of *the real,* is love that does not confuse its object with the fleeting name-and-form in which it is clothed in experience. It does not confuse the *self* of its beloved with the non-self associated with experience of it. It knows what is dear *for its own sake* and what is dear "for the sake of another". I for example, know that I love you, and that in the terms of human experience the truth of what we are to each other is expressed in the relations of *husband* and *wife.* But I also know that this human expression of our relationship is not an

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as a defect of the *will* itself. For it is only when an action is the fruit of not *willing* rightly that there can be any room for condemnation upon *moral* grounds. Actions themselves are to be judged by their results as harmful or beneficial. They are, as it were, the shadows cast by that which has a far deeper significance—the consciously *willing* Purusha "I". We cannot rightly speak of this or that action as "a sin"; sin does not pertain to the action but to the actor; it is the character of the *will* behind them which determines the moral significance of actions.

We of course recognize this in our ordinary experience. Even when a person has done great harm as a result of a defect of judgment, if we are really convinced that "he meant well" we at once shift the basis of our condemnation from the moral plane to one quite different, and either blame his vehicle—Buddhi, etc.,—or his circumstances. On the other side, even a beneficial action gives rise to moral condemnation when we recognize that it has its origin in what was not well meant. The beauty of its expression will not for a moment save it from reprobation if the nature of the purpose lying behind it is seen to be ill.

Viewed from this angle "sin" is something quite apart from the *deed.* It is unfaithfulness to such light as has been achieved by the evolving "I", irrespective of whether the shadow it casts in 'the world' be beautiful or the opposite. It is the failure of Satyasamkalpa—failure of *will* to be true to the noblest experience of the "I". It follows from this that what may be *the right* for an "I" at one stage in its evolution—and therefore its *duty* at that juncture—may be *the wrong* for it at another stage.

What is always and unchangeably the right for us is faithfulness to the light we see; failure of will to be faithful to it is *sin.*

essential expression of it. *You* are not human; *I* am not human. It is true nevertheless that we have come to be to each other what we are through experience achieved in human terms. For this reason I may not hate or despise the human expression; I cannot look upon it as something which "veils" or obscures the beloved reality. On the contrary, I see in 'name-and-form' the *scaffolding* of that experience-life whereby the conscious, the personal, the individuated Púrusha timelessly builds up its multi-personal life. It is only "false" (असत्) in the sense that it is not *of* our personal self and that its present name—and—form has only a temporary significance. It expresses *humanly* what we truly are to each other at this stage of our personal evolution; it does not express what we are to be as we further explore the implications of our personal Púrusha relationship.

As long as love is not rightly directed—as long as it is subject to confusion—it confuses the reality with its temporary expression. Were my love for you such, I should think that its object was *human* and, as such, subject to death and decay. And I should live in dread, nor able to find joy in the present for thought of the future. Then the only escape from sorrow would be escape from love. Or I should think that the fleeting garb was to be the eternal expression of my beloved, and so thinking would be the victim of delusion. In neither case should I have attained to Satyaprēma. Nevertheless, it seems to me that such love, even though it is still confused, is a precious thing, for it is true love "with a covering of the false", and from it will emerge Satyaprēma when the covering of the false has been stripped away.

These three elements—Satyakāma, Satyasaṃkalpa and Satyaprēma—may be said to compose the Yoga of this philosophy. Each of them must be more and more truly realized if we are to advance continuously toward our goal in Bráhman.

Not to be achieved by the Intellect.

The question is: *how* are they to be achieved? Not by the intellect alone surely—or even primarily by it. *Buddhi* may be 'the driver of the chariot', but the driver must refer to the desire and will of his master—the 'Lord of the chariot' —before he can direct his vehicle toward the goal. His work is to fulfil his master's will and to have no will of his own. It is for this reason that 'salvation' is not to be achieved by the study of this or any other philosophy. At best, philosophy is an intellectual presentation of the elements of the "I"s experience. We must first *know*, we must first *feel*, and only then is the Buddhi in a position to correlate more or less intelligently what we know and feel. The philosophical grasping of life's meaning is nothing more than a re-appropriation by the "I" in terms of Buddhi of that which it has *already experienced*. The "I" must first feel; then the implications of what it feels may be implemented in terms of the intellect. The latter, as 'driver' may trace out the road, but it can do so only after its master—the "I"—has expressed his wishes as to the goal.

Therefore, beloved, do not worry in the slightest if what I have written does not at once appear the *truth* to you. Should it be really the truth it will become so to you at the right and proper time. Many an "I" that knows nothing

whatever of philosophy has entered into the truth with which philosophy has attempted so haltingly and stumblingly to deal. This is because the "I", in its experience, can become directly aware—can come to *feel*—more than the Buddhi is capable of implementing.

How to become "mounted upon" the Yoga.

Rightly directed Love is dependent upon Right Will, and Right Will must grow out of Right Desire. But Right Desire must grow out of the correct apprehension of what is to be desired, and such apprehension is *Knowledge* (ज्ञान). From this it would at first sight seem apparent that we must begin with Knowledge, yet I am certain that we never can. For Knowledge can only grow out of Right Experience. The truth must be *felt* by the "I" before it can be appropriated by the "I" in terms of Buddhi.

How are we then to become, as the Gita expresses it, "mounted on the Yoga" (योगारूढः) of rightly directed Desire, Will and Love?

I think I see the way—one more trustworthy than that of any philosophy—a path by which we all may pass over into the truth of eternal life in Bráhman. It is a road by which all may travel, simple and learned alike. Jesus saw it, and his vision of it constitutes the essence of his message. With what unerring insight he grasped the truth that *Love* is "the fulfilling of the law" and that he who loves shall live! Neither philosophy nor the intellect will lead us to desiring and willing rightly, or guide us into rightly directed love. They too have their place to fill and a noble one, but it is not that. It is *the experience of love* alone that will open our eyes and make us conscious of

the truth. As we grow in loving experience we shall become more and more conscious of its implications. There is no other way.

It is therefore by learning *to love*, and by what our experience of loving reveals to us, that we shall eventually become "mounted" upon the three-fold Yoga of True Desire, Will and Love. We must begin with love and leave it to reveal the Truth to us. Slowly, as loving experience grows and deepens, the "I" will become conscious of what is *real* and what is merely the temporary garb of reality.

For even at the stage where we still confuse "name and form" with the true object of our love, we have established touch with reality as soon as we learn to love nobly and unselfishly. Such love is true and for the real, despite the confusion that has not ceased to attend it. "These are true desires with a covering that is false" as the Upanishad puts it. Or, we might say, "This is true love, though it has not yet learned discrimination". The vital consideration is that there should be *love*; discrimination will follow.

If we take Love for our Rule of Life—our 'Dharma'—it will in due course guide us into all the Truth; it will ever increasingly open our eyes to the meaning of Life. If we would attain to the complete Yoga of rightly directed Desire and Will and Love, this is the path to it—the simplest Yoga of all. It does not demand learning of us or a lofty intellect capable of abstruse metaphysical thought. All it demands is that we set ourselves *to live lovingly* and, in so far as we can see, *to work out the implications of Love* in all the personal relations of our experience-life. If we

but set ourselves definitely, earnestly and self-forgetfully to do this, we shall find ourselves rising from height to height.

Let us start with the Love we know—our love for each other and for our children and those others who are near and dear to us. I know it here in terms of human fatherhood, husbandhood, sonship; you experience it in terms of human motherhood, wifehood, daughterhood, and to a greater or less degree in other terms as well. These forms which serve to implement loving experience are fleeting, it is true, but each of them is the true expression in the terms of human experience of an underlying personal Púrusha relationship that has been achieved and is being at present evolved through the instrumentality of what we experience 'humanly.'

And as each of these expressions of what we experience differs from every other, so the underlying reality of the personal Púrusha relationship so clothed differs also. The personal relationship of the two Púrusha "I"s that is implemented 'humanly' in our relationship to each other as husband and wife—that expresses its growth and evolution in the terms of what we are 'humanly' to each other, and develops through the instrumentality of the human husbandhood and wifehood of our present experience—is a different personal relationship in the Púrusha from those that find their expression through, and evolve in terms of human fatherhood or motherhood or friendship. Each such differing human relationship in the experience of the "I" represents a more real and deeper relationship in the multi-personal life of the timeless Púrusha. The forms will fade away, but the reality—differing from all

other realities—that was for a time clothed in terms of them, and grew and deepened by means of them, will abide and develop in the endless life of which it is a part.

If this be true—if these 'human' relationships of our present experience are not only true expressions of what the Púrusha is to itself in the terms of its multiple personality at a given juncture in its evolving life, but the instrumentalities as well of its further multi-personal evolution—then surely the task before us becomes clearer. Is it not to explore each of them, seeking to discover the potentialities inherent in it for the expression and further evolution of the personal Púrusha relation that underlies it?

How may this human *husbandhood* of my experience be made to express most nobly and fully what I am and seek to be to you in Púrusha? How can what you feel for me and wish to be to me be most richly and truly implemented in terms of wifehood? How can these diverse experiences of personal relationship that find expression in fatherhood, motherhood, sonship, daughterhood, brotherhood, sisterhood, friendship, be most perfectly implemented in these terms? How can we make these temporary garbs of the "I"'s experience express most nobly and fully what we *personally* are or desire to be to each other? How can we make these fleeting expressions the most useful instruments for the achievement of a further and nobler evolution of the personal relationships that for the time they clothe?

This may sound complicated, dearest, but the answer to these questions is simple enough. We

must seek to work out the fullest implications of love in the various relationships that at present constitute our experience life. With regard to each such relationship, and in every situation with which we are confronted, we must ask ourselves the question, "What would true love dictate?" Our progress will lie in our progressively finding ever deeper answers to this question and giving them expression in all our personal relationships.

I have to explore the potentialities of human husbandhood and discover the deepest implications of my love for you in terms of it. I have to learn to express myself and what you are to me in terms of it. I must discover the richest expression in terms of husbandhood of what I am and wish to be to you. I must meditate and practice with it to that end, consciously, and as intelligently as my Buddhi permits. The same applies to this human fatherhood. How can I make it the noblest, the richest, the most wonderful expression of what I feel for those personalities whom I know at present in terms of their sonship and daughterhood. It applies in friendship, and in all of the other relationships of my experience-life. I must seek to discover what would be the most loving expression of each of them—*to work out love in terms of life.*

But how of those relations in which love is not yet felt? As I see it, we must depend upon our growing consciousness of the implications of love in those relationships in which we experience it, to point out what love would demand there, were it present. We must learn to *anticipate* love by acting in accordance with its laws

toward those for whom we do not yet experience it. For just as service follows freely from love, so love tends to follow from service that is given for love's sake.

We are far too apt to assume that Love is like wind that "blowth where it listeth"—something entirely beyond our control. This is not the case. Even where love is present it will not do at this stage to take its continuation for granted and trust carelessly to its taking care of itself. Like all other powers, it grows by *exercise*, by practice and considered expression—not by theorizing or passivity. Therefore I have called it a 'Yoga'—a discipline.

Where it is not present it can be cultivated—not by merely longing for its advent so that it may be given expression in loving deeds, but by following its laws in our relations with our fellows. Love springs up for those we serve earnestly; we see this constantly in our experience-life. Again and again I have begun with service and have found it end in love, and I am conscious that had the service been more devoted the love resulting would have been deeper and more lasting. Thus the power to extend the area of our love is—subject to certain limitations—in our own hands.

Let us then begin with love where it is present, and with service for love's sake where love as yet does not extend, seeking to make life and its relations an expression in human terms of the eternal law of love. For if there is any truth in this vision of the meaning of Life, then Love is in very truth the "fulfilling of the law". By it 'from beginningless time' is building up the wondrous multi-personal life of the timeless

Púrusha. Through it the oneness of the Bráhman-life finds its conscious realization in countless Púrusha personalities, fulfilled and knit together in the timeless self-subsistent "I". It is "the Light unto our feet and the Lamp unto our path" whose rays shining into our darkness dispel our illusions of separateness and show us the way out of our confusions and pathetic gropings. Springing from the essential need of Paramâtmán —grounded timelessly in the Divine Desire—it is the Law of all other laws. By following it we attain to the realization of ourselves in that *One* which is Bráhman.

Conclusion.

"That art Thou."

And if this be so, my darling, what need is there for us to cling so painfully to old names—products of bygone isolation? What to us are such terms as "Christian" and "Hindu", "Buddhist" and "Muslim" if we are indeed *one spirit*—one Púrusha? For then whatever deep experience there has been, it is ours. Whatever love for God or man has glorified life, it is *that which you are—that which I am*—that has experienced it. Wherever there has been noble thought, the Thinker has been the *self* of us. It is that life into which we are growing—our own Eternal Life—that in all experience is being enriched. In the meditations of sages and the raptures of saints and mystics wherever they may have lived and by whatever "religion" they may be claimed, the experiencer is Púrusha. In the Upanishads and the Gospels alike—and in every noble book and utterance, in every loving thought and unselfish deed, Mother-love, the self-forgetfulness of the father, the faithfulness of the friend—are revealed to us the travail, the yearning, the achievement of the Spirit—*our* Spirit. "That art thou", as the Upanishads say, and all that is the Spirit's is thy own and my own—to be entered into when we have realized our Oneness in Bráhman where all true desires find their fulfilment.

APPENDIX

Further consideration of certain problems.

Upon first consideration, the conception of the multipersonal evolution of the Purusha as developed in this book might seem to be confronted by an insuperable difficulty—a difficulty which all philosophies based upon a theory of "transmigration" are called upon to face. For in the view of each of them *Spirit*—by whatever name it may be designated—is the *Experiencer* through each separate vehicle.

It is what we may describe as a 'mechanical' difficulty. As we cast our eyes over the world present to us in experience one of the most striking features we notice is that the more lowly forms or vehicles appear immeasurably in excess of the higher and more evolved. A bucket of sea-water probably contains more living organisms than there are people in the world today, and leaving out of consideration such simple forms as the bacteria and single-celled animalcules, we find among vastly more developed organisms both animal and vegetable, an amazing fecundity. Yet, according to all systems that accept the principle of 'transmigration' no single one of these forms but is the transient vehicle or 'vestment' of a conscious and experiencing 'Jiva.'

Thus considered, it is not difficult to perceive the apparent dilemma. The mere vastness of the numbers of living forms of course gives us no trouble, but the paucity of those "at the top" as compared with those nearer the bottom of the scale of evolution would seem to exclude all but an infinitesimal fraction of the evolving centres of conscious experiencing from the attainment of those levels where the purpose of their evolution could alone find its consummation. The whole vehicular system, instead of being as it were a 'ladder' by which Purusha evolving under countless increasingly personal modes presses ever upward into the splendour of the Divine Light, would thus appear to function

rather as a gigantic obstruction—a maze from which extrication is well nigh impossible.

The sages of India were not unaware of this problem. Reference is found in possibly the most ancient Upanishad—the Brihad-Aranyaka—to those souls that pass neither by the "Path of the Gods" (देवयानः पन्था) to return no more, nor by the "Path of the Fathers' (पितृयाण) which eventually leads to re-incarnation in the higher mundane vehicles. "Those who know neither of these ways" are said, quaintly, to take birth as "crawling and flying insects and whatever there is here that bites". The same idea is found more fully developed in the Chandogya, where, after discussing the "Path of the Gods" and the "Path of the Fathers" it continues—

> "But on neither of these ways are the small, continually returning creatures (of whom it is said, "Be born and die")—theirs is *third state*."

and as a further explanation is added, "Thereby yonder world is not filled up".

Attention is not called to these passages as furnishing any real solution of the problem, but merely to show that the ancient thinkers of India were cognizant of it. As I understand subsequent references to it in the commentaries on the Upanishads and the Brahma Sutras, the whole of the world of lower forms—especially that part of it which could not become human diet—was looked upon as a sort of vehicular 'back-water' along the shore of the rushing river of embodied life, into which if a soul drifted as a consequence of evil deeds committed in the course of its transmigration, there was little chance of escape—or we might liken it to a sort of Sargossa Sea in the ocean of Samsara.

The purpose of this appendix is to deal with the problem and certain others that are closely associated with it. Laying no claim to inspiration on the subject, and unable to depend upon 'the authority of scripture' in lieu of argument, I have had—if I may resort to the metaphor of the Kaṭha—to trust to my Buddhi as 'charioteer'.

In the first place it should be borne in mind that when dealing with questions of the 'mechanism'—if such a term is admissible—of the inter-dependent evolutions of the growingly personal Purusha and its Prakrtic vehicle, we have to do with something

so completely outside our present experience that our approach must be, in the nature of the case, purely speculative—a very different matter from when we are engaged in studying our own personal life as we find it in experience. The best we can hope to do, therefore, is to show that the difficulty is not incapable of solution, and to point out possible lines of approach to it.

In doing this it is obviously essential to treat the whole question *realistically*. As I have repeatedly pointed out in the body of the book, we are not in a position to deal with *things in themselves*, but only with the reals of our experience-life. Its reals are, however, experienced as externals. Their *externality* is itself a real of experience. In treating, therefore, what follows in the way I shall, I am interpreting reality in the terms in which it finds expression in the experience-world of the conscious self.

Doubtless there are other solutions —some have even presented themselves to me in the years that have intervened since I first became conscious of the problem. My intention, however, is to give here only the answer that seemed to me most probable when I first wrote the book, and my present feeling on the subject —the outcome of seven years of further consideration. My first attempt to arrive at a solution was made in the jail, and I give it below practically as I then wrote it :—

" There remains one problem yet to be touched upon—that of the *permanence* of the evolving centres of Personality under the mode of which the Purusha is evolving.

This is an important question. For when we consider the whole area of organic evolution we must be struck with the fact that the less complex developments of vehicular life are far more numerous than those which have become more elaborated. Each drop of water contains numbers of living organisms; each small pond contains more of them than there are members of the human species. This naturally raises the question, "Is each of these the vehicle of experience whereby a centre of personality is reacting, which will some-day attain to the highest and most perfect individuality ? " If so, then by what means ? For there are myriads of these primitive vehicles for every one of the higher.

Fully recognizing that my answer to this question may not

be the correct one, I shall still attempt to put my thought on the subject before you and to do so, will begin with an analogy from nature.

In front of the building where I am lodged here in the jail is a young Pipal tree. As it is the only one in the courtyard I have had ample opportunity to study its habits during my time here. This spring, before the leaves came out, every branch and twig produced numbers of small, berry-like fruit filled as full of seed as the fig. In each of these berries there were probably from twenty to fifty seeds, and I have no idea how many thousands of the berries there were on the tree. Some are still there, some have been blown off, and others eaten by birds or insects. As a matter of fact, since the tree is in a prison yard which is swept every day, not one of the seeds will have the opportunity to germinate and grow into a tree

But let us suppose it were outside where nothing interfered with it, what would have happened? Most of the seeds would have been destroyed either before or shortly after the berries fell to the ground; a few of the remainder would have germinated, even of these by far the larger part would have been destroyed by cold or heat, or trodden under foot, or having germinated would have been choked by weeds. Possibly of the myriads of seeds—each the product of an age-old evolution and each having inherent in it potentialities for growth into an enormous tree—a very few might succeed in becoming established. Yet even then they would not be sure of survival, and the smaller they were the less would be their chance of escaping destruction. It would only be after they had attained to such substantial proportions that a careless foot could not break them or a thoughtless hand tear them up, that we should be justified in entertaining any confidence of their growing to maturity. In this connection only one other point need be noted—that the further they progress the less easy it is to destroy them.

Again let us take an example, this time from animal life. Up in the branches of my tree are several of the nests of the tent-caterpillar. You know them well for we have them in our trees at home. Soon each of them will be filled with hundreds upon hundreds of tiny caterpillars. Yet will all these reach maturity and, becoming butterflies, lay eggs which will hatch out

as many more? We know that they will not; if they did, and the process continued uninterruptedly, the earth would soon be denuded of vegetation and become uninhabitable. Nature provides that only one in thusands should survive.

And yet each of these tiny bodies was the efficient vehicle of experience to an evolving centre of Purusha personality at a certain stage in its progress. Each implied the existence of such a centre.

These examples are taken from forms that are, comparatively speaking, evolved and highly elaborated. And just as these are far more numerous than the higher vehicles of experience, so the lower and less elaborated are vastly more numerous than they.

A further consideration makes it clear that the lower the form the more numerous are the off-spring, and the fewer of the latter attain to maturity; while the higher the form the fewer are the off-spring, and the more proportionately attain to maturity. We also see that the higher the form the more sustained it is. Among lower forms a sufficient number survive to carry on the species or variety, because too many are produced to be entirely wiped out in spite of their defencelessness. In the higher forms progressively fewer are produced, but these are increasingly provided with powers for self-preservation.

I have given these examples from nature because, as I pointed out earlier, there seems to me much that is analogus in the evolutionary processes of Purusha and Prakrti. Do you not find something suggestive here?

We must remember that the lower the form of vehicle, the less *individualistic* is the Buddhi. As we consider increasingly primitive varieties of organisms, we find that the reactions of the representative forms that sustain each become more and more alike when confronted by the same stimuli, the further back we go. Two highly evolved personalities, reacting through their respective vehicles to an identical set of circumstances, will react quite differently. They do so because they have evolved a great personal dissimilarity, and their vehicles have done the same. But as regards very primitive forms, I imagine that if the stimuli could be absolutely controlled so that two forms representative of the same variety could be confronted by

identical stimuli at an identical juncture in their life-cycle, their reactions would be practically identical.* In other words, the lower the species, the less the individuality of the Buddhis of the various forms that sustain it. What individuality there is, is in the *species.*

How does all this touch the problem of the permanence of Personality? To me it seems to do so very closely. Of course

*It has, of course, been observed that individual solitary wasps, spiders, and certain other of the more highly evolved representatives of 'instinct governed' life, do not always meet what (to us) appear identical situations in exactly the same way. There appear to be slight differences in their reactions to apparently similar stimuli.

But is it not more probable that no two artificially produced situations can be arranged that will be in any but the roughest sense identical to the insect under observation, though the differentiating factors may be beyond the powers of human observation? A difference in hours—even minutes—in the ages of two specimens might alone account for slight differences in their method of dealing with a situation. Temperature, the exact nature of their previous diet, and a large number of minute differences in the relations between the various factors that went to make up the whole of a given situation would necessarily escape us, yet could well introduce considerations which would account for the somewhat different reaction of the insect in each case.

The position taken throughout this Appendix is that what we call 'instinct' is in fact the expression of *intelligence*, but that it is not a *self*-conscious intelligence individuated to the specific representative form that evinces it. On the contrary, it is the intelligent expression of a *varietal Buddhi* unindividuated in the various forms which represent the variety. On this ground it is held that this varietal Buddhi, identically represented in each of the representative forms, intelligently meets all really identical situations in exactly the same way.

It seems to me that this position involves less difficulties than one that thinks of 'instinct behaviour' as merely the expression of enregistered habits unassociated with conscious intelligence. For, though the acts are uniform for the variety it seems difficult to escape the conclusion in many cases that they are the product of intelligent thought—as when a couple of dung-beetles, confronted by a situation in which their dung-ball has been empaled on a match-stick, proceed at once to cut it in two, remove it, and then join the pieces together again.

Such behaviour is explainable if we think of a *varietal* Buddhi, undifferentiated in all its representatives. Identity of reaction upon the part of all representatives of the variety would then be quite compatible with intelligence in action.

Failures to cope with specific situations outside the ordinary run of experience would merely denote limitations of adaptability upon the part of the varietal Buddhi, as it does in the case of individuated Buddhis associated with *self*-conscious personalities.

it is quite possible that there is another solution, but what we have been discussing suggests to me a law of "Survival of the Fittest" in the evolution of Purusha personality somewhat analogous to that in nature.

Understand clearly that I do not suggest the possibility of any *portion* of Purusha—to put it crudely—ceasing to exist. I merely suspect that only certain of the personal *modes* under which it is evolving are sustained. Just as the myriads of separate aggregates of 'matter' subsisting in organic mode fail to attain to maturity, yet *as matter* do not discontinue to exist, so I conceive that in the lower stages of the evolution of the Purusha under the mode of Personality it is possible that only certain of the personal centres are sustained. In all other cases the individuated modes would fail to sustain themselves; the Purusha, which in them had begun to subsist with some faint personal individuation, would no longer subsist personally in the terms of them. Yet that which had in them subsisted for a moment in individuation would still have existed *as Purusha* with all its potentialities for personal evolution in tact.

Another point suggests itself from our consideration of the Pipal tree and the caterpillars. Probably the less evolved a centre of personality is, the less certain is it of being sustained. If this were so, then the less evolved the centres were the fewer of them proportionately would be able to sustain their individuality. From this it would follow that the more evolved a centre of personality becomes, the *less* apt is it to fail in maintaining itself as a centre of individuated experience. The farther it advances the less danger there will be of its failing to survive personally.

If this should be so it is evident that in proportion to its advance the possibility of its personal impermanence will recede more and more, and after it has reached a certain stage it must be practically impossible for it to cease to survive. I have not gone into the question deeply or devoted to it any very careful thought, but I should imagine that when a centre of evolving personality has become "twice-born" in the sense in which I have previously used that term, its experiencing life may be considered as practically secure from any failure to survive.

The question is an extraordinarily interesting one, and in

arriving at any conclusion as to the exact point in the evolution of a personality when it may be considered to have passed beyond the peril of failure to maintain its individual mode, I think we shall find that the factor of sustained capacity to remember plays an important part among those that must be considered in arriving at a satisfactory answer."

The solution suggested in the foregoing paragraphs, and the one that most appealed to me in 1922, sought to meet the difficulty by showing that though there might be a vastly greater number of centres of developing personality in the zones of simpler experience, far fewer of them proportionately would escape disintegration than in the case of those that had attained to a more evolved individuality of personal mode.

I still incline to believe that there is such a thing as the disintegration of a Purusha centre of personality, though I doubt if it is other than a rare occurrence. There are, however, factors which point to the possibility of its sometimes taking place even at the level of 'human' experience. There are cases where a strong and self-centred personality appears to drain all the individuality out of another and annihilate its will. We see others in which the expression, "He has gone all to pieces" may have a more literal and sinister significance than we dream of. There are characters which appear not merely to be degenerating but actually breaking-up, as it were—becoming progressively "blurred" and less defined. I do not at present feel able to go deeper into this question. Of one point, however, I feel certain; becoming 'twice-born' — passing over into 'Eternal Life'— implies, in the very nature of the case, the entering upon an area of experiencing life where this dark shadow no longer threatens.

As a solution of the problem with which this Appendix attempts to deal, it does not now seem to me that a wholesale disintegration of less defined centres of personality offers as satisfactory a possible explanation as the view toward which I at present lean, and which is given below.

In the body of the book my position was, as may be remembered, that the differentiated personal modes of the Purusha evolving from the X of my diagram were the result of its becoming the subject of mutually exclusive experience-

contents. The 'break-up', so to speak, of the personal unity of the Purusha as *experiencer* (not, of course, implying any disintegration of its timelessly essential nature) was conceived as taking place at the juncture when its reaction (and consequent modification of personal texture) through one vehicle, differed from its reaction to a different experience (with consequent modification of personal texture) through another vehicle.

At that time I assumed that with the fission of the first life-form the process of differentiation in the personal terms of the Purusha experiencing through them must have begun. A long and earnest consideration of the question has led me to doubt if this were the case. Though I still see the progressive differentiation of Purusha centres of personality resulting from precisely the same cause as I did then, I am led to slightly modify the conception held (if not explicitly stated) by me, with regard to what may be called the *sequence* of the differentiation in the lower and simpler areas of the personal evolution. This in no way affects the principle or the validity of anything in the body of the book; at the same time it serves to throw more light upon the possible "mechanism" of the earlier stages of the evolutionary process. While doing so it not only offers a possible solution of the problem with which this appendix is primarily attempting to deal, but may throw some light on the problem of 'instinctive behaviour' as well.

Even the scientists can only speculate regarding the first living creature—the most primitive vehicle for Purusha experiencing. It was doubtless a mycroscopic form far simpler than the simplest at present known to them, in comparison with which the Protozoa are highly developed organisms. Though this earliest form probably multiplied numerically so as to have countless representatives, it suggests itself to me that *as vehicles of experience* they would not have differed in the slightest one from another. That is to say, the reaction of any of the forms to a given stimulus would be identical with the reaction of any other form under precisely the same conditions. The only individuality would be a *numerical* one.

If this were the case, is it necessary for us to believe that two, or ten, or a myriad such identical forms, marked by identical reactions to the same stimuli, must inevitably be the vehicles

of an equal number of different centres of experiencing Purusha personality?

Our answer would have to be in the affirmative if we predicated *place* of Purusha--if we thought of each vehicle as a fragment of Prakrti with a fragment of Purusha in it. As I have already urged at some length, however, we must divest our minds of the idea that the Experiencer is *in* the vehicle—or *outside* it. *Place* appears to me to express a relation in the 'name-and-form' element of our experience, and not to be predicable of either Paramatman or Purusha. These are not "here" or "there" or "everywhere" or "anywhere"; the *locality* factor simply has no application to these categories of Being. *They are*, and whatever else Brahman is subsists with reference to them—but the relation is not a *spatial* one.

Viewed thus the Experiencer is neither *in* the vehicle or *outside* it, and there would seem to be no reason to believe that a mere multiplication of identical forms representing a single vehicular type necessarily demands an equal number of separate centres of conscious experiencing. This is so because the differentiation is *merely numerical*. No other form of differentiation is conceived as having yet taken place. The absolute uniformity of the type has not been broken up by the growth of individuality in any of the representative forms under which it subsists. Each such form can be depended upon to act in the same manner as any of the others under precisely the same conditions. As long as such a state of affairs continues it seems to me that *the unity of the vehicle*—whether subsisting as a single form or as a vast number of them—will not have been impaired. It still is fitted to function as a single vehicle for a single centre of conscious Purusha, experiencing through and in terms of it.

What, then, would break up its unity as a vehicle and render it no longer fit to function as the vehicle of a single (primary) subject of experience? The obvious reply is that when any of its individual representative forms ceases to react to given stimuli in exactly the same way as other representative forms, the *unity* of the vehicle has been broken, and personal differentiation in the conscious Purusha which has been experiencing through it will begin, since the latter becomes the subject of two mutually exclusive experience-contents. For as long as Y

is the same thing to the Experiencer when experienced in terms of its vehicle A and its vehicle B, so long is it possible for A and B jointly to be its vehicle. But as soon as Y is one thing to it when experienced through A and something else when experienced through B at that moment the unity of conscious experiencing is destroyed. Something cannot be two different and mutually exclusive things to the same centre of conscious experience at one and the same time.

Thus it would appear that though a vehicle might subsist as a single form or a myriad identical forms without losing its unity as a vehicle, the development of differentiation as between even one tiny form out of that myriad from its hosts of fellows would break the unity and result in the evolution of another centre of conscious experiencing in the evolving Purusha.

What I deduce from this is that the first life-form—the first vehicle of this particular Purusha evolution from the X of our diagram—may have expanded numerically until it filled the oceans from shore to shore before it ceased to be the single and undivided vehicle of a single centre of conscious and evolving Purusha. The whole aggregate would have been the *one* vehicle so long as it had not become divided by any *differentiation* among the forms that constituted it.

How long it may have continued thus we, of course, will never know. A vast period may have elapsed before, as a result of environmental influences the uniformity was broken by the production of a " sport " or in some other manner. During the period preceding such an event the Purusha's experience-life would have been uni-personal and obviously limited as to development by the limitations of its extremely limited vehicle. Yet during that same period we can conceive its life as slowly organizing in those terms and being lived in the same manner in all the forms which together constituted its vehicle.

Personal differentiation, therefore, would only begin when the first break in the absolute uniformity of the constituent organisms took place. As soon as the primitive aggregate had resolved itself into two varieties—even if one of them consisted of but a single organism—the first break in the *personal* unity of Purusha as Experiencer would take place. Thereafter it would subsist as conscious of experience in *two* different ways. In

other words its personal evolution would be continued, but it would continue under *two* modes.

I have said enough to suggest the nature of the further development of this area of the Purusha evolution in accordance with the hypothesis. Each successive variation developing among the representative forms—each new species, sub-species and variety that emerged—would become the instrument for the development of another centre of Purusha personality. (I am using the term 'personality' throughout in its broadest sense of individuation of mode as conscious experiencer.)

It is easy to see that in accordance with this conception the earth may have been in those earliest periods "teeming with life", yet the Purusha experiencing that was taking place through it might have been in terms of only a comparatively few centres of personality, gradually increasing in number with the multiplication of species, varieties, etc.

But here we are confronted with a difficulty, and in dealing as we are doing with problems so far removed from "human" experience, one feels almost as if one were groping in impenetrable darkness. Had experience indicated that all the representative forms constituting a single variety lived together in "brotherly love" and concord it would have seemed plainer sailing. As a matter of fact, scientists tell us that this is very far from being the case. On the contrary a constant cannibalistic struggle is going on between the various representative forms belonging to one and the same variety. The destroyer clearly evinces intention to eat and the victim as clearly attempts to escape. On the face of it, here would appear to be present what I have repeatedly insisted must be impossible in the case of a single experiencer—the presence at the same time of two mutually exclusive experiences. How could *one Experiencer* be at one and the same time the subject of an experience in which it is conscious of itself as the *attacker* and the *attacked*—the eater and the eaten? If it wills through two separate vehicular forms, how can it will to attack through the one and at the same time will not to be attacked through the other? Does this not indicate that the two experiences have for their subjects separate conscious centres of volition?

This question at first worried me, but I no longer feel that there is any real dilemma. The solution seems clear to me, but I find considerable difficulty in putting it into words. It should be borne in mind that though I have always spoken of the individuated centres of the evolving and experiencing Purusha as *personal* I have used this word in a very broad sense, at least as regards the lower zones of Purusha evolution. As employed with references to the earlier stages of the evolution *personal differentiation* means neither more nor less than individuation of mode as conscious experiencer It does not here imply *self*-consciousness the sense of oneself in terms of '*I*'*ness*. In fact, I am convinced that the sense of oneself *as* "*I*' emerges gradually, and far along the road of the Purusha's personal evolution. At the stage with which we are here dealing I do not conceive that such an emergence has even begun. Purusha is conscious, it is true, but it is as yet conscious only *in terms of its vehicle*. It reacts and undergoes consequent modification of its personal texture—using 'personal' in the broad sense I have just indicated —but its consciousness may be conceived as only a general awareness to the reactions of its vehicle. It is as yet only *vehicle conscious* —not *self*-conscious.

Its vehicle is here the *variety* and is multi formed. Each of these forms makes the one typical demand of the variety and undergoes the typical reaction of the variety in every situation confronting it. Neither demand nor reaction are individuated to the form that makes it. Each expresses what *the variety* will always do when subject to a particular set of stimuli. The factors which control the reaction at any juncture in the life of one of the constituent organisms are *two* only—the variety and the specific stimulus. In one situation the *variety* will always do this, and in another it will always do that.

The representative organisms have *numerical* individuality but nothing else. This means that their reactions in *all* situations will perfectly and identically express the reaction of the *variety* in each such situation, and that consequently the differing reactions of the various representative forms when subjected simultaneously to differing stimuli are each of them the typical reaction of *the variety* to that situation, and its consistent expression. The various differentiated reactions are each of

them the one possible reaction in each of a number of differentiated situations in which *the variety* finds itself by reason of the numerical individuality of its identical representative organisms. Each of the reactions therefore—even when they are apparently contradictory, as in the case of *eating* and *trying not to be eaten*—perfectly express the one nature of the *variety* when confronted by experience. Each is the only possible reaction of the variety *plus* a given stimulus.

In attempting to grasp the nature of such experience as I am here supposing we are naturally handicapped by the terms of our present individuated experience through a single individuated vehicle. Indeed, as I have pointed out elsewhere, our tendency is mistakenly to confuse our own personal individuality with that vehicle. Each of the reactions of that vehicle certainly means for us an individuated experience presented in the terms of that vehicle only. It is therefore next to impossible for us to conceive an experience-life which is not individuated in the terms of a single form. Yet such is, I believe, possible, however outside our present experience.

Suppose that this "I"—being just what it is personally, and differing in the terms of its personality from all other "I"s—had half a dozen bodies, each absolutely identical with its present body, through which it experienced. Suppose that in them it was confronted by half a dozen different situations. It would react to each of these situations differently, but each of these reactions would perfectly express this particular "I"s reaction to experience presented in the terms of one specific body type. And all six reactions would be different from what they would have been if either the terms of the "I" or the terms of the sextet of identical vehicles had differed.

It will be said at once that such an experience would be impossible. Undoubtedly so. It would be impossible *because of the nature of this centre's personal development.* It has become individuated personally in terms of "I" and therefore cannot be the subject of mutually exclusive experiences.

But let us suppose that the nature of this centre's conscious evolution had been in the direction of an individuation that was *not* in terms of "I"-ness. Suppose it was conscious only of the reactions of its specific vehicle to external stimuli—that its

experience-life had not become ego-centric. Having become individuated by reason of its reactions to experience in the terms of a differentiated vehicle, its responses would differ from the responses of other centres from which it was conscious in a somewhat different way, but its awareness would be *in terms of the vehicle*—here the *variety* subsisting in six identical forms. It would not be awareness in terms of "I". In each of the six forms it would experience in terms of the variety, and its awareness would be in terms of the reaction *of the variety* finding expression through one or another of its representative forms. In one form it would experience awareness of and dim desire for what it was the nature of the *variety* to do in one situation. At the same time and in another form it would be aware of and as dimly desire what it was the nature of the *variety* to do in a different situation. Its consciousness and sense of need would be framed in the terms of the *variety* as expressed in each of its various forms. And because its sense of "I"ness had not yet evolved, its awareness would be of a *general* nature, its experience an unintegrated experience—except in so far as it might be said to be integrated in the terms of the variety—the multi-formed vehicle—of whose life it was the Experiencer.

To a Purusha centre of conscious experiencing that has evolved until it has become individuated in terms of "I", in which as the *self*-conscious subject all experience must be integrated, it would, as I have said, be quite impossible for the experience of *eating* and *being eaten* to be simultaneously present. It would be impossible for it to be the one subject of mutually exclusive experience contents. But to a centre that has not yet evolved a sense of "I"-ness such as ours—in whose awareness there is no sense of "I" whatever—whose whole experience life is envehicled by and limited to the typical reactions of a variety, it does not seem to me that it would be impossible. Such a centre would have attained to consciousness in the specific terms of its vehicle, but not to *self*-consciousness—to a sense of *itself* as Experiencer. There would be a general awareness of all *varietal* experience—an awareness not integrated but *there* to each reaction of the variety as distributed throughout its various representative forms.

Only such experience would be impossible for it as was in other terms than those of *one* vehicle, either single or multiformed. It would not, for example, be possible for such a centre to be the Experiencer in terms of *two* differentiated multi-formed vehicles.

All this has been put very clumsily, but I have found no clearer method as yet of explaining what I mean. Put very briefly, it is not *the fact of awareness*, but of awareness by an Experiencer conscious of itself *as "I"* that would preclude the possibility of such apparently exclusive experiences as we have been discussing. Before the emergence of a Purusha centre's sense of "I"-ness such experience need present no difficulty, for the experiences would be mutually exclusive *to the "I"*—not *to awareness* as apart from it.

(I need hardly point out that this conception of a general awareness in an as yet unpersonalized subject of experience presents certain analogies with Sankara's conception of a common impersonal basic consciousness for all individuated personal experience. With him, however, the one timeless and changeless consciousness becomes (apparently) individuated and personal *in the vehicle*. In the view of this book "I"-ness is *the mode* under which the Purusha centre of personality evolves after a certain stage in its experience. My individuated "I" is *of the Experiencer*; his is of the *vehicle* or of Maya. Mine is *emergent*; his is a *superimposition*.)

It would be impossible to pursue this line of thought further in an Appendix, but I must point out a few of its other implications before leaving it.

It is obvious that evolution along the lines we have been considering—the centre of personality being one and its vehicle multi-formed—would be possible only for so long as the "sub-vehicles", so to speak, lacked individuality of their own. How far up in the scale of vehicular evolution this might continue to be the case it is, of course, impossible to say. We might assume that as long as the various representative forms of a variety lived their lives—no matter how complicated those lives had become—in a uniform manner and without showing any individuality, the *variety* could continue to be the vehicle. Assuming, for example, that *bees* entirely lack individuality—that in identical

situations the reactions of all *drones* of a certain variety to identical stimuli would be exactly the same, that each *worker* would react as every other worker, each *queen* as every other queen, and that the life in each swarm would be lived exactly as it would be lived in every other swarm of the same variety that was similarly situated—is it not at least conceivable that *the whole variety* is the vehicle for a single centre of Purusha personality, and that the rounded *whole* of the bee-life of this variety is its life, begun with the evolution of a differentiation in some older variety of bee-vehicle sustained and implemented over countless ages possibly, and to cease to experience through it only with the extinction of the variety?

If this were so would it not suggest that we are here in touch with a development of Purusha personality that, upon lines entirely different from our own, has reached to the capacity for highly intelligent experience? Should this be the case, would it not render much more understandable the strange phenomenon of the unified life of a swarm of bees or colony of ants, in which life appears to be lived in a highly reasonable manner by large groups of individual forms each seemingly lacking in individuality and each completely subordinated to the whole? It seems to me that it would.

For on the side of Purusha, it would represent a condition of *awareness* that as yet was conscious of no sense of "I"-ness. On the side of the multi-formed vehicle it would indicate the growth of a *varietal* individuality with a highly evolved and specialized Buddhi capable of coping with the complex demands made upon the variety, and meeting them in a remarkable and reasonable manner. In a very real sense the life of such a variety would be a life of *reason*—an expression of *Buddhi*. It would represent the typical Buddhi of the variety in intelligent application to the variety's life-needs. But it would *not* be a life of *individuated* intelligence upon the part of any one of the countless forms by which it was lived. No one of them would, as a vehicle, express *itself*; each of them would perfectly express a typical aspect of the life of the *variety*, and of the variety's way of coping with environment.

In this book, as in all Indian philosophy, the Intellect—the

Buddhi—is conceived as being *of the vehicle*—not of the Self. According to the present conception the whole of the highly complex and reasonable life of a variety of bees would be *a Buddhi vehicle development*—of which there is awareness upon the part of a centre of Purusha personality, it is true, but an awareness entirely divorced from any sense of "I". The awareness would be of the working of the Buddhi of the variety which is *one*, sustained identically in countless unindividuated forms. The life of the variety would be the expression of that one undifferentiated Buddhi's response to the stimuli to which it was exposed in the reactions of the variety. It would be a life not sundered from awareness — an expression of *impersonal intelligence*, individuated to the variety but not to any of its representative forms.

My object in all this speculation has been to show that the mere fact of this world of our experience appearing to teem with innumerable living forms does not of necessity imply that in the lower areas of vehicular development there are a commensurate number of experiencing centres of evolving Purusha personality, or even that Purusha *self*-consciousness has emerged in these earlier zones of experience.

Should the line of approach that we have just been pursuing in any degree approximate to the truth, it would indicate that, broadly speaking, experience-life is evolving along *two* different lines, probably representing different stages in the evolution of Purusha personality. In the cases we have been discussing the Experiencer is conceived as living its experience-life in the terms of a variety sustained in many identical forms. Along this line of evolution the gradual production of other vehicles would result from the rise of modification in the *variety*. With the emergence of a modification—an individuation as between the type of the variety and one of its representative forms—two mutually exclusive experience-contents would come into being and a consequent personal differentiation in the terms of the Experiencer. Obviously such a process as this would only be possible for evolving Purusha centres in which the consciousness of "I"-ness had not yet emerged and whose experience was in the terms of multi-formed vehicles.

The more I have considered this question in recent years, the more I am inclined to this view of the nature of the process by which evolving Purusha slowly grows to consciousness of itself as "I". The forms we have just been discussing would represent the mode of the earlier stages of its evolution—a mode that still persists in terms of 'insect life' and wherever else the life-activities of the creature are entirely controlled by what we are accustomed to call "instinct" as opposed to *individuated* intelligence.

Where the hitherto identical Buddhis of the various representative forms of a variety begin to undergo individuation as between themselves, the multi-formed vehicle would no longer continue a possibility, for the Experiencer through each Buddhi would become the subject of an individuated experience content, and in reaction to experience framed in terms of it would undergo an individuated modification in the terms of its personality. The one hitherto un *self*-conscious centre of personality that had ere this experienced in the terms of all the unindividuated forms would now become disintegrated into many faintly differentiated centres each experiencing through an individuated Buddhi in a manner slightly different from any of the rest. *Just at this point* would take place the transition from the more primitive mode of Purusha experiencing to a second and higher one. At this juncture each individual form would become the vehicle of a centre of Purusha Personality, instead of a group of forms being so.


I do not mean, of course, to imply that the various constituent organisms of a variety in which there has hitherto been absolute uniformity will all of them suddenly begin to differ in some slight degree from each other. Such a thing probably never happened. The change from a variety in which the organisms were identical would take place by the production in that variety of a modification or "sport" differing from its fellow forms in that it produced off-spring *not* absolutely lacking in individuality.

That such an event must have taken place in the course of the evolution of various varieties would seem certain from the fact that in the higher forms of organic life we can clearly see differentiation in the individuals of the same variety. We all of

us know, for example, that the intelligence and dispositions of the various dogs of the same breed, and even of the same litter, are clearly individuated.

Let us then attempt to grasp how the transition from the un-*self* conscious experience of a single centre through a single multi-formed vehicle might resolve itself into the faintly *self*-conscious experience of a number of centres each experiencing in the terms of a single individuated vehicle. It may seem presumptuous—almost ridiculous—to attempt an examination of the details of a hypothetical process so remote from our own present experience, but even in putting forward a theory I can see no justification for being more vague than is necessary. The more exactly its possibility can be demonstrated, the more right can it claim to thoughtful attention.

In the accompanying diagram *M* represents a variety of organisms in which the constitutent forms are absolutely un-individuated. We will consider it as functioning as the single multi-formed vehicle of un self-conscious Purusha, impersonally *aware* of the reactions of that vehicle as decentralized in its absolutely un-individuated sustaining forms. This centre or mode of the Purusha's conscious evolution may be designated (A).



N represents one of the constituent organisms of the *M* variety differing from its fellows in that it produces off-spring which are *not* absolutely uniform. We may call them N (a), N (b), N (c), etc. These off-spring, or a certain number of them, inherit *N*'s peculiarity of producing off-spring which are not

absolutely unindividuated. The rest of the constitutent organisms of *M* continue to produce unindividuated offspring, represented in the diagram as M.

What follows ? Upon the line of our reasoning, N (a), N (b), N (c), etc., each frame experience to the Purusha aware in the terms of the Ⓐ centre, in a slightly different manner from any of the others, and from Ⓐ's experience in terms of the multi-formed vehicle *M*. As a consequence, as many 'fissions', so to speak, take place in the mode of Purusha awareness as Ⓐ, and as many new centres of personality are evolved from it as there are differentiated vehicles. Each of these new centres, or newly evolved modes of awareness, is an experiencing mode of Purusha through and in the terms of a *single* faintly individuated vehicle.

But will the newly evolved centre of personality experiencing, for example. in the terms of the N (a) vehicle, continue to be the Experiencer through *a single vehicle*, or will it upon the production of offspring by its vehicle begin to experience through these offspring as the single centre of awareness for a new multi-formed vehicle ? I conceive that in future its experience life will be framed to it in terms of a single vehicle only.

For even assuming the possibility that the Purusha mode of awareness experiencing in terms of N (a) should on their production become the Experiencer through N (e), N (f), N (g), etc., it could not possibly be so as the single centre through a new multi-formed vehicle. For it is our hypothesis that N's peculiarity was to produce offspring *not* absolutely uniform, and that this peculiarity was transmitted to its offspring. The conditions of a multi-formed vehicle thus could not be fulfilled, which demand that all its constitutent organisms should be *un*individuated. Should Purusha in its mode of Experiencer through N (a) become Experiencer through the various differentiated offspring of its vehicle, it could only be by a repetition of what took place when the separate Centre of personality emerged at the time of the production of vehicle N (a). This would mean that the centres, or modes under which Purusha subsisted consciously, as Experiencer through N (a) and each of the individuated offspring of the latter would each differ from the others and each would experience through a separate vehicle.

But I do *not* believe that the Purusha mode of personality experiencing through vehicle N (a) could have been the origin of its modes experiencing through N (e), N (f), N (g), etc. The reason why this is unlikely arises out of the nature of experience through a single vehicle, as will appear shortly.

At this stage in the evolution of the Purusha, its awareness is of the experience-life of its *vehicle* only There is, as I have already said, *vehicle-consciousness* on the part of the Purusha, but no *self*-consciousness. As long as the vehicle was multi-formed the awareness was essentially decentralized and impersonal. As soon as experience came to be framed in the terms of the life of a *single* vehicle, the factors making against individuation and co-ordination of the whole content of consciousness would be removed.

The tendency of the conscious Experiencer is, as Sankara often points out, to identify itself with its vehicle—its "steed". At the same time, the tendency of the vehicle, as its intellecting faculty develops, is to distinguish between *itself* and *external stimuli.* For example, when an organism recoils from a painful 'sense-contact', there is a faint difference made by its Buddhi between it and that which it experiences as causing pain. What in the earlier stages of vehicular evolution may have been manifested as a purely involuntary recoil from the painful contact, becomes framed as that evolution proceeds in increasingly intelligent terms. And that which is so framed is the sense of the difference between the vehicle as *the hurt* and the *thing which is painful.*

The vehicle's growing sense of separate identity is framed in the terms of its Buddhi to Purusha conscious in the specific mode in which it experiences through it. The Purusha's awareness is of its *vehicle's* sense of separate identity from what causes it pain. Out of mere dim awareness of pain grows the consciousness, framed in ever higher terms of Buddhi, of being hurt by *something else* which must be avoided. Identifying itself with its vehicle, the experiencing Purusha slowly becomes conscious of *that which hurts* as different from *itself.* Its consciousness is of feeling what, framed in the terms of the Buddhi of its vehicle, would be "*I* am hurt", "*I* must avoid". Thus in its identification of itself with its vehicle the evolving Purusha

in this specific conscious mode arrives at awareness in terms of "*I*", though that "I"-ness is appropriated to its vehicle with which it identifies itself completely.

The individual organism's sense of non-identity with that which caused it pain was doubtless present in each of the undifferentiated forms of the multi-formed vehicle *M*. To the Purusha experiencing in the (A) mode that feeling of the difference between *being hurt* and *that which hurts* and must be avoided was doubtless present also, but being present merely as the variety's sense—not individuated to it exclusively in the terms of a single correlated experience-content—it would be unable to attain the consciousness of specific individuated experience out of which the sense of its "I"-ness could evolve. For this it would need to be the Experiencer of what was presented to it in the terms of a single life, from which all other experience was excluded. This would only become possible upon the advent of experience in the terms of a single vehicle.

For the sake of clearness it seems advisable here to recapitulate. There would appear to be three clearly marked stages up to the point where the Purusha consciousness of "I"-ness emerges. Starting from unconsciousness and unawareness, the first mode—at X of our diagram—is of *simple awareness* in the terms of a vehicle too primitive for anything more to be possible. This state would not be affected by the mere multiplication of vehicular forms completely lacking in individuation. With the emergence of a modification from the primitive life-form a second stage in the Purusha evolution is entered upon. At this point the Experiencer becomes the subject of two *different kinds* of experience, and its awareness, though still of a general and un-*self*-conscious nature, is of two differing and mutually exclusive experience-contents, resulting in the rise of a second centre or mode of Purusha awareness. As further vehicular modifications take place, a proportionate number of modes of Purusha awareness come into being, each resulting from the differentiated reactions of the Experiencer to the unidentical experience-content framed to it by each variety. There has as yet been no individuation except as between

varieties, and as between the modes in which the Experiencer—Purusha—is conscious as the subject of differentiated *varietal* experience.

This condition would continue until, in one of the varieties whose constituent organisms have hitherto been absolutely alike, an organism is produced the offspring of which are *not* absolutely uniform. This event would mark the initiation of the *third stage* in the Purusha evolution. In this new type of constituent organisms the individuation of the Purusha centres will be narrowed down to experience in terms of the life of individual organisms, each of which will be the *only* vehicle of the Experiencer in a particular personal mode. Having reached this stage where experience is presented to it exclusively in the terms of a single, somewhat highly evolved vehicle, the Experiencer—identifying itself with its single vehicle — becomes conscious *of itself* as that vehicle, and feels itself as "I" in terms of the vehicle. Thus entry upon the third stage marks the dawn of *self*-consciousness in the personal evolution of the Purusha.

With the attainment of even this primitive form of *self*-consciousness - of "I"-ness—it seems improbable that the earlier method of multiplication of personalities could continue. It is of the nature of the "I" to integrate all that is experienced in itself. I am unable to think of the "I"-ness of the centre of personality at this stage as merely a "reflection" (प्रतिबिंब) of the individuality of a Buddhi in a consciousness-mirror. I am unable to accept the idea of individuated experience-life being like a pond with its surface broken by ripples in each of which the steadfast sun is separately reflected. On the contrary I conceive that "I"-ness is *a mode* of consciousness—of awareness—under which Purusha in a specific personal mode now comes to subsist.

The fact that it has come to subsist in this mode as a consequence of its tendency to mistakenly identify itself with the individuated vehicle, makes no difference. This merely indicates that at a certain stage in the evolution of true personality this aspect of the Great Illusion has had its relevant function. Indeed, from this point onward until the progressively self-conscious personality is fully formulated at the Ahamkāra Line of our diagram, the primary function of vehicular experience is

probably the accentuation of the Experiencer's sense of itself as "I", and of its feeling of the independent reality of its "I"-ness. Only after this has been effectually achieved can that re-integration of the personally individuated Purusha toward consciously experienced *oneness* begin to take place, with which this book primarily deals.

As has been said, it does not seem possible that the earlier method of multiplication of centres or personal modes of the Purusha as Experiencer could continue in the case of a centre that has attained to even the slightest degree of *self*-consciousness—to a feeling of *itself* as experiencing. As such it would appropriate all experience to itself, and this being so it could not function as the subject of two mutually exclusive experience-contents. Nor could it undergo "fission", that would have been possible only so long as its awareness continued of a decentralized and general character, free from sense of *self*. "I"-ness is in its very nature indivisible From the time that the mode of the evolving centre of Purusha personality becomes ego-centric it must continue its evolution as a unity. It will thenceforth be able to live its experience life through only a single vehicle and in the terms of only a single Buddhi at a time. Up to this point there has been no "transmigration" in the ordinarily accepted sense of the word. From this point onward its personal evolution must take place through the instrumentality of a series of single individuated vehicles, if it is to take place at all.

But if the personal mode of Purusha experiencing through the individuated vehicle N (a) of our last diagram attains in its experience to a feeling of "I"-ness which renders it incapable of functioning as the personal basis from which other individuated centres could evolve to be personal modes of the Purusha experiencing through organisms N (e), N (f), etc., then to *what* are we to look for the basis of the centres experiencing through these organisms? To me it seems that they would be evolutions of the Purusha under its Ⓐ mode of consciousness. For under this mode Purusha is no more precluded from experiencing in terms of N (e) or N (f) than it was of doing so in terms of N (a). Of course the individuated terms of these new vehicles would result in the evolution of Ⓐ as a new centre of personality associated with each of them. Thus it would seem that as ever

larger numbers of individuated organisms of the N group were evolved, some would become vehicles for the further evolution of Ⓐ in terms of *self* conscious individuation, while others would probably function as vehicles for centres that had already attained to the beginnings of self-consciousness in terms of other N vehicles, and upon the disintegration of the latter.

Here another question arises. One gathers from what one reads that the transition from "instinct-governed" life to one lived in an intelligently individuated manner by each individual is *not* a sudden jump. Faint indications of individual intelligence begin to be in evidence in a life that otherwise appears to be governed entirely by instinct.

If this is the case what are the implications? Does this mean that in the earlier stages of the evolution of Purusha in a specific personal mode, it only *gradually* passes out of a state of generalized and un-self-conscious awareness into one of consciousness of self felt in terms of an individuated vehicle? Is it, so far as whatever is identical in *all* its vehicles is concerned, still subsisting in a state of general awareness, and at the same time dawningly *self*-conscious as the Experiencer through each of its vehicles, so far as those display differences from each other? This is not possible. Emergent Personality, whether as yet "I"-conscious or othrwise, is a mode of Purusha awareness. As such it is essentially *one*. It cannot be one thing and another thing at the same time. Absence of the consciousness of self and the presence of it are impossible characteristics of a single mode of awareness because they are contradictory. A centre of personality may be characterized by one or the other, but *not* by both.

Though this is not the solution it does not seem to me that one should be hard to find. We must bear in mind that each of the new and faintly individuated centres or modes of Purusha personality is a *continuation*, so to speak, of the centre from which it derives. Each is not a *fraction* of the whole, consisting of a *part* of what the original Ⓐ mode personally was. We have not to do with a *material* process by which a body is broken up into a number of fragments. On the contrary, and adhering to the terms of our last diagram, each of the individuated modes experiencing through one or another of the organisms of the *N*

group is *a complete personal expression* of all that mode Ⓐ was up to the point where minute differentiations in the Buddhis of the various *N* forms produced lack of uniformity in the presentation of experience. Each of the new modes of Purusha awareness is thus an unbroken continuation of the Ⓐ mode. Each is whatever the Purusha was personally as Ⓐ with its evolution continued in a slightly different manner as the Experiencer of each slightly differing experience life. Each of these newly differentiated centres may therefore be considered as an evolution of the Ⓐ mode of Purusha awareness in a specific direction slightly differing from that of its evolution in any of the others. The fact that each of them is a minute modification of the Ⓐ mode would mean, of course, that they would be *almost* the same in their reactions to experience presented in terms of only faintly individuated vehicles.

It should also be remembered that though there would now be as many centres or modes of Purusha awareness as there are vehicles, the latter are all of them according to our hypothesis members of *one variety.* Their differences, in other words, are not of such a character or extent as to break the *varietal* unity, though sufficient to render the variety incapable of functioning as a *single vehicle* of Purusha experiencing. Except for slight deviations of a nature which does not affect the unity of the varietal type, the organisms are identical—their mental apparatus the same. Aside from minute differences they record experience in the same manner and register their reactions to various stimuli in the same way. In short, each completely embodies the life and 'instinctive' reactions of the *variety* in nearly the whole of its behaviour.

Broadly speaking, their behaviour—their method of coping with environment—has already been formed for them. It was evolved by the *varietal mind* subsisting unindividuated in the various identical representative forms, long before the emergence of the slight individuations with which we are dealing. It was formulated by, and is the expression of *the Buddhi of the variety* —identical throughout its numerically differentiated forms—long before *self*-consciousness had become possible for the Experiencer. It follows therefore that even after each of the organisms ceased to be absolutely identical, the typical life and behaviour

of the *variety* would still continue to express the reactions to environment of its constituent organisms as exactly as it had hitherto done, except as regards those minute points in which they had become individuated.

Up to the point where the Experiencer, identifying itself with the vehicle, first began to have a feeling of *self*, its share in the dual evolution may be thought of as an almost passive awareness of a generalized character. The vehicle—the variety—ruled supreme; its life and exigencies were the sole determining factors of the evolution. Purusha was, so to speak, the impersonal "Witness" (साक्षिन्) Only very gradually, as in its various experiencing modes it began to be aware in terms of selfhood, and to feel itself as "I, the doer", would it begin slowly to invade the domain of varietal behaviour, and colour the activities of its vehicles with its growing individuality.

To me this would explain the phenomenon of the life-activities of those varieties in which we find traces of individualism in a life otherwise quite uniform and ' instinct governed". The "I"-less routine evolved by the varietal Buddhi is gradually being invaded by the "I"—by Purusha increasingly conscious of itself as doer and experiencer.

Here many possibilities occur to me, some of which my mind fails to grasp clearly, others more tangible. One only needs to be noted. If all the individuated modes of Purusha awareness are differentiated continuations of a single one, resulting from a break up of the uniformity of its multi-formed vehicle at a specific juncture, it is obvious that their personal terms will have as a *common basis* all that the originating mode personally was as distinguished from other modes, at the time further personal differentiation took place within it. This would imply that, though all modes of Purusha personality derive ultimately from a common undifferentiated basis at the X of our diagram, there are various *aggregates* of such modes all the members of which derive from a common personal basis far this side of X.

In accordance with this theory the area of evolution lying between the X of our diagram and the Ahamkara Line at which an evolving centre or mode of Purusha personality becomes fully

conscious of its individuality in terms of "I", falls clearly into *two* zones.

In the lower zone, though there is *awareness*, and individuation of the terms of that awareness, it is not an awareness of *self* but only of the vehicle, which is invariably multi-formed. There is consequently in this zone no emergence of *self*-consciousness—of sense of "I"-ness. Evolution and differentiation are progressively taking place. New individuated modes of Purusha awareness are constantly emerging, yet—in the higher sense—Purusha-experiencing is impersonal. The zone might be described as that of differentiated but impersonal awareness. Here the vehicle rules supreme, and its nature and reactions determine the road. Being an "I"-less zone it is also a *loveless* one, though in its upper areas the sexual urge in the vehicle is laying the foundations of what will subsequently open the path to loving experience for the evolving Purusha.

It would appear that this zone may include even highly intelligent experience, though of an impersonal, non-ego-centric nature. The ordered and reasonable life of ants, bees, etc., suggests that the varietal Buddhi may evolve through its unindividuated representative forms a high degree of impersonal intelligence.

The *second* zone of Purusha experience would, in accordance with this theory, be entered upon with the break-up of the multi-formed vehicle For the *vehicle* it is the zone of progressively individuated intelligence ; for *Purusha* it is that of progressively individuated experience together with the rise and growth of consciousness of *self* identified by it with its vehicle. In this zone lies the dawn of *loving experience.* It extends up to experience in "human" terms, and very possibly includes the most primitive terms of the latter also.

Beyond these two zones—after the Ahamkara Line has been crossed—lies that zone, or those zones, with which this book primarily deals, and with regard to which we are not forced to depend upon pure theory. Here it is that Purusha, hitherto self-conscious but identifying itself with its vehicle, grows to consciousness of itself as "I" *apart* from its vehicle. Here Purusha, which hitherto in each individuated personal mode was conscious of itself as separate and independent of all other "I"s,

grows through ever deeper experience of love, toward consciousness of its essential multi-personal *oneness*. Here Purusha in all its personal modes finds progressively the fulfilment of its essential need and incompleteness in the timeless " I "—Paramatman—and the fullness of its conscious life in the realization of that timeless *oneness* which is Brahman.

This Appendix is in danger of growing into a book if not brought speedily to an end. I have, however, written sufficient to show that, far from it being essential for us to believe the number of centres of evolving personality vastly greater in the zones nearer to X, it is by no means impossible that the opposite is the case. It may well be that with the passing over of the personal life of the Purusha from experience in terms of multi-formed vehicles to that in terms of single ones, each the "chariot" of Purusha in a single one of its countless personal modes, the number of evolving centres tends to actual *increase*. At what juncture that passing over takes place we are not in a position to hazard an opinion.

I am equally unwilling to attempt any speculation upon the factors controlling the transition—"transmigration"—of Purusha, personal in a specific mode, from a 'lower' vehicle to a higher one. To do this one would have to have some idea of the nature of its consciousness-content in that mode and of the terms of its personality, together with some conception of the factors in its evolving personal life that would constitute potentiality for experience in terms of a higher vehicle. All this is vastly too far removed from the terms of 'human' experience to justify the formation even of a theory.

NOTE I.

Although this book was written in the winter of 1921-2, and revised, extended and completed during subsequent years, it is the product of thought and meditation covering a considerable period of my life.

In going over some old notes written in the days when I was a strong if not very orthodox Churchman (1910) I came across the following. It is of interest as the earliest record I can find of the thought which later developed into "Satyakama". In

so far as I can recollect, it was at about this period that life began to take on its present meaning to me.

"Our Lord Jesus Christ upon a certain occasion prayed that we, his disciples, might become one with each other as He was one with God the Father, thereby implying that the unity of spirit to which He was desirous we should attain, was to resemble the unity which existed between Him and His Father.

In other words He plainly implied that there lay open to men a relationship with each other which would, to a certain degree at least, approximate the relationship of the persons within the Godhead.

For this reason, if for no other, it cannot be thought profitless to seek a better understanding of those relations in the Trinity concerning which the Church has taught us that the existence of several distinct "Persons" in no wise interferes with the "Oneness", and that the "Oneness" in nowise tends to destroy the distinctness of the "persons".

And since we are men, and all our reasoning must be grounded upon human experience, it is fitting that when seeking to understand the nature of that Divine relationship we should start from the side of our own humanity, and strive to understand into what relation it would be possible for man to enter with his fellows when he and they had been perfected in all those Christian graces of which God has made us the heirs in Jesus Christ.

This line of thought···was suggested while reading one of S. Augustin's Homilies on S. John's Gospel. The saint had been discussing the nature of the Trinity, and called attention to the passage in Acts where it is reported that 'the multitude were of one heart and one soul'. 'They were', he says, 'by their love and fervour of spirit welded into one', and shortly after adds, 'If by approaching God, many souls by love become one soul, and many hearts one heart, what of the very fountain of love in the Father and Son?'

The 'Oneness' of heart and soul spoken of in Acts is, of course, a figure of speech, and could not be pressed in

attempting to explain the nature of the relationship existing within the Godhead. At the same time the thought which made S. Augustin use the passage in such a connection—i.e., that *love* drew the disciples together, and that the Godhead is 'the very fountain of Love'—opens the way for deep and practical speculation. .

We have been enjoined to love one another. In fact it is very clearly set down in the N.T. that we cannot learn to love God until we have learned to love our brother. That the disciples might 'love one another'—might become one'—seems to me to have been our Lord's great object, and the subject of His most constant prayer."

How little I dreamed as I penned these lines some twenty years ago where the thought they embody would ultimately lead me! Good S. Augustin would, I am sure, have been even more astonished.

NOTE II.

To find corroboration for one's thought in that of another who has arrived at a similar conclusion by different paths, is always inspiring. I received in the autumn 1928 the just published Life of a very old and valued friend—the late Charles H. Robinson, Canon of Ripon—and have felt impelled to quote the following passage from one of his letters that appears in it:

"Love is immortal, and I think anyone who learns to love becomes immortal: *probably anyone who is intensely loved by another becomes immortal* It seems to me that we are like square stones in a building. Naturally any one stone can be removed and replaced without injuring the building. But when any one hooks into another, as the stones in the Eddystone lighthouse hook into each other, so that you cannot pull a single stone out without pulling down the whole, then *he whose life has become inseparably united to the life of another must share with him immortality. If one whom we really loved perished, part of our own being would perish.* Of course this argument would apply with greater force to the effect produced by love to God, but St. John seems to regard love to man and love to God, as

so inseparably connected that the argument which may be deduced from love to God would hold good in regard to love to man···" (Chas. H Robinson, by Florence Robinson, S.P.G., London, 1928 p. 123.)
The italics are mine.

NOTE III.

The Seat of Memory.

Though experience is *by* the vehicle, and framed in terms of the Buddhi, etc., it is not present *to* the vehicle or the Buddhi but *to the Purusha* in its mode of "I".

I do not therefore hold that *memory* is of the vehicle. *Where* experience is present *there* it is retained or nowhere. The growth of the experience world of the self is in the consciousness of the self—in Purusha. As the power of Purusha in one of its modes of personality to retain what has been presented to it in terms of its vehicle grows, what we call "Memory" grows also. Its power to retain in consciousness what it has experienced *is* memory.

It might be objected that injury to the vehicle sometimes results in loss of memory, thereby suggesting that the power to remember is a power *of mind,* and dependent for its presence upon a properly functioning brain. Strike a man upon a certain part of his skull, or subject him to some great nervous shock, and memory goes.

While admitting that this happens, my reply would be that it does not prove the image of what has been experienced to be *in* the brain. Memory is the continued presence *in consciousness* of experience framed to consciousness—to the conscious Purusha —in terms of the vehicle.

If then it is in that which experiences as "I", and not in the vehicle, how is it that there is no memory upon injury to the vehicle?

The reason to me seems clear. Though the experience is the Purusha's—*not* the Buddhi's that framed it—it can only be given *form* by a vehicle. That is why I expressed belief in the book that the "I"—Purusha in personal mode—will never pass beyond the need of a vehicle. Memory is dependent upon the

intervention of that which will *formulate* what is present to consciousness. When a vehicle is injured in such a manner that it is no longer capable of functioning as a *formulator*, then what is present to consciousness remains unformulated. This does not mean that it has been 'lost to memory', though it has the same appearance to us as real *forgetting*. Forgetting is the lack of retention of an experience in the consciousness of the self; this other condition is not forgetting, but a temporary or permanent loss upon the part of the vehicle of its power to formulate what is present to consciousness.

It might be objected that sometimes the "loss of memory" of past events, resulting from an accident or illness or shock, does not render the vehicle incapable of functioning as formulator of other experience. That is true, and the fact that it may again suddenly become capable as formulator of experience "lost to memory" at the time of the shock or accident, merely shows that for a time it has been unfit to formulate it. It also shows that the "memory" was present all the time—somewhere. Where? I should say, where it has *always* been—present to Purusha—waiting for formulation till its vehicle could function to that end.

It comes to this, then: Experience is framed to the Self—to Purusha in a specific personal mode. It is framed *in terms of* the vehicle but not *to* the vehicle. It is present to the Self—*not* to the vehicle. If it continues present—is retained—it is *by the Self, not* by the vehicle.

But that which is present to the Self is present *in formulation* only through instrumentality of the vehicle. Without a vehicle there may be feeling but no formulation.

This means that Purusha in personal mode as consciously "I", *must* have a vehicle—a Buddhi—to give form to what it has experienced. But because what it has experienced is specific—and *its own*, not the vehicle's—it need not be formulated to it by the *same* vehicle as framed the experience to it at first. The formulation in terms of another and higher Buddhi would doubtless be another and higher formulation but it would be a formulation of that specific experience—of what that experience had been *to* the Self—and still was in the consciousness-content of the Self.

NOTE IV.

Thought Transference.

It is not meant to imply that ability to "read" the thoughts of another necessarily has its basis in loving intuition. Indeed we know this is not the case since "thought reading" is quite common without any accompaniment of love. The fact that it is possible assumes significance for this philosophy only when the ability to so enter into the thought of another "I" is associated with loving experience.

The power to share not only the thought but also the emotions of others is manifestly present even at far lower levels of experiencing ; what one feels is that the urge toward the perfect mutuality for which love yearns would furnish the dynamic for its far greater perfection and extension, so that it might prove ultimately the most vital factor in the achievement of the Purusha's multi personal self-realization. I do not mean by this that the vehicle which frames experience to the "I" in 'human' terms will develop such extended power, but that as Purusha in personal mode attains to progressively higher levels of experience this factor must assume ever greater importance in the evolution of its love for Purusha in other personal modes, and that the vehicles of its higher experience may be expected to develop and extend its power to enter ever more intimately into the thought and feeling of the object of its love.

How this "entering into" the emotional and thought-life of other "I"s takes place at the present stage of our experience is a question for which psychologists may have an answer. So far as the participation of the vehicle is concerned some light might be thrown by a further study of the implications of the 'varietal Buddhi' with which the appendix especially deals.

May it not be that, just as in stringed musical instruments in close proximity, the striking of a chord upon one will result in a vibration of the same chord in the rest, so in closely associated vehicles which are varietally one there will be an inter-vehicular "vibration", so to speak, when a chord is struck on one of them ?

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